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This thesis comprises three comparative case studies of advance directives under
existing legislative arrangements in the Netherlands, Scotland and England. In the
Netherlands, an Act of Parliament gives statutory backing to advance directives. In
Scotland, the principles of the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 instructs
persons who take any intervention under the Act to have regard to a person's
previously expressed wishes. Whereas, in England, no current statute governs
medical decision-making and practitioners look to the common law for legal
guidance. The research seeks to elucidate attitudes to advance directives within the
medical and legal professions in each country and to determine how much impact (if
any) they have on treatment decision-making for incapacitated persons. It focuses on
the process of medical decision-making for patients with and without capacity, and
the ways in which medical and legal professionals assess the adequacy of existing
arrangements. The primary goals of the thesis are to understand whether, and if so
how, advance directives contribute to patient autonomy, the extent to which legal
regulation controls medical decision-making, and the effects of advance directives on
the balance of power between doctors and patients. Two models of decision-making
('substituted judgement' and 'best interests') and how doctors use them to make
decisions for persons without capacity are considered.
Arguments in favour of advance directives are usually based on the principle of
respect for individual autonomy, and the belief that anticipatory decision-making
provides a mechanism for preserving patients' autonomy when they are no longer
capable of expressing their own preferences. The idea of using anticipatory decision¬
making as a method of extending individual autonomy into the future has been
welcomed by the majority ofmedical and legal professionals. However, a significant
minority express serious doubts about the efficacy of advance directives in
preserving the autonomy of the patient, especially when this conflicts with the
doctor's professional autonomy and the exercise of the doctor's professional power.
They may erode the ultimate decision-making power of the doctor and exacerbate the
conflict between individual and professional autonomy. Professional autonomy stems
not only from the doctors' knowledge and expertise but also from their position as
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gatekeepers for goods and services; it is protected by the medical profession's right
to self-regulation which enables doctors to define both the needs of patients and how
these needs should be met.
The study uses a socio-legal approach based on fieldwork in the Netherlands,
Scotland and England to study this important issue in medical law. Qualitative
interviews were conducted with 10 lawyers and 10 doctors in each country and
interview data were analysed using NVIVO. The data were used to study advance
directives in relation to medical decision-making, individual and professional
autonomy and the balance of power between doctor and patient. The main findings
are that, in all three countries, advance directives can be significant in protecting
patient autonomy and can be used to strengthen the patient's substituted judgement.
Statutory regulation of advance directives (in the Netherlands) does not appear to
protect patients' autonomy any more than the common law (in Scotland and
England); in fact the common law seems to be marginally better at ensuring
incapacitated patients' rights to their own choices. Differences in legal regulation of
advance directives in each country have made little difference to the inequality of
power between doctor and patient but legislation is being used to initiate a reduction
of that inequality in the Netherlands, where statutory regulation can strengthen the
patient's substituted judgement and emphasise or enhance decisions made by a
patient's representative. Power in both England and in Scotland is still heavily
weighted on the side of the physician but, in England, advance directives can help
relationships between doctor and patient where the act of writing an advance
directive encourages patients to open a dialogue with their doctors and promote
discussion of future treatment preferences. In Scotland, however, there has been little
change in the doctor-patient relationship - it is still believed that 'doctor knows best'
and prevailing opinion suggests that advance directives are not be legally binding on
doctors.
The thesis makes a significant contribution to understanding the operation of advance
directives and their impact on medical decision-making. By investigating medical
decision making in three different jurisdictions, it shows that a patient's personal
autonomy is tolerated rather than celebrated by those in possession of professional
autonomy and power, regardless of the nature of the legal rules involved.
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Chapter One Introduction to the Thesis
Introduction
This introductory chapter covers several areas. Firstly, there is a brief historical
account and definition of advance directives; secondly, a broad outline of what this
research is about and what it hopes to achieve. Next, the existing legislative
arrangements for advance directives in the three countries - the Netherlands,
Scotland, and England - are explained. As this study is based in Europe, there is also
a brief account of the European perspective where it is useful to this thesis. The final
part of the chapter discusses advance directives and their place in the current debate
on euthanasia. This is necessary because, while this research is not concerned with
euthanasia per se, it would be wrong to ignore this important issue in the discussion
of advance directives
Advance Directives - The Background
New York State Judge Benjamin Cardozo held in 1914 that 'every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without the patient's consent
commits an assault' (Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospitals 211 NY 125;
105 NE 92 (NY, 1914). This is the basis for medical consent to treatment issues
within most of the Western world and it follows that, while a patient cannot validly
consent to treatment designed to kill him or her, any competent adult can refuse
consent to any form of medical treatment regardless of the consequences (Re T
[1992] 4 All ER 649). This legal recognition of the principle of autonomy and the
consequent right of self-determination is further illustrated in the rulings of two
leading appeal cases.
The House of Lords in Bland established that:
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... the principle of self-determination requires that respect must be given to
the wishes of the patient, so that if an adult of sound mind refuses, however
unreasonably, to consent to treatment or care by which his life would or
might be prolonged, the doctors responsible for his care must give effect to
his wishes, even though they do not consider it to be in his best interests to do
so ... [t]o this extent, the principle of the sanctity of human life must yield to
the principle of self-determination ...{Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] 1
All ER 821 per Lord Goff ofChievely at 864)
Similarly the Court of Session in Scotland:
Where the patient is of full age and capable of understanding and consenting
to the procedures which on medical advice are for his or her benefit, or
decides to refuse treatment, the right of self-determination provides the
solution to all problems, at least so far as the court is concerned. It is not in
doubt that a medical practitioner who acts or omits to act with the consent of
his patient requires no sanction or other authority from the court. The
patient's consent renders lawful that which would otherwise be unlawful
{Law Hospital v. Lord Advocate 1996 SLT 848 per Lord President Hope at
852F).
Problems arise when the person no longer has the capacity to give his or her consent
to or refusal of medical treatment. In 1969, a Chicago lawyer, Luis Kutner, invented
the living will, a document that, when 'adjudicated by a court and buttressed by
medical and lay testimony and evidence, can create the affirmative inaction
termination of a patient's life' (Kutner, 1969: 554). It is a means by which individuals
can provide, in advance, evidence to rebut the presumption that life-prolonging
treatment can be given to them when they are unable to decide for themselves
(Sommerville, 1996a: 32). In 1976, Karen Quinlan, a patient diagnosed as being in a
persistent vegetative state, inspired the first state law granting legal status to living
wills in America (California Natural Death Act 1976). Subsequently, most states
have passed legislation that allows patients to die "naturally". In Britain we do not
have any such legislation; The Medical Treatment (Advance Directives) Bill was
introduced by Lord Allen in 1992, and would have given advance directives legal
status, albeit with certain qualifications, but it was unsuccessful.
The generic term "advance statement" encompasses a variety of forms of prospective
decision-making and can be known as an advance directive, advance refusal or living
will. They all have one thing in common - they allow the declarant to make his or her
wishes known in relation to any medical treatment in case of his or her incapacity to
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give instructions (Hanafin, 1997: 80). They can declare the circumstances in which
any life-sustaining treatment may be stopped (Brazier, 1992: 457), and give
instructions regarding the patient's values and goals and choice of treatment (Post,
1999: 37). Often formal, written documents, they would probably be admissible as
valid evidence in any subsequent decisions of the patient's "best interests".
The person making the directive may specify the treatment he or she does or does not
want under certain conditions. This is often referred to as a "treatment directive" and
may have either positive or negative characteristics. A negative directive would
specify those treatments the person would not wish to receive in specified
circumstances. A positive directive, on the other hand, would give instructions to
healthcare providers regarding life-prolonging treatment (resuscitation) or life-
shortening treatment (euthanasia) that the person wished to be given in specified
conditions. Since futile treatment is unlikely to be given, 'the legal significance of
positive directives is therefore very limited in nearly all jurisdictions' (Vezzoni,
2001: 72). The only country, which gives legal status to positive treatment directives,
is the Netherlands. The recent law legalising euthanasia1, under certain conditions,
permits a person to ask for euthanasia in an advance directive.
In some jurisdictions, the law recognising advance directives, requires that medical
practitioners must follow a valid directive; these so-called 'rules' can form the basis
of binding directives. Licensing directives have accompanying 'may rules' which
allow practitioners to follow patients' wishes set out in advance directives. This legal
recognition affords protection to medical practitioners against possible civil or penal
sanctions when the death of patient results from following an advance directive
(ibid.). In the three countries in this study (Scotland, England and the Netherlands)
the legal status of advance directives is strong. The legal rules designed to protect the
patient's autonomy in situations of incapacity are generally binding on doctors. All
have some degree of 'must rules' accorded to advance directives with varying
degrees of limitations varying from a small number in the Netherlands to an middling
amount in Scotland and England, meaning that the instructions in valid treatment
directives must be respected (ibid.).
1 The Termination of Life on Request Act 2001
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A proxy directive differs from a living will or advance directive. It does not set down
specifics in relation to medical treatment, but rather it allows the person to appoint
someone else to make these decisions on his or her behalf in the event of incapacity.
If there is a living will formalised in written form, the drafter may name a proxy2 to
make these healthcare decisions (Hanafin, 1997: 80). In these circumstances, the two
directives can be complementary.
An advance directive can be 'a written document, a witnessed oral statement, a
signed printed card, a smart card or a note of a discussion recorded in the patient's
file (BMA, 1995a: 4). Directives need not be written to be valid: the individual may
have discussed his or her wishes with a doctor, nurse or close relative before
becoming unable to express his or her wishes personally. If this has been recorded in
the patient's case notes, 'this will have the same status as a written advance directive'
(1999: 15).
Oral statements to family members, friends, and health care professionals are the
most common form of advance directive. However, oral statements are problematic
if they are vague and ambiguous or if they were casual comments rather than
seriously-intended directives. When an advance directive results from a conversation
between two people it is not possible for a doctor to know whether the conversation
between them was the only conversation the relevant individual had on that subject.
There could have been others in which that individual might have expressed different
opinions about whether he or she would or would not wish to receive certain
treatment. Often people do not know what medical advice and assistance might be
available to them in a given set of circumstances and unless the decision has been
discussed with a doctor who has some knowledge of the individual's circumstances,
the individual will not know whether the decision is in his or her best interests
(House of Commons Standing Committee A, 2003: Column Number: 208). This
2 The term 'proxy' refers to any person who has authority to act on another's behalf. It is probably
best known in relation to voting by proxy - the authorisation that a member of the electorate can give
to another to exercise his/her vote in his/her absence.
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may have implications for the status of oral advance statements in relation to the
requirement of informed consent. The BMA guidelines state that
A conscious, mentally competent adult cannot be given treatment without his
or her valid consent. Consent may not be valid if insufficient relevant
information is given. It is illegal and unethical to treat an adult who is capable
of understanding and willing to know, unless the nature of the procedure, its
purpose and implications have been explained and that person's agreement
obtained (BMA, 1999: para 4.1.1).
In the UK, the BMA states that, although oral statements are equally valid if
supported by appropriate evidence, there are advantages to recording general views
and firm decisions in writing. Advance statements are aids to, rather than substitutes
for, open dialogue between patients and health professionals. Opportunistic or casual
remarks by a healthy person that reflect distaste for life-prolonging treatment in the
hypothetical event of incapacity are unlikely to meet the evidential requirements
necessary to establish that it was an informed and considered decision. A general
expression of views cannot be accorded the same weight as a firm and well-informed
decision. However, if oral remarks are representative of consistently-held values,
they can contribute to an evaluation of the patient's interests; if witnessed and made
by an informed individual, they can carry legal weight {ibid, para 6.1).
Oral advance directives (verbal directives) can be allowed if there is clear and
convincing evidence that they represent the patient's wishes. This can include
evidence that the patient made the statement consistently and seriously over time,
that it specifically addresses the actual condition of the patient, and is consistent with
values that apply to other areas of the patient's life (Ramsay and Mitty, 2003).
National Health Service policy guidelines for hospitals in England state that, where a
patient has made an oral advance directive, there must be very clear evidence in
existence which satisfies the consultant that the advance directive made orally is
valid and can be acted upon. The policy states:
Some patients choose to express their wishes in a written document (an
advance directive or "living will") but it is not necessary for the refusal to be
in writing in order to be valid. However, under these circumstances it would
be wise to have the patient's verbal instructions witnessed and confirmed in
writing (Nolan 2004: para 3.4).
5
According to some medical practitioners, the effects of an advance refusal are much
more serious than provisions in most testamentary wills, and for such a document to
be legally enforceable, it should be properly signed and witnessed at least to the same
standard of proof as a will. One, at least, of the witnesses should be required to
certify to the capacity of the testator at the time of signing. Some practitioners find
oral advance statements ethically unsound (Guild of Catholic Doctors, 1999) and
therefore conclude that they should not be legally binding:
Oral advance directives, as opposed to contemporaneous decisions, given the
circumstances in which they might be made and the risk ofmisrepresentation,
should only be acceptable as a general indication of the patient's wishes, and
not legally binding (Law Commission, Part V, 5.22).
There are no specific legal requirements concerning the format of advance statements
in any of the jurisdictions studied. The minimum requirements for the statement to be
legally valid concern only the individual's competence, awareness of the
implications of the decision and the relevance of the decision to the circumstances
which arise. The BMA believes that some people have a false impression that a
written, witnessed statement carries more weight than their contemporaneous oral
consent or refusal and so make statements for the wrong reasons. It follows that,
'health professionals must be aware of this and make all reasonable efforts to prevent
such misunderstanding' (BMA, 1999: para 6.2).
Aims of the Research
My MSc dissertation (Anderson, 2000) involved an examination of the reasons
behind the decisions not give advance directives legislative status by drawing on
Lukes' (1974) one and two-dimensional views of power. In an analysis of English
and Scottish documents, 1 sought to demonstrate how ideas have developed and
changed in the process of consultation. I also conducted interviews with the Scottish
Law Commission, the Scottish Executive, lobbyists, and religious groups, some of
whom were opposed to and others were in favour of legislation. Due to constraints of
time it was not possible to conduct interviews in both countries. I therefore adopted a
two-tiered approach involving documentary analysis in England and Scotland and
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interviews in Scotland only. This research builds upon my MSc dissertation and
seeks to discover the attitudes to advance directives within the legal and medical
professions under current legislative arrangements, and how much influence (if any)
advance directives have in decision-making related to treatment for incapacitated
persons.
Discussion of living wills focuses on the moral principle of respect for autonomy.
Vernon (1996) acknowledges that medical treatment often occurs without moral
difficulty and 'doctors usually take clinical decision making for granted' {ibid. 604).
He sees anticipatory decisions as providing a mechanism for preserving patients'
autonomy when they are incapable of making their own judgments and believes that
the 'living will, when properly drawn up and executed, is perhaps the best device
available to ensure respect for prior autonomy' {ibid. 605). Advance directives have
raised serious questions of autonomy in the medical, nursing and medico-legal fields
and the notion of using anticipatory decision-making as a method of extending
personal autonomy into the future has been welcomed by the majority of healthcare
and legal professions. However, a significant minority has serious doubts as to the
efficacy of the advance directive in preserving individual autonomy, especially
where this may conflict with the doctor's professional autonomy and inherent
professional power.
My interest in this subject has its foundations in my nursing career. I encountered
many patients and families who felt disempowered by their lack of knowledge and
their ability to assert their wishes and I became interested in ways in which persons
could retain some personal autonomy. Much decision-making concerning treatment
for persons who have lost the capacity to give or refuse consent takes place without
any clear understanding of those persons' wishes, and a statement made by the
patient setting out what he or she would wish to consent to may be a way of
preserving the patient's autonomy. However, following a document that sets out
these wishes may erode the ultimate decision-making power of the physician and this
may entail conflict between professional and individual autonomy. My earlier
research provided an insight into the policy process involved in decision-making for
incapacitated adults, and as such provides a useful background to this research which
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focuses on the decision-makers themselves, i.e. on medical practitioners, patient, and
their legal representatives; and exploring the process of decision-making concerning
medical treatment for patients without capacity, how advance directives may be
involved in this decision-making process and the ways in which those most involved
assess the adequacy of the present legal arrangements.
This research aims to answer the following questions:
1. How is medical decision-making carried out, and how does this relate to
statute or common law provisions in the three jurisdictions?
2. What are the processes of treatment decision-making for incapax patients and
how are they related to doctors' professional autonomy?
3. How do doctors and lawyers view the current legal status of advance
directives in each of the jurisdictions?
4. Do doctors consider advance directives when making treatment decisions for
incapax patients?
5. How do advance directives affect professional and patient autonomy and the
balance of power between doctor and patient?
In order to accomplish these objectives research was carried out in three locations:
The Netherlands, Scotland, and England. In the Netherlands legislation may give a
statutory basis to advance directives. In Scotland recent legislation (The Adults with
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000) has deliberately avoided giving advance directives a
statutory basis, but section 1(1 )(a) of the Act implies some sort of legislative
standing for advance directives. In England legality of advance statements is based
on common law but the newly formed Department of Constitutional Affairs has
published the Mental Capacity Bill which contains proposals to establish a legislative
basis for advance statements3. These differing circumstances provide an ideal basis
for comparison and the legal conditions in England and Wales and the Netherlands
highlight the ambiguity of the nature of the Scottish legal situation. The legislative
arrangements in each of the three jurisdictions investigated are detailed below, but a
representation of their relationship can be explained in basic terms as a continuum,
drawing attention to the lesser protection of the law in Scotland.
3 Published 26 June 2003
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Legislative Arrangements and Advance Care Planning
Statute
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If social reality is whatever people believe it to be, the task of (social) science
research is to describe people's perception of reality. This being the case, the
interpretive paradigm, and thus valid knowledge, involves the researcher being able
to accurately and plausibly document people's experiences, beliefs, meanings and so
forth. Proof of valid knowledge, or epistemology, therefore, is based upon a
researcher's ability to experience the world as others experience it and is usually -
but not exclusively - gained by a researcher experiencing the world from the
viewpoint of the people being researched. My experience within both the medical
and legal fields is significant in this requirement of research.
This research employs a comparative case study strategy and seeks to develop an in-
depth analysis of three cases using multiple sources - documents, case law, statutes,
interviews, and personal narratives. The cases studied are the different legal
jurisdictions examined, and the interviewees within each of the cases make up the
data sources. Answers to my research questions are to be found in discussions with
the appropriate persons within their professional roles; therefore, the information
required will be best found through qualitative research methods within an
interpretive perspective. The unique strengths of this method are situated in the
context and setting of both the interviews and decision-making process; and facilitate
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the 'search for a deeper understanding of how decisions [are] made by participants
and their lived experiences of the phenomenon' (Marshall and Rossman, 1995: 39).
By using in-depth interviewing, rich and varied data can be gathered (Bulmer, 1986)
and questions about behaviour, what people think and feel, about beliefs and
attitudes are some of the most beneficial uses of face-to-face interviews. The
question 'what is the nature of reality' (Creswell, 1994: 5) will be answered through
use of quotes and themes in the words of the participants, providing evidence of the
differing perspectives concerned in this phenomenon. The research methodology
employed in this research will be discussed in greater depth in chapter four.
Current Legal Situation
The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, the Law on Contracts for Medical Treatment (WGBO) 1995
introduced Part 5 (Medical Treatment Contracts), Articles 446-68 into the Civil
Code; Article 450(3) concerns treatment directives and gives advance refusals of
medical treatment legal force. The Dutch situation is almost unique in Europe, with
only Belgium having somewhat analogous legislation, in that patients' rights are
guaranteed by the legislature and regulated by contract law in the Civil Code.
Professor Jaap Rang first set out the aims of the patients' rights movement in 1973 in
his inaugural lecture at Leiden University. This led the Dutch Government to ponder
the question on how to implement these rights and two possibilities were suggested:
the first was to leave it to the medical profession; the other was to introduce
legislation. The former suggestion was rejected as legislation seemed more
appropriate and the Government opted to use the civil law based on contractual
obligations rather than the law of negligence.
The Act has certain advantages and disadvantages. Most authors agree that contract
law is advantageous to all parties concerned but more heavily weighted on the side of
the patient. Contract law is based on self-determination which is considered to be of
fundamental importance in the relationship between doctor and patient. It is also
based on party autonomy, the natural habitat of patients' rights, especially the right to
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information, consent, and access to medical records. Use of contract law follows a
tradition in continental Europe. The French, for instance, have always looked upon
the relationship between doctor and patient as a contract and this tradition also exists
in the Netherlands. It is a reciprocal contract agreement; but the emphasis is on
strengthening the position of the patient. Strengthening of the position of the weaker
partner in a civil contract (by specifying the contents of that contract) is in line with
tradition Dutch law relating to, for example, workers and tenants (Merkenstein,
1995: 34).
The Act applies to the activities of doctors in relation to their patients and also to all
contracts in which a healthcare provider undertakes to provide medical treatment.
The healthcare provider can be either a natural or legal person e.g. a hospital; and
this implies that a patient may have two contracts: one with the doctor for
examination and treatment, and one with the hospital for nursing and care. This does
not interfere with the relationship between doctor and patient. Medical treatment
includes treatment by dentists, midwives and nursing staff; pharmacists are excluded.
The general principle underlying this law is that any medical treatment requires the
informed consent of the patient. Doctors are now obliged to inform the patient
clearly, and if necessary, in writing, about the proposed examination and treatment.
In this respect Dutch law is now moving in the direction of German law, which
developed the right of informed consent earlier (Nadorp-van der Borg, 1995: 1-13).
But the right to be informed is not unlimited, Article 448 provides for a therapeutical
exception, and under Article 449 the patient also has the right not to be informed.
In the case of incompetent patients the Act assigns the authority to consent to
treatment to others. Their parents represent incompetent minors and Article 465
appoints the spouse or partner as proxy for incompetent adults. In their absence,
other family members will be appointed. Many authors have expressed an aversion to
family members acting as proxies (Leenan, 1988: 178-81; Gevers, 1987: 2094; van
Veen, 1993: 6-10), but this will only be a problem if the patient has not made a
treatment directive or appointed his or her own proxy. The proxy can take all
decisions on the health care of the patient, but the Act provides that the healthcare
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provider does not have to comply with the proxy's decisions insofar as they are
incompatible with the level of care which a conscientious healthcare provider has to
offer (Article 465(4)).
If the patient is no longer competent, refusal of consent can be found in a treatment
directive or levenstestament (living will) written while the patient was still
competent. Such a directive must be dated and signed, and the refusal has to be made
in writing while the patient is still competent; there are no other formal requirements.
The Act places a statutory duty on physicians to follow the patient's written
instructions.
If a patient aged sixteen or over cannot be deemed capable of reasonably
assessing his interests in the matter, the care provider and a person as referred
to in paragraphs 2 or 3 of article 465 shall comply with the apparent opinion
of the patient expressed in writing while he was still capable of the said
reasonable assessment of his interests and containing a refusal to grant
consent as referred to in the first paragraph. The care provider may deviate
from this if he deems that there are well-founded reasons for so doing (Article
450(3)).
The age limitation for informed consent also applies in the case of the treatment
directive: patients aged 16 years or older can give consent to (or refuse) treatment
and patients between 12 and 16 years are presumed competent to make medical
decisions, unless the contrary is shown. For minors under 16, the legal
representatives (usually the parents) should be consulted, even if their consent is not
required.
It took a lot of parliamentary pressure to get provisions for the legal status of advance
statements into the WGBO. The amendment was made at the last moment, the main
issue of the discussion being the value that can and should be attached to statements
written in advance. The present provision is a compromise with very limited scope
(Merkenstein, 1995: 37). The Dutch Parliament decided to enact legislation on this
rather than leave it to self-regulation, i.e. to codes of conduct, professional guidelines
drawn up by the medical profession, because the view was, that in the final analysis,
legislation provides a right to self-determination in a way that self-regulation does
not. While it is accepted that specific cases cannot be solved in advance by passing a
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law, what can be done is to lay down general guidelines that create certain rules for
healthcare providers and patients.
The treatment directive binds all care providers: if an incompetent person of sixteen
years or older has in written form, clearly expressed opinions that contain a refusal of
medical treatment, then the physician must follow these instructions. The law only
allows deviation from it if 'there are good reasons to do so' (Article 450). The
formulation is vague, but it is generally interpreted to refer to a well-founded doubt
about the applicability of the directive to the current situation, or about the
competence of the author at the time of writing the treatment directive. A common
reason given for disregarding a treatment directive is that the request expressed no
longer reflects the real wishes of the patient. To neutralise this argument, the Dutch
Society for Voluntary Euthanasia (NVVE) suggests adding to any treatment directive
a statement that the patient accepts this risk.
The Act provides for the patient to appoint a proxy who will take all decisions about
the health care of the incompetent patient. This appointment must be made in writing
while the person is still competent and above the age ofmajority (18 years) (Article
465(3)). The rights of the patient regarding medical treatment are transferred to the
proxy, subject to some limitations. The proxy should behave as a 'good
representative', trying to involve the patient as much as possible in the decisions,
which should reflect the patient's wishes. When these are not clear, the proxy should
decide on the basis of the best interests of the patient. If these requirements are not
fulfilled, a care provider can refuse to comply with the decisions of the representative
(Article 465(4)). The autonomy of the incompetent patient is further protected by the
provision that, despite the consent to the proxy, a treatment cannot be performed if
the patient strongly resists it. The only exception is if the treatment is necessary to
prevent serious harm to the patients' health.
The patient cannot ask for euthanasia in the treatment directive, a separate document
is required, and the doctor will not be allowed to perform euthanasia if the legal
requirements are not met (Sutorius & Jansen, 1991: 994). It is generally accepted that
a proxy cannot ask for euthanasia, unless there has been a clear request, in writing,
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from the patient (Leenan, 1987: 2095). The Royal Dutch Medical Association
(KNMG) has pointed out that it is important that such a written statement, in which
the patient specifies his or her request for euthanasia, does not and should not imply
a duty for the doctor to perform euthanasia. They state that 'such advance directives
will always remain imperfect instruments to state patients' wishes ... [and] ... find it
important that such documents have a high quality ... and should be updated on a
regular basis' (Markenstein, 2001).
As the WGBO is a matter of contract law, sanctions for infringements are civil
(prospective and respective). However, a serious violation of the requirement of
informed consent could give rise to penal or disciplinary sanctions, although Dutch
courts see very few cases of this type (civil or criminal). Procedures are more likely
to be heard in the Medical Disciplinary Tribunal (a legally established, public
tribunal) but litigation (except for medical malpractice) against doctors and other
healthcare providers is rarely practised in the Netherlands.
Scotland
The literature implies that advance directives may be legally binding in some
fashion. Barr et al, (1994) devote seven pages to living wills and include a sample of
a living will. It consists of two sections: Section A, an advance medical directive and
section B, a "values history" statement. Within Section A there is the note 'this
section may be legally binding' (ibid. 97). Lack of clarity surrounding the legality of
advance directives may lead to vague statements of legality, such as this, leaving
both healthcare professionals and the public unsure of the true legal status of advance
directives.
In Scotland, prior to the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, the tutor-
dative4 may have been able to make treatment decisions on behalf of adults who lack
decision-making capacity. Section 80 of the 2000 Act states that there will be no new
appointments of tutors and Schedule 4 lays out the situation for tutors who were
4 A proxy decision-maker appointed by the Court of Session or the SheriffCourt with personal welfare
powers only.
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appointed before the Act came into force. Nevertheless, the validity of a treatment
refusal5 has never been tested in the Scottish Courts. Such legal uncertainty was one
of the reasons why the Scottish Law Commission included advance directives in The
Report on Incapable Adults (SLC, 1995: para 5.41 ff.). The Commission
recommended in Part 5 (medical matters) that doctors and other health care
professionals should have a general statutory authority to treat incapable adults.
However, decisions about consenting to future medical treatment were considered
within the area of advance statements, which the Commission recommended to be
put on a firm legal basis. The main reasons for the recommendation were:
• Legislation may clarify the position of doctors and would make it clear that a
doctor who acts in good faith and with reasonable care, in accordance with an
advance directive that he or she believes to be valid, should not be exposed to
liability even if the directive is subsequently shown to be invalid.
• Advance statements are already recognised at common law in England and it
is possible that the situation in Scotland is probably the same, but at present,
the courts' role is limited to making declarations that a particular course of
action is or is not lawful.
The Commission did not ignore the problems involved in taking this course of action
and suggested that the main problems fell into three broad areas:
Firstly, there are dangers in relying on oral refusals:
• The doctor may not remember the precise terms of the refusal at the time
when the treatment is being made;
• The oral statement may have been made to a person other than the treating
doctor because of duty rotas, etc;
• Without some form of writing, even in the patients' case notes, it would be
difficult to ensure that the treating doctors were aware of the terms of the oral
advance refusal.
5
A patient cannot force a doctor to carry out treatment that is futile or unnecessary, but if the patient
has capacity, he or she can refuse treatment regardless of the consequences of this refusal.
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As a result of this, does an advance refusal have to be in writing and if so do any
special formalities have to be observed?
• Undue formality and insistence on writing may deny effect to the wishes of
the patient;
• Problems of construction may arise if a refusal referred to specified
treatments for a particular condition but due to advances in medicine the
doctors were proposing to use a different treatment.
Thirdly, there may be problems in following the directive:
• An advance refusal of treatment may involve a clash between the doctor's
duty of care and the patient's own wishes;
• Some doctors tend to treat even if the treatment is futile for fear of being sued
for negligence, or may have a conscientious objection to withholding life
saving treatment;
• Undue influence by others might encourage the making of an advance refusal
against their own will.
With these difficulties in mind, the Commission made the following
recommendation:
Recommendation 68
(1) Legislation should be introduced making it clear that, subject to certain
exceptions dealt with in later recommendations, a valid refusal made by a
competent patient of treatment that may be offered in the future when he or
she is not mentally capable should have the effect that doctors have no
authority to give the treatment in question.
(2) Doctors should not be liable for withholding treatment in accordance with a
refusal which they reasonably believe was validly made and is applicable in
the circumstances, or for giving treatment contrary to the terms of a refusal
that they reasonably believe is neither valid nor applicable.
(3) A refusal should be effective whether it is in writing or oral. A written refusal
should have to be signed by the patient but should not have to be witnessed or
made in any particular form.
The recommendations were clarified by the following caveats:
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• An advance refusal should have to apply to the treatment in question and to
the circumstances in which the patient finds himself or herself before it is
regarded as having binding effect.
• Drafting in more general terms could avoid problems regarding specific
treatments and advances in medicine.
• The act of writing down an advance refusal focuses the patient's mind and
helps the patient to set out the terms of the refusal in a more precise way.
• A clear and explicit refusal orally to a doctor in the presence of others should
entitle legal effect to be given to such a refusal.
• Encouragement should be given to make the advance refusal in writing,
simplified by a printed form in which blanks could be filled or boxes ticked.
• The Commission rejects the notion that doctors should regard advance
refusals as advisory and simply take them into account in making treatment
decisions as this gives too little weight to the principle of patient autonomy.
• The general authority of doctors to treat should not apply in the face of an
advance refusal and therefore it follows that a doctor should be protected
from any criminal, civil or disciplinary liability if he or she withheld
treatment in accordance with an advance refusal.
• The assumption should be that the refusal was validly made by a patient with
capacity to do so. Capacity is presumed so that the onus would be on those
seeking to deny effect to the refusal to rebut the presumption.
• Undue influence on the patient should be an invalidating factor.
Following the Scottish Law Commission Report, the Scottish Office issued a
Consultation Paper in 1997, requesting responses to the Commission's
recommendations (Scottish Office, 1997). All the recommendations were accepted
by the Scottish Office and set out in sections 6.25 to 6.32. The Consultation Paper
specifically notes that 'respect for patient autonomy demands that an advance refusal
of treatment made when capable, should survive any subsequent loss of capacity'
(ibid. 1997: par. 6.27, p6). This concurs with the concept of autonomy stated in the
English Law Commission's Papers.
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Between the issue of the Consultation Paper and the collation of responses, the
Scottish Parliament was created and it became evident that the Adults with
Incapacity Bill would be its first major piece of legislation. The Justice Department
supervised the Bill with input from the Health Department. As Part V was the most
controversial area, the problem was how to make the contents and wording
acceptable to the public. In response to questions regarding legalising advance
statements there were 127 written responses with 72 against legislation, 31 in favour
of legislation, and 24 that made no comment.
The strength of feeling by those who were opposed to legislation and the ambivalent
reaction of proponents, combined with political considerations in such a high profile
Bill, led the Executive to make the decision that would minimise conflict in the first
year of the Scottish Parliament, i.e. to drop the issue of advance statements from the
Bill. The issue did not disappear however, as advance statements had a re-assessment
by the Millan Committee in the review ofmental health legislation.
The Millan Committee was set up in 1999, to review the Mental Health (Scotland)
Act 1984. It has published two major Consultation Papers, the first in April 1999 and
the second in April 2000 (Millan Committee, 1999 & 2000), both Papers addressed
the question of advance directives. The first consultation asked the following
questions:
16.9 What are your views on the proposals in relation to advance refusals of
treatment (Recommendations 68-74, SLC)?
16.10 What status (if any) should advance statements, or the views of
guardians or welfare attorneys, have in relation to treatment carried out on a
compulsory basis under mental health law?
In the second Consultation the Committee asked:
7.12 Do you think that advance directives should be binding unless the risks
of a refusal would put the patient's life in danger or put others at risk? Or are
there any other circumstances which would lead to them not being binding?
7.13 Alternatively, do you think advance directives should have no legislative
status except for an expectation that they will be considered?
18
7.14 Or do you think advance directives should operate in some other
fashion?
Again the views returned were polarised with extremes on both sides. Inevitably the
decision of the review committee was to once more drop any explicit reference to
advance statements in mental health legislation. In addition, while the Executive also
withdrew explicit reference to advance statements from the Adults with Incapacity
Bill; many organisations believed the general principles of the Bill (and now the Act)
referred to advance statements in an implicit sense.
The Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 sets out the principles to be followed
in interventions under the Act rather than a general test of what is in the best interests
of the adult. Subsection (4) refers specifically to the adult's wishes. Subsection (4)(a)
emphasises the importance of considering the adult's views, both those known to
have been expressed in the past and their current views, regardless of their capacity
(Explanatory Notes to the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, 2000: 1).
Within the general principles and fundamental definitions of the Act, section one
states,
(4) In determining if an intervention is to be made and, if so, what
intervention is to be made, account shall be taken of-
(a) the present and past wishes and feelings of the adult so far as they
can be ascertained by any means of communication, whether human
or by mechanical aid (whether of an interpretative nature or
otherwise) appropriate to the adult;
The Act makes no reference to the "best interests" test, a concept that was developed
in the context of the law on children. It is a general term and is considered more
protective than is suitable for adults, as it would not give particular weight to the
individual's own views, including those expressed previously while they had the
capacity to do so. Laurie and Mason (2000) concur, viewing the 'essentially
paternalistic ["best interests" test] to be inappropriate when applied to adults' (ibid,
176). They add that the concept of the welfare attorney6 to act as a proxy to be ...
... founded on the assumption that he or she is speaking "as" the incapax and
is, thereby entitled to the same freedom to accept or refuse treatment as is
enjoyed by the incapax - in other words, there is an intention, whether it is
avowed or subconscious, to introduce the far more patient-orientated concept
of "substituted-judgement" (ibid.)
6 Section 16 Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000
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In determining whether something should be done for an adult under the legislation
subsections (4) (b), (c) and (d) AWI Act require that others must be consulted; those
persons are:
(b) the views of the nearest relative and the primary carer of the adult, in so
far as it is reasonable and practicable to do so;
the views of
(i) any guardian, continuing attorney or welfare attorney of the adult
who has powers relating to the proposed intervention; and
(ii) any person whom the sheriff has directed to be consulted,
(c) in so far as it is reasonable and practicable to do so; and
(d) the views of any other person appearing to the person responsible for
authorising or effecting the intervention to have an interest in the welfare of
the adult or in the proposed intervention, where these views have been made
known to the person responsible, in so far as it is reasonable and practicable
to do so.
The nearest relative, primary carer, guardian, attorney and anyone nominated by the
sheriffmust be consulted by the decision-maker, so far as reasonable and practicable,
for example so long as their whereabouts can fairly readily be ascertained. There is
no obligation, however, to seek out the views of others who might have an interest,
although if such views have been made known to the person taking the decision, they
should be taken into account. As a consequence of these provisions, doctors making
treatment decisions for adults with incapacity may find that they have to take a
greater number of opinions into account.
But just how are the provisions of (4) (a) balanced against those of (4) (b) & (c)? In
evidence to the Justice and Home Affairs Committee, the RCN pointed out that
advance statements would be assumed to be expressions of past wishes and
preferences of the adult. They warned that section 1 'will, in practice, result in
enormous weight being attached to entirely unregulated living wills' (RCN, 1999:
par. 8.2). The Royal College of Psychiatrists also believes that Section One will take
account of advance statements. Their spokesperson said: T think that is where
advance statements come in, so it is in there somewhere, but it is not given the
prominence it had in the SLC report, it's implicit rather than explicit' (Dr Donnie
Lyons, Royal College of Psychiatrists).
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However, a key element of in Part 5 of the AWI Act is to introduce a 'general
authority to treat' for medical practitioners responsible for the care of the
incapacitated person. Section 47(1) states where the medical practitioner
(a) is of the opinion that the adult is incapable in relation to a decision
about the medical treatment in question; and
(2) without prejudice to any authority conferred by any other enactment or
rule of law, and subject to sections 49 and 50 and to the following provisions
of this section, the medical practitioner primarily responsible for the medical
treatment of the adult shall have, during the period specified in the certificate,
authority to do what is reasonable in the circumstances, in relation to the
medical treatment, to safeguard or promote the physical or mental health of
the adult.
Therefore, once the authority to treat is established the medical practitioner may
carry out any procedure or treatment designed to promote the wellbeing of the adult
(section 47(4)). In situations where the proxy (who believes he or she is acting in
accordance with the present and past wishes and feelings of the incapacitated adult)
and the doctor disagree then an independent practitioner is nominated to give an
opinion as to the medical treatment advocated. If this practitioner agrees with the
responsible doctor then the treatment can go ahead (section 50(5)). This situation
may cause a conflict between the two decision-making concepts of "substituted-
judgement" and "best interests" and ultimately between patient and medical
autonomy.
England and Wales
In England and Wales the next of kin has no legal right to consent to or refuse
medical treatment (Re T [1992] 4 All ER 649), and proxy consents 'are truly valid
only when the patient has given express authority to another person to give or
withhold consent on his behalf (Mason & McCall Smith, 1994: 222). Therefore, it is
necessary for the incompetent patient to have expressed a desire for another person to
make decisions on his or her behalf while still competent to do so. Lord Donaldson
MR (Re T at 653) drew attention to the right to determine medical treatment in
advance. The judgement expressly recognised a patient's right to state in advance
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and in writing his or her objection to certain forms of treatment. In order for such a
refusal to be binding, the Court of Appeal decided that four criteria had to be
fulfilled. The patient:
• Must have capacity to make the decision;
• Must not have been unduly influenced by a third party;
• Must have understood in broad terms the nature and effect of the treatment
being refused; and
• The refusal must cover the actual situation in which treatment is needed.
Thorpe J, in a case where an adult refused amputation of a gangrenous leg, reiterated
Lord Donaldson's four criteria (Re T, 1992) stating that they were 'common ground'
(Re C [1994] 1 All ER 819). He added '[I]t is also common ground that a refusal can
take the form of a declaration of intention never to consent in the future or never to
consent in some future circumstances' (Re C at 824). In verifying C's capacity to
refuse medical treatment now and in the future, The High Court, exercising its
inherent jurisdiction, made it clear that it could determine the effect of a purported
advance directive as to future medical treatment. These two cases establish, in
common law, that an informed refusal of treatment made in advance by an adult who
understands the implications of that decision has the same legal power as a
contemporaneous refusal.
Investigation of statutory support for advance directives began in 1991 with the
publication of the first of a series of discussion papers by the Law Commission in
England (Law Comm., 1991). Its remit was to assess the need for reform and to
recommend the most practicable way forward. Part VI sets out some options for
reform in medical matters and deals inter alia with advance directives. It establishes
the concept of advance directives as a form of substitutive decision-making, the aim
of which is to 'give the person concerned the assurance that his expressed wishes
will be followed and his autonomy respected to the highest possible degree' (ibid.
138).
At that time there had been no reported decision on the legal standing of advance
directives. It was thought that the English courts would follow the position adopted
by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the case of In re Conroy (1985), which held
that, if known, the incompetent patient's earlier wishes would be determinative.
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However, it was possible that the English courts would regard these wishes as being
merely persuasive rather than imposing any obligation on doctors. With an increased
interest in advance directives in the UK, the Law Commission felt 'some clarification
of their legal status to be desirable' (1991: 139). Consultation produced over 120
responses by 1993, the majority supporting reform, but without a clear consensus on
the form this should take.
In 1993 the Law Commission carried out a further consultation on the role of
advance directives as part of an integrated system for making decisions when a
patient is incapacitated (Law Com, 1993). By this time the case of Anthony Bland
(iop cit.) had made it clear that the principle of self-determination, which holds that a
patient with sound mind could refuse medical treatment, should be applied to patients
who are unable to give or refuse consent, if their earlier wishes are known.
One year earlier the British Medical Association (BMA) strongly supported the
principle of advance directives as a means for patients to exercise their autonomy in
situations where they no longer had the capacity to make decisions. However, the
BMA argued that 'mutual respect and common accord is better achieved without
legislation' and that advance directives did not have legal force (BMA, 1992: 3-4). In
response to this, the Law Commission made several proposals in its Discussion
Paper, the main one being that 'legislation should provide for the scope and legal
effect of anticipatory decisions' (Law Com, 1993: 31)
The House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics included an examination of
advance statements in their final report (House of Lords, 1994). It concluded that
legislation for advance statements was unnecessary, fearing it would be impossible to
give them greater legal force without depriving patients of the benefit of new
treatments and procedures which may become available after the advance statement
is signed. At this stage they commended the use of advance statements but were
satisfied with them being managed by a Code of Practice.
In 1995 the Law Commission published its Report, Mental Incapacity (Law Comm.,
1995). The fundamental issue discussed in Part V is the nature and legal effect of
views which have been expressed by the person concerning anticipatory decisions on
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medical treatment. The Report explains how the recommendations in the 1993
Discussion Paper make satisfactory legal provision to accommodate many of the
views that are commonly expressed in advance directives. It recommends specific
statutory protection for situations where the patient has decided in advance to refuse
some particular form of treatment.
A clear majority of those who responded to the Discussion Paper supported the
proposal that legislation should be introduced to govern anticipatory decisions. A
majority of respondents was keen to see statutory force given to the common law
principle that treating a patient despite a refusal of consent is a civil wrong and may
constitute a crime. There was an almost unanimous view that patients should be
enabled and encouraged to exercise choice about medical treatment. However, a
number of respondents, including the BMA, argued that legislation would be
unnecessary and unhelpful, and that the common law could be relied upon to provide
adequate guidance. Those with firm religious views opposed the introduction of
legislation because they did not wish to see anticipatory decisions by patients
becoming binding on doctors in all circumstances.
The Law Commission accepted that there was a need to address the danger that a
patient who has made an advance directive could unwittingly be depriving himself or
herself of professional medical expertise or of beneficial advances in treatment.
However, the Commission did not believe it was open to them 'to omit all reference
to the increasingly visible issue of health care advance directives from the scope of
the integrated legislative scheme' (Law Comm., 1995: 5.5, p67).
The Lord Chancellor's Department responded to the Law Commission's
recommendations by publishing a Consultation Paper entitled Who Decides? (LCD,
1997). It contained all the proposals put forward by the Law Commission on advance
directives, and in a statement on mental incapacity to the House of Lords, the Lord
Chancellor made it clear that
[t]he Government recognises that the Law Commission's proposals on
advance statements raise complex issues on which people have strongly held
personal, religious and ethical opinions. For this reason, the Consultation
Paper specifically seeks views on whether legislation in this area is
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appropriate, and if so, what its objective should be. (Hansard, 10 December
1997: column 155)
But in October 1999, Government published its Policy Statement, Making Decisions
(LCD, 1999), which announced that it had decided that proposals for legislation on
advance statements were to be withdrawn. In a speech to the Law Society, Lord
Irvine set out the reasons for this decision, stating that the guidance contained in case
law, together with the BMA Code of Practice should
provide sufficient flexibility to enable the validity and applicability of
advance statements to be determined. The courts have a great advantage over
any possible statute ... [and] legislation would risk making advance
statements inappropriate and inflexible, with the obvious dangers to the best
interests of individuals which that would involve ... [T]o fix into statute now
a set of rules, when the case law, influenced by medical advances and the
development of precedent, is still evolving, would not be sound (Irvine,
Conference on Mental Incapacity, 10 November, 1999: 3).
Following the ruling in Re C (1994), the British Medical Journal published several
articles in 1995 dealing with the issue of legality. An advisor to the BMA on medical
ethics, commented, 'the paucity of legal and ethical guidance on reported oral
advance statements makes debate imperative and renders the alternative of having
designated surrogate decision makers increasingly attractive' (Sommerville, 1995:
1663). While debate was widened to cover oral statements and proxy decision¬
making, the point remained, that 'the fundamental legal basis of advance statements
is beyond doubt' (ibid. 1664). Healthcare managers also began to worry about the
lack of clarity in the law and were advised that 'in common law, "advance
directives" or "living wills" or advance refusals of treatment are accepted as lawful'
(Dimond, 1995: 7).
The British Medical Association has indicated that advance directives could be
legally binding on doctors in the future (BMA, 1995a: 5) and its revised Code of
Practice, made the position clear:
Common law establishes that an informed refusal of treatment made in
advance by an adult who understands the implications of that decision has the
same legal power as a contemporaneous refusal (BMA, 1999: par. 4.1, 10-
11).
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The General Medical Council7 more recently has drawn up guidelines for doctors:
Any valid advance refusal of treatment - one made when the patient was
competent and on the basis of adequate information about the implications of
his/her choice - is legally binding and must be respected where it is clearly
applicable to the patient's present circumstances and where there is no reason
to believe that the patient had changed his/her mind (GMC, 2002: Para 10).
Recent case law has addressed the issue of decision-making capacity and reinforced
the legal standing of anticipatory treatment refusals. Re AK ((2000) 58 BMLR 151)
concerns a 19-year-old man suffering from motor neurone disease. AK was
completely paralysed; tube fed and could only breathe with the aid of a ventilator, his
only means of communication was by a small movement of one eyelid. In October
1999 he made an advance statement in the presence of his mother and the nursing
team about his further treatment. His instructions were that, if he had a chest
infection, he would wish it to be treated, but if he suffered a cardiac arrest; he did not
wish to be resuscitated. Eight months later he was informed of the impending loss of
his remaining ability to communicate and a few days later he told his carers that he
wished his ventilator to be switched off if he could no longer communicate. The
health authority applied to the High Court for a declaration that it would be lawful to
discontinue artificial ventilation, nutrition and hydration in accordance with AK
wishes. The court held that in the case of an adult patient with full capacity his
refusal to consent to treatment must in law be observed and in that respect the 'case
has reinforced the well-established principle that a competent adult has an
unassailable right to refuse all treatment at common law, even if this will lead to
death' (Commentary, 2001: 174).
More importantly, for our purposes, is the ruling on the advance directive. Hughes, J.
held that '[t]o this extent an advance indication of the wishes of a patient of full
capacity and sound mind is effective, but care must be taken to ensure that such
anticipatory declarations of wishes still represent the wishes of the patient' {Re AK at
152). This case again reinforces the common law position, that provided the
conditions in Re T above, are satisfied, then 'there is no doubt that the law will
7 The BMA and the GMC guidelines also apply to doctors in Scotland as wells as those in England
Wales.
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recognise the binding effect of a validly made anticipatory refusal' (Commentary,
175).
A further case {Re B (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [2002] 2 All ER 449)
confirms the right of a competent patient to refuse treatment even if the result is
death, but also the facility for conscientious objection by doctors, previously not
explicitly recognised in case law. Ms B, a 43-year-old woman, was tetraplegic, relied
on respiratory support, and could speak only through a speech valve. There was no
prospect of a recovery, although rehabilitation schemes had been offered to improve
her quality of life away from the intensive care unit where she had been resident for
over a year. Ms B did not feel that she could continue living in this way and had
requested the removal of her ventilation (which would ultimately mean her death)
since March 2001. Expert opinion agreed that Ms B did have capacity to make such a
decision since August 2001, but treating clinicians felt unable to switch off the
ventilator, and suggested a one-way weaning process whereby support would
gradually be reduced. Ms B rejected this, as well as the rehabilitation scheme, and
since no attempts were made to affect her wishes in the following months, she
instructed her solicitors to make an application to the High Court seeking a
declaration as to her capacity and the legality of her treatment since August 2001.
Dame Butler-Sloss, President of the Family Division, held that Ms B had
unquestionably possessed the requisite degree of capacity since August 2001, and
that she had been unlawfully subjected to invasive treatment since that time,
justifying a small award of damages to recognise trespass. The President pointed out
that the "right of the competent patient to request cessation of treatment must prevail
over the natural desire of the medical and nursing profession to try to keep her alive'
(Butler-Sloss, P. at 27).
The parameters of capacity were extended in an attempt to resolve the dilemma that
the medical staff found themselves in, doctors insisted that the patient could not
make an informed decision because her capacity was impaired by the gravity of her
situation, when in fact the psychological effects on the doctors themselves was more
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than likely to be the problem. One doctor said in evidence that she felt she was being
asked to kill Ms B (Stauch, 2002: 233). Ms B's capacity was held to be unaffected:
In the case of Ms B there was no evidence that her capacity since August
2001 had been affected by factors which had been of concern to her doctors,
such as the gravity of her condition, her long-term stay in the ICU,
psychological regression induced by her physical condition or her lack of
experience of a rehabilitation unit. Similarly she had not displayed a degree
of anger, ambivalence or inconsistency high enough to strike at the root of
her capacity (Butler-Sloss, P. at 202-3).
The President describes the situation where the attitude of'some hope of life is better
than none [as being] a serious danger ... of benevolent paternalism which fails to
respect the personal autonomy of the patient' (Commentary, 2002: 2024). She
effectively reprimanded the clinicians by awarding damages for trespass and through
reinforcing patient autonomy over clinical judgement in her ruling:
When forming a view as to capacity, particularly if the refusal will have
grave consequences, the nature of the patient's decision, the values which
inform it and the emotional reaction of doctors should not be allowed to
detract from the primary question regarding capacity. Place must be allowed
for the patient's subjective perspective on the nature of their condition and
treatment being offered (Butler-Sloss, P. at 202).
But the problems encountered by doctors treating Ms B were not ignored by the
court and rather than ordering her own doctors to cease ventilation, the judgment
sanctioned Ms B's transfer to a different hospital where doctors would be prepared to
do this.
If there is no disagreement as to the capacity of the patient, but the doctors
nevertheless feel unable to comply with the patient's request, their duty is to
find other doctors who will do so (Butler-Sloss, P. at 202).
This aspect of the legal judgment 'may be regarded as setting a new precedent for the
UK ... [a] course of conduct required by law, a right of conscientious objection'
(Stauch, op cit., 233). While the BMA Code of Practice (1995: para 13, 35)
specifically outlined the right of doctors, who have a conscientious objection to
advance statements, or withdrawal of treatment, to withdraw from treating that
particular patient, this is the first time that the courts have addressed the issue in a
judgement. The General Medical Council also has drawn up guidelines:
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Where a decision to withhold or withdraw life-prolonging treatment has been
made by a competent adult patient, or made by the senior clinician
responsible for the care of a patient who lacks capacity to decide following
discussions with those close to the patient and the health care team, doctors
who have a conscientious objection to the decision may withdraw from the
care of that patient. In doing so they must ensure, without delay, that
arrangements have been made for another suitably qualified colleague to take
over their role, so that the patient's care does not suffer. Where they work for
a NHS Trust or other employing body, they will also need to consider any
contractual implications of withdrawing from the care of the patient, and take
legal advice if appropriate (GMC, 2002: para 20).
In England, therefore, the Common Law and the GMC and BMA Codes of Practice
throughout the UK provide guidance for the drawing up and execution of advance
directives. Recent case law has reinforced the common law position but as yet, this
has not been tested to any degree in the courts.
A summary of the legislative conditions in each of the three countries are set out in
the table below.
1.1 Summary of Legislative Conditions
NETHERLANDS SCOTLAND ENGLAND &
WALES
Legal Tradition Civil law Hybrid Common law
Law in relation to
advance directives
Statute Implied in statute
Case law
Case law




























In April 1995, the Council of Europe was asked by The European Conference on
Family Law to examine the desirability of drafting a European instrument to protect
adults with incapacity and to guarantee their integrity, rights and independence. A
Group of Specialists was set up by the Council ofMinisters under the authority of the
European Committee on Legal Co-operation (CDJC) with a remit to study and
prepare draft principles about the legal protection of incapable adults. The draft
recommendations to Member States on principles concerning the legal protection of
adults with incapacity were published in February 1999 (Recommendation No R (99)
4 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States). The draft recommendation was
sent out to the European Health Committee, the Steering Committee on Social Policy
and the Steering Committee for Human Rights to ensure effective protection for
incapable adults. Principle 9, using similar language to the Adults with Incapacity
(Scotland) Act 2000, addresses respect for the wishes and feelings of the person
concerned:
In establishing or implementing a measure of protection for an incapable
adult the past and present wishes and feelings of the adult should be
ascertained so far as possible, and should be taken into account and given due
respect (1999: Principle 9).
There have been a number of developments in European Law. Article 8 of the
European Convention of Human Rights is the primary provision as it concerns
respect for private and family life. As Nys (1999) states, this is clearly concerned
with individual choices as to bodily autonomy. Article 9 (freedom of conviction and
religion) is relevant where the refusal of life-sustaining treatment is inspired by
religious motives; the most obvious example being the refusal of blood transfusions
by Jehovah's Witnesses (ibid, 208)8.
8 Recent voting by church elders in New York may allow members to accept blood transfusions in
critical medical circumstances providing they repent afterwards (The Guardian, 15 June, 2000).
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The ECHR does not contain any direct reference to an advance refusal of medical
treatment, but Nys believes that the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine9
is of direct relevance. It reads:
The previously expressed wishes relating to a medical intervention by a
patient, who is not, at the time of the intervention, in a state to express his or
her wishes shall be taken into account (1997: Article 9).
As Nys rightly states, '"taking into account" is only a weak recognition of the right to
refuse medical treatment in advance' {ibid. 211). The cautious approach of the
Convention reflects the lack of consensus in Europe regarding the validity of an
advance refusal of treatment {ibid. 212).
Advance Statements and Euthanasia
Dutch Legislation on Euthanasia
Euthanasia - killing another person at his or her request - is prohibited in Dutch law
by article 293 of the Criminal Code, but when performed by a doctor under specific
conditions, it is taken to be justified (Griffiths et al, 1998: 4). The new Dutch law on
euthanasia, officially called the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide
(Review Procedures) Act 2001, has fundamentally changed the Dutch Criminal
Code, explicitly allowing euthanasia and assisted suicide. The most formal change to
the law is that, while it is still a crime to terminate a life on request:
Any person who terminates another person's life at that person's express and
earnest request shall be liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding twelve
years or a fifth category fine (Criminal Code, section 293(1)).
The new law allows euthanasia by giving the doctor performing this act a special
defence. The section reads as follows:
The act referred to in the first subsection shall not be an offence if it is
committed by a physician who fulfils the due care criteria set out in section 2
of the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review
Procedures) Act, and if the physician notifies the municipal pathologist of
9 The Convention was signed by 21 Member States of the Council of Europe in Oveido, Spain on 4
April 1997. It enters into force after ratification by five states, including at least four Member States of
the Council of Europe (Article 33(3)). Six Member States have already ratified the Convention; the
UK has yet to do so.
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this act in accordance with the provisions of section 7, subsection 2 of the
Burial and Cremation Act (Criminal Code, section 293(2)).
To avoid prosecution the doctor must convince the regional review committee that he
or she has met certain requirements - the 'due care criteria'. These requirements
mean that the physician believed that:
a. the request by the patient was voluntary and well-considered;
b. the patient's suffering was lasting and unbearable;
c. has informed the patient about the situation he was in and about his
prospects; and
d. the patient believed that there was no other reasonable solution for the
situation he was in;
e. has consulted at least one other, independent physician who has seen the
patient and has given his written opinion on the requirements of due
care, referred to in parts a-d; and
f. the physician has terminated a life or assisted in a suicide with due care
(Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures)
Act 2001, section 2(1)).
If the committee10 is satisfied that all the care criteria have been fulfilled, the Public
Prosecution Service will not be involved.
Section 2(2) of the 2001 Act allows the patient to ask for euthanasia in advance in a
written request. In the past it was not clear whether a doctor could comply with a
request for euthanasia made in advance in writing by a patient who had become
incapable of making an informed decision. The new Act changes this situation:
If a patient aged sixteen years or older is no longer capable of expressing his
will, but prior to reaching this condition was deemed to have a reasonable
understanding of his interests and has made a written statement containing a
request for termination of life, the physician may carry out this request. The
requirements of due care, referred to in the first paragraph, apply mutatis
mutandis (Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review
Procedures) Act 2001, section 2(2)).
De Haan (2002) comments that this provision in the Act led to strong criticism by
doctors and bewilderment by lawyers and ethicists (ibid, 64-65). Some doctors made
it clear that they would be unwilling to terminate a patient's life on the basis of an
advance request, because if the 'due care' criteria were to be followed, a patient who
was unable to give consent would be unlikely to be aware of enduring unbearable
10 The Committee consists of a lawyer, a physician and an ethicist.
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suffering. In spite of the condemnation by the medical and legal establishment the
proposal remained unchanged and was accepted by Parliament. While the new law
tries to accommodate the patient's right to self determination (ibid., 60), it stops short
of giving patients a legally enforceable right to euthanasia by placing doctors under a
duty to carry out a request for termination of life. In the broad view, the two Dutch
Acts afford protection to both doctors and patients: the Act on Medical Services is
weighted more heavily on the rights of the patient, while the Termination of Life on
Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act primarily protects doctors
from prosecution.
Advance Directives and Euthanasia
Many people have considerable difficulty in accepting advance directives and for
them, giving them legislative force is the same as legalising euthanasia. The problem
arises because advance directives often tend to be promoted by pro-choice groups.
The main advocates of advance directives are euthanasia societies and consequently
advance directives are generally associated with end-of-life decisions. One of the
largest organisations working towards societal acceptance of voluntary euthanasia
and its legislation is the Dutch Association for Voluntary Euthanasia (NVVE). Its
objectives include formulation and distribution of "euthanasia statements" (advance
directives) where a person can specify the circumstances that would apply in which
he or she would wish to request euthanasia (Griffiths et al, 1998:53).
Organisations promoting euthanasia and the "right-to-die" also exist in Scotland
(EXIT, Friends at the End) and England (Voluntary Euthanasia Society) and, like the
NVVE, promote the use of advance directives as a method of making the
incapacitated person's wishes known, but not as requests for euthanasia. Other
organisations, in the UK (the Terence Higgins Trust, Age Concern) are also
proactive in the attempt to gain legislative status for advance directives; they are also
organisations that have wider agendas.
Advance directives in Britain have moved through three principal stages of
development. Initially advance directive forms were only available from
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organisations supporting voluntary euthanasia and were generally viewed as being
only applicable to those with a terminal illness. The second stage saw advance
directives being used in situations such as persistent vegetative state. The House of
Lords in the Bland decision commented that had Anthony Bland ever indicated,
before the accident, that he would not, in these circumstances want life-sustaining
treatment, such an indication would have settled the matter {Airedale NHS Trust v.
Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821). The third stage, favoured by the Terence Higgins Trust,
provides not only for refusal of treatment but for the option of permitting
preservation of life until a nominated person can be called to say goodbye. This type
of directive is a move towards a right to choose rather than a right to die
(Sommerville, 1996: 34)
While advance directives still concern end-of-life decision-making, there have been
attempts to deal with medicalisation and marginalisation of those persons unable to
make decisions, lllich (1976) described the way society tries to protect itself from the
realities of mental degeneration and death as the 'medicalization of death' {ibid. 31).
The responsibility for the care of the elderly and the dying has increasingly been
confined to institutions, hospitals and health professionals, so that society need not
confront these facets of human experience. While other aspects of life - birth,
ageing, mental and physical illness - have also been medicalised, they have not been
marginalised to the extent of death and dying. Advance directives have tried to
evolve into a means to 'empower the individual to make future choices using present
mental capacity and knowledge' {ibid.).
Advance directives can only authorise a refusal of treatment, to the extent that if they
'demand the continuation of futile treatment they have no legal force' (BMA, 1995:
12). It is for this reason that many people associate them with euthanasia in either
passive or active forms. Nevertheless, the BMA believes that an advance directive is
a 'right to choose rather than a right to die' {ibid, emphasis in original). This is
echoed in the Law Commission's definition:
The purpose of an advance directive is to enable a competent person to give
instructions about what he wishes to be done, or who he wishes to make
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decisions for him, if he should subsequently lose the capacity to decide for
himself. (Law Commission, 1991: para. 6.2)
Summary
This chapter has highlighted the background to and definitions of advance directives
that are relevant to this thesis. The differences in the legislative arrangements for
medical decision-making have been explained along with the legal framework
governing treatment decision-making and advance directives in each of the three
countries compared in this thesis: the Netherlands, Scotland, and England and Wales.
The aims of the research and the main themes that run through this whole empirical
work are also laid out.
Chapter Two reviews the literature concerning autonomy from a medical
jurisprudential viewpoint with reference to empirical research relevant to advance
directives, autonomy and power. Chapter Three explains the research methodology
used in the research. Chapter Four discusses findings from interviews with Dutch
lawyers and doctors; Chapter Five examines similar data from Scotland and Chapter
Six looks at data from England. Finally Chapter Seven compares the data from the
three jurisdictions, answering the research questions and addressing any
recommendations for further research. Samples of letters, interview schedules, data
analysis themes and various documents are reproduced in the appendices.
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Chapter Two Literature Review
Introduction
This chapter looks at autonomy and power from the perspective of the doctor and
patient and reviews the literature surrounding advance directives within the areas of
bioethics and medical jurisprudence. The bioethical principles of respect for
autonomy and justice inform medical decision-making and the ways in which a
doctor's professional power can affect decision-making for patients without capacity,
and are relevant in addressing how advance directives impact on individual and
professional autonomy. A shift in emphasis from "medical ethics" to "bioethics" has
transferred ... 'from being internal concerns of the professions to matters of public,
political debate' (Ashcroft, 2001: 322) ... and consequently provides a starting point
for research on personal autonomy in relation to professional power.
The literature on autonomy and power is reviewed in a systematic manner, beginning
with literature on respect for autonomy in general and advance directives and
individual and medical autonomy in particular. It continues by analysing critical
perspectives on doctor-patient relationships and decision-making and discussing how
advance directives affect these areas with reference to conflicts of interest and
opinion and conscientious objections to advance directives. Finally, the principle of
justice is examined through three areas: advance directives and human rights - rights
based justice; advance directives and resources - distributive justice; and advance
directives and the legal profession - legal justice.
Respect forAutonomy
According to Beauchamp and Childress (1994), the bioethical principle of autonomy
can inform the attitudes of doctors and other healthcare professionals towards
treatment decisions and is relevant to investigating how medical decisions are made.
It is also relevant to an examination of codes of professional ethics, and the
connection between law and public policy (ibid. 10-14). While ethical theories, with
their abstract principles and rules, cannot contain enough specific information or
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guidance to dictate public policy, the bioethical principle of autonomy can provide a
moral backdrop for policy and 'an ethical theory can be used not only as a
framework to construct policies but also to criticise those already in place' (ibid. 14).
It is generally accepted that healthcare ethics consists of four prima facie principles
based on basic moral commitments (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994). The four
principles are:
• Respect for autonomy or personhood;
• Beneficence - engender benefit (if possible);
• Nonmaleficence - avoid harm;
• Justice - consider fairly the interests of all those affected.
The use of the term "prima facie" suggests that the principle is binding unless it
conflicts with another moral principle - if it does then a choice must be made
between them. Rights to bodily autonomy are not absolute since they become
curtailed when another party becomes involved (Horan and Mall, 1977: 362).
Beneficence and nonmaleficence both require respect for autonomy: what may be a
benefit for one person may constitute harm for another. Gillon (1994) encapsulates
these three principles in what may be a new moral obligation - empowerment. He
believes 'that empowerment is essentially an action that combines the three moral
obligations of beneficence, nonmaleficence and respect for autonomy to help patients
in ways that not only respect but also enhance their autonomy' (ibid: 185).
Autonomy enables us to make decisions for ourselves, which may be based on
deliberation of all the facts, or by ill-considered, emotional or irrational decisions. It
includes the right to 'take decisions based on factors other than pure reason, and
embraces the right to take a wrong decision' (Brazier, 1987: 175). It is part of the
growing emphasis on patient autonomy as Tonelli (1996) observes:
... as medical practice has evolved from an ideal of the beneficent physician,
practising with little guidance from the patient, toward the acceptance of a
nearly absolute right of patients to control the means and manner of their
health care, the very boundaries of personal autonomy have been met and
forced back (ibid: 816).
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Autonomy enables us to make decisions based on deliberation, but being
autonomous is not the same as being respected as an autonomous agent. Respect for
autonomy involves acknowledging a person's right to make choices, to hold views,
to have values and beliefs and to take actions based on these values and beliefs
(Beauchamp and Childress, op cit., 125). It is 'the moral obligation to respect the
autonomy of others in so far as such respect is compatible with equal respect for the
autonomy of all potentially affected' (Gillon, 1994: 184). In Kantian terms it is
acting 'so that you treat humanity ... always as an end and never as a means only'
(Kant in Singer, 1994: 279).
Autonomy requires the capacity to think and make decisions consistent with one's
own values and the ability to act freely without undue influence from others. Patients
exercise their autonomy in healthcare settings through the use of informed consent to
medical procedures. Consent may be given through non-refusal of various
procedures, explicitly through a signature on a form consenting to surgery or it may
be implied for example, when a patient allows an injection to be given, or blood to be
taken. Three elements are required, however, for informed consent to be valid: first
the patient must be competent to give consent; in general there is a presumption of
competence in adults unless rebutted by a medical practitioner who has reason to
believe a person no longer has the capacity to give consent. Second, the person must
be able to understand and appraise the information provided. This may difficult to
determine, but a medical practitioner has an obligation to help the patient's
understanding as much as possible. Third, the patient must give his or her consent
freely, without coercion or manipulation and without being subject to undue
influence (Young, 1998: 442-43). Only when these three elements are satisfied can
the patient truly give or refuse informed consent.
Autonomy may be thwarted by external forces or by loss of capacity (agency) and in
such circumstances consent will be invalid (Clarke, 1999: 459). It is this loss of
agency and the consequential loss of autonomy that advance directives attempt to
address through respecting the person's earlier autonomy in instructing others to
make decisions on his or her behalf.
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As mentioned above, respect for autonomy (as well as beneficence, nonmaleficence
and justice) can be overridden by competing moral considerations. Autonomy will
only be respected where it does not harm others, endanger public health or unfairly
demand scarce resources, to mention but a few overriding factors. It is sometimes
agreed that 'the principle of respect for autonomy should be viewed as establishing a
stalwart right of authority to control one's personal destiny, but not as the only
source ofmoral obligations and rights' (Beauchamp and Childress, op cit. 126).
The basic sense of autonomy is the ability for individuals to act intentionally, to carry
out actions and to formulate reasons for these actions. It requires intellectual capacity
and freedom of choice to make decisions and to act upon them, in short 'to be an
autonomous person is to be an intentional agent' (Doyal, 1990: 4). This basic
autonomy, or 'first order' autonomy as Doyal calls it, is a very basic form of
autonomy. In healthcare terms, it is the autonomy shown by the compliant patient
who relinquishes his or her choices to the clinician, who signs the operation consent
form without any clear understanding of what it entails. This type of autonomy is
compatible with medical paternalism as long as the doctor has not manipulated or
coerced the patient against his or her wishes (ibid 5).
'Second order' autonomy requires individuals to have capacity to understand and the
opportunities to exercise a critical faculty when it comes to making decisions. In
healthcare, patients exercising this type of autonomy do not merely agree or disagree
with treatment options put to them, they must also understand, to some extent, their
illness, the different treatments available and advantages and disadvantages of each
option. These strongly autonomous patients 'may well insist on better information,
better communication, better clinicians, and even different approaches to treatment
itself (ibid 6). In this way the doctors' treatment decisions may have to be made
differently because of greater patient autonomy: 'the increasing emphasis on
consumerism and "patients' rights" sometimes results in a demand for treatments [or
non-treatments] which the doctor may consider inappropriate' (Horner, 2000: 414).
The following section reviews a selection of recent literature which discusses the
differing autonomy that is afforded to professionals and individuals, which is
referred to as 'professional autonomy' and 'individual autonomy'.
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Professional Autonomy
A professional, whether medical practitioner or lawyer, has a relative monopoly over
his or her work, and enjoys a great degree autonomy. Professional autonomy derives
not only from the nature of the work performed, but also from the relationship of the
profession to institutions that are external to it, for example the government and
society at large. It may only be preserved so long as the profession meets the
responsibilities expected of it by these institutions (Swick, op cit, 612).
By conforming to its expectations the state ensures doctors' and lawyers'
professional autonomy: for example, it is only doctors who may issue death
certificates and only lawyers who may be paid for transferring interests in property.
The state also provides the opportunity for those professions to practise within a
rather restrictive social order and the professions in turn, through self-governance,
reinforce the existing social order (Dingwall & Lewis, 1983). Professionals continue
to enjoy positions of power and control over their clients, but a corollary of this
power may be disempowerment of those requiring services.
In the case of healthcare, the government hands over autonomy to physicians on the
understanding that, as professionals, they will put the welfare of both the patient and
society above their own interests, and that they will govern themselves by a code of
ethics. The central element of professional autonomy for medical practitioners is
the assurance that individual physicians have the freedom to exercise their
professional judgement in the care and treatment of their patients ... [it is] ...
an essential component of high quality medical care and therefore a benefit
due to the patient that must be preserved (World Medical Association, 1987:
Declarations 1 & 2).
Professional autonomy represents the freedom of doctors to secure treatments, to
prescribe medicines and to provide healthcare according to their own judgement,
without interference from the state or from private interests. In this view, it is
beneficial for patients because it sets no limits to medical intervention other than
those imposed by the limits of medicine itself and by its ethical codes (Dupuis, 2000:
294). In the UK, professional autonomy may be described as the successful outcome
40
of a struggle of power between the medical profession and society. The moral
justification is its protection of patients 'within a state run health care system,
offering potentially unlimited resources to the care of the individual patient,
professional autonomy offers that patient the highest available standard of care'
(Horner, 2000: 416). This author raises the point that professional autonomy means
that doctors have the freedom to control (through their professional organisations)
recruitment, training and practices and control over the conduct of individual
members, who each have clinical autonomy. The point being that professional
autonomy can be considered as the collective right of a profession, and the individual
right of each doctor within that profession (Dupuis, op cit. 495).
In the Netherlands, the "guild-free-choice" healthcare system ensures professional
autonomy among clinicians that is only limited by the medical profession itself. The
doctor can almost freely select medical resources and interventions; these are only
restricted by treatment decisions made within a framework of legislation and
professional guidelines. The medical profession is assumed to adopt a high standard
of self-regulation and the 'guild-free-system is based on the expectation that doctors
will serve society and not exploit their professional autonomy for their own personal
interests' (Polder and Jochemsen, 2000: 482-3).
A comparison of the healthcare systems in the Netherlands and the UK in relation to
professional autonomy is depicted in the table below.
2.3 Professional autonomy in different healthcare systems
NETHERLANDS UNITED KINGDOM
Type ofhealthcare system Guild-free-choice Centrally planned
Professional autonomy Nearly unlimited Limited to a budgeted
volume of care








(Adaptedfrom Polder and Jochemsen, 2000)
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Professionals' autonomy in their work requires some control over their clients,
manifested by determining the work to be done and how it should be carried out
(Freidson, 1986: 216). Professionals claim, and are often accorded, complete
autonomy by their clients because they are presumed to be the only judges of how
good their work is and because no layman or outsider can make this judgement. Cain
argues that the concept of a "profession" obscures more than it reveals about the
work professionals do. For example, in the case of lawyers, it is difficult to tell
whether a lawyer has done a good job (1983: 106). When a professional's work is
difficult to evaluate this can represent a degree of power over a client, characterised
by clients' relative impotence, their control by professionals, and the difficulties they
have over understanding the issues in legal terms {ibid, 129). Floogland and
Jochemsen see this being the paradox of autonomy where two poles exist: autonomy
is essential for members of a profession to fulfil their roles as professionals, but this
autonomy makes it very difficult to make sure that they are fulfilling their roles
adequately (2000: 459). An unbreakable circle is created: the professionals' specialist
knowledge creates the professional power, that power is used exclusively in the
client's best interests, but these best interests can only be judged by the professionals
themselves, because they have the specialist knowledge, and so it goes on (Mungham
and Thomas, 1983: 148).
Individual Autonomy
Individual autonomy refers to agency, in the form of an awareness of oneself with
desires and goals, being able to act upon them and rationality to critically reflect on
them. It also refers to self-governance and the independence to act without outside
controls, free from coercion and manipulation with the right to make decisions
against other individuals or the state (Verkerk, 1999: 360). Respecting a person's
autonomy recognises the attributes that give humans their moral uniqueness.
Humans, unlike animals, 'formulate aims and beliefs, reason about them, make
choices on their basis, and attempt to plan for the future' (O'Brien and Chantler,
2003: 36).
There are several reasons why it is a good idea to support individual autonomy in
making choices. Economic efficiency proposes that people are better off if they are
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allowed to make their own choices about goods and services and, by offering better
value through lower prices and better quality, consumers have the potential of
making gains. Rice claims that this belief is exemplified by the "theory of revealed
preference" - 'allowing people to make their own economic choices will, in and of
itself, make them best off (Rice, 2001: 240). Individual autonomy is also
substantiated through the psychological satisfaction people get out of goods and
services they choose themselves. Because consumer decisions, and in particular
consumer decisions that involve healthcare needs, are so individualistic and personal,
it is more likely that people will better qualified to make their own choices. This in
turn may assist in creating a positive therapeutic environment {ibid 241). Finally, in
the spirit of equity and fairness, individual autonomy could dictate that it is unfair to
tax one individual's resources to spend on others. However, drawing on Rawls'
notion of fairness in determining how resources are distributed, Rice concludes that
the policy implication is 'to ensure that individuals who are at a disadvantage have
an equal probability of attaining good health, it is necessary to redistribute resources
from those who have been more fortunate' {ibid 242-3).
Doyal and Gough (1991) describe a minimal sense of autonomy in which the
individual has 'the ability to make informed choices about what should be done and
how to go about doing it' {ibid. 53). Our reasons for making these choices, connect
us with our actions, and our capacity to make mistakes 'performs the same role as
regards the successes and failures of our actions' {ibid.) In expressing autonomy, the
individual formulates consistent aims and strategies that are believed to be in his or
her best interests and attempts to put them into practice. The degree by which this
individual autonomy can be increased is affected by three key variables. First, the
degree of understanding a person has about his or herself and about his or her
culture, which depends on the cognitive skills learned from others. Second, the
individual's cognitive and emotional capacity is an important component, illustrated
by the reduction in autonomous decision-making allowed to the mentally ill. Third,
the range of opportunities for new and significant actions open to the individual
means that improvements in autonomy can be linked to increased and significant
choices; what was minimal autonomy now becomes critical autonomy {ibid. 59-67).
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In the field of healthcare, critical autonomy becomes the reasoning behind medical
confidentiality, and the obligation to obtain informed consent from patients and to
respect their decisions. Respect for autonomy and respect for self-determination in
persons using healthcare services has been expressed in several medical laws in the
Netherlands (Verkerk, op cit. 361). In the law on Contracts for Medical Treatment
(WGBO) 1995, patients' rights are defined through the right of informed consent and
the right to refuse medical treatment. The law on Special Admission to Psychiatric
Hospitals 1994 (Wet Bopz) defines the legal position of psychiatric patients who
may be compulsorily detained in hospital. Coercive admission to hospital and
coercive treatment are no longer justified in the patient's best interests and are
overruled by the right of self-determination in all but extreme cases.
When a patient exercises his or her autonomy in a healthcare situation, he or she
decides which treatment option to consent to in dealing with the particular health
problem, taking into consideration his or her goals, values and wishes. Normally this
causes few problems since the patient and the doctor are in agreement, but
recognition and respect for the patient's autonomy will be more seriously tested
when the patient's choice conflicts with that of the clinician. Where the course of
action is not in the patient's best interests and is even detrimental to his or her well-
being, it may appear to the doctor that these choices are unbalanced and there will be
a temptation to overrule the patient by questioning his or her mental capacity.
However, as is quite correctly stated 'disagreement as such cannot be taken to signify
that the patient is incompetent' (Young, 1998: 442).
Advance Directives and Autonomy
Discussion of advance directives or "living wills" focuses on the moral principle of
respect for autonomy. Vernon (1996) admits that medical treatment often occurs
without moral difficulty and 'doctors usually take clinical decision making for
granted' {ibid. 604). He sees anticipatory decisions as providing a mechanism for
preserving patients' autonomy when they are incapable of making their own
decisions. He believes that the 'living will, when properly drawn up and executed, is
perhaps the best device available to ensure respect for prior autonomy' {ibid. 605).
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Advance directives have raised serious issues of autonomy and justice in the medical,
nursing and medico-legal literature in the last decade. The idea of using anticipatory
decision-making as a means of extending personal autonomy into the future has been
welcomed by the majority of healthcare professionals but a significant minority has
serious doubts as to the efficacy of the advance directive. Further disagreement is
apparent in the debate on the legal status of advance directives.
Childress (1982), in discussing decision-making and paternalism, comments that the
significance of statements made in advance means that unless the person has revoked
them, or was incompetent when they made them, they determine what ought to be
done. Use of advance directives as a decision-making tool may be a way to
determine what ought to be done.
In an article analysing three inter-related concepts relevant to advance directives -
rights, values, and personhood - Rashid (2000) notes that Codes of Conduct,
information guides, etc. uses "rights" language (BMA, 1995a; RCN, 1994; Patients
Association, 1995). She believes
... such language implies there are certain morally justified claims or
entitlements that are beyond question and universally applicable ... [but] ...
there can be potential conflicts between the "rights" of different individuals
... (Rashid, 2000: 38).
In assessing advance decision-making, Rashid refers to the Kantian principle of the
autonomy of the individual, which holds that personal autonomy is an absolute value,
whatever the circumstances. The BMA in its code of practice on advance statements
states:
Personal autonomy although important, cannot always be an overriding
ethical principle. In most situations the individual's right to refuse treatment
outweighs any competing interests, including the wishes of other people. In
exceptional circumstances, the individual's choice has unacceptable
consequences; such as potentially serious harm for others, which is sufficient,
to outweigh the patient's right of refusal. Others may be harmed if refusal of
basic care leads, for example, to the spread of infection (1995a: 15, emphasis
added).
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Contrary to Kant's view, the advance statement cannot be seen then as having an
absolute value or being an overriding ethical principle. Rashid claims that while the
opening reference to personal autonomy in the BMA's Code of Practice implies a
Kantian commitment to the autonomous individual, the remainder of the passage
uses utilitarian language in the tradition of Bentham and Mill, in referring to the
balancing of interests.
There is an argument that autonomy can be damaging to the doctor-patient
relationship. Kessel and Meran (1998) see a 'legitimate concern that the corollary of
individualism and technological advancement is diminishing communication with
doctors, which may result in patients being literally abandoned to their own
autonomy' {ibid. 1265). The suggestion that advance directives refer only to a refusal
of treatment and may reflect a lack of faith in doctors may support such concerns.
This is echoed in the debate on euthanasia, where 'this "right to die" is asserted
within the bounds of a patient's autonomy' (Sobczak, 1997: 878). This does nothing
to diminish fears that advance directives are but a step away from legalising
euthanasia.
Fears that a person's advance directive will not be taken seriously and subsequently
not followed are likely to be damaging to the doctor-patient relationship. In a survey
of American nurses, one-quarter of the nurses claimed that they had seen a doctor or
other healthcare provider deliberately disregard an advance directive; among those
working in critical care, the proportion was more than half (Wolfe, 1998: 51). Many
different reasons for ignoring directives were suggested, including the doctor found
the patient's instructions ambiguous; the patient could not have anticipated specific
treatment choices; the doctor felt compelled to respect a family's request to override
a patient's wishes; and the doctor did not agree with the directive on medical
grounds. In situations such as these, the nurse is in a 'no win situation' - he or she
must follow the doctor's instructions even if this means overriding or ignoring a
patient's previously expressed wishes {ibid).
Objections to advance directives on the grounds that they do not necessarily increase
patient autonomy often raise the issue of informed decision-making. Ryan (1996: 96)
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argues that autonomy cannot be exercised without full possession of all the
information that might influence a decision; consent being valid only if the patient
has been informed of all the risks and consequences of the treatment. A person who
makes provisions in a living will may not have access to all the information that
could affect his or her decision and Ryan maintains that, in this case, the person is
making a decision in the present about a hypothetical situation in the future. While he
concedes that the individual is in the best position to know how he or she would act
in that situation,
... most people have no experience of their reactions to a life-threatening
illness, they can only guess at their reaction and they frequently guess wrong
... [and] ... people do not believe in, or even know of the possibility of, an
inaccurate guess ... the lack of vital information prohibits a fully informed
and autonomous choice {ibid. 97).
When a person executes an advance directive it may be some time until the directive
comes into force, in some cases several years. The gap between writing the directive
and the person's incapacity is an area of concern for opponents of advance directives,
who claim that a person's choices may change over time. Emanuel et al (1994)
investigated this problem in a prospective cohort study of 495 outpatients and 102
members of the public, in which the research subjects completed an advance
directive that included four illness scenarios and 11 treatment choices. Follow ups
were undertaken after 12 and 24 months. To realise personal autonomy, the choices
expressed at one point in time must correspond reasonably well with those expressed
subsequently. The study found that
patients and members of the public can make scenario and treatment-specific
advance choices that are reasonably stable; that their choices become more
stable with repeat consideration, especially if they have discussions with their
physicians; and that illness ... had little effect on the stability of choices. The
findings also suggest that stability may be improved by periodic review of
decisions and discussion with physicians {ibid, 214).
Although discussions between doctor and patients appear to be important in many
aspects surrounding advance directives they are not without their own difficulties.
From the physician's perspective a number of barriers including lack of time, lack of
administrative support, perceived legal uncertainties and lack of proper knowledge or
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expertise are reported to inhibit discussions of advance directives (Markson et al,
1994: 2324). Lack of knowledge of advance directives is frequently an obstacle for
the patient and the doctor, and general practitioners are not particularly effective in
promoting discussions of patient preferences for end-of-life care (Gamble et al,
1991: 279).
A reticence to encourage patients to express their treatment preferences in an
advance directive is found in the policies of the NHS. In guidance to clinical staff,
the Newcastle Upon Tyne NHS Trust Clinical Ethics Advisory Group (CEAG)
advised that, while patients should be made generally aware of living wills, this
would not be routinely raised with all patients. The reasons for this are that patients
might feel that undue pressure is being brought to bear on them, 'breaching the
principle of nonmaleficence and potentially undermining the patient's trust in their
health carers in hospital' (CEAG, 2001: 3).
From the patient's perspective, one researcher found that many elderly patients do
not discuss their advance directive with their doctor because they perceive it to be
"private" in the way that a testamentary will may be (Wolfe, 1998: 52).
Advance Directives and the Medical Profession
Medical practitioners have traditionally been given considerable liberty in their
professional work, and often appeal to the right to "clinical freedom" when outside
influences threaten to control their practice (Warren, 1979). Berger (2002) comments
that a doctor's knowledge, and thus his or her power over a patient is a critical
variable in the development of arrogance among doctors, deluding 'some physicians
into imagining that they are all-powerful' (ibid 145). Treatment decision-making for
patients unable to decide for themselves can allow doctors ultimate power to decide
on behalf of another. This power may be conceptualised as a continuum along which
the wishes of the patient compete with doctors' opinions: 'at one end the physician
honours the wishes of the patient; at the other, he or she does not' (Johnson, 1996:
569).
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Advance directives may be viewed as a method of eroding the doctor's power and
some worry that they may compromise the autonomy of the professional (Higgs,
1987: 1221). Doctors in the UK are obliged to follow a competent person's wishes
regarding treatment, while in the case of an incompetent patient the doctors must act
in the patient's best interests. Following a patient's treatment requests in an advance
directive, for example, a refusal of pain relief, which would be not be likely to be in
his or her best interests would probably be ignored. The ultimate power therefore
being in the hands of the clinician (BMA, 1995a: 35).
In 1999, the NHS Executive issued guidelines on withholding consent to treatment
and the GMC (1999) issued guidance on the current legal position on advance
directives. In order to discover what provisions had been made to recognise advance
directives through actual or intended policies, Diggory and Judd (2000) conducted
research on 463 NHS Trusts. Half (124) of the Trusts that responded had already
developed or intended to develop policies on advance directives but 28% (70) did not
intend to develop policies. In 94% of the trusts surveyed, ward staff were given no
guidance on advance directives. The researchers recommend that 'national
guidelines should be developed to support a consistent approach to tertiary care
across the NHS for patients with advance directives' (Diggory and Judd, 2000: 25).
According to NHS Trusts, by initiating policies and consequently restricting a
doctor's freedom to make decisions in relation to advance directives are
circumventing the boundaries of clinical freedom which a doctor enjoys 'by authority
in various guises' (Warren, op cit.).
A major objection to making advance directives binding on doctors is that the
autonomous demands of the patient may clash with the "rights" of doctors to follow
their conscience (Guild of Catholic Doctors, 1999). In its booklet on the use of
advance statements, the Guild addresses the questions of whether advance directives
are legally binding. The advice given is misleading in some respects, for example
stating that the BMA considers advance statements not binding on health
professionals, but deserve thorough consideration. This is inaccurate as the BMA
clearly states in its Code of Practice that where they are valid and applicable,
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advance statements must be followed (1995a: para. 14.2). This booklet illustrates the
diversity of opinion from both a medical and religious perspective.
Some doctors regard advance directives as a 'benchmark in the decline of respect for
clinical judgement, predicting that doctors will become mere technicians subject to
inappropriate and perhaps outdated instructions from now incapacitated individuals'
(Sommerville, 1996b: 9). They are concerned that this will clash with the obligation
to act in the patient's best interests and fear that they are part of a trend indicating a
lack of trust in the doctor-patient relationship, which will lead to increasing
confrontation and litigation (ibid).
Samuels (1996) comments that the advance directive may represent a lack of trust in
doctors to do the right thing when the patient becomes incapable and states that by
restricting the clinician's decision-making his or her autonomy will be impeded or
inhibited (ibid., 3). This concern had been previously addressed by the House of
Lords Select Committee which advised against making advance directives legally
binding on the grounds that, they 'would gravely undermine the professional
expertise and judgement of doctors. It would make doctors nothing more than slaves
of society' (1994: para 196).
In a letter to the British Medical Journal, the Bromley division of the BMA expressed
its concern at the Association's stance over advance directives stating that 'advance
directives should have been opposed as being incompatible with good medical
practice and ethics rather than accepted as a fait accompli' (Jessiman, 1996: 851).
Ending on an ominous note, the letter warns anyone contemplating using this type of
anticipatory decision-making that 'medical staff tend to avoid those who spurn their
best endeavours, and patients' care will suffer in consequence' (ibid). An equally
forthright reply followed disagreeing with the previously expressed views and
supporting advance directives as reflecting both good medical practice and a legal
obligation to respect a patient's wishes. The author strongly expresses the view that
'carrying out treatments contrary to the patient's stated wishes and getting away with
it because the patient is not mentally or physically competent to resist, is something
that no doctor or the BMA could sanction' (Finfer, 1996: 1539).
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Perhaps doctors' problems with advance directives stem from lack of information
and knowledge. General Practitioners in London and Winchester were asked
questions about the current legal status of living wills (Bowker et al, 1998). The
doctors were asked to indicate whether they were aware that some forms of advance
directive could carry legal force. The results of the survey show that only half (107)
of the GPs surveyed were aware that living wills currently carry some legal force
under English law. Most of them were ignorant of important aspects of the law. The
researchers comment that they believe that the lack of specific legislation in this area
has contributed to doctors' confusion about the legality of living wills. A postal
survey investigating doctors' knowledge of advance directives was conducted in
Dorset and questionnaires were sent to 80 hospital doctors and 80 GPs in over four
NHS trusts. Of the 89 doctors" who replied, 17 hospital doctors and 21 GPs had not
heard of the BMA's guidance on advance statements. The researchers comment that
there is a clear message that the medical profession needs to address how best to
inform and train doctors about advance directives (Zaman and Battock, 1998: 147).
A similar study was conducted in South Australia in 1991, where living wills have
been legally binding since 1983. A postal questionnaire was sent to a random sample
of 158 General Practitioners, 117 (74%) of whom replied. Sixty-three per cent (74)
of the respondents were aware of the provision for living wills with 23 of them
having forms in their office, 41 had discussed them with their patients. Of the 21
doctors whose patients had made a living will, 12 had considered it helpful in
decision-making and five were undecided, while 4 thought that it had not been
useful. The main concern of the GPs was that they had difficulty in raising the
subject of living wills with their patients because of the possibilities of an adverse
effect on the doctor-patient relationship and generating disagreements between
doctors and families over treatment decisions. The authors believed that lack of
knowledge of the Natural Death Act 1983 in South Australia was an impediment to
effective use of living wills and that a "raising awareness programme" was necessary
for GPs and the public. They conclude that 'any form of living will, advance
"




directive is intended to clarify what the patient wants and so should be an ally of
good medical practice, not a troublesome intruder' (Ashby et al, 1995: 230).
If advance directives are to be useful as a means of maintaining an incapacitated
patient's autonomy, there needs to be an awareness of their existence and their
function not only by doctors, but also by the public. Little empirical research has
been carried out on advance directives in the UK but a comprehensive piece of
research was carried out by the Office for National Statistics on behalf of the
Department of Health in 1996 (ONS, 1996) showed a lack of knowledge on advance
directives within the general community. Questions concerning advance directives
were asked in order to measure how many people knew what an advance
statement/advance directive/living will could authorise. Only 7.1% (131) of
respondents replied to this question, and just over half (75) ofwhom were aware that
advance statements concerned medical treatment but could not authorise euthanasia.
The remainder of the respondents were either unsure or had some other
understanding of advance statements.
Contrary to the belief that advance directives erode doctors' power, Tonelli (1996)
believes that the right of patients to control their healthcare and make their own
treatment decisions through the use of advance directives places the doctor in a
position of ultimate power. The need to encompass a vast array of medical conditions
and illnesses in an attempt to cover all eventualities produces an inherent vagueness
in living wills and leaves them open to interpretation by the clinician,. Additionally,
the point at when an advance directive comes into effect is also left up to the doctor
in charge of the patient's care to decide and 'by ceding to physicians the power of
determining if and when advance directives are going to be applied, patient
autonomy is not protected against the paternalistic practitioner' (ibid 818).
Doctor-Patient Relationships and Decision-making
At the core of medical practice is a need to create and nurture a trusting dyadic
relationship between physician and patient. The literature overwhelmingly cites
communication as being the bedrock of the relationship between doctor and patient -
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'the purpose of communication is not to convince the patient to do what the
physician desires but to understand the patient's concerns and to make decisions
acceptable to both the patient and the physician' (Herndon and Pollack, 2002: 309).
This section examines the literature on different models of medical decision-making
beginning with the decision-making process. This is followed by a discussion of the
most commonly used models of decision-making for incapacitated persons: "best
interests" and "substituted judgement" models. It concludes with a review of
alternatives to these models before moving on to a discussion of how advance
directives can affect decision-making.
As doctors are professionals, in order to adhere to the core elements of
professionalism (altruism, accountability, excellence, duty, integrity, respect for
others, etc.) there needs to be effective communication between doctor and patient
and between doctors and their colleagues. However, effective communication cannot
exist in the absence of a solid, trusting physician-patient relationship; the two are
inextricably linked (ibid). Emanuel and Dubler (1995) suggested "Six Cs" in
facilitating effective doctor-patient communication. They are:
• Choice - treatment options
• Competence - expected of doctors by patients
• Communication - doctors must listen, understand the patient's pain or
problem, and communicate
• Compassion - patients want technical proficiency but also empathy
• Continuity - the patient-physician relationship should endure over time
• (No) Conflict of interest - the doctor's primary concern must be for his or her
patient - the patient's wellbeing must take precedence over the doctor's own
personal interest
Medical decision-making both for patients with capacity and those unable to make
their own decisions requires a balanced consideration of medical, ethical,
psychosocial, and societal aspects (van der Heide et al, 2003: 1). Patients, relatives
and healthcare professionals are all involved in treatment decision-making to some
degree and the preceding aspects and the legal arrangements in different countries
can modify the decision-making practices and attitudes of the parties involved.
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In their discussion on the criteria for medical decision-making, Hertogh et al (1996)
argue that every medical decision is based on two categories of norms: professional
medical norms and societal norms. Professional medical norms or professional
medical standards are an expression of professional autonomy. Societal norms are
reflected in the patient's preferences and the treatments that he or she has given
consent to. However, respect for medical or patient autonomy is not absolute but is a
reciprocal limiting principle, under which the doctor has a duty,
to perform only those actions for which he/she has been given permission ...
and it restricts the patient in that he/she can only ask the physician to do what
the physician considers to be in keeping with the standards of proper care
{ibid, 14-15).
The doctor's duty of care is protected, in the case of the Netherlands, by the Dutch
Act on Medical Treatment Contract in which the legislature has determined that,
The care provider must in the course of his duties have regard for the
standard of care required of a competent care provider and must act in
accordance with the responsibilities ensuing from the standard of professional
care required of care providers (Article 453).
By ensuring that the doctor must act according to professional standards, the
intention is that the Act offers protection against requests to perform medical
procedures that are in conflict with those standards (Hertogh, op cit., 15).
Interestingly, if the patient does not have an advance directive and has to rely on a
representative to make his or her treatment decisions, the Act does quality how those
decisions should be made or whether the decisions should be in the patient's best
interests.
The BMA has produced guidelines on decision-making for incapacitated patients. In
addition to recommending clinicians to follow any local or national guidelines for
doctors in the UK, the BMA (1999) advises doctors to: involve the multi-disciplinary
team (section 17.8); take account of the patient's previous views (section 18.2);
consult with family and close friends of the patient (section 18.3); and secure good
communication with all parties involved (section 18.4).
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Substituted Judgement
The courts in the United States have stated that substituted judgement is the 'means
by which incompetents can exercise their right to refuse or terminate treatment'
(Martyn, 1994: 196). In Saikewicz (1977) the court applied a 5-pronged test to
determine the values and desires of the individual. The test required analysis of:
• The expressed patient preferences;
• The patient's religious convictions;
• The impact on the patient's family;
• The patient's prognosis with or without treatment; and
• The probability of adverse side effects.
The first two factors are subjective and require a personal knowledge of the patient;
the third factor takes the family's views into account, something that is not included
in other definitions of substituted judgement. The last two factors rely on more
objective information which can be obtained from the clinician in charge of the
patient's care. The decision obtained from substituted judgement 'must be based
either on expressed preferences or inferences deduced from conscious volitional
actions' (Martyn, 1994: 197).
The term "substituted judgement" refers to a patient-centred criterion where the
wishes of the patient prevail. It is a weak autonomy-based standard (Beauchamp and
Childress, op cit. 171) where the surrogate decision-maker is required to 'don the
mental mantle of the incompetent' (Saikewicz, 1977). The judgement in question is
the patient's judgement and the decision-maker or proxy is a substitute for the patient
who makes the decisions on the patient's behalf (Deverette, 1995: 110). As a
substitute model of decision-making, a treatment plan previously chosen by the
patient can be authorised or, if no plan was made, the situation can be assessed and
the decision that the proxy believes the patient would have made can be carried out.
Thirty-three physicians, bioethicists, and medical economists from ten countries met
at Lawrence University, Appleton, Wisconsin in 1989, to create The Appleton
Consensus: International Guidelines for Decisions to Forego Medical Treatment. The
guidelines deal with four specific decision-making circumstances:
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• Five guidelines were created for decisions involving competent patients or
patients who have executed an advance directive before becoming
incompetent;
• Thirteen guidelines were created for decisions involving patients who were
once competent, but are now incompetent, who have not executed an advance
directive;
• Seven guidelines were created for decisions involving patients who never
have been competent, for whom "no substituted judgement" can be rendered;
and
• Eleven guidelines were created for resource-led decisions (Stanley, 1989).
The major criticism of the substituted judgement standard is the failure of the
surrogate decision-maker to make correct decisions for the incapacitated person and
the poor success rate in making choices is a major reason for non-involvement of
proxies. In the absence of specific instructions, the decision is often an optimistic
guess (Emanuel and Emanuel, 1992: 2068). Doctors have difficulty taking the
surrogates' decisions seriously when only about 50% of the decisions are in
agreement with decisions the patients would have made (Dubler, 1995: 298-301).
In a review of empirical studies on proxy decision-making, Emanuel and Emanuel
(1994) found three major flaws in this method of decision-making. First, they found
that discussions of treatment issues between patients and their proxies were
uncommon, particularly in the area of resuscitation and treatment withdrawal.
Second, they found that family members are unreliable in assessing a patient's
quality of life, usually erring by underestimating of the patient's functional status.
Emanuel and Emanuel (ibid: 2069) note that 'if a proxy's assessment of the patient's
quality of life is indispensable to making an accurate decision about terminating care,
then this research casts doubt on the capacity of proxies to make valid substituted
judgements' (ibid). Third, proxies were found to be unable to accurately predict
patients' preferences for life-sustaining treatments and were not much better at
predicting patients' other preferences during incompetence (ibid). Similar problems
arose in a study of surrogate decision-making preferences for nursing home patients
in the absence of advance directives. The researchers were concerned to discover that
'decisions were infrequently based on views the resident held and expressed while
competent. ... [and] ... nearly 75% of surrogates indicated that their decisions were
not at all based on residents' statements or comments' (Cogen et al, 1992: 1887-88).
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Similar problems afflict doctors' decision-making in the same situations. In a study
of surrogate decision-makers' views (family members and primary care providers)
'neither physicians nor designated family members met criteria for accuracy in their
predictions of patients' wishes' (Seckler et al, 1991: 95). One of the conclusions of
this study is that doctors might have difficulty leaving their personal quality of life
assessments aside when asked to make substituted judgement decisions (ibid).
Other studies have also found that doctors substitute their own preferences for those
of their patients (Schneiderman et al 1993: 28; Orentlicher, 1992: 2102). Extending
their observations to a larger population, the researchers' findings remained the same
with doctors predicting that patients' treatment choices were closer to their own
choices than the ones the patients would have made. Since doctors ultimately
exercise control, Schneiderman, (1997) concludes that this raises serious concerns
about physicians acting in a substituted judgement capacity' (ibid 131).
The substituted judgement model is only really useful if the decision-maker knows
what the patient would have wanted. There are three ways that someone could know
this,
• The patient could have explicitly told someone, orally or in a written
directive, what he or she wants done;
• The patient could have implicitly made clear what he or she wants - previous
conversations, offhand comments, etc;
• The patient could have revealed enough about his or her thinking and values
so the person knows even though it was never actually discussed (Deverette,
op cit., 111).
The third option is a weak and unsatisfactory basis for substituted judgement
decisions and would only really apply if the relationship between patient and other
person was really close, e.g. couples who enjoyed a happy and communicative
relationship. Finally, in assessing whether substituted judgement could be an
alternative to using an advance directive to indicate patient preferences, Emanuel et
al, found that 'in the absence of direct discussion with patients, substituted decision
making is not likely to correspond with their preferences' (1991: 895).
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Best Interests
When the patient's wishes are not known or cannot be discerned, the clinical team
has to rely on the "best interests" test to determine treatment decisions. The interests
are those of the patient and what will be of benefit to him or her, all things
considered, i.e. what is good for that patient at that particular time (Deverette, op cit.,
113). The best interests standard should guide treatment choices by focusing on the
person and the alternatives available and identifying the most acceptable of available
options (Kopelman, 1997: 277-79). Used as a model for medical decision-makers, it
is often used as a "standard of reasonableness" where the best treatment may be
justifiable for various moral and resource-led reasons (ibid, 281).
The Appleton Consensus Guidelines for medical treatment decision-making
recommend that decisions should be made using the best interests standard when
there is no clear indication which plan of care the patient would have preferred. They
advise discussion with the family, other care-givers and the clinical team and, if all
are in agreement, recommend that treatment should be implemented (Stanley, op cit.,
131). Medical and legal professional organisations agree with these
recommendations and add that, while a consensus between health professionals and
the family is usually sufficient for less serious decisions, some treatment decisions
are so serious that the courts may need to become involved in making the decision
(BMA and The Law Society, 1995: Chapter 10).
Criticisms of the best interests standard are many and varied. It has been criticised
for being paternalistic and more suited to decision-making for children than for
adults, regardless of their decision-making capacity. While any treatment should be
of benefit to the patient, it would be wrong to apply the standard without balancing
different and conflicting interests (Kopelman, 1997: 283). Associated with being
self-defeating, it is criticised for being too individualistic, demanding that only one
person's interest is considered and unfairly ignoring other people's interests (ibid:
284). The next two criticisms go hand-in-hand; they state that it is ineffective to use
the best interests standard because it is unknowable and vague. It is unknowable
because no one can ever really be sure of another's best interests and the best that
can be done is to maximise benefits and minimise harms in the choice of treatment. It
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is criticised for being vague as it is often impossible to determine what values people
judge as best. This is particularly true for the person who has left no indication,
written or oral, of his or her wishes, preferences or desires with 'potentially
conflicting values that are unstated, undefended and unranked' {ibid: 286).
The harshest criticism of the best interests standard is that it is too easily misused,
dangerous and open to abuse {ibid: 285). There are fears that it will be used to
withhold or withdraw treatment based on the decision that it would not be in the
patient's best interests to continue to be treated.
Alternative Models ofDecision-making
The "shared decision-making" model actively involves patients in their healthcare
and is an important dimension of contemporary models of patient-centred care. There
is concern among policy makers in the United Kingdom 'to equalise relationships
between health professionals and lay people ... [with a] ... new emphasis on shared
information, shared evaluation, shared decision making and shared responsibilities'
(Williamson, 1999: 719). In shared decision-making there are two fundamental
principles: promoting the patient's well-being and respecting the patient's autonomy.
Brock (1998) describes the concept of well-being as being 'designed to signal the
respects in which the fundamental goal of medicine is in part subjectively determined
by the particular patients' aims and values' {ibid 232). The patient's autonomy
reflects the patient's interest in making these treatment decisions for him or herself
and being allowed to act on these decisions. In essence, shared decision-making is a
combination of the substituted judgement and the best interests models with a
heavily weighted subjective element: what is best for this particular patient subject to
his or her personal preferences. Without an advance directive or some prior
discussion with a proxy or doctor there may be difficulties determining what the best
decision for the patient is in the circumstances.
In cases where neither substituted judgment nor the best interests are appropriate
methods of making decisions and shared decision-making is also inappropriate, a
fourth model of decision-making may be the answer. Deverette (1995) proposes a
third "reasonable treatment" standard by which to make these difficult decisions.
This could be used to justify withdrawal of treatment where there is no cogent reason
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for continuing to treat the patient. Withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration for
a patient in a PVS would, ostensibly be neither a benefit nor a burden and the
reasonable treatment standard would justify withdrawal of all treatment with the
ultimate consequence that the patient will die. Critics of this reasoning argue that the
PVS patient has one interest - the interest to live and that this is enough to apply the
best interests standard.
Deverette summarises the rationale of this type of decision-making by placing the
different standards in a form of hierarchy. When patients have no decision-making
capacity, someone else must decide for them, this could be an appointed proxy or the
doctor in charge of medical treatment and care. The decision-maker would have a
choice of three standards: first, to use the substituted judgement standard and report
what the patients wants. If this is not possible, then the best interests standard would
be used to try to decide what is in the best interests of the particular patient. If the
patient has left no indication of his or her wishes and has no interests because of the
permanent loss of all awareness, the decisions can only be made on the basis of what
constitutes reasonable treatment in the circumstances (ibid 115).
Advance Directives and Decision-making
When making treatment decisions for patients without capacity, an advance directive
may assist the proxy or healthcare professionals in formulating a treatment plan
which takes the patient's wishes into consideration, thereby attempting to retain his
or her individual autonomy. There are two main ways by which advance directives
can aid decision-making: by acting as a catalyst for communication between doctor
and patient, and as a tool to help the main actors in the decision-making process.
In a qualitative, ethnographic study of elderly patients in nursing homes in the
eastern Netherlands, The et al (2002) found that doctors' decisions about care and
treatment were influenced more by the clinical course of the illness, the presumed
quality of life of the patient, and the patient's medical condition than by any
advanced planning of care (ibid 1326). Patients' wishes were factors in the decision-
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making process and a written advance directive influenced the doctor's decision to
withhold the artificial administration of fluids and food (ibid 1330).
In a recent study of older people's views on advance directives in Britain, 82% of the
participants had never heard of living wills, but (75%) would welcome the chance to
discuss issues surrounding the end of life (Schiff et al, 2000: 1640-41).
Unfortunately communication between doctors and patients about important
treatment decisions is poor (Virmani et al, 1994: 913). Few doctors or patients
initiate discussions on planning their future healthcare although doctors and patients
did agree that it was up to the doctor to initiate the discussion (Emanuel, 2000;
Morrison et al, 1994; Reilly et al, 1994).
Potential barriers to physician-initiated discussions were investigated by Morrison et
al (1994). The main barrier to communication was the timing of the discussion:
patients believed that the conversation should be initiated early in the doctor-patient
relationship, while doctors believed the 'advance directive discussion should occur
later in the physician-patient relationship, at an older age of the patient, and later in
the course of the disease' (Johnston et al, 1995: 1028). Even when conversations do
take place, there is little evidence that this makes much difference to ultimate
treatment decisions, and there are few direct benefits (Foubister, 2001: 1). The
indirect benefits are improvements in the relationships between patients and their
doctors, 'if you talk to your patients about these things you fundamentally change the
relationship that you have with your patients ... what they do is create an opportunity
for me to sit down with my patients and have some really meaningful discussions
about what they want done' (Tierney in Foubister, ibid: 1-2).
Advance directives can be used as a tool in the decision-making process, helping
structure shared decision-making, 'not replacing] discussions about treatment and
care, but guid[ing] them (Widdershoven and Berghmans, 2001: 185). According to
Brock (1998), when used alongside substituted judgement, advance directives can
help to make healthcare providers respect the now incompetent patient's prior
autonomy as much as possible (ibid 233). Flowever, a recent study, which looked
retrospectively at the effect of advance directives on the accuracy of surrogate
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decisions, showed that there was 'no significant improvements in the accuracy of
surrogate substituted judgement in any illness or for any medical treatment' (Ditto et
al, 2001: 421). The researchers believed that their results challenged the conventional
belief that advance directives are a means of honouring the patients' specific wishes
when they have lost competence (ibid).
Clinicians' values inform their decisions even when a valid advance directive exists
and where they disagree with the patients' wishes they may ignore the directive
(Mower and Baroff, 1993: 380). One study emphasised the central role for clinical
judgement in critical decision-making in interviews and focus groups with nurses and
doctors in the west of Scotland. The conclusions reached were that advance
directives were open to interpretation and that any particular outcome cannot be
relied upon (Thompson et al, 2003: 1016). Significantly, a criticism of the substituted
judgement model is also valid in relation to advance directives, as the decision¬
makers appear to be influenced by their own principles and beliefs and 'what some
of the participants lacked was a willingness to step out outside their own value
system in fully embracing that of the patient' (ibid). In a study of nursing home
patients, 75% of the treatments received were consistent with the preferences
expressed in the patients' advance directives. However, much of this consistency
might be explained by shared values among doctors and patients (Orentlicher, 1992:
2101).
Conflicts
Medical decision-making was once a simple process: the patient put his or her life in
the doctor's hands and the doctor in turn did the best he or she could to alleviate the
patient's suffering and to prolong his or her life as long as possible. Medical
paternalism meant that the doctor would decide what the best course of action would
be to help the patient return to health, and disagreements were few because the
doctor made decisions unilaterally. Conflict between doctor and patient occurs 'when
the patient ... tries in some way to control what the physician does to him' (Freidson,
1975: 296). Criticism of this paternalistic behaviour has led to a support for the
principles of patient autonomy and patient self-determination and giving the patient a
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primary role in decision-making. According to Deverette (1995), this situation leads
to conflict because doctors cannot abdicate their responsibility for the medical
treatment they provide for the patient. This has led to questions about the rights of
doctors and to encouraging patients to think through treatment decisions for
themselves and 'in cases involving conflict of values, ... learning] to decide what is
the better course of action [in the circumstances]' (Dewey, 1978: 10).
An early study of the prevalence of conflict during life-support decisions found that
in 63% of the 400+ doctors and nurses conflict arose over decisions about life-
sustaining treatment (Mulvihill, 2001). In 45% of cases, conflicts were centred on
issues such as pain control and communication between healthcare staff and family
members. Conflict occurred between family members and healthcare staff in about
half of these cases, and just as frequently there was tension among staff members. In
about one quarter of cases, family members had conflicts with each other. Another
study examined compliance by doctors with patients' wishes. The researchers found,
that among 535 doctors in Sweden, Germany and Russia who participated in end of
life decision-making, conflicts in decision-making were significantly reduced when
more information was available about patients' wishes, through "Do Not
Resuscitate" orders and advance directives, highlighting the 'usefulness of detailed
patient directives' (Richter et al, 2001: 190). Nevertheless, a relatively large number
of doctors would not act according to the patients' explicit wishes, especially in
Russia. The researchers explain this in terms of 'the conflict between the doctor's
and the patient's autonomy and also between the doctor's duty of beneficence and
the patient's autonomy' (ibid).
Conflict between doctors and patients may be due to misperceptions and lack of
awareness. Schneiderman et al (1997) investigated physicians' predictions of
patients' preferences in treatment decisions and found that patients viewed their state
of health in a better light than their doctors or their surrogates. Furthermore, doctors
commonly misunderstood what their patients' preferences and treatment wishes
were, and importantly, were often unaware that their patients had executed advance
directives to document their wishes (ibid, 135).
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Solutions for dealing with these conflicts include anticipating tension-filled situations
to prevent discord,
Keeping families informed about the patient's response to therapy and what
treatment options remain throughout a patient's illness may reduce the
likelihood that families will be blind-sided by a request to limit treatment.
Family conferences are helpful, and just as there is constructive criticism,
there can be constructive conflict. For example, when staff members disagree
on the appropriate level of treatment, each side may have legitimate concerns
that need to be addressed, and disagreement over decisions between the
family and staff may reflect differences in values (Tulsky in Mulvihill, 2001:
283).
A study into conflicts between patients and their caregivers found that caregivers
making surrogate decisions based on considerations of treatment outcomes might not
effectively represent patients' preferences (Fried et al, 2003). When asked to rate
physical states of health as being either acceptable or unacceptable, patients or their
carers were at least 80% in agreement. However, patient-caregiver agreement about
the acceptability of health states with functional or cognitive impairment was poor.
Conflicts between doctors and families are rarely resolved through recourse to law.
Scots law is seldom used to intrude into the doctor-patient relationship and one of the
reasons for this is the 'strong role that paternalism has traditionally played in the
practice of medicine in Scotland,' with many people retaining the "doctor knows
best" perspective regardless of the growing demand for greater patient autonomy
(Miller and Meyers, 1992: 91).
Relationships and Trust
Doctors argue that the doctor-patient relationship is based on trust, but trust must be
mutual. The patient must trust the doctor but there must be reciprocity in this
relationship and therefore the doctor needs to trust his or her patients. This
relationship, according to Leenen, would benefit from regulation, especially the
regulation of the rights of the patient, something reflected in Dutch law in the law on
medical treatment and in the European Convention of Human Rights, particularly in
the case law of the European Commission and European Court of Justice. Moreover,
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the 'movement of patients' rights can develop in an antithetical way if doctors
oppose it and only defend their own position' (Leenen, 19926: 106).
While Miller and Meyers (1992) believe that trust is the strongest factor in the
doctor-patient relationship, paternalism is also an intrinsic element. The attitude of
"doctor knows best" is reflected in the comment that
most patients, no matter how intense their desire to be informed of their
condition and the available treatment options, deep down want to put
themselves into the hands of their physician and to have him or her do what is
"best" for them (ibid: 91).
The relationship that can develop between doctor and proxy decision-maker is an
important one principally because the patient, due to his or her inability to participate
in decision-making, relies on these parties to make the most appropriate treatment
decisions in the circumstances. Unfortunately problems arise in these relationships
through uncertainty about the duties and obligations of the proxy who is often
ignored in the decision-making process; Dubler (1995) offers several reasons for this.
The original case law on surrogate decision-making (Quintan, 1976; Saikewicz,
1977; Eichner, 1981) sought to protect patients from the "wrong" decision being
made by the proxy and attempted to produce legal standards with which to control
choices. These were intended to protect patients from decisions which were made by
self-interested surrogates who might decisions not in the patient's best interests, with
doubtful motives.
Deverette (1995) describes a different type of conflict that can exist in healthcare
situations, the conflict between clinical and ethical goals. The clinical goal associated
with healthcare decisions is to decide what will be good healthcare for the patient. In
most cases this will be treatment to cure the disease and good patient care. However,
this is not always the case. Sometimes good care can involve withholding futile
treatments, palliative care for a terminal disease and generally recognising
medicine's limitations. The risks associated with many treatments and surgical
interventions, the unpleasant and often debilitating side effects of many medications
and the need to justify these injurious features of good medical care are all areas that
may conflict with the clinical goal of good healthcare. These potential conflicts are
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some of the factors that give rise to the inherent complexity of decision-making in
healthcare {ibid. 78-9).
Advance Directives and Conscientious Objection
The principle of autonomy is often referred to as a basis for recognising
conscientious objection. While respect for autonomy is an important ethical basis for
the patient's right to refuse treatment, it can also apply to the doctor and in asking
them to carry out procedures with which they disagree, ignores their right of
autonomy. However, Wicclair (2000) believes that there are several problems with
this line of reasoning. First, only certain types of reasons (ethical or religious) are
valid conscientious objections. Second, it is possible to respect a physician's
conscience without respecting his or her autonomy -a doctor withdrawing from a
patient's care because he or she does not agree with the patient's treatment choices is
not the same as respecting the doctor's autonomy to determine the care a patient will
receive. Finally, respecting a doctor's autonomy does not automatically provide a
reason for believing that his or her choices are ethically acceptable but respecting a
conscientious objection can influence the moral assessment of choices and actions.
Wicclair explains this further by arguing that a doctor who refuses to participate in a
patient's care through purely autonomy-based reasons could be subject to moral
condemnation for that decision, while a refused based on conscientious objection is
likely to immunise the doctor from such condemnation (Wicclair, 2000: 212-13).
Rather than using respect for autonomy as a basis for recognising conscientious
objection, Wicclair prefers the physician's stronger claim of respect for moral
integrity and argues that appeals to conscience can be understood as efforts to
preserve or maintain moral integrity' {ibid). Moral integrity, according to Wicclair,
shows that the physician has core ethical values that are part of an understanding of
who he or she is and therefore be incompatible with the requirement to participate in
the patient's treatment choices in question. Nevertheless, it would inappropriate for
doctors to have a blanket right to use conscientious objection to enable them to
withdraw from patient care without facilitating the provision of other treatment. This
is why conscientious objection to certain treatments and procedures (e.g. termination
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of pregnancy12) are usually kept in check through self-regulatory guidelines. The
understanding that doctors can object in principle to advance directives is recognised
in the BMA guidelines, which indicate that management of the patient can be passed
on to a colleague (British Medical Association, 1995a: para 13.4, 35). Appeals to
conscience by doctors can be accommodated by transferring the patient to a
colleague, providing all parties are in agreement with this solution.
A more effective means to accommodate physicians' integrity interests without
compromising patients' rights and patients' interests is for 'physicians to clearly
inform patients in advance of any value commitments that will restrict the range of
services that the physician is willing to provide' (Wicclair, 2000: 226-27, emphasis
in original). The BMA (1993) advises its members to 'consider their own views and
to inform patients at the outset of any absolute objection they have to limiting
treatment; competent patients then have the opportunity of consulting another doctor
or re-considering their own stance' (Stanley, 1989: 130). The obvious situation that
comes to mind is that of the case of advance directives, where asking patients if they
have an advance directive at the outset of their care allows doctors to identify one
possible circumstance that may give rise to conscientious objection.
Rashid (2000) takes the issue of conscientious objection to advance directives further
by suggesting that an element of reciprocity can come into play. Patients' rights to
have their treatment wishes respected implies a corresponding right for healthcare
professionals to have their moral, religious and personal beliefs respected and not to
be pressurised into acting contrary to those beliefs: 'a patient's right of autonomy
should not be purchased at the price of the physician's parallel right' (Beauchamp
and Childress, 1994: 480). These rights will only be effective, however, 'if a
substitute for the healthcare professional expressing a moral objection to carrying out
the patient's wishes can be found' (ibid, 38). A solution to this dilemma reiterates the
12
The UK Abortion Act 1967 has a conscientious objection clause which permits doctors to refuse to
participate in terminations. The scope of the Act's conscientious objection clause was clarified in a
Department of Health Parliamentary answer in 1991, and in a circular (Health Service Guidance HSG
(94) 39).
In 1999, the BMA called on its Medical Ethics Committee to produce guidance on conscientious
objections in relation to participation in termination of pregnancy due to the harassment of those
doctors.
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need to discuss these issues with patients in advance, opening up a dialogue between
doctor and patient in terms of treatment decision-making.
Advance Directives and Advance Care Planning
Advance care planning offers patients an opportunity to gain control over their
medical care if they ever lose decision-making capacity (Teno et al, 1994). Ideally
this involves discussions with their medical practitioners resulting in a treatment plan
for the future and documentation of their informed decisions regarding treatment if
and/or when they become incapable or deciding for themselves (Teno et al, 1998).
Many advance directives have limited impact on decisions made for incompetent
patients' medical treatment because they do not result from counseling and only
contain vague instructions to physicians. Improvements in writing and implementing
advance directives are needed if these instruments are to achieve their intended
impact. These findings are based on the largest study carried out to date on the
impact of advance directives on seriously-ill patients in hospitalised patients in the
United States. The SUPPORT project - the Study to Understand Prognoses and
Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments - was a 10-year study of almost
10,000 inpatients at five teaching hospitals between 1989 and 1994 (Teno and the
SUPPORT Investigators, 1995).
The goal of the study was to understand decision-making as it relates to the process
of dying. It demonstrated that enhancing opportunities for more patient-physician
communication alone was inadequate to change established practices or increase the
uptake of advance directives or improve care and patient outcomes (Ibid. 1995; Teno
et al, 1997a; Teno et al, 1997b). Many types of intervention and outcomes were
studied including lack of clarity of advance directives, the quantity and quality of
discussions with proxies and physicians, the disturbing experience of dying patients
and their families and the importance of advance care planning in end-of-life
treatments. The last years of the study followed implementation of the Patient Self-
Determination Act, a federal statute aimed at ensuring availability and effectiveness
of advance directives, including an effort to improve advance care planning for more
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than half of patients by providing prognostic information and counselling by a skilled
nurse. Even after passage of the Act, only 20% of patients had an advance directive.
The researchers urge renewed focus on physician-patient communication and more
comprehensive advance care planning {Ibid. 1995).
A study by the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (1997) found that most
written advance directives are too vague to make a difference in the patient's care.
When the researchers reviewed the charts of 4,804 dying patients, they found only
688 written advance directives, of which, only three per cent (22) were specific
enough to guide medical practitioners' decisions about a specified medical treatment.
Among patients who had written advance directives, only about 1 in 10 had spoken
with their doctors when writing the directive, less that half had ever talked with any
of their doctors about having a directive, and only about one third had their wishes
documented in their medical records. Even when specific instructions were present,
care was potentially inconsistent in half of the cases and, furthermore, written
advance directives did not reduce the use of hospital resources.
At the turn of the century further reviews showed that the take up of advance
directives within the United States had not made much progress. Pollack (2000)
shows that 90% still do not have advance directives and that little improvement has
been made is discussions between doctors and patients about end-of-life issues with
Medicare, insurance companies and hospitals doing little to remedy this. Pollack's
conclusion is that this supports the case for listing simplified advance directives on
the patient's Medicare card.
A study conducted in Hawaii (Braun et al 2001) found that 29% of Hawaii residents
had a living will and 22% had a healthcare power of attorney. An analysis of a
random sample of all US deaths in 1986 found that about 10% of decedents had
living wills (Hanson and Rodgman, 1996) while more recent studies suggest rates of
15% to 25% among the general public (Miles et al, 1996). Compared with the US
mainland, findings suggest that Hawaii has similar rates of advance directive
completion in its general population, but higher rates of completion among adults age
65 and older (2001: 1710).
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Fewer advance directives appear to be written in Europe. An investigation of
attitudes towards writing advance directives in Germany found that 18% of cancer
patients, 19% of healthy controls and only 10% of nursing staff had written an
advance directive (Sahm et al, 2004). This was the first time such an investigation
had been conducted in Germany and the researchers observe that the low rates of
those who had written an advance directive corresponded with the results obtained
through the SUPPORT study in different groups of patients and among nursing home
residents {ibid. 439).
The highest level of advance directive completion and appointment of a proxy has
been noted when associated with systematic and comprehensive implementation of
advance care planning. In a study examining the effect of systematically
implementing advance directives in nursing homes on patient and family satisfaction
with involvement in decision-making and on healthcare costs, Molloy et al (2000)
found that systematic implementation of a programme to increase the use of advance
directives reduces the use of healthcare services without affecting satisfaction or
mortality. Dr Molloy and colleagues introduced the "Let Me Decide" advance
directive programme at three nursing homes. This included educating nursing home
staff, residents and family members, and offering residents (or next of kin of
mentally incompetent residents) an advance directive with a range of choices
regarding treatment in the event of life-threatening illness or cardiac arrest. Ninety
competent residents and family members of 305 incompetent residents completed an
advance directive. The researchers suggest that the results may have implications for
training of nursing home personnel and healthcare systems across Canada, the United
States, and northern Europe may be sufficiently similar that the findings could be
replicated in other countries (ibid. 1443).
In an editorial discussing the above study, Teno (2000) suggests that advance
directives are not an end in themselves, but rather 'they must be seen as part of the
process that includes ongoing communication about the goals of care and the
development of contingency plans that will ensure both that preferences will be
honoured and appropriate palliation provided' (ibid. 1481). Nevertheless, medical
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decisions ought to reflect patients' informed preferences and values and the findings
ofMolloy et al suggest progress in these areas {ibid.).
As life expectancy has increased, so too have the multiple complications associated
with chronic illnesses in the later years of life. Once the patient is unable to
participate in decision-making it becomes essential that plans be made in advance to
guide future decisions about medical treatments. Teno (1994) describes the goals of
advance care planning to encompass the following:
1. Ensure clinical care is consistent with patient preferences when capacity
is lost.
2. Improve the decision-making process through:
Facilitating shared decision-making;
Allowing the proxy to speak on behalf of the patient;
Responding with flexibility; and
Providing education.
3. Improve the patient's well-being by reducing the frequency of over or
under treatment.
4. Reduce the patient's concern regarding any possible burden placed on the
family or others {ibid. S32-36).
In a study to understand the role of written advance directives in medical decision¬
making through an examination of qualitative and quantitative data sources, Teno et
al (1998) addressed the question of whether physicians unilaterally disregarded
advance directives. The research showed that the effectiveness of advance directives
could be improved by approaching advance directives more as dynamic processes of
communication and negotiation about the goals of care rather merely formal legal
documents {ibid. 445). The overall conclusions were that physicians did not
unilaterally disregard patients' advance directives. The two factors that enhance the
role of the directives were surrogates who were available to advocate for the patient
and open communication between the physician and the surrogate {ibid. 445-6).
Finally in an editorial written in 2004, Teno comments on the 'striking increase in
the use of written advance directives'. From a report of a 22-state survey of bereaved
family members Teno and her colleagues estimated that 71% of persons dying in
those states had completed an advance directive before death (2004). Teno argues
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that increasing the use of advance directives is important, but cautions that they are
not sufficient to address the concerns of family members of dying patients.
Improving the quality of end-of-life care requires moving from a focus on
single interventions, such as the living will, to a focus on public policies that
use multifaceted interventions to provide competent, coordinated, and
compassionate end-of-life care (2004: 160).
Justice
The fourth prima facie moral principle is justice. This places a moral obligation on
all persons to act justly or fairly towards others in the context of respect for each
other's rights, in the distribution of scarce resources, and in the context of obeying
morally acceptable laws (Stanley, 1989: 130). Justice can be subdivided into three
further categories: rights based justice; distributive justice; and legal justice.
Advance Directives and Human Rights - Rights Based Justice
The right to refuse treatment while competent is not in dispute and is authorised by
case law in the UK (see Chapter One) and by statute (WGBO) in the Netherlands'. In
respecting an individual's autonomy the person's right to refuse treatment while
competent continues when he or she becomes incompetent if instructions have been
left in a validly executed advance directive. In considering treatment for patients
without capacity, the BMA (1995, 10:4) have devised some general principles which
constitute best practice. The patient has several rights, these include:
• Freedom from discrimination - the patient should not be treated differently
solely because of the condition that gives rise to his or her incapacity;
• Privacy and freedom from medical procedures unless there are good
therapeutic reasons for them;
• Confidentiality - his or her personal information should not be disclosed
unless necessary;
• Liberty - the patient should be free from interventions that inhibit liberty or
the capacity to enjoy life unless necessary to prevent greater harm to the
patient or to others;
• Dignity - social and cultural values should be respected; and
• Participation - the patient's views should be taken into account even if he or
she is considered legally incapable of determining what happens regarding
his or her treatment.
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Incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law confers a
responsibility on governments to ensure that individual rights are not violated
through legislation or otherwise. The right to life expressed in Article 2 of the ECHR
is an area that may be addressed in relation to recognising a refusal to accept medical
treatment. Human rights organisations believe that this is an area for specific
legislation and do not consider Article 2 to be fundamentally incompatible with
possible future legislation on advance directives (Liberty, 1991). The passing of the
Human Rights Act 1998 may mean that human rights arguments will be advanced to
justify the legality of advance directives (Laurie, 2001: 36). Article 3 (inhuman and
degrading treatment) may be useful to persons trying to safeguard their personal
autonomy in the shape of an advance statement.
A society that is seriously committed to the principle of self-determination gives rise
to an expectation to give legal effect to advance care planning (Teff, 1994: 143). At
present patients have no guarantee that their wishes will be respected and doctors
may find themselves facing a dilemma between respecting a patient's advance
wishes and acting as they see fit. The current solution in the UK in particular the,
absence of legislation and the fact that the case law is only now tentatively
addressing the issue is a further illustration of the gap between long-standing
rhetorical endorsement of self-determination and concrete provision for it
(ibid, 146).
Legislation, however, may lead to an increase in confrontation between doctors and
patients and a possible move towards greater litigation (ibid, 170).
As a footnote to rights-based justice, the antithesis of the right to refuse treatment
when incompetent would be the right to consent to treatment in a similar way. In a
challenge to General Medical Council (GMC) guidelines, Leslie Burke won the right
for treatment not to be withdrawn against his wishes when he could no longer
communicate. Due to a progressive condition, Mr Burke is likely to require artificial
nutrition and hydration in the future and GMC guidelines meant that doctors could
make a decision to withdraw artificial feeding if they believed that further treatment
was futile. Mr Burke argued that existing guidance provided to doctors by the GMC
contravened his right to life under the Human Rights Act 1998. Agreeing with Mr
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Burke, the High Court ruled that the GMC guidelines would have to be redrafted (R
(on the application of Oliver Leslie Burke) v. The General Medical Council 2004).
The Disability Rights Commission wants the guidance about "quality of life" to be
removed from the guidelines as there is too much scope allowed for a doctor's
personal opinion to influence the outcome of a decision about providing artificial
nutrition and hydration (Adam-Spink, 2004). This is a groundbreaking case, as it
recognises the ability of competent patients to require the establishment and
continuation of life-prolonging treatment in certain limited circumstances, whether
done contemporaneously or via an advance directive (Commentary, 2004: 315).
Advance Directives and Resources - Distributive Justice
The principle of justice requires 'universal access to an acceptable, decent minimum
of basic health care' (Stanley, 1989: 133). In the context of the allocation ofmedical
resources, conflicts exist between several common moral concerns. According to
Gillon (1994), medical professionals should,
... meet the needs of all who require it; when this is impossible, to distribute
healthcare resources in proportion to the extent of people's needs for
healthcare ... to allow people as much choice as possible in selecting their
healthcare [and] to maximise the benefit produced by the available resources
... (ibid, 183).
The Appleton Consensus (1989) agreed that the principal task of the clinician was to
assess other competing values and to make judgements about which
healthcare needs are most pressing and which responses to those needs are
reasonable and proportional (ibid, 133).
As ever-increasing costs for healthcare generate greater demands on scarce resources
and since the 1990s there has been an increasing emphasis on reducing costs in
healthcare. Medical ethicists have become 'concerned about the potential for conflict
between the desire to hold down costs and the duties of health-care providers to act
as strong advocates for those in their care' (McGhee and Caplan, 2000: 3).
Critics of advance directives have pointed out that they may be a way of saving
money. Teno's (2000) query of whether promoting the completion of an advance
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directive saves resources otherwise squandered on care not wanted by the dying
patient remains a tantalising question. However, serious problems would occur if
they were seen as a covert measure for reducing treatment costs or limiting the
amount of care given to the elderly and the terminally ill. If this were the case then
support for advance directives by healthcare staff could arouse suspicion and create
mistrust (Sommerville, 1996a). A study of the relationship between advance
directives, hospital charges and patient autonomy indicated that they were regarded
in a more positive light. In a survey of 474 patients over a period of three years
Chambers et al (1994) found that during discussions of advance directives, patient
often opted to limit the extent of care they required in certain situations. The results
imply that 'an enormous cost saving to society may be realised if such discussions
take place, while, at the same time, autonomous patient choice will be respected'
(ibid, 541).
Advance Directives and the Legal Profession - Legal Justice
Until the 1960s and the development of bioethics or health law, medical ethics was
the ethics of good medical practice, doctors were expected to act for the good of the
patient and specific rules of health law were virtually non-existent. The law respected
professional autonomy and upheld extensive discretionary powers for doctors and
only marginally interfered with medical practice (van der Burg, 1997: 95). Since
these developments, little further has been done in either Scotland or England and
Wales on a statutory front to emphasise patient self-determination, with only a
consideration of respect for a person's present or past wishes in section 1 of the
Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 and with no legislation as yet in
England. While speaking primarily of the law surrounding "allowing to die", Lord
Browne-Wilkinson addressed the problem as follows:
Should judges seek to develop new law to meet a wholly new situation? Or is
this a matter which lies outside the area of legitimate development of the law
by judges and requires society, through the democratic expression of its
views in Parliament, to reach its decisions on the underlying moral and
practical problems and then reflect those decisions in legislation? I have no
doubt it is for Parliament, not the courts, to decide the broader issues which
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this case raises (Airedale National Health Service Trust v. Bland [1993] 1 All
ER 821 at 878, HL).
The authority of doctors and judges to make the ultimate decisions in these matters
encroaches on the autonomy of the patient and extends from "allowing to die"
decisions to treatment decisions as a whole. English judges have traditionally
favoured the "best interests" test, which can be used to restrict patient autonomy in
favour of medical paternalism (Morris, 1996). This test was also used by the Scottish
courts in a case {Law Hospital v. Lord Advocate and Others (1996) 39 BMLR 166)
where the courts were asked to reach a decision about whether it would be unlawful
to withdraw artificial feeding from a woman in a permanent vegetative state. By
ruling that this would not be unlawful, the court applied a best interests test in
holding that further treatment would not be of benefit to the patient. However, as
McLean observes, the crux of the diagnosis was that the patient had no interests and
it was therefore impossible to decide whether the test had been met (McLean, 1996:
262).
Much UK case law has seen the judiciary 'pass the parcel of patient rights to the
medical profession, and so "by-pass" the central tenet of medical law, namely self-
determination' (Laurie, 2001: 32). Many judges in England 'have tended to hide
behind "clinical judgement" in cases which involve questions of medical treatment'
(Stern, 1994: 70); for example, according to Stern, the real question in Bland
{Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993] AC 789) was whether Tony Bland should be
kept alive and not whether the medical treatment he was receiving (artificial nutrition
and hydration) was effective in achieving this end.
The deference the law (at least in Scotland) pays to the medical profession in respect
of patients' rights is felt by Laurie to be characterised by:
• Grudging acceptance of the right to self-determination, including the right
to refuse treatment;
• Dominance by the 'best interests' test where patient competence is in doubt;
• Undue deference by the courts to the medical profession to determine what
should be meant by 'best interests';
• Serious reluctance on the part of the courts to intervene in the assessment of
best interests; and
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• Perhaps most surprisingly of all, the willingness of the courts to surrender to
the medical profession the responsibility for determining the scope of the
duty of care to patients, and the linking of this assessment with the
assessment of patient best interests (ibid, 7).
The English Courts have been accused in the past of being too deferential to the
medical profession in the past, but this has come to an end with a 'move to a rights
based society [which] had fundamentally changed the behaviour of the courts' (Dyer
reporting Lord Woolf, 2001: 129). It appears that the 'automatic presumption of
beneficence' (ibid) afforded to doctors by the courts has come to an end
Gillon (1994) states '... even if a person believes that the law is morally unjustified,
there is no legal entitlement to break the law and no justification to avoid the
consequences of doing so' (op cit. 185). A dilemma occurs when there is no clear
statute setting out the rules to be followed in a particular situation. This dilemma is
present in the use of advance directives and much attention has been given to their
legal status in the UK. The legal profession has a degree of authority in this matter;
while at the present there is no precise wording required in drawing up an advance
directive, expert drafting can only help ensure that healthcare professionals comply
with it. The question of whether a solicitor, in the absence of any legislation, is
legally obliged to inform a doctor that the patient has an advance directive may also
be raised (Mason & McCall Smith, 1999: 338).
Summary
Professional autonomy gives the medical and legal professions freedoms in many if
not all of their working practices. They enjoy a monopoly in their specialised work
and expect non-interference from outside agencies. Although this all contributes to
their professional power, professional autonomy may be being eroded by an increase
in individual autonomy, by further internal and external controls over professional
activities and by greater governmental involvement in setting standards and
guidelines, especially in relation to healthcare.
Individual autonomy is associated with agency and an individual's entitlement to
make his or her own decisions and formulate his or her goals. Autonomy for the
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individual patient is often in conflict with professional medical autonomy and
sometimes leads to an erosion of trust in medical decision-making. However
regardless of an increase in individual autonomy and a continued wearing down of
professional autonomy, most authors agree that professionals still exercise more
power than the individual client in law, and considerably more than the individual
patient in medicine.
Bioethical principles are well-established and are useful in informing medical
decision-making in the area of incompetency. Advance directives, as a tool for
extending patients' autonomy into the future, have, in the last decade, raised serious
issues of respect for individual and professional autonomy, personhood, and justice
in the medical, nursing and medico-legal literature. The idea of using anticipatory
decision-making as a method of extending personal autonomy into the future has
been welcomed by a majority of healthcare staff but a significant minority has had
serious doubts as to their efficacy and raised objections based on conscientious
grounds. Further disagreement is apparent in the debate concerning their legal status,




This chapter describes the methodology used in this thesis and contains a discussion
of the issues involved in the research. First, the aims of the research and how these
informed the choice of research questions are examined. This is followed by
discussions in which use of the interpretive paradigm, case studies and qualitative
research methods are considered. The following section deals with the research
methods employed in this study and details the information that was required and
who could provide it; the preparatory work completed before data collection was
started; and what problems were anticipated and encountered in obtaining this data.
The data collection methods are discussed along with a consideration of the research
ethics involved. How the data was analysed concludes this chapter with a brief
summary of the main points at the end.
Aims of the Research
As stated in Chapter One, discussion of living wills or advance directives focuses on
respect for autonomy. Many healthcare professionals have welcomed using these
devices as methods of extending personal autonomy into the future but the directives
may produce concerns when the professional's (most likely the doctor's) treatment
decisions are at odds with those stated in an advance directive. This has led to a
significant minority expressing serious doubts as to the efficacy of the advance
directive in preserving individual autonomy, especially where this may conflict with
the doctor's professional autonomy and inherent professional power.
Disempowerment encountered by patients and their families who have cause to be
come involved in the healthcare system often arises from a lack of knowledge and
ability to assert their wishes. Healthcare professionals often must make decisions
concerning treatment for persons who have lost the capacity to give or refuse consent
without any clear indication of the person's wishes. Relatives may have an idea of
what that person would have wanted, in such circumstances, but in the UK they
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cannot give consent to or refuse treatment on their relative's behalf and only a
statement made by the patient setting out what he or she would wish to consent to
may be a way of preserving the patient's autonomy. A document setting out that
person's wishes can help treatment decision-making for the clinical team and the
family and may allow the doctor to apply a model of decision-making more in line
with substituted-judgement rather than the more paternalistic "best-interests" model.
Conversely, the ultimate decision-making power of the physician may be affected by
an advance decision made by the patient and this may cause conflict between
professional autonomy and individual autonomy. Earlier research for an MSc
dissertation (Anderson, 2000) provided an insight into the policy processes involved
in decision-making for incapacitated adults, and as such forms a useful background
to this research which focuses on the decision-makers themselves: medical
practitioners, patients and their legal representatives. The ultimate aim of this
research - ascertaining how advance directives impact on professional and individual
autonomy and the balance of power between doctor and patient - was achieved
exploring the process of decision-making concerning medical treatment for patients
without capacity, discovering whether doctors take advance directives into
consideration when making treatment decisions for incapax patients and the ways in
which those most involved assess the adequacy of the present legal arrangements.
These aims give rise to the research questions outlined below.
Research Questions
Clarifying the type of research questions to be investigated - who, what, where, how
and why questions - assisted in refining which research strategy to employ. If
"what", "who" and "where" questions are the focus then they are exploratory and
depending on the form of the question, all five strategies identified by Yin (1994)
could be used, though surveys or analyses of archival records are used most often.
"How" or "why" questions are explanatory and preferred research strategies are
experiments, histories and case studies according to Yin (1994). Marshall and
Rossman (1989) have prepared a matrix that explains the type of research question,
the research strategy and data collection techniques for the different purposes of a
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study, this has been adapted to incorporate the data required in this research and
show how it fits into the matrix below (Table 3.1).
3.1 Matching research questions with research strategy
PURPOSE OF RESEARCH RESEARCH RESEARCH EXAMPLES OF
THE STUDY QUESTIONS QUESTIONS STRATEGY DATA
ADAPTED FOR COLLECTION
THIS STUDY TECHNIQUES
EXPLORATORY What is What are the Case study Participant
To investigate little happening in this issues Field study observation
understood social surrounding In-depth
phenomena. programme? treatment interviewing
To identify and/or What are the decision-making Elite
discover important salient themes, for persons interviewing
variables. patterns, and without capacity?
To generate categories in What are the
hypotheses for participants' significant
further research. meaning techniques used
structures? in each of the
How are these cases in question?
patterns linked How do they
with one link/compare
another? with one another?
EXPLANATORY What events, What models of Multi-site case Participant
To explain the beliefs, attitudes, decision-making study observation
forces causing the policies are shape this History In-depth
phenomenon in shaping this phenomenon? Field study interviewing
question. phenomenon? What rules or Ethnography Survey
To identify How do these laws determine questionnaire
plausible causal forces interact to the procedures Documentary
networks shaping result in the executed? analysis




DESCRIPTIVE What are the What significant Field study Participant
To document the salient factors occur in Case study observation
phenomenon of behaviours, the interaction of Ethnography In-depth
interest events, beliefs, professional and interviewing
attitudes, personal Documentary
structures, and autonomy? analysis
processes Survey
occurring in this questionnaire
phenomenon?
PREDICTIVE What will occur What might occur Experiment Survey
To predict the as a result of this if advance Quasi- questionnaire
outcomes of the phenomenon? directives were experiment (large sample)
phenomenon. Who will be used more Kinesics/proxem
To forecast the affected? frequently in each ics




(Source: adaptedfrom Marshall and Rossman, 1989: 78)
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Treatment decision-making processes used by healthcare professionals were useful
models in examining professional autonomy and doctors' attitudes towards advance
directives as part of this process. Documentary analysis established the legal
regulations surrounding treatment decision-making for persons with or without
capacity in each of the three jurisdictions. Then doctors and lawyers were asked a
series of interview questions to discover the policy and procedures adopted during
decision-making and their attitudes towards them, including the types of decision¬
making models used by doctors in deciding treatments for patients without capacity.
Challenges to doctors' autonomy and how conflicts between families and clinicians
are resolved were also investigated. Lawyers were able to provide data on the
circumstances in which the parties in medical decision-making seek legal advice,
however, in all three jurisdictions, it was clear that lawyers often made aspirational
statements about how the law ought to be and referred less frequently to how the law
actually works in practice. The last three research questions refer explicitly to
advance directives - doctors and lawyers were both able to give their opinions on the
legality of advance directives and these were compared with documentary evidence
from statute and case law of their actual legal status. Finally, attitudes towards
advance directives, medical decision-making and professional and personal
autonomy were investigated in order to answer questions four and five. The research
questions, which were set out on page 5, are reproduced below.
Research Question One
How is medical decision-making carried out, and how does this relate to statute or
common law provisions in the three jurisdictions?
Research Question Two
What are the processes of treatment decision-making for incapcoc patients and how
are they related to doctors' professional autonomy?
Research Question Three
How do doctors and lawyers view the current legal status of advance directives in
each of the jurisdictions?
Research Question Four




How do advance directives affect professional and patient autonomy and the balance
of power between doctor and patient?
Research Design
The Interpretive Paradigm
Research into healthcare situations often uses methods within the interpretive
paradigm to allow comparison between different approaches to decision-making or
treatment; between different sites where an intervention is taking place; and between
different spheres of regulation of practice (Keen and Packwood in Pope and Mays,
1999). The interpretive paradigm is not a single approach to research and it brings
together differing strands united by a phenomenological slant. Moreover, as a set of
overarching and interconnected assumptions about the nature of reality (Maykut and
Morehouse, 1997), and their normative nature, it is instrumental as a way of breaking
down the complexity of the real world. Understanding of the real world is best
achieved through observation, listening, asking questions, recording and examining.
The design of this research is takes into consideration the need to balance the
necessity for collecting unbiased data with the methods employed in obtaining that
data, for this reason, the interpretive paradigm would appear to be an appropriate
model for research on autonomy and decision-making. Its unique strengths lie in the
value it places on context and setting and the 'search for a deeper understanding of
decisions made by participants, and their lived experiences of the phenomenon'
(Marshall and Rossman, 1995: 39).
Case Study Research
In considering case studies as a research methodology, I reviewed how to best
answer research questions. As the nature of this research is mainly exploratory, the
case study approach, involving qualitative methods of data collection was considered
to be the most appropriate. Many interventions in the healthcare setting depended for
their success on the involvement of several different interested parties, so it is often
necessary to be sensitive to issues of collaboration and conflict: each party may have
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a legitimate, but different, interpretation of events. The strength of good case study
designs is that they can cope with, and provide insights into, complex real world
developments, with the "case" providing a source of explanations for wider
developments (Keen and Packwood, 1999). In this study, capturing the differing
views of doctors and lawyers was felt to be best achieved using qualitative methods
within a case study design.
Yin (1994) defines the case study method as an empirical inquiry that investigates a
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and where multiple sources of
evidence are used (ibid, 23).
Yin adds that a case study design has five components: the research question(s); its
propositions; its unit(s) of analysis; a determination of how the data are linked to the
propositions; and criteria to interpret the findings. The three countries investigated
within this research comprise the cases: the Netherlands, Scotland and England and
Yin's case study criteria are satisfied in the following manner. The research
questions13 are concerned with how medical decision-making is carried out; how
decision-making is affected by the medical profession's authority; and the effect of
advance directives on the decision-making process. Answers to the research
questions were obtained through 'conversations with a purpose' (Burgess, 1991:
102), with the appropriate persons about their approaches to their professional roles,
using qualitative research methods and adopting an interpretive and holistic
perspective.
The propositions linked to the data are that greater regulation of medical decision¬
making achieves a more equal balance in power between doctor and patient and that
advance directives can be used as a means of giving substance to the regulations.
According to Brownell (1995) the units of analysis are the cases themselves, 'as
opposed to the multiple individuals, situations, places and contexts which may be
implicated in a single case' (ibid, 64). In this research the cases are the countries
being investigated, each of which was analysed by conducting qualitative interviews
13 These are discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
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with doctors and lawyers and by studying documentation relative to the regulatory
process. This included statute and case law, consultation and policy documents, and
scholarly publications of a discursive and evaluatory nature on the current legal
arrangements in each of the countries in question. The data were linked through the
three methods of regulation14 of medical decision-making, in general, and advance
directives in particular, in each of the three cases/countries and the ultimate
comparison of these rules. Finally, interpretation of the findings was informed by the
extensive literature reviewed on the fundamental principles of medical bioethics15,
and the documents that were analysed prior to commencing fieldwork. The first four
criteria are discussed in greater detail within this particular chapter, the fifth criterion
is examined in Chapter Seven in discussion of the research findings.
Qualitative Research Methodology
Much research into the work of healthcare professionals involves interpretation of
decision-making using methods that are qualitative rather than quantitative in nature;
a tradition maintained by regular case study reports in leading medical journals
(Keen and Packwood, op cit). Qualitative research methods adopt a subjective and
holistic perspective, and by using methods of data collection such as in-depth
interviewing, rich and varied data can be gathered (Bulmer, 1986). In addition,
questions about behaviour, what people think and feel, about beliefs and attitudes are
most successfully approached through face-to-face interviews. Asking participants
about their experiences, within their own in work settings, can provide rich data for
descriptive and explanatory accounts of organisational processes, work practices, and
the impact of decision-making practices.
Case studies employing qualitative methods have been used by bodies that regulate
public services, examples include the work of the National Audit Office (NAO,
1998) and the Audit Commission (1997) in the UK. They have also been used in
evaluations, including studies of the introduction of general management (Pollitt, et
al, 1988) and business process re-engineering (Packwood, et al, 1998) in hospitals,
14
Statutory Law (Netherlands); implied legislation/general principles of statutory law (Scotland);
common law (England).
15 See Chapter Two
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and of general practice fund holding (Laughlin, 1997) in the UK. All used one or
more qualitative methods including interviews, documentary analysis and non-
participant observation of meetings.
Validity and Reliability
Many qualitative researchers emphasise validity rather than reliability; documenting
what occurs in an accurate manner may reveal inconsistencies, whereas reality is
dynamic, changing constantly. Low reliability could be consistent with high validity
if the social situation is continually in flux, or people might see things differently
because they are seeing different aspects, different levels, and different perspectives
of the whole which is far more complex than any single perspective/person might
see. Putting two different accounts together might result in a better understanding of
the whole than either one separately, even though the consistency between those
accounts might be rather low. Together, the two very different accounts, reflecting
low reliability, could produce even higher validity (Ratcliff, 1995).
For qualitative researchers, reliability in a form recognised in quantitative research is
impossible to realise because the research design is so flexible and the research
findings are produced by constantly changing interactions between researchers and
participants (Oka and Shaw, 2000). As Guba and Lincoln (1989) state, "such changes
and shifts are hallmarks of a maturing and successful inquiry" (ibid, 242). In this
research, interviews were in a semi-structured form and as such facilitated consistent
and reliable data analysis.
The concept of validity can be described by a wide range of terms in qualitative
studies, not as a single, fixed or universal model, but "rather a contingent construct,
inescapably grounded in the processes and intentions of particular research
methodologies and projects" (Winter, 2000: 1). Although some qualitative
researchers have argued that the term validity is not applicable to qualitative
research, they have realised the need for some kind of qualifying check or measure
for their research (Golafshani, 2003). Validity in qualitative research can be found
through several methods: divergence from initial expectations by consulting personal
notes; convergence with other sources of data by using a variation of triangulation
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and comparisons with the literature; extensive quotations from field notes, transcripts
of interviews, other notes; and other research data, such as archival data, recordings
(video or audio). Within this research, validity as a check of quality was achieved
through all of the above methods. Notes were taken during or more usually,
immediately after data collection in the form of interviews. These notes
complemented the interview transcripts when they were analysed using a qualitative
data analysis computer package (NVIVO). Triangulation was employed through use
of qualitative interviews and documentary analysis of policy documents, consultation
papers and texts of statutes and governmental papers. Additionally, extensive
quotations were used from interview data which was transcribed by an independent
person in order to reduce interviewer bias in process of transcribing. Quotations from
relevant regulations and guidance documents were also used to support and check the
primary data.
Research Methods
Two contrasting types of autonomy are relevant to this study: professional autonomy
and personal autonomy. Respect for autonomy was assessed through an investigation
of the decision-making processes and by questioning how the current legal
arrangements assist in protecting autonomy from both professional and personal
standpoints.
Documentary Information
Documentary analysis was the first step in this research: it provided a basis for
further investigation and freed up time to use other research methods as a means of
discovering answers to questions not readily found elsewhere. Documentary analysis
of the current legislative arrangements clarified each country's position in terms of
legislation and case law. In the case of the Netherlands, the Act on the Medical
Services 1995 and the debates that surrounded the passing of the Act were examined.
Dutch legislation is published on an English language website and English is widely
spoken in the Netherlands so few language problems were anticipated. Two months
were spent in the Netherlands and this optimism was proved to be correct. The Dutch
situation provided a basis for comparison with the Scottish and English positions.
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Legislative arrangements in both Scotland and England were already partially
addressed in my MSc dissertation (Anderson, 2000), which sought to demonstrate
how government thinking developed and changed in the process of consultation.
Further policy issues were investigated through the analysis of new documents, and
of national and international case law. The documents analysed include:
In the Netherlands:
• The Law on Medical Treatment Contract 1995
• Review procedures for the termination of life on request and assisted suicide
and amendment of the Criminal Code and the Burial and Cremation Act
(Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures)
Act 2001)
• Dutch Criminal Code
In Scotland:
• Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper: Mentally DisabledAdults, 1991;
• Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper: Disordered and Vulnerable
Adults, 1993;
• Scottish Law Commission Report: Incapable Adults, 1995;
• Scottish Office Consultation Paper: Managing the Finances and Welfare of
Incapable Adults, 1997;
• Reports, written and oral evidence of the Justice and Flome Affairs and the
Health and Community Care Committees of the Scottish Parliament, 1999;
• Scottish Executive Policy Statement: Making the Right Moves, 1999;
• Scottish Executive, Millan Committee on Review of the Mental Health
(Scotland) Act 1984, 1999;
• Scottish Executive, Millan Committee on Review of the Mental Health
(Scotland) Act 1984, 2000;
• Scottish Executive, New Directions: Report of the Millan Committee's
Review ofthe Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984, 2000;
• Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000; and
• Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003.
In England and Wales:
• European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950;
• Law Commission Discussion Paper: Mentally Incapacitated Adults &
Decision-Making: An Overview, 1991;
• Law Commission Discussion Paper: Mentally Incapacitated Adults &
Decision-Making: Medical Treatment & Research, 1993;
• House of Lords: Report ofthe Select Committee on Medical Ethics, 1994;
• Law Commission Report: Mental Incapacity, 1995;
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• Lord Chancellor's Department, Consultation Paper Who Decides? Making
Decisions on BehalfofMentally IncapacitatedAdults, 1997;
• European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 1997;
• Human Rights Act 1998;
• Government Policy Statement: Making Decisions, 1999;
• Hague Convention on the International Protection of Adults 2000; and
• Draft Mental Capacity Bill.
In Europe:
• RECOMMENDATION R (99) 4 of The Committee Of Ministers on
Principles Concerning The Legal Protection of Incapable Adults (Adopted by
the Committee of Ministers on 23 February 1999, at the 660th meeting of the
Ministers' Deputies)
In addition, published speeches, parliamentary debates, and draft legislation, press
releases, newspaper and journal articles relating to the above legislation and
legislative proposals were reviewed. These documents were examined to identify the
arguments for and against advance directive legislation and to show how ideas
developed and changed in the process of consultation. This informed the interview
schedules for both doctors and lawyers in the respective countries.
Case Law
A review of reported cases in Scotland and England and Wales was undertaken to
inform the subsequent research. It was necessary to examine what the current state of
the law is prior to asking respondents what they thought of it in interviews. In
addition to UK case law, European case law, and applications presented to the
European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court were also
examined. Little case law on advance directives and medical decision-making exists
in the Netherlands.
Preparatory Work
Earlier research carried out for my MSc dissertation (Anderson, 2000) attempted to
the following questions:
(i) Why did the UK government and the Scottish Executive decide not to
legislate for advance directives in the light of the recommendations of the
two Law Commissions and the Lord Chancellor's assurance that they
would do so?
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(ii) Have the UK Government and the Scottish Executive yielded to lobbying
by pressure groups that oppose legalising advance directives on the
grounds that they are the first step towards legalising euthanasia?
It concluded that lack of clarity about the status of advance directives throughout the
UK led to them being placed on the legislative agenda. However, the strength of
feeling by those who were opposed to legislation and the ambivalent reactions of
those who were in favour caused the Scottish Executive to have second thoughts.
This, combined with political considerations in one of the first Bills to pass through
the new Scottish Parliament, led the Executive to make a decision that was intended
to minimise conflict by dropping the issue from the Bill. Lack of time in the UK
Parliament at Westminster meant that incapacity legislation, which incorporated
advance directives, made little progress until recently. As a result, advance directives
still suffer from vagueness and lack of direction in legislative terms. In Scotland, the
Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 makes implied reference to them in its
general principles as taking a person's past and present wishes into consideration
when making decisions in the face of his or her incapacity. In England at present
advance directives are regulated by common law; by contrast, in the Netherlands
statutory rules govern advance directives16.
Development of data collection instruments
Developing the research questions was a very challenging part of the project and
much discussion and thought took place before deciding on the 'final' version.
Initially the questions arose from the research undertaken for my MSc dissertation
(discussed above) and further reading stimulated more questions with one question
leading to others.
Many questions emerged from the aims which informed the research, especially
those surrounding decision-making models and the possibility of competing
autonomies. My interest in how people behave in providing care for the incapacitated
- professionals, patients, families - shows that people relinquish their autonomy very
easily especially when they are already vulnerable. I was interested in retaining my
16
Reports of medical bodies are also important in Dutch Law.
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own autonomy, and was interested in whether there were others who felt the same
and if so, how could autonomy be retained? Advance directives can be frightening
but how do doctors feel about them? Very little research on this subject had been
done in Scotland, and I felt that there was much to be learned from research, in
particular from research which compared the position in Scotland with that in other
countries.
During my previous career in psychiatry I had encountered both more and less
impressive examples of ways in which medical practitioners made treatment
decisions. In some circumstances anything that came between the doctor and his or
her decision-making was seen as an obstacle and interference to effective treatment.
In others, doctors welcomed patient involvement in the decision-making process and,
of course, there were numerous variations between these extremes. Advance
directives could have been welcomed or ignored, given passing regard or taken
seriously as a decision-making tool. My experience also told me that, while the
subject could have been explored through a survey, interviews were a better way of
eliciting information from doctors. My knowledge of medicine and my familiarity
with medical vocabulary gave me the confidence to engage in face-to-face discussion
with doctors. My qualification in Scots law likewise contributed to any confidence in
carrying out interviews with lawyers.
The subjects I wished to explore were grouped into topics and themes and divided
into major and subsidiary questions which sought to address the five main research
questions set out on pages eight and 83 above. It was always an option to alter the
interview questions as the research progressed and this did happen following my first
interview with a Scottish doctor prior to embarking on fieldwork in the Netherlands.
Following my first interview with a doctor in the Netherlands, it became obvious that
some of the questions that might be appropriate and relevant in the UK turned out to
less important or even inappropriate in the Netherlands and the interview schedules
were altered accordingly.
The style of interview schedule was also developed through my knowledge of
medical practitioners and application of that knowledge to lawyers. I anticipated
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(correctly) that both doctors and lawyers would be less comfortable with a
completely unstructured interview and would be happier if I used a semi-structured
format to the interview. This was adapted during the interview with some
interviewees happy to let the subject take its own course while others were more
comfortable with a more straightforward question-and-answer format. The semi-
structured format was also useful in keeping the interview on course and within the
agreed time limit, something that was important for doctors and lawyers in all three
jurisdictions.
Data Collection
In deciding to choose qualitative methods, the nature and sensitivity of the topic and
the type of participants involved were taken into consideration. The next section
discusses the methods used: who and what provided the data; how interviewees were
selected; the following section describes how the data were analysed.
Blaikie (2000), states that there is no necessary connection between the type of
research method used and the type of sample but 'because qualitative methods are
resource-intensive, smaller samples must be used' (ibid. 203). This view was
considered in devising the sampling strategy. How medical decision-making and the
law work were elicited through in-depth interviews with doctors and lawyers in each
of the three countries.
Research was carried out in three locations: the Netherlands, Scotland, and England,
on a sequential basis. These locations were chosen because of the differences in legal
arrangements for advance directives. In the Netherlands recent legislation17 had been
passed giving a statutory basis to advance directives. In recent Scottish legislation
(The Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000) Ministers deliberately avoided
giving advance directives a statutory basis, but section 4(a) of the Act implies some
sort of legislative standing for advance directives. In England no such legislation has
yet been placed before parliament. The legislative relationships in terms of advance
directives can be viewed below in diagrammatic form.
17 The Medical Treatment Contract 1995
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3.1 Legal status ofadvance directives
In considering selection of doctors for interview, the clinical areas chosen were
geriatric medicine, neurology, and oncology. While there are few areas of medicine
that do not have the potential to encounter patients with advance directives
(paediatrics is the most obvious), these three areas potentially encompass a large
variety of patients who have life-threatening conditions and who may have made
anticipatory decisions about their medical treatment.
The areas of law thought most likely to have associations with drafting advance
directives or, more generally, with medical decision-making are wills and probate
and medical negligence. It was decided to concentrate on lawyers working in these
areas when approaching firms, but not to the exclusion of other potential areas of
expertise.
Interviews with 10 respondents in the areas of law and medicine in each of the three
countries were planned to be approximately one hour in length. They were conducted
at the interviewee's place of employment and were tape-recorded in all but four
instances. The dynamic aspect of qualitative research meant that flexibility within
this research design was able to accommodate difficulties in accessing respondents,
and differences in medical and legal categories in different jurisdictions.
The following two tables detail the anticipated and the actual composition and
number of interviewees in each of the three countries.
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3.2 Proposed interviewees












+ 1 other of above
Lawyers 5 wills & probate
5 medical negligence
5 wills & probate
5 medical
negligence
5 wills & probate
5 medical negligence
3.3 Actual interviewees





























1 wills & probate




Other 1 user of advance
directives
1 user of advance
directives
Anticipated and Actual Problems
Marshall and Rossman (1995) describe a form of interviewing which focuses on a
particular type of interviewee: elite interviewing. These individuals are considered to
be "the influential, the prominent, and the well-informed people in an organisation or
community and are selected for interviews on the basis of their expertise in areas
relevant to the research' (ibid. 83). This type of interviewing has advantages of
18 It proved to be difficult to select medical interviewees in the Netherlands in the same categories as
those in Scotland and England. This was due both to my lack of practical knowledge of the Dutch
healthcare system and to the different structure ofmedical specialities in the Netherlands.
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providing valuable information because of the positions the participants hold within
an organisation or profession: doctors, and lawyers fall into this category.
There are two types of elite interviewees: those who are specific key players and are
instrumental in, for example, forming or amending public policy. This group of elites
is self-selecting and therefore relatively easy to identify when selecting respondents.
The second group consists of the key decision-makers, for example, as in this study,
doctors and lawyers. Appropriate respondents within this group of elites need to be
selected by the researcher. In both types of elites gaining access is problematic due to
their professional commitments, and time constraints. Mordaunt (2000) describes the
technique she used to gain access to inspectors of prisons for research into four
government inspectorates through approaching an elite group of chief inspectors. She
warned:
Although there were clear advantages in choosing such an approach, it was a
high-risk strategy since only one attempt could be made. In such
circumstances very careful planning was essential {ibid, 4).
Heads of department in the medical schools in the leading universities of each
country were approached to gain access to doctors within the hospital setting. The
initial letters explaining the project needed to be informative about the research and
the researcher and 'set out clearly what access [was] required, so that no surprises
[were] sprung at a later stage' {ibid. 5). This also applied to the unsolicited letters
sent to solicitors requesting information19. Regardless of employing the above
techniques, access to both doctors and lawyers in all countries proved to be
problematic. Many felt that they did not have the expertise or the knowledge to
participate in the research, others were simply too busy and could not find sufficient
time for the interview. In the latter case, interviews were offered by telephone in a
written format. In the event, two doctors and one lawyer in England were
interviewed by telephone and two lawyers in Scotland completed a written
questionnaire. Across the board, however, both doctors and lawyers appeared to be
more willing to participate in interviews when they were assured that interviews
would last no longer than 45 minutes and that they had a degree of structure.
19
Copies of these documents can be found in Appendix B.
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Lengthy, unstructured interviews were anathema to the respondents in this research,
but paradoxically, once they had agreed to participation, many interviewees were
happy to speak at length on the subject, often well over the time limit they may have
stipulated initially.
It was necessary to be well informed and well prepared for the interviews - what
some researchers have called "studying up" (Pierce, 1995: 95). Like Mordaunt, who
found it beneficial to use prior knowledge from her career in public service, I found
it useful to use my experience of working within a healthcare team20 to enhance the
interview situation. A semi-structured interview format allowed a dialogue between
interviewer and interviewee to develop, enabling 'conversations with a purpose'
(Burgess, 1991: 102) to develop.
A potential problem of the elite interview was that of an interviewee trying to control
the interview and take charge. The terms and conditions of the interview needed to
be established at the outset with the interviewer retaining the ultimate control:
Once researchers agree to give others a veto power, their intellectual integrity
is compromised - even if they are mistaken. Researchers have the right to be
mistaken (Eisner, 1991: 175).
Fortunately, in this instance, this dilemma was avoided (albeit sometimes narrowly)
by being well-prepared, aware of the prospect of this happening, and not allowing
sidetracking by the interviewee. Preparation was to be the keynote feature of the
interviews. The warning by Fitz and Halpin (1994) was not to be ignored. In their
experience of elite interviewees they found that these interviewees
... set out their case not only in correct, connected English sentences, but in
paragraphs as well {ibid. 42).
This was indeed the case, even among some of the interviewees whose first language
was not English. In addition, Mordaunt's reminder and that 'elite interviewees take
no prisoners' (Mordaunt, supra cit. 9) was well heeded and appreciated.
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My background in healthcare consists of 17 years (10 years as a Senior Nurse) experience as a
psychiatric nurse working within the NHS.
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Ethical Considerations
Applications for ethical approval of research projects carried out in NHS premises in
the UK usually require ethical approval from the Research Ethics Sub-Committees.
On enquiry to the Medicine/Oncology Ethical Sub-Committee, confirmation was
received as this research was deemed to fall into the category of 'audit', for which
formal ethical approval was not required. Likewise, formal ethical approval was not
required in the Netherlands.
There are also ethical considerations in the conduct of interviews that deal with
sensitive and possibly confidential issues. Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1992)
assert that social scientists face a conflict between two rights: 'the right to research
and to acquire knowledge and the right of individual research participants to self-
determination, privacy, and dignity' (ibid. 78). While the latter is indeed a right, the
former may be overstated and should be seen more as a privilege as opposed to the
right to intrude into ethically sensitive areas. Nevertheless the ethical dilemma of
whether to undertake research if it interferes with participants' lives is relevant.
There is no absolute right or wrong solution to this problem, but the researcher has
an obligation to balance any costs to the participants against any potential benefits of
the research. This research did not deal with patients and did not ask for information
concerning particular cases; therefore the problems associated with interference were
of lesser concern, especially when the prospective participants were in positions of
power.
Interviewees have concerns about privacy and confidentiality and doctors and
lawyers were concerned about the issue of anonymity. In relation to anonymity,
interviewees were made aware that they might be quoted directly, but that every care
would be taken to avoid any identification of individuals.
Sites within the three countries took account of the limited financial resources
available and the time-constraints associated with completing a PhD. Interviewees in
the Netherlands were initially identified through liaison with a contact at major
university and teaching hospital. From there, further interviewees were found
through a snowballing technique with interviewees recommending names of other
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professionals who might be able to contribute either as interviewees or as contacts
for other respondents. Because medical specialties in the Netherlands are categorised
differently from the UK, the anticipated types of clinicians had to be reconsidered. It
seemed to be the case that doctors who had most involvement with persons with
advance directives were associated with medicine involving the elderly (both in
nursing homes and hospitals) and general practice. These areas of expertise made up
the majority of the interviewees with one surgeon included through a chance
encounter with a lawyer who asked him to accompany her to her interview. Lawyer
respondents were found using similar methods using a snowballing technique and by
establishing contacts with lawyers who were both interested in legislation concerning
medical treatment and who represented doctors in disciplinary hearings. Lawyers
comprised those who specialised in health law, civil law, a member of the Erste
Kamer2] and a lawyer involved in reviewing the changes to the Criminal Code
relating to euthanasia. Doctors and lawyers were located across the whole of the
Netherlands. In addition, one person, who had personal experience of writing an
advance directive, was interviewed. This person's interview data was not used in the
final analysis, but it was very informative in gaining an understanding of the
motivations behind the use of advance directives and giving a "real life" perspective
on the subject.
In Scotland, doctors and lawyers in Edinburgh were interviewed because of the
proximity of teaching hospitals to the university and because of easy access to a large
number of lawyers within the city. A direct approach was used to identify doctors
who could be contacted. Letters were sent to the heads of the relevant University
Medical School departments for assistance in contacting consultants in Lothian
Health Board. This method was successful in establishing contacts with doctors in
the areas of elderly care, neurology and oncology and the anticipated mix was
achieved with the addition of one general practitioner. This method was also
successful in establishing contacts with some neurologists in Newcastle through the
snowballing method of finding interviewees.
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Upper Chamber of the Dutch Parliament
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Information on solicitors practising in the areas of wills, probate and trusts, property
law, and medical negligence and reparation obtained from the Law Society in
Scotland was used to identify solicitors who could be approached. These areas of law
were chosen because of the greater likelihood of solicitors who had drawn up
advance directives or acted for clients in cases concerning medical decisions.
Initially solicitors were contacted by letter or email and given a brief explanation of
the research. Initially, many lawyers were reluctant to agree to take part in the
research citing to lack of time or knowledge of the subject, and consequently the
research strategy was modified so that the initial approach letter included the
interview schedule in order that the potential respondents were prepared. This was
more successful yielding 10 respondents including a Queen's Counsel who
specialised in medical law and a solicitor whose area of expertise was the law
surrounding incapacity. Eight of those were interviewed in person, two responded by
letter; of those interviewed face to face, one did not allow tape recording but did
allow note taking.
English doctors and lawyers were mainly based in Newcastle and Tyneside. The city
was the site of a large teaching hospital and an accompanying body of law firms
specialising in wills, probates and trusts, medical law and medical negligence. Initial
contact was made through one Scottish doctor who had contacts in England and this
led, through the snowballing method, to several other doctors who were willing to
take part in this research. Many doctors were interested in advance directives and
were happy to be interviewed; this was especially so with doctors who specialised in
palliative care and oncology. In fact, doctors in England were more amenable to
taking part in this research than their Scottish counterparts. Most doctors were
interviewed face to face, except for two who were interviewed by telephone due to
time constraints. All were happy to be tape recorded, unfortunately one tape was
corrupted and failed to produce any data from transcription. In this case the data from
the interview could not be used for verbatim quotations but the general impressions
and any information noted from the interview was drawn upon in the findings
discussed in Chapter Seven.
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A similar technique to the one used in Scotland was used to identify English lawyers.
A list of lawyers currently practising in England, their locations, and their areas of
expertise is available from the Law Society in both paper and electronic versions.
This was used to identify lawyers who could be approached. They were contacted by
letter, email or in person and given an interview schedule prior to the actual
interview. This was found to be the most successful method of finding respondents.
As in Scotland, it was difficult to find lawyers willing to be interviewed, but all
eventual respondents were interviewed face to face, except one where the interview
was conducted telephone. All allowed tape recording.
The snowballing technique of sampling used in all three cases works, in the strictest
sense, on the principle that each person studied is chosen by previous participant, and
therefore linkages between people become apparent. In this study the snowball did
not accumulate interviewees in such a regular way. Some interviewees would
suggest many others who might be possible participants, while others were unable to
make any suggestions of possible contacts. Although this was not the only way to
find members of the relevant groups, and many lawyers were contacted through the
appropriate law societies in the UK, it proved to be an invaluable approach in finding
interview respondents in the Netherlands. Likewise, it was a technique used
alongside initial contact with the heads of faculty at the two medical schools in the
UK cases; it was used more widely for contacting doctors in the Netherlands.
This purposive sampling technique was not intended to be representative as there
never was an intention to generalise from the data obtained in this study. The ability
to generalise findings to wider groups and circumstances is one of the most common
tests of validity for quantitative research and yet is considered to be of little, or even
no, importance for many qualitative researchers (Winter, 2000). Maxwell, (1992)
notes that sampling, a vital consideration in establishing the validity of a statistical
test, is usually purposeful in qualitative research as opposed to random. Qualitative
research almost exclusively limits itself to internal generalisations, if indeed it seeks
to claim any form of generalisability at all. These factors were taken into
consideration in the data analysis process and on the final conclusions drawn.
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Data Analysis
Documentary analysis was useful in acquiring background knowledge and in
determining the appropriate questions to ask interviewees, but the most important
analysis was that of the interviews themselves. A large volume of material was
collected and computer software helped speed up its analysis aiding more conceptual
and theoretical thinking (Barry, 1998).
Conceptual and empirical analyses occur simultaneously in case study research. Data
analysis is an iterative process, in which the researcher moves from the literature to
the data and back to the literature again (see Figure 4.2) (Zucker, 2001). All
interviews were transcribed and formatted for entry into a QSR NVIVO (formerly
NU*DIST) database. The software, designed as a toolkit for coding text documents,
was just used to create categories and code the data, and then used to analyse and
explore the coded data. Alongside this method of analysis, overall impressions and
ideas that occurred during data collection were added; the flexibility of the software
allowing field notes to be coded alongside the interview data. They were added to the
transcripts of the relevant interviews and used in the final analysis of the data. As a
"code-and-retrieve" software package, NVIVO separated the text into segments,
attached codes to these segments of text, and then found and displayed all text
segments with a given code or some combination of them. Even using the software at
this basic level, it was more systematic and thorough than the manual equivalent
would have been (Fielding, 1994).
After transcription, interview data were separated by country and then sub-divided
into doctors or lawyers. In the case of doctors, the major themes naturally developed
from the structure of the research interview, which focused first on treatment
decision-making and then on advance directives. In analysing the data on treatment
decision-making, six sub-themes emerged; for advance directives, seven sub-themes
became apparent. These are set out in Table 3.4 below.
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3.4 Doctors: emerging themes
1. TREATMENTDECISION- MAKING
1.1 Capax patients: how are treatment decisions made?
1.2 Incapax patients: how are treatment decisions made?
1.3 Power: how does it affect decision-making?
1.4 Decision-making models: best interests or substituted judgement?
1.5 Right to refuse treatment: are persons told of their right to do so?
1.6 Conflicts in decision-making: what do they involve?
2. ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
2.1 Doctors' definitions of advance directives
2.2 Use of advance directives
2.3 Hospital/Nursing Home admission: are patients asked if they have an advance
directive?
2.4 Legality of advance directives: do doctors view them as legally binding?
2.5 Overriding an advance directive: under what conditions does this happen?
2.6 Patient autonomy: do advance directives affect it?
2.1 Conscientious objection to advance directives: is this acceptable?
The sections of text in which these themes resided were then coded; in the software,
these codes are stored along with the location, or address, of the appropriate passage
of text, which specified where the information associated with a certain topic, could
be found. The software provides a variety of tools for manipulating the data records,
browsing them, coding them, and annotating and gaining access to data records
quickly and accurately (Richards, 1999). Although software packages provide a
variety of tools and formats for coding, principles are the same as when done
manually (Patton, 2002). The themes and sub-themes which were developed from the
interviews with lawyers are set out in Table 3.5 below.
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3.5 Lawyers: emerging themes
1. LEGISLATION
11.1 Background to legislation surrounding medical decision-making
1.2 Type of law involved in medical decision-making
1.3 Case law on medical decision-making
1.4 Court involvement in medical decision-making |
1.5 Capax patients: medical decision-making, lawyers' views
1.6 Incapax patients: medical decision-making, lawyers' views
1.7 Refusal of treatment: legal rights |
I 2. ADVANCE DIRECTIVES |
12.1 Legal status ofadvance directives |2.2 Conflicts in medical decision-making: lawyers' involvement2.3 Overriding advance directives: legal background
These themes are shown in more detail in Appendix C.
Triangulation - i.e. the use ofmultiple
methods and the obtaining of relevant
information from several informants -
proved to be a useful tool. It provided
a means of testing one source of
information against other sources;
correspondences and discrepancies
were both of value and enabled
interview data to be tested against the
documentary evidence. Robson
(1993) states that this method of
testing a hypothesis means that if two
sources give the same information
then they cross-validate each other. If
there is a discrepancy, investigation
may help in explanation (ibid. 383).
3.2 The data analysis process
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Triangulation was a useful method for validating information and improving the
accuracy of findings. Because conceptual and empirical analyses occur
simultaneously, analysis of the data is only part of free-flowing guide to forming
conclusions from the data. Analysis begins with the literature informing the
questions that make up the interview schedules and additional questions were taken
from significant topics originating from earlier documentary analysis. The interviews
were conducted over a period of months but took into account documentary evidence
generated in the previous steps of the process. During the data analysis phase, coding
was undertaken by constantly referring back to the documentary evidence in the
development of themes (as noted in the above tables). Various key words and issues
were grouped into a number of themes and specific trends were identified allowing
comparison of like with like where doctors and lawyers from each case/country were
compared with each other.
Reflexive Comments on the Methodology
Having completed the data collection and analysis and having answered my research
questions, I have had an opportunity to reflect on the methodological choices made
for this research and the changes that occurred over the period of this study.
Although it initially appeared to be appropriate to collect data, through interviews,
from an equal number of lawyers and doctors, this may not have been the best course
of action. Lawyers, as stated earlier, tended to respond to many of the interview
questions by referring to how the law ought to be rather than to what actually
happens in practice. To be fair, this was possibly because litigation in the area of
medical decision-making and advance directives is uncommon in all three countries.
Lawyers, particularly in Scotland, were reluctant to be interviewed and those who
did agree were often interested in the subject from a more theoretical rather than
from their clients' perspective. This may explain the responses received. It may have
been better to have interviewed fewer lawyers in each of the countries and to have
directed the questions towards clarifying the law. Alternatively, postal questionnaires
could have been sent out to lawyers asking them to outline their experience of
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advance directives with the option of returning to some of them to conduct
qualitative interviews in which they could have expanded on their comments. More
doctors and fewer lawyers might have generated better results.
Due to my inexperience as a researcher it was probably imprudent to tackle the most
unfamiliar element of the research first. It might have been better to conduct the
Dutch component of the research last when I had gained more experience in
interviewing and had more clarity of what I required in the way of data collection,
i.e. after conducting 40 interviews in Scotland and England. Unfortunately, this was
not possible at the time, as I had to act quickly to take advantage of practical and
financial arrangements that happened to be in place at the beginning of the research
project. Additionally, use of more than one city in Scotland and England might have
produced a wider range of responses.
Why use the selected methodology?
Reflecting on the methodology used brings various aspects of it to mind. The socio-
legal approach allowed me to say more than would have been the case if I had
adopted a black-letter law approach. Although black-letter researchers become
experts on the law in their particular area of research, I believe that socio-legal
research enabled me to address a wider range of questions and to obtain a better
understanding of how the law operates in practice. If I had adopted a black-letter law
approach I would only have been able to say what statute and case law stated in
relation to advance directives. Because there is very little case law in Scotland and
the Netherlands there would have been few definitive interpretations to inform my
analysis. I would not have been able to discover what the key players in the field
thought about advance directives, decision-making, the law surrounding these areas.
Social-legal rather than doctrinal analysis enabled me to these questions.
Although I concede that 1 could have collected more data through a larger scale
survey and that it might have been possible to generalise from this, and I accept that
there is a need for research of this kind, I maintain that this was not the project to do
this. It was interesting to find out what doctors and lawyers thought about advance
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directives, in their own words, with the freedom to explore wider issues when they
came up, with the continued security of a semi-structured interview schedule. I also
could have combined methods but this was not possible for a PhD - time, financial
resources and other constraints made this impracticable.
I think it was sensible to compare advance directives in England, Scotland and the
Netherlands: the differences in legal authority for advance directives were interesting
and significant and there were few, if any, language problems. The number of
respondents was manageable and at the same time sufficient. There were no ethical
issues or problems in securing access and the respondents, as key decision-makers,
were able to provide interesting answers to my questions which generated rich and
abundant data.
Key information was gathered prior to the interviews through an analysis of statute
law (legislation), case law, professional codes of practice and a review of the
academic and professional literature on advance directives and related topics. This
meant that I was as well informed as I could be prior to the interviews. I was also
able to draw on my experience in medicine and the law to enable me to converse
with interviewees on a more equal level. It also helped to persuade interviewees to
speak to me. On the other hand, it was difficult to access some potential interviewees
who refused because they did not have time or because they had little experience of
advance directives.
On a more practical level, I fell into the novice researcher's trap and generated too
much data, much of which I was unable to use. The scope of the interviews and the
background literature review were initially too wide. It would have been better to
read widely but to narrow the focus of the literature review as the research
developed. The main lessons learned regarding data collection were: not to ask
questions that are not required by the research; to concentrate on fewer research
questions and to investigate them in depth rather than too widely; because finding
respondents is always more difficult than anticipated; to be aware of the need to
trawl widely; and to recognise that everything takes three times as long as initially
estimated.
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It would have been informative to interview individuals who had written advance
directives and their families in order to obtain their views and experiences, however,
since these groups would have been extremely difficult to access, a whole new
research methodology would have had to be devised to incorporate this group.
Interviewing other healthcare professionals, in particular nurses, would have
provided a check on the answers given by medical practitioners. However, they were
not key decision-makers, and their opinions, while interesting, are probably not as
important as those of the doctors. The homogeneity of doctors' and lawyers'
responses within each country and corroboration by other interviewees made the case
for checking the validity of those responses less than pressing.
On reflection, although I acknowledge that many changes could have been made, I
am satisfied with the main outcomes of the research methodology as it stands.
Summary
Using an interpretive approach, a multiple case-study, qualitative research
methodology was adopted. The cases were three countries in question (the
Netherlands, Scotland and England) and qualitative findings were reported from
doctors and lawyers. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 10 doctors and 10
lawyers in each of the countries. A semi-structured interview schedule was
constructed using open-ended questions to collect data on medical decision-making
and the effects of advance directives on professional and personal autonomy. The
transcribed interview data was subsequently refined through coding (generating
themes) and, along with documentary material, the findings were analysed and
comparisons and conclusions developed.
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Chapter Four Analysis of Dutch Data
Introduction and Background
This chapter is divided into two main parts: one dealing with lawyers and the other
with doctors. Within each part, there are subsections examining the various themes
discovered in the interview data. Subsections one and two examine Dutch lawyers'
perspectives on the law surrounding treatment decision-making and advance
directives. The sections on the law and procedures are laid out at the beginning of
this chapter to serve as a background against which the reader can measure the
doctors' comments. Therefore, the following subsections explore doctors' views on
treatment decision-making and advance directives in this area. A similar format will
be adopted in Chapters Five and Six, which examine the same issues from the
Scottish and English perspectives.
All quotations are anonymous and identified by use of a number and two preceding
letters: D to denote Dutch and L to denote lawyer or a second D to denote doctor.
This chapter shows that all Dutch lawyers interviewed are aware that advance
directives are legally binding on their decisions and from a legal point of view, many
were happy with their status in protecting patients' rights. They believe that the law
states that medical staff should comply with advance directives unless there is a good
reason for overriding them and that doctors can be held accountable for ignoring or
overriding directives. While this option is open to families to challenge a doctor's
treatment decisions, this seldom happens in the Netherlands, where litigation against
medical practitioners is uncommon. Lawyers interviewed also consider the WGBO
to be a positive method of protecting patients' rights and autonomy and although the
doctors interviewed thought it had been unnecessary to pass a law to protect these
rights, lawyers felt it to be useful nonetheless. In particular, they believed that
advance directives in the Netherlands are felt by lawyers and doctors interviewed to
be a way of strengthening the substituted judgement model of decision-making, and
to emphasise or enhance decisions made by a patient's representative.
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In the Netherlands, patients who have capacity to make treatment decisions have the
right to refuse treatment, whatever the possible outcomes, and this right is not
disputed by any of the doctors interviewed; in most situations, doctors are happy to
allow those persons to express their will. In situations where the patient no longer has
capacity, a proxy often takes the patient's place in decision-making and doctors have
various methods of making decisions for the patient's medical treatment, together
with the proxy, employing either a best interests or substituted judgement model or
sometimes a combination of both.
Dutch law clearly instructs doctors to follow a refusal of treatment in certain
circumstances and when contained within a valid, advance directive but some
doctors do not believe they legally bound them. Doctors were not aware of the legal
status of advance directives and believed that if they were in doubt about the legality
of the advance directives then the doctor's view would prevail. Often, because of a
patient's medical condition, a directive is the only way to determine the patient's
wishes but doctors recognised problems in trying to respect a patient's autonomy
while fulfilling their duty of care. This conflict may extend to the point where the
doctor can no longer treat the patient and must refer him or her on to another
physician.
Lawyers
Ten lawyers were interviewed, who specialised in two broad areas of law: civil law
and health law. These are notional categories bringing together similar spheres of law
for the purposes of this research. Civil law included wills and probate, disciplinary
actions involving physicians, and general legal activities. All four civil lawyers had
other roles: one was a civil servant working in the Ministry of Health, one was a
university lecturer, one was a Senator in the Dutch Parliament,22 and one was a
member of the working committee reviewing the amendment to the Criminal Code
22 The Dutch Parliament is bicameral, with the equivalent chamber of the House of Lords in the UK
being the Erste Kamer consisting of 75 Senators whose main tasks are to control the government, and
to enact and amend existing legislation to changing circumstances.
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which legalised euthanasia. The remaining six lawyers practised health law, which
encompassed the law of negligence, medical ethics, and mental health & incapacity
law (BOPZ). Two of them were also part-time judges in BOPZ law.
All interviews with lawyers were tape recorded, except one, where instead, brief
notes were taken. The interviews pursued two main themes, both on Dutch
legislation: in treatment decision-making and concerning advance directives.
Legislation
Background
Statute in the Netherlands governs the law on advance directives. It falls into the
category of contract law and has been called a "Special Contract" (Markenstein,
1995) because it has extraordinary rules within the civil code. There are virtually no
reported cases relevant to advance directives as court cases in the Netherlands
regarding patients' rights are rare and lawyers seldom become involved in disputes
between doctor and patient. In cases where the courts do become involved, the
doctors' opinions are likely to be highly influential.
The current legislation in the Netherlands, the Law on Contracts for Medical
Treatment (WGBO), introduced an awareness of patients' rights into the civil code.
Before the Act in 1995, the Dutch Medical Society (KNMG), and patients'
organisations had agreed on a protocol stating how to deal with consent to treatment
issues. The Act, which is in fact an amendment to Book 7 of the Civil Code, inserting
Part 5, Medical Treatment, gave substance to patients' rights and established them in
statutory law rather than simply being a code of practice regulated only by the
medical profession.
The background to this law begins in 1986 when members of parliament and
spokespersons on medical issues became interested in the medical ethics sphere. The
Liberals and Social Democrat Government (The Purple Coalition) introduced the law
following a case of a woman who, after giving birth, lapsed into a coma and
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remained in that state for 15 years before the Supreme Court ruled that she should be
allowed to die. While the concept of futility was well-established, problems were
with stopping artificial hydration and nutrition until the courts held that this, too, was
medical treatment and could be stopped if the doctor felt it was futile.
Many Dutch Members of Parliament favoured the view that, if a patient decided that
he or she wanted no more treatment, then the doctor should not be able to overrule
this decision. They also believed that it should be law to have these wishes followed
if they had been written down in advance. These proposals had previously been
opposed because written wishes were already recognised through court decisions,
and so it was thought to be unnecessary to refer to them in the codified law; a
situation similar to that in the UK {Re C [1994] 1 All ER 819). The rationale was that
if advance directives were made statutory, it might cause a new problem, as people
might believe that by putting their requests on paper the doctor would be compelled
to follow them without any exceptions, which is not the case (DL09). A Senator, who
had previously been active in proposing the amendment to legislation, told how the
change was helped by the unusual coalition of political parties in power.
I thought it would it be possible that the Purple Coalition would be willing
and I had at least two or three professors of law help me write the
amendment. The Secretary for Public Health didn't want to oppose my
proposalfor a change to the law, but the Minister ofJustice did. However, he
couldn't get the Social Democrats to change to the other side and so the
proposal was accepted (DL05).
Type ofLaw
In many countries (including the UK and the USA) many rules concerning medical
treatment are left to self-regulation, codes of conduct, professional guidelines and,
like the Netherlands, decisions of disciplinary courts. In the Netherlands, it was
considered useful and even necessary to pass an amendment to the existing Civil
Code and other legislation in connection with the incorporation of provisions
concerning the contract to provide medical treatment, and therefore provide a clear
framework as a basis for patients' rights in treatment decision-making. The preamble
to the code states:
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Whereas we have considered that it is desirable to clarify and strengthen the
legal position of patients while taking into account the responsibility of the
care provider to act as a competent care provider, and therefore to incorporate
certain provisions concerning medical treatment contracts in the Civil Code
(Preamble).
While specific cases cannot be solved in advance through legislation, what could be
done was to lay down general guidelines, creating certain rules for healthcare
providers and patients (DL07).
It is common that when some kind of contract is used it is specifically provided for in
the code; for example there are special provisions on rental and labour contracts. As
far as the contract analogy goes, reciprocal rights and duties of patients and doctors
are unequal; there are many patients' rights and many duties for the doctor, which
may have been based on the assumption that it was necessary to make the parties
more equal (DL08). The doctor's obligations are wide (Art. 463), as are the
hospital's, which bears joint liability for any failure to comply with the provisions of
the treatment contract as if it were a party to the contract (Art. 462), departures from
the statutory duties are not allowed.
No limitation or exception can be made in respect of the liability of a care
provider or, in the case referred to in article 462, of a hospital (Art. 463).
As a situation where there are parties of unequal power involved (doctors and
patients), the legislators tried to improve the situation of the less powerful party, i.e.
the patient. The patient's obligations are narrow: to pay the care provider unless he
or she receives a salary or another form of payment specified elsewhere (Art. 461)
and to provide the doctor with any necessary information:
The patient shall to the best of his knowledge furnish the care provider with the
information and co-operation which the latter may reasonably require in order to
implement the contract (Art. 452).
Case Law and the Courts
Three years after the initial case that inspired the change in legislation, another case
advanced the cause to change legislation.
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The whole thing was a court decision, in 1989. A woman tried to commit
suicide but did not succeed, she was found unconscious with a note saying, "I
want to die, let me die. " Someone called the emergency services, and she was
rushed into hospital where they had about three minutes left to decide
whether to resuscitate. In this instance, they did resuscitate her, but since she
had given away her possessions this was reason for her to sue the hospital, as
they should not have resuscitated her. The court said first of all, and this is
the most important thing, that a written advance directive in which the patient
refuses something should be respected, but in certain circumstances the
doctor may be in doubt and then he should investigate, query the will of the
patient. In this case, there were several reasons not to doubt, but because this
was an emergency, there was no time (DL07).
The hospital subsequently appealed the decision, but it was upheld and this became a
definitive decision in favour of the binding nature of advance directives.
Litigation involving patient's legal rights is relatively rare in the Netherlands. In
disputes between doctors and families, lawyers seldom become involved. A situation
where a family wants their relative to have a treatment that the doctor feels is futile
would rarely end up in court. One lawyer explained the situation as he saw it in
Amsterdam.
[WJhere there is a court case you know that there were ten other cases which
did not reach court but were disputed and others where there was almost a
conflict (DL01).
Of course, lawyers do sometimes get involved with disputes between families and
doctors, and these disputes do, on occasion end up in court. However, the courts
seem disinclined to challenge the doctor's judgment, a circumstance similarly found
the UK courts. Another lawyer illustrated the point with a recent case.
The doctor said the patient should not be admitted to the Intensive Care unit
because medical treatment was futile. The daughter went to court to force the
doctor to admit herfather, the courtfollowed the doctor and said, "Ifyou say
it is senseless, then who are we to say otherwise " (DL04).
The first proxy, the person who is supposed to act if the patient becomes
incapacitated, is the legal representative, the curator, but few patients have such a
person as this position is quite formal and hardly ever is used. The mentor is much
more common and is the person who was authorised by the patient in a written
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document when he or she was still capable. As many people become incapacitated
without appointing a proxy the law provides for additional proxies. A hierarchical
order of relatives exists; the first is the spouse or partner and then the group of
parents, children, brothers, and sisters. If there is no one in that group, then there will
be no one to consent to or refuse treatment as no other person is mentioned in the
Law on Contracts for Medical Treatment (Art 465(3)).
When the doctor feels that the patient needs treatment, but the representative refuses,
this may constitute one of the exceptions mentioned in the Act which states:
The care provider must in the course of his duties have regard for the
standard of care required of a competent care provider and must act in
accordance with the responsibilities ensuing from the standard of professional
care required of care providers (Art. 453).
The doctor, therefore, may use the law to override the proxy's wishes if these wishes
would not satisfy the doctor's duty of care as 'a competent care provider' (Art. 453).
The Act does not define this standard of care and it is likely that the court would
have to ask the medical profession for an appropriate definition. Where the doctor is
not satisfied that a patient's proxy is acting either in the patient's best interests or
within the bounds of the patient's wishes expressed through a living will or other
method of determining his or her substituted judgement he can request the court to
appoint a mentor. Where a curator is in the first place responsible for the patient's
finances, the mentor looks after the health and welfare aspects of the incapacitated
person. It is a mentor who would be appointed (at the request of the doctor) if the
"family" cannot agree among themselves, or if the doctor does not think they really
represent the patient's wishes. Nursing home doctors say this use ofmentors is fairly
common. In the end, the mentor may be able to help each side come to an acceptable
compromise, even if the doctor has to acquiesce to some of the family's wishes
(against his or her better judgment) because the alternative is worse for the patient.
Capax Patients
All the lawyers interviewed agreed that even before the Law on Contracts for
Medical Treatment, competent persons always had the right to refuse treatment, and
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that all treatment usually required the person's informed consent (emergency, life-
saving treatment is one of the few exceptions). The majority of lawyers interviewed
felt that the public was aware of their rights regarding medical treatment and that
they knew what to expect when they visited their GPs or were admitted to hospital.
Nevertheless, it is not clear whether they were more aware of their rights because of
the Act. One lawyer commented that in her experience the Act was not the reason
people were better informed; the reason was that the public was less in awe of the
doctor as a powerful professional person and felt more able to ask questions, and
even challenge decisions23.
I wonder if the average patient is aware that there is a Treatment Act. I think
that patients are more aware of their position, and they don't see the doctor
any more as the authority. It is easier for them to complain when something
goes wrong, or in their opinion, went wrong. I don 'I think it is because of the
[Medical Treatment] contract, it's more a kind of development that people
have the opinion that they have more rights (DL02).
Physicians are not under any obligation to inform their patients of these statutory
rights, the Act is silent on any duty on a healthcare provider to explain formally these
rights to the patient, but doctors do have an equivalent obligation as the lawyer above
explained.
They don't have to tell the patient[s] about their contractual rights, but the
doctor has to give the patient information about the choices he has, whether
there is a contract or not. If he doesn't do so he violates his contractual
obligations and I think he also risks disciplinary action (DL10).
While there is no real change in the patient's right to consent or refuse treatment, the
doctor's, now statutory, duty to inform the patient of all his or her choices of
treatment (within what might be expected of a reasonable healthcare provider) seems
to establish a definite standard. This may be initially felt to be a step away from self-
regulation by the medical profession, but since the profession itself decides 'what
might be expected of a reasonable healthcare provider' then it is quite a small step.




When a patient cannot make any comment on a medical decision because he or she is
incapacitated, it possibly falls to the patient's proxy, to consent to or to dispute the
treatment decision. In any dispute on treatment decisions, the representative of a
patient without capacity may challenge the doctor's decision on behalf of the patient.
A problem arises when the representative disagrees with what the doctor thinks is
best for the patient. The WGBO (Art. 446), states, since there is a contractual
dynamic between doctors and their patients or the patient's representative, either the
patient or the representative must give his or her informed consent (Art. 450 para. 3).
If the patient's representative has prior knowledge of the patient's wishes, either in
writing or otherwise, then
[T]he representative cannot oppose his opinion. The [doctor and
representative] need each other and they keep each other in some kind of
balance ... That is the reason important decisions are not for a judge to
approve because we trust that the doctor knows enough and the
representative and doctor keep an eye on each other. There is a small margin
in this law for the doctor to say you are the representative, but what you
suggest now, I will ignore, because I have to conduct the care of the good
doctor, which is a condition of this law, and that gives him some space to
ignore the representative (DL08).
Therefore, the doctor must follow the patient's wishes, directed through his or her
representative while acting in accordance with a body of professional, medical
opinion having 'regard for the standard of care required of a competent care
provider' (Art 453). The above lawyer's view of the physician may be more
defensible as this 'standard of care' is likely to be based on the standards of the
medical profession as a self-regulating body. The doctor may be able to override the
patient's wishes by citing standards of care as an applicable reason.
Refusal of Treatment
Patients' consent is required before the treatment contract is implemented (Art.
450(1)), the corollary of this right is also the right to refuse treatment, and this is
mentioned in the Law on Contracts for Medical Treatment at Article 450(3).
Lawyers' opinions were therefore canvassed to discover whether they thought that
patients should be explicitly informed that they had the right to refuse treatment. Few
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lawyers interviewed had any specific thoughts on the more general opinion of the
right to refuse treatment; one lawyer reported that some of his clients were uncertain
about their course of action when they are informed that they can refuse treatment.
I think they are told that they can refuse it as soon as they start saying "Do I
need to say yes to the treatments? " There first has to be some kind of
hesitance, and then probably the doctors will say, "Of course, ifyou don't
want it you may refuse " (DL04).
The problem, from the point of view of some of the lawyers interviewed, is focused
on the requirement of doctors to explain the treatment choices to their patients (Art.
452). The doctor must tell the patient what he or she intends to do,
The care provider shall inform the patient clearly and, if requested, in writing
of the proposed examination and treatment and of developments related to the
examination, the treatment and the state of health of the patient (Art 448(1)).
On the other hand, if the doctor is 'guided by what is reasonable for the patient to
know' (Art. 448(2)) he or she can restrict the amount of information given to the
patient. This may be useful if the doctor suspects that the patient may refuse consent
for inappropriate reasons. However, if the doctor ignores the refusal of treatment
from the patient, this could constitute unlawful touching, which is a cause for
litigation. One firm of lawyers were
asking patients or family members to come forward if doctors did not follow
the refusal, and we are going to try to see ifwe can make a case (DL04).
On the more specific point of whether the patient should be explicitly informed of
the right to refuse treatment, only one of the lawyers interviewed was prepared to
state that the patient should be informed, but not necessarily in those exact terms.
I would like doctors ... [to] do more explaining the alternatives ... [it is
reported that] doctors do respect the autonomy of the patient, but they are
very much inclined still to take patients along with them on their way to what
they think is in the best interests of the patient and they should do more in
explaining the alternatives to the patient (DL07).
The general feeling amongst lawyers interviewed was that Dutch doctors did inform
patients of their rights up to a certain point and they would not go as far as saying




In the Netherlands, there are two types of directives, negative (a treatment refusal)
and positive (where the patient asks for something, e.g. resuscitation). The Law on
Contracts for Medical Treatment (WGBO) states that a written treatment refusal
from a patient, who cannot give consent to or refuse treatment, must be adhered to by
a medical practitioner:
If a patient aged sixteen or over cannot be deemed capable of reasonably
assessing his interests in the matter, the care provider and a person as referred
to in paragraphs 2 or 3 of article 465 shall comply with the apparent opinion
of the patient expressed in writing while he was still capable of the said
reasonable assessment of his interests and containing a refusal to grant
consent as referred to in the first paragraph. The care provider may deviate
from this if he deems that there are good reasons for so doing (Article
450(3)).
All the lawyers interviewed were sure of the legal status of negative advance
directives and that they were legally binding on doctors. They were also generally
happy with the law as a method of protecting patients' rights in medical treatment
issues. One stated,
Basically they [advance directives] should be complied with, but as the Act
says, doctors may be justified in not acting upon them, and that means that he
or she must have a good reason or they can be held accountable. This puts a
certain pressure on the doctor, and the family has a kind of instrument with
which to challenge him. This changes the positions of the people involved
(DL07).
The care provider can attempt to justify any deviation or overruling of the patient's
directive, that justification merely requires that the doctor may deviate from this if
'he deems that there are well-founded reasons for so doing' (Art 450 para 3), which
without any guidance on what constitutes 'well-founded reasons', does seem to allow
the medical practitioner to fill in the terms. While this imposes a certain pressure on
the doctor and it may offer the family a kind of means with which to challenge him
or her, but there is still no absolute duty to comply with the living will.
118
Conflicts
As mentioned earlier, lawyers seldom become involved when conflicts between
patients' relatives or proxies and the medical team arise. However, it is interesting to
see how conflicts in treatment decision-making are resolved and how patient
autonomy is protected where advance directives are involved. One lawyer held the
opinion that neither doctor nor representatives have cause to dispute the contents of a
valid living will.
[LJegally they have no ground to do so, because the living will is there, and if
it is correct, and all the demands are fulfilled, it's firmer than the opinion of
the representatives. If there is a problem with the family, it is not a legal
problem, it is an emotional problem, I think. Legally, it is quite clear, for me,
and it is for the WGBO as well (DL08).
While that appears to be reasonably clear, disputes do arise. Lawyers and doctors,
however, do recognise that they are best dealt with at as local a level as possible
rather than by resort to the law.
Sometimes you have these problems where there is not a [written] living will,
but the patient has said things on several occasions "I don't want them to
treat me if or when. " If the relatives, mostly the children, differ on what the
patient's will is, then it is difficult for the doctor, and he has to make a choice
(DL02).
This is a recurrent problem with oral statements of future wishes. Oral directives
have a difficult legal status as directives for advance care planning have to be made
in writing (Art 450(3)). The WGBO does not mention oral directives and the only
other method of expressing one's wishes by appointing a proxy. How seriously oral
directives will be taken when treatment decisions are being made is still unclear, as
some lawyers would give them similar authority to written directives while others
would not consider them valid. While oral statements can be taken seriously, they are
too easily open to misuse to overrule all other decisions by the healthcare team; at




Lawyers interviewed asserted that the WGBO allowed doctors to override an
advance directive provided they had good reasons for doing so. Examples of good
reasons given were that new medical treatments had emerged, the advance directive
was very old and had not been updated, or that there were concerns about the
patient's mental health when the directive was written. One lawyer said,
If there are new treatments and [the doctor] thinks the patient would have
decided in a completely different way if he or she had known of these
treatments (DL06).
Possibly this fact alone might not be enough,
When it is very old, there may be other circumstantial evidence which brings
the doctor to the conclusion that this cannot be true or this is so uncertain
that he cannot be responsible. There is no strict rule that it should not be
older than Xyears (DL07).
Many lawyers (50% of those interviewed) thought that advance directives should not
be overridden by doctors or healthcare providers, but lack of litigation in this area
means that the courts have had little chance to rule on this.
If the physician thought the patient was depressed when he or she wrote it, then the
directive could be at risk of being undermined. One lawyer would recommend that
clients have the will 'witnessed by somebody with authority who can diagnose that
"This patient was not depressed when they wrote this will"' (DL03).
Dutch lawyers have little experience in these types of disputes. Circumstances may
change when there is an increase in written advance directives and their subsequent
usage rises.
PatientAutonomy and Balance ofRights
The WGBO was designed to be a means of strengthening patients' rights and
redressing the balance of power between doctor and patient. While some doctors did
not believe that it was necessary to pass a law, which merely documented what had
been happening anyway, both doctors and lawyers felt it to be useful nonetheless.
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I think [the WGBO] can avoid a lot of discussion about what the patient
actually wanted. It is also something on which the doctors can base their
decisions, and a patient has to consider all the possibilities when he writes
down what he wants. It is different from the situation where he says to a
nurse, a doctor, or a friend "If this happens to me I don't want to be treated"
(DL02).
A study evaluating the WGBO has been conducted by Schools of General Practice of
various universities who reported to the commissioning agency. The conclusions
were that the law is achieving its goal of strengthening the position of the patient.
While this is felt to be reasonable, the study also reports that more could still be done
in terms of implementation and elaboration of the principles for specific situations.
One of the lawyers interviewed commented that the rights and obligations are not yet
equal, but it is a reciprocal contract agreement, and the emphasis is on strengthening
the position of the patient (DL09).
Dutch lawyers interviewed were generally sympathetic to the idea that living wills
could help promote patient autonomy, by extending autonomy into the future when
the patient is no longer able to assert their own autonomy. When used in certain
settings (AIDS wards were mentioned as an example) they can be very useful. They
are used also as a way of extending autonomy beyond treatment decisions, to decide
who would be with the person when death was imminent, etc. In these situations,
they can be positive.
Without advance directives there may be problems in respecting the autonomy of
persons who are incapacitated. They can used to support substituted judgements, to
strengthen decisions made by a patient's representative. There is also the unforeseen
situation where the proxy is not available to make these decisions and the living will
may be sole indication of the patient's wishes. Finally, rather than the autonomy of
the professional and the individual being on a pendulum, one lawyer felt that both
could be winners.
I think they are not yet perfect, but they are getting more successful, at least
they give the patient the right to tell the doctor, to argue. They strike up a
kind of debate between doctor and patient; at least that's what I hope. We
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have had accounts from clients where they worked, and where the doctors
said theyfelt it was better not to treat certain patients and theyfelt supported
by the declaration. Sometimes it makes it easierfor doctors (DL04).
Patients may need to have more confidence in challenging their doctors' decisions
and asserting their autonomy, something that may increase with future generations of
patients.
Doctors
Of the ten doctors interviewed, four were in general practice, four in nursing home
medicine, one worked in general medicine in a major teaching hospital, and one was
a practising surgeon. Of those ten doctors, three also had teaching and research
appointments at hospitals in three cities in the Netherlands. Unlike General
Practitioners in the UK, GPs in the Netherlands do not continue to care for their
patients when they are admitted permanently to nursing homes. Nursing Home
Medicine has been an organised medical speciality since 1990 (KNMG, 2004),
treating people at the end of their lives, and is therefore a useful specialism to include
in a study of advance directives.
All interviews with doctors were tape recorded, except one, where instead, brief
notes were taken. The interviews pursued two major themes: treatment decision¬
making, and opinions concerning advance directives and decision-making.
Treatment Decisions
Capax Patients
First, doctors were asked how medical treatment decisions were made for competent
patients in order to establish a basis for comparison with decision-making for those
lacking capacity.
General Practice
In general practice medicine, doctors often know their patients well and have long¬
standing relationships with the families. Several had been family doctors for many
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years and literally had been family doctors "from the cradle to the grave". Normally
the patient would make his or her own decisions and give or refuse consent;
however, in situations where specialist advice was required, many patients looked to
the GP for advice in making treatment decisions.
I think that, in the first place, people are responsible for themselves, for what
is happening with their body, and I can only give advice or treatment as a
professional. For me, being autonomous, as a patient, is important, and
mostly, this works out fine. Of course, there are some patients who want to
give their autonomy to the doctor, which makes it difficult if it comes to a life
and death situation. I tell them that I can give them my opinion, but still it is
their decision (DD07).
Visits to the GP usually increase as the patient gets older, with the majority of care
being given towards the end of life. The GPs interviewed noted that, in these
situations, patients, while still able to give consent, look more and more to doctors
for help in making treatment decisions. When this situation is combined with
specialist advice then decision-making becomes more complicated. However, the
GPs interviewed would normally encourage the patient to make his or her own
decisions, often with help. The patient will often return from a visit with a specialist
and tell the GP:
The thing is, the specialist says that, "well maybe I have a 10% chance of
living a bit longer and 1 have to have this awful treatment, what do you
think? We try not to make the decision for the patient but to counsel, to try
to find out what the options are, what the patient's opinion is what is
important for the patient and [then] try to mediate between the patient and
the specialist (DD06).
ft appears that even when GPs tried to preserve the patient's decision-making
autonomy lack of medical knowledge meant that doctors indeed did know best.
Nursing Home Medicine
Medical staff in nursing homes make qualitative distinctions about the levels of
consent some residents are able to make. While day-to-day decision-making are
almost taken for granted,
I think that most people can make their own decisions; you have to make the
distinction about what kind ofdecisions they make. Things like here and now,
123
do they want to eat, do they want to drink or do they want help to the toilet,
are simple things which people are able to decide for themselves (DD03).
Decisions that are more serious might require some help, but it is still important to
allow the person to express his or her will.
About the future, it is more difficult for people to make decisions, so you have
to make a division, I think about what kind ofproblem they have and the kind
ofperson they are, and make a decision about this problem, so you don't
have to say he is not able to make any decisions. (DD03)
General Hospital Medicine
Often, when a patient is admitted to hospital, consent to some treatments can be
verbal only, and like hospitals in the UK, do not require written consent. With the
progress of electronic file systems in hospitals a reduction in paperwork is becoming
commonplace.
Yes, we don't sign consents here, when somebody says okay then you write it
all in the computer, we have automatic files, so you write down, "I talked to
Mr. or Mrs. and s/he wants the operation " that's how it works (DD09).
Incapax Patients
Doctors were asked how decisions are made for patients who have lost capacity, and
for those patients whose capacity is in doubt. They were asked to explain the
procedure they adopt in ensuring that appropriate treatment decisions were made for
patients who had lost the capacity to give consent or refuse treatment. It was stressed
that this category of patients would have had capacity at an earlier time and that they
may or may not have made their wishes known to healthcare staff, friends, or
relatives.
The WGBO24 in the Netherlands is quite clear that informed consent is mandatory.
As soon as the patient becomes incompetent, the proxy, whoever it may be, takes his
or her place in decision-making and gives or refuses consent. Theoretically, the
circumstances are unchanged by the fact that the patient has lost capacity and the
doctor must have consent before he or she can treat and that consent has to come
24 See Chapter One
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from either the patient or a proxy. If there is no one else then, someone has to apply
for a mentor25.
... the residents living in nursing homes are mostly older women. They first
look after their husband, and then he dies, and then they become so weak that
they cannot look after themselves, and go into nursing homes. If that person,
whose parents are already dead, doesn't have children ... [or] ...brothers or
sisters ...it ends up that the mentally incapacitated person has no one to
represent them on a legal basis, and then you have to applyfor a mentor, we
do that quite often (DD05).
As mentioned earlier, the mentor looks out for the incapax patient's interests and
takes the patient's place in decision-making, particularly in give or refusing consent
to treatment.
In general hospital care, the family are routinely consulted to find out the patients'
previous wishes. There may be circumstances where these are not known, if this
happens then one doctor interviewed would ask what the family's wishes were, and it
was understood that the same is likely to happen with his or her colleagues.
Ifyou cannot communicate with patients themselves, you can communicate
with their family, and you try to get an idea of what they think the person
would have wanted in such a situation. That is something which is very
important, that's the way the doctors I know do it. Ifa person has never given
his or her opinion earlier, you do what the family would like, that's the way
we do it (DD02).
This might also be the case if a more serious intervention, for example surgery, was
thought to be necessary.
If they couldn 7 give consent, well that's for me to assess and to re-assess of
course, and we always try to make our decisions with the patient, however
incompetent or incapacitated he may be. But if surgical treatment is
necessary, we will discuss the treatment decision with the family or the other
representative to see ifthe family gives consent or not (DD04).
Following the WGBO the proxy or informal representative must consent to or refuse
treatment.
25
See section on lawyers and the courts.
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General Practice
General Practitioners take a slightly different approach. They may see patients in
their own homes in the final stages of a terminal illness and it is likely that decisions
will have been made in advance. However, in circumstances where this has not been
clarified, the GPs interviewed employed a system of consultation; one had a protocol
which was followed thus:
First, the physicians' [opinions], in second place the nursing care staff, and
in third place the family. The input of the family is highly important, but the
physician works according to medical standards (DD10).
A more detailed explanation of the practicalities of this system was given.
Most of the time you talk to the people who are there, and most of the time
there is no legal connection, so there is no official mentor or proxy or anyone
who is responsible. What you do is also assess whether these people have the
best interests of the patient at heart, and that is an assessment that is not
done explicitly, but more or less implicitly. You may see that the family is not
interested or the family is highly interested, or the family is emotionally
involved. The family must be taken seriously, for two reasons, because they
are the family and are involved, and they need to know that physicians have
compassion and that they have carried out theirjob well. [Then] they can live
with it if things do not work out positively (DD10).
Nursing Homes
Because of the nature of the reasons for admission to a nursing home, prior notice of
the patient's wishes can be determined ahead of time. A pragmatic approach to end-
of-Iife care is apparent in this branch of medicine in the Netherlands.
Usually, after the admission ofa new patient into a nursing home, we have an
intensive conversation with the patient and his relatives, or with the relatives
if the patient is incapacitated, to determine the medical policy, not only for
that moment specifically, but also for the future. (DD04).
When a patient does not have capacity, doctors still require consent for treatments.
While each of the three medical specialties follows slightly different procedures, the
general outcome is the same. The patients are consulted, as far as that is possible, the
relatives' and proxies' are also taken into consideration, if all this fails and there is
no one to make the decision, then the courts must appoint someone to take that
responsibility. How the decision is made is discussed in the next section.
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Power
Even when patients have capacity to make their own treatment decisions, there can
be an imbalance of power in the doctor-patient relationship. The medical
practitioners interviewed noted the impact of this power disparity. One GP felt that
some patients had 'trouble telling the specialist "No thank-you"' (DD06). The
inability to express their own wishes may be a precursor to relinquishing their
personal autonomy, and the elderly are the group most likely to behave in this way.
One doctor, when asked if that was because they thought the doctor knows best,
declared, 'Knows best? Knows everything! They have a great confidence [in us]'
(DD07).
The reasons why patients place that importance in the medical profession can be
widely varied and sometimes may be based purely on faith in the medical profession.
According to some patients, specialists and hospital consultants seem to have been
given extraordinary powers over life and death, while the GP may take on the role of
patient's advocate, increasing the physician's responsibility to help make the correct
decision. One doctor summed up the situation:
The power of being able to save lives is a mystery [to some patients]. The
patient goes [to hospital] and has no idea what the specialist can do for them
... it is nearly impossible for the patient to really be there and be a partner in
making the decisions. Some patients just say, "Okay here I am, tell me what I
should do and where to lie down, whatever?" Other patients try to be a
partner in this decision-making and to have GPs to be mediators. People who
ask for our mediation are better off because they realise that we are one of
the people who can help them get what they want (DD06).
There is a great deal of information available about health care in the Netherlands,
and there are many patient organisations informing people of their rights and the
possibilities of different treatments for a given disease. Television is an important
information source, and there is, of course, the ongoing debate on euthanasia. This
does not mean that people are resistant to medical advice, one doctor said,
Most people are rather well informed because they are interested in what
goes on in health care, [but] there are also people who think they have to do
what the doctor says (DD04).
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When the Dutch Government introduced the Law on Contracts for Medical
Treatment (WGBO) in 1995, doctors were legally considered to have entered into a
contract with the patient regarding medical treatment. The principle behind this law
was to balance the rights and duties between doctor and patient. However, the main
thinking among the physicians interviewed was that nothing had really changed; all
that had happened was that what was already taking place was put into writing, 'in
practice nothing has changed, there was no change in policy except that it is now
acknowledged by the law' (DD08).
Many patients in the Netherlands have trouble expressing their treatment wishes and
this may be an indication of an attrition of their personal autonomy. The elderly are
most affected and still feel that "doctor knows best". Patients still believe that
doctors have power over life and death and more information about medical
treatment is required. The WGBO tried to equalise the balance between doctor and
patient but Dutch doctors felt that the law has not made any significant changes
because they think the change had already occurred.
Decision-making Models
Decision-making for incapacitated persons can follow different models. Two
decision-making models are examined here: the "best interests" model, a
paternalistic type of decision-making, where the person making the decision
determines what would be best for the patient, often ignoring what the patient would
have chosen if that is different; and a "substituted-judgement" model, which gives
more consideration to patient autonomy, in which the decision-maker determines
what the person would have chosen. This choice may or may not coincide with the
patient's best interests (Brett, 1991).
A problem arises when trying to use substituted judgement, as it is never truly
possible to know what another person would do in specific situations. This is
particularly difficult when the incapacitated person has left no indication of what he
or she wished to happen.
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As a GP, ifyou have known the patient and his partner maybe for 10 or 20
years, know their children, know about their household, know how they
normally tend to react to complaints or diseases, then I think it makes it
easier to make the right medical decision. So that part of your decision
making will surely be that you know this patient and you know that he or she
is not the one who always wants the last possibility, but it's not that you think
that you know what this patient would do (DD01).
In this case it may be possible to accurately predict the patient's wishes, however, it
other situations this might not be possible. Many of the doctors interviewed tried to
use a combination of both substituted judgement and best interests, but where one
approach was required; there was a difference of opinion about which one that
should be. One doctor said, in the absence of the patient's wishes substituted
judgement would be used. If this failed, only them would the decision be made
purely in the patient's best interest:
In common medical ethics, the first rule is to get consent from the patient,
and ifnot, then to try to reconstruct what the patient would have wished were
he competent in the situation, and only if there is no way to reconstruct or to
get to know the wishes of the patient, then we go to the best interests
standards (DD04).
While another thought that best interests was a surer method of decision-making,
We have a very subtle difference here between knowing what a patient said,
trying to figure out what the patient would have said, which is quite
something else, and doing what is in the best interests of the patient. I think
that Dutch law recognises the first and the third of these three possibilities.
The second of these ...infers what the patient might have said ...I think it is
very shaky ground, because, this has been shown in several research articles
that substitutedjudgement by proxy is quite often a very limitedproxy to what
the patient would have decided, it's hardly better than chance (DD05).
Finally, the general physician summed up the dilemma:
Well, the paternalistic approach [best interests] doesn't work, and the
autonomy model [substituted judgement] has no legal foundation. The
autonomy model means that you have to respect the autonomy of the patient,
but that does not necessarily mean that you have to follow the requests ofthe
family, so what you do is you try to find out what the patient would have
wanted in the given situation and you try to reconstruct it. For that
reconstruction, you need the family, because most of the time you don 7 have
a prior experience of the patient (DD02).
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These three opinions are examples of how doctors try, in various ways, to make the
correct decision for the patient, whether by trying to put themselves in the patient's
shoes, trying to find out what the patient might have wanted through the family, or
by making a decision in the patient's best interests. Unfortunately, these differing
opinions are also good examples of how confused and confusing this area of medical
decision-making is for patients and their families, and probably even for doctors.
There seems to be a certain general agreement among the Dutch doctors interviewed
that they tried to employ a consistent method of decision-making - a combination of
the two decision-making models. Doctors working in general practice and nursing
home medicine who were interviewed felt that the substituted judgement model
would be used unless there was no way of determining the patient's wishes and the
family needed to help reconstruct them. However, not all opinions concurred, one
doctor had little time for either decision-making model but no alternative decision¬
making style to offer in their place.
The Right to Refuse Treatment
As mentioned earlier, one of the basic principles of personal autonomy is the right to
refuse medical treatment regardless of whether this may put the person's health at
risk. The right to refuse is only useful if the patient is aware of this right and
therefore it was relevant to discover whether patients are reminded of this right when
they are admitted to hospital, or a nursing home, or on their first visit to the GP.
Answers to these questions were mixed, but the majority of doctors interviewed
admitted that it was not something they went out of their way to remind or inform
their patients; there were several reasons for this.
Doctors working in hospitals who were interviewed said patients are not told that
they could refuse treatment; it is 'not said explicitly to them' (DD08). There was
uncertainty at whether these patients actually knew that they had this right and the
explanation given was that
... [this generation] ofpatients was brought up to behave in a certain way
toward the doctor. I guess patients nowadays know that they can say "I don't
want this", but I doubt that my patients do ...the new old, they know, people
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who are now becoming old, also the people who are now 60, 65 are
completely differentfrom the group already 80 or 80 plus (DD02).
Similarly, when a patient is admitted to hospital for surgery or some other treatment
they are not told that they can withhold consent to all or some of those procedures
because patients ...
... come to a hospital with a certain amount ofanxiety and a certain amount
of trust that the doctors will do what medicine provides in the case of their
disease (DD08).
General practitioners interviewed have fewer reservations about informing their
patients of the right to refuse treatment. One GP was able to explain why he thought
that some patients felt they could not refuse treatment, especially from a specialist.
He believed that most patients realised that they could refuse treatment, but that the
problem was twofold,
... sometimes it is not clear that they are in the category that should consider
refusing, and when they realise that they are in that category, it's often too
late to stop the process ... [and] ... people have the idea that they more or
less promised the specialist to undergo a certain treatment or tests, it's like
being unfaithful (DD06).
Another GP admitted that a nurse or a doctor would never say explicitly that the
patient could refuse but doctors would say, 'this is what I would advise you, but you
do not necessarily have to want it, or to follow it. It's up to you to make your own
decisions' (DD10). This is not termed as encouraging a refusal, but in a more
positive way, the doctor advises that the patient can choose between doing and not
doing something.
Doctors interviewed said that patients being admitted to nursing homes in the
Netherlands are not told that they can refuse treatment, nor is the family. One nursing
home physician expressed a refusal of treatment by a patient as a type of 'conflict'
and stated that,
we don't interact with our patients in contractual terms, or in terms of
conflict. Ifyou enter a nursing home and you need a physician who is going
to talk to you about what you can refuse or disagree with, that's typical ofthe
type of relationship we don't try to engage in with our patients. It is
commonly known that everyone has a right to refuse medical treatment, but if
people consent to come to the nursing home, they have consented to the care
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offered to them in the nursing home, so that is not the first topic when you
meet each other (DD04).
This doctor gives the impression that the patient implies his or her consent by
presenting themselves at a medical centre, hospital, or similar establishment, but in
law this is not taken to imply that one is giving consent to treatment. In the
Netherlands, the law states that
Procedures carried out for the purpose of implementing a treatment contract
shall require the consent of the patient (Article 450, para 1).
It might be assumed that to consent to treatment the patient would also be aware that
he or she could refuse treatment, but to be confident of this it would be prudent to
inform them of this entitlement. Many of the Dutch doctors interviewed, however,
stated that they might infer that the (potential) patient does consent to treatment just
by consulting the physician. Furthermore, there appears to be a belief that it is not
necessary to inform people of there right to refuse treatment, as they are already
aware of this right. For example, one doctor stated:
[There is an] implicit understanding, and most people in the Netherlands,
especially in the region where I am working, know what their rights are, they
don't need to have them explained (DD04).
One approach taken when admitting patients to a nursing home was that it was best
to discuss this issue when the time is right. While this might not apply to all patients,
this doctor would also reassure patients that if they did refuse treatment, they would
not be discharged. It may be that patients are fearful of refusing some treatments
because they believe they will be left with no treatment at all and this was given as a
reason by this doctor for not telling patients of this right.
[Treatment refusal was not discussed] on a routine basis, but then again, in
my opinion, there is such pervasive knowledge that you have the power to
define treatment, that you have the right to do that, it would be a bit
overdone, if the doctors asked for your consent before they treat you, if they
were to reiterate that every time. Of course, when the discussion focuses on
whether or not treatment will be chosen, then the doctors will say, "Listen, it
is up to you, ifyou don 7 want it, it's okay. That does not mean that you will
be out ofhere tomorrow, it only means that we won 7 do this or that. " I think,
actually, it is mentioned when it is needed, but not all the time (DD05).
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Only one doctor mentioned that there was a routine discussion with patients about
consent and refusal issues,
... when someone is admitted to a hospital there is a talk with the patient
about what ... we are going to do, we make a treatment plan, and we talk
about decisions like whether or not to resuscitate [or to take the patient] to
the Intensive or Coronary Care Units. That's all done in the first meeting
with the patient (DD04).
This doctor was speaking of admitting patients to a nursing home. She also stated
that people appreciated being asked these things at that time, and that while it
worried them, they were dealt with sensitively and in a non-paternalistic manner. The
doctor believed the reaction to the question was dependent on how it was asked.
There is a lot of information at first, but it is the best time to talk about it
because people are ill mostly, andmost things occur in the first three days, so
when you don 7 say anything and put the family together at the end of the
week, the most critical phase is over already, so we prefer talking about it
when they first come in. Sometimes people can 7 decide then, [and] we say
well, talk it over and come to us tomorrow or the day after and just tell us
and listen to the results ofthe investigation (DD04).
Although some doctors do speak to patients about their treatment preferences early in
their admission to their care, explicitly informing these patients of their right to
refuse treatment was often avoided. Doctors gave a variety of reasons for this, from
the paternalistic wish not to upset patients at an already anxious time for them to the
assumption that since they already knew of this right, to repeat it would be
unnecessary. Additionally, some doctors interviewed had the view that if patients
turned up for treatment then it was obvious that they wanted some sort of medical
intervention, they were unaware, however, to the fact that while a patient might
consent to some treatments, he or she might also refuse others. The important issue
of treatment refusal, like decision-making models, is that again it is open to
interpretation and clinicians' preferences and regardless of the reasons behind it;
there appears no real wish to broach this subject with patients in treatment planning.
Conflicts in Decision-making
Disagreements in deciding on the best treatment for an incapacitated person may
arise for several different reasons and between several different parties. The family
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may want a treatment for their relative that the doctor thinks is futile, or the doctor
may believe that certain procedures are worth trying, while the family want their
relative to have only conservative treatment or even that treatment be withdrawn
completely. When a doctor states that any further treatment is futile, the family often
may find that decision hard to accept, especially as futility is an often-disputed
notion and rarely an absolute. Other reasons can be rooted more in family
relationships and relatives may disagree with ceasing treatment because personal
issues need to be resolved. One doctor gave the following example of how family
relationships can influence decisions and how these situations can affect healthcare
staff:
This is a very difficult problem, because you as a doctor can say that it is not
usefid to give an [intravenous] infusion, to treat infections, or to give
nutrition by some means. Sometimes the family needs more time. So you have
to investigate why the family doesn't agree ... I remember one case, where
the son wanted to repair everything that was not good in the past, so his
father had to stay alive just for him to [sort out] his relationship. Then, it is
very difficultfor a doctor to say, I will finish this (DD03).
Sensitivity to circumstances such as this affects everyone involved in the patient's
care, because the relationship with the patient involves more than just medical care
and can become a holistic relationship with the whole family. This was particularly
obvious when speaking to doctors who work in nursing home settings: decisions that
are acceptable to the doctor may be very difficult for the family. In one case, the
doctor communicated with the family to find out what the problem was and to help
work it out,
we tried to come to a compromise to treat for three weeks or a month and to
see what happens then, or when another infection comes up, to speak
together. So it is not the decision of the doctor, it is the family, because you
know the family goes on with the situation after death (DD03).
These are a few examples of how differences of opinion can affect decision-making,
and how these differences are resolved may become more important than the actual
outcome; fragile relationships may be irreparably damaged through poor
communication. The doctors interviewed provided varied and important insights on
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this topic. One nursing home physician made the important distinction between
patients and their representatives making treatment decisions.
Let's put it this way, to a certain extent you [the patient] are allowed to make
stupid decisions, you can do or say irrational things, but your representative
cannot. The representative should always be governed by the best interests of
the patient, so he can't do anything without taking that into account, and that,
ofcourse, is something you negotiate (DD05).
The second thing that the representative must consider is what the patient would have
wanted if he or she had been able to make that decision. However, what is interesting
in this case is what the doctor says about the quality of the decision being made. The
patient with capacity has the right to make any decision, reasonable or not, about his
or her medical treatment. The decision can be downright foolhardy and even
dangerous to the point of death and no one, not even a court can ignore that. The
proxy or representative, on the other hand, must be prepared to give valid and
applicable reasons for the decision, and in this doctor's opinion, they would be in the
best interests of the patient. It is worth noting at this point that the doctor uses a "best
interests" primary criterion and presumably, substituted judgement was not applied
either because the patient wishes were not known or perhaps were too difficult to
justify, overall.
If both doctor and proxy agree that the best interests of the patient are the primary
goal, there may be a disagreement on what each believes these best interests to be. In
this interview, the doctor believed that the ultimate decision rested with the
physician. This may not be legally the case, but there is not enough information on
this particular situation to be sure, for example did the patient leave instructions with
a proxy for decisions to be made in certain way, or was there a living will? What is
interesting here is, the fact that the doctor is sure that his or her professional
autonomy trumps the views of the relatives on what the patient's best interests might
be.
It might be that the doctor's perception ofwhat are the best interests of the
patient is different from the representative, in that case, they should
negotiate, and each retain, I think, some responsibility. The doctor on one
hand has to argue to provide treatment or supply other types of care and
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always has his own responsibilities, so it is in a small minority of cases that
the representative and the doctor do not come together and do not reach a
consensus, I think the sentiment of the doctor will prevail, but only in the end.
Of course, the doctor has to have very good reasons for doing so, and as a
doctor must be accountable for that ...the doctor's will is law. I think in the
end, if the conflict cannot be settled in a satisfactory way, and then it's the
treatment responsibility of the doctor that wins, but that is only in the end
(DD05).
Communication is certainly a valuable tool for all parties involved, likewise being
given enough time to make a considered and informed decision. One hospital
physician described how she would tackle a difficult situation with a family.
Myself, I think most of the problems emerge because ofmiscommunication. I
think ifyou are able to tell the family exactly what you want and why you
want it and what the situation is with the patient at this moment. Ifyou are
able to tell them extensively about these things, most of the time you come to
the same conclusion. What you do ifyou don't come to the same conclusion
by, let's say, Monday, you say, "We'll wait and think about the decision,
we '11 speak to each other on Wednesday again. " That's the wayyou try to get
an agreement, you give people time to think about things, with the
information you have just given them (DD02).
One GP felt that many conflicts could be resolved through more information. The
approach taken is perhaps rather paternalistic, in that while the relatives may disagree
with the medical opinion, it is because they do not understand and if things are
explained more fully, then they will come round. As long as they have their say,
things will work out well.
Often you don't see it as a legal conflict but as a psychological difference of
opinion. Your first assignment is to find out why people have these opinions.
Often you find out that they have the wrong information, they have no clear
sight of the prognosis, ofwhat the effect ofor how fruitful it will be, so often
there is a lack of information, andpeople want to be heard (DD10).
The crux of the matter, from the doctor's perspective, is that eventually, the
clinician's duty of care appears to take precedence. If the family still do not agree,
then, according to one doctor, the only other recourse is court action.
As a physician, you have your responsibility according to medical standards,
and that's also what you explain to the family, and you also have to accept
that sometimes you don't agree and ifyou don't agree there is always the
option afterwardsfor legal reparation (DD09).
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The doctor may go further and refuse to carry on caring for a patient if the family do
not agree with his or her medical opinion or decisions. This is not allowed in the
Netherlands as the WGBO is a special contract, which protects patients' rights, and
the doctor cannot terminate the contract unless there are good reasons for doing so:
The care provider shall not terminate the treatment contract unless there are
cogent reasons for doing so (Article 460).
As the Act does not explain what these 'cogent reasons' may be, this article is open
to interpretation by the interested parties. There also is no suggestion of any the
alternatives for patients if their doctors do terminate treatment contracts. In one case,
a GP wanted to carry on with medical treatment, while the family did not agree and
wanted their father to die with no further medical intervention. When asked whether,
if things arrive at an impasse where he and the family cannot agree, he would carry
on with treatment regardless, he replied:
No, I would propose that they look for another doctor, because I am not the
right person and we do not get along (DD07).
This raises issues of patient abandonment and possibly a breach of the treatment
contract by the medical practitioner. There is a duty of the doctor, in case law, to
ensure continuity of treatment and to assist in transfer of the patient to another
doctor.
Sometimes the doctor is happy to allow relatives to make the decisions and to carry
them out even if they differ from his or her own. This final remark from a nursing
home doctor sums up the diversity of opinion and actions that may be taken in a calm
and straightforward manner.
If it's not harmful for the patient, their decision is right, but ifwe think that it
is not goodfor the patient, then we will do our best to convince the caregiver
that it is necessary. I think with decisions like that, ifwe think a person will
not get better by treating and the family does want the treatment, it is the
doctor who decides, that's also legal, I think. Pointless medical treatment is
not given (DD09).
Family relationships may cause conflicts and Dutch doctors may try to compromise
with representative in decision-making, but both of these conflicts can be resolved
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through passing on more information and through better communication. The patient
may make irrational decisions but the proxy/representative does not have that
freedom as the patient's interests are paramount and there needs to be valid and
applicable reasons for the decision.
Advance Directives
Definitions
The Dutch doctors who were interviewed were familiar with the concept of advance
directives or living wills. Most people obtain their living wills from the Dutch
euthanasia society, the NVVE, which supplies a document originally drafted by a
lawyer26. The definitions the doctors interviewed gave of advance directives were
largely comparable and doctors were eager for patients to put their wishes in writing,
but considered that having their signatures witnessed was not necessary. For
example, one doctor felt that it did not need to be witnessed, 'but I would require it
to be signed and dated' (DD05). Of course, this doctor was not strictly entitled, by
law, to demand that the directive be signed and dated, as the statute does not stipulate
that signature, witnesses or even dating the directive are necessary requirements. The
Act only states that,
a person ... shall comply with the apparent opinion of the patient expressed in
writing while he was still capable of the said reasonable assessment of his
interests and containing a refusal to grant consent ... The care provider may
deviate from this if he deems that there are good reasons for so doing (Article
450(3).
As the article states, the 'caregiver may deviate ... there are good reasons for doing
so' (ibid) The doctor could refuse to comply if he or she was unsure that the
document was written by the patient and this would be a good reason to insist on a
signature and date. It therefore, would be prudent to have the document signed and
dated.
26 See Appendix D for examples of advance directives.
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Another doctor also encouraged patients to put their wishes in writing but also to
discuss the directive with those involved in their care,
If they are capable, I advise [patients] always to write it down, also to
discuss it with their children, to get a consensus and I want them to give it to
me and Iput it in the fde, so I have it ifthey need to destroy it, or if they need
to update it (DD07).
Several physicians interviewed raised the differences between two types of directive,
one doctor stated
There is a difference between two types of advance directives; one is what
you call the negative living will, the treatment refusal or request not to be
resuscitated and the other one is what we call the positive declaration, living
will in which the patient asks the doctor to do something, for instance to do
resuscitation in case of cardiac arrest. The negative living wills such as the
treatment refusal have legal status in the medical contract act because it says
that the doctor has, in the case ofan incompetent patient, to follow the living
will, unless he has very thorough grounds not to do so. The negative living
will has aformal status and is binding (DD04).
Normally only a refusal of medical treatment is legally binding on doctors, but since
April 2001, patients have also been legally allowed to ask for euthanasia in a living
will.
The euthanasia declaration is a type ofpositive living will that has been given
legal status. It says that if a patient is incapacitated, but also in a state of
unbearable suffering, and there is a living will in which the patient requests
euthanasia, and it is applicable to the actual situation, then the doctor is
allowed to follow it. So the living will in that case replaces an oral request
(DD08).
The legislation does give recognition to the validity of a written declaration of will
regarding euthanasia (the so-called euthanasia declaration). The presence of a written
declaration means that the physician can regard such a declaration as being in
accordance with the patient's wishes. The declaration has the same status as a
specific request for euthanasia. Both an oral and a written request legitimises the
physician to accede to the request, however, he or she is not obliged to do so and
must take into account the due care requirements mentioned in the Act. The due care
requirements must be complied with, regardless of whether it involves a request from
a lucid patient or a request from a non-lucid patient with a living will. The Criminal
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Code and the Burial and Cremation Act (Termination of Life on Request and
Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act is amended to include the following
section:
If a patient aged sixteen or over who is no longer capable of expressing his
will, but before reaching this state was deemed capable of making a
reasonable appraisal of his own interests, has made a written declaration
requesting that his life be terminated, the attending physician may comply
with this request. The due care criteria referred to in subsection 1 shall apply
mutatis mutandis (Section 2(2)).
In addition to this positive request for treatment (or otherwise) a patient can make
treatment requests in an advance directive. As with the euthanasia request, the doctor
need not comply, but the request does satisfy the requirement of informed consent.
Some persons do not give much thought to their own treatment preferences until they
find themselves in a serious medical situation. In these circumstances, patients often
express their wishes orally to relatives or healthcare staff. Doctors interviewed were
reticent to give oral directives as much authority as their written counterparts and one
doctor would not consider an oral statement to be valid:
No, I don't think that I can, there is no physicalproof, I would advise them if
they have these feelings and are still capable ofputting down on paper, at
that moment, not to wait too long. If this didn't become known until the
patient was incapable, then I can always discuss it with their family or
relatives, but it is a little bit difficult (DD03).
Other doctors interviewed took a different view, and gave oral statements similar
authority to written directives, although some doctors believed they did not have the
same status as a written statement of the patient's wishes:
In my opinion, and I have said it since 1993, it's not regulated in the law, but
oral statements should have the same priority. I do not see any good reason
for not having that, as long as the oral statement is communicated to you and
not "I think that he would have said". At that moment, it becomes substituted
judgement (DD05).
In this doctor's opinion, oral directives merit some sort of legitimate authority. These
two opinions are examples of two ends of a spectrum, while the more widely held
view is probably somewhere in-between: oral statements of treatment refusal are
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weighed up and each case considered on its own merits, taking notice of the relatives
concerns and the patient's prognosis.
Use ofAdvance Directives
Despite the fact that advance directives are authorised by statute, it appears that
relatively few persons take advantage of using them. An example of the spread of
their use is illustrated in Table 4.1.
4.1 Dutch Doctors' Estimated Experience in Dealing with Patients with
Advance Directives
SPECIALTY OF MEDICINE ESTIMATED NUMBER OFPATIENTS WITH
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES27
General Practice ~ 2.5%
Surgical None
Hospital Medicine 10%
Nursing Home Medicine 30 - 35%
(Source: Interviews with Dutch doctors)
There are many people in the Netherlands who have living wills (the NVVE has
around 103,000 members). However, the great majority do not take steps to make an
advance directive until there is a diagnosis of a serious illness. As one doctor said, 7
think many people have the idea that a living will is only for people who have a
terminal condition' (DD06). Age is another factor that predisposes people to making
living wills. Many people believe that such a document is unnecessary, as they are
too young to need one and one doctor stated,
People who are younger than 60 don't really think about it, that they are
going to die, but I guess that people over that age have many more people
around them dying and that makes them think about it more (DD02).
Usually with age comes increasing bouts of ill health and more of the person's
contemporaries becoming ill and dying are factors contributing to more people make
living wills.
27
People can, of course, have a living will without giving their doctors a copy, and since there is no
live register of advance directives in the Netherlands, it is virtually impossible to estimate the
percentage of the population who have made such a document.
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When you get older and see people around you are older, and getting sick
and dying in a way you wouldn't like to die yourself, that's a reason for
people to make a will (DD09).
According to doctors interviewed who practised nursing home medicine, residents of
those institutions are a group who are more likely to have taken steps towards
expressing their wishes for future medical care (see Table 4.1). They may not all
have prepared a written document, but usually some discussion has taken place.
I don't think that among the general population, many people have one, but
in nursing homes, the percentage is a bit higher. We have several people,
who have not written down their thoughts, but they have thought about it, and
they have talked about it with their family. So, some sort ofopinion is there
(DD05).
Dutch doctors interviewed were keen for patients to use advance directives to
express their wishes in writing, but until people get older and more frail there is little
incentive to do so.
Hospital Admission
The majority of doctors interviewed would expect patients to be asked whether they
had advance directives when they were admitted to hospital, however, where they
disagreed was in deciding when the most appropriate time was to ask. Some doctors
interviewed stated that admission protocols in some areas of care meant that it was a
mandatory question, for others, there was a more considered approach. Unlike the
United States, where federal law (Patient Self Determination Act 1990) requires
healthcare personnel to ask all Medicare or Medicaid patients whether they have an
advance directive on admission to hospital, the Dutch Act does not impose this
requirement on healthcare providers. This flexibility allows doctors to determine a
suitable time in which to ask each patient, while offering more individualised care,
one doctor explained,
In nursing homes, it's my experience that, patients are often asked whether or
not they have certain opinions about what they want, but that's probably
because they are at the end of their life. It is not so typical of hospitals. In
several discussions at medical college it was asked whether it would be
desirable to ask such a question for all patients, and the general belief was
that it was not necessary to do so, they would rather have policies that allow
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you ask these questions when the time is right. For example, when patients
are deteriorating rather than do it routinely for elective surgery or whatever.
The drawback is that you will miss certain situations, people who suddenly
become incapacitated and you will not be able to ask for their opinion
(DD05).
The lack of any clear guidance or protocols for doctors on a national level means that
it will only be chance if patients are asked about their treatment preferences before
they are too ill to discuss them. The other option is for patients to broach themselves
with their doctors, something that patients may feel disinclined to do.
Legality
The Dutch Law on Contracts for Medical Treatment (WGBO) establishes in statute,
a legal contract between doctor and patient, and the obligation for healthcare workers
to follow a patient's written directive. However, some doctors interviewed took quite
a different view; they believed that they were not legally bound, and that if they did
not want to follow them, they were not compelled to do so by law. One doctor put it
bluntly,
No, a patient can put it down on paper that they don't want that treatment, or
this operation ... If it then conflicts with my opinion ofwhat the patient needs,
then they can find another doctor (DD07).
This doctor was in the minority of those interviewed and many more doctors were
sure of the legal status of advance directives. Nevertheless, if in doubt, they believed
that the doctor's decision would prevail.
I believe that doctors have to be sure that patients really knew what they are
talking about when they map out their life in advance directives. Ifyou are
not completely sure, you should not err on the side of death, but you should
err on the side of life. I would suggest that doctors who find them effective
know what their patients want and that they were serious about it. But you
will only find that out ifyou talk to the family, so this is really a process of
communication, not a process ofreading advance directives (DD10).
Three out of 10 of the doctors interviewed believed advance directives legally bound
them and that they should be followed unless they had good reason to override them.
While many of the doctors interviewed were aware of the legal standing of advance
directives, up to some point, their responses at interview shows the divergent
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professional views of that position. This important theme emphasises the gap
between the legal framework and the practical realities of this area of medical law,
and this will be expanded upon in Chapter seven in discussion and comparison with
responses from doctors in Scotland and England.
Overriding an Advance Directive
The Medical Treatment Act states that a patient's clearly expressed refusal of
medical treatment must be followed and the 'care provider may deviate from this if
he deems that there are good reasons for so doing' (Art. 450(3)). These 'good
reasons' can form the circumstances in which a doctor could override an advance
directive, and their interpretation of the law may allow some doctors an escape route,
especially since the medical profession self-regulates and sets its own standards.
The law is there to be interpreted and translated into reality. First ofall the
law says that I am obliged to follow the living will, unless I have thorough
grounds not to do so. Second, the law states that as a physician, I am obliged
to give the care ofa good healthcare professional [Art. 453], which relates to
the rules ofpractice that we as a profession have made together. I can make
the law less strong because it [professional procedure] is something we
devise as doctors ourselves, is not imposed on us by law, so we can make our
own policy on how to deal with living wills in these two ways (DD04).
This doctor confirms the notion that doctors interpret the law and to decide how to
deal with living wills.
There may be more pragmatic reasons for physicians to override a treatment refusal.
One example was given by a GP, who had many elderly patients in his practice,
A patient with dementia, who is severely ill with pneumonia, has a non-
treatment contract. If I follow the non-treatment contract, I can't give him
any antibiotics. Some people think that ifyou don't treat a pneumonia, the
patient dies, but that it not true, that is something from the nineteenth
century, the old man's friend. ... A pneumonia that can be considered the
"old man's friend", is one which is accompanied by very few clinical
symptoms: the patient is moderately ill, has only a slight fever, and gets
sleepy. The type ofpneumonia that when left untreated, you slip away, and if
you treat it the patient will still slip away because the machinery is off, the
body is off. But in a full-blown pneumonia, in a vital dementedpatient who is
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coughing and has a very high fever, if I don 7 treat him, he will have an
extension of his disease, he will have lost some pulmonary tissue, but he
won 7 die. He will become worse, he will be more ill, it will exhaust him, and
after the pneumonia has gone, he will have pulmonary problems. In that case,
we do give the patient penicillin and we do that under the policy ofpalliative
care (DD04).
This scenario shows that misguided beliefs and lack of medical knowledge may force
the doctor to override the directive in order to 'have regard for the standard of care
required of a competent care provider' (Art. 453). He therefore 'must act in
accordance with the responsibilities ensuing from the standard of professional care
required of care providers' (ibid). In these circumstances, the patient's autonomy, as
previously expressed wishes, will be overridden with the full backing of statute and
probably of the medical profession.
Patient Autonomy
Advance directives may be a reliable method of safeguarding a person's autonomy at
a time when the person no longer has the ability to make choices. For example, a
patient who had no surviving family may rely on an advance directive to help the
doctor find out his or her wishes. If the patient requires a mentor to be appointed by
the court to make treatment decisions, an advance directive may play an important
role in treatment decision-making. One GP felt that ' if it is clear that this is the will
ofmy patient then I will follow it. That is the reason I pay a lot of attention to the
living will' (DD01).
There may be concerns in protecting the patient's autonomy via the living will. For
example, certain medical conditions may alter the patient's autonomy to such an
extent that the advance directive may be the only way for the doctor to determine the
patient's wishes.
Is it advisory or not? In my opinion, a living will, in the case ofa patient in a
persistent vegetative state, is more important and has more power, than the
case ofa dementedpatient, because you can 7 talk with the [PVS] patient any
more, and it gives you a possibility to stop the machines. That is very clear
(DD04).
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Furthermore, the question of how important the person's autonomy has become in
the face of his or her illness is also relevant.
There are always two problems with advance directives: those [written] too
far in advance, and several years later, become effective; the other, do you
believe the autonomous self who once said he would not be happy being
demented or do you believe the present person who is not competent, but
seems to be happy? You can only answer this ifyou first ask the question
"how important do you think autonomy is? ", and we tend to think it is very
important, so we accept the risks, but in other societies, it's the other way
around, it would be stupid to follow the advance directive (DD05).
It might be said that this particular doctor regarded the patient's autonomy as being
less important than the doctor's own professional autonomy. However, some doctors
interviewed believed patients' autonomy to be equally important as their own, and
thus respected as such.
The doctor has the right to do things and refrain from things in his own
domain, but as a professional, he should do his job and in the profession ofa
doctor. It must be quite clear that the patient is not a thing you can bend or
you can divide in two or whatever, he is a human being having the same
rights as you as a doctor (DD06).
The dilemma seems to be one of trying to respect patient autonomy while following
two of the basic tenets of medical bioethics: beneficence and nonmaleficence. The
doctor is trapped between respecting a patient's autonomy, which may involve a
request to withdraw treatment, and his or her duty of care to benefit the patient
(beneficence) and to do no harm (nonmaleficence). The advance directive might be
able to help with difficult medical decision-making and whether to allow medical
autonomy to overrule the earlier expressed individual autonomy of the patient.
Elderly patients often belong to the "doctor knows best" generation and are not
inclined to challenge their doctors' decisions. In other situations, respect for a
patient's autonomy may compromise the doctor's duty of care or at least the doctor's
concept of his or her duty of care. If a patient requires an operation to save his or her
life, but refuses to consent to surgery, a doctor may believe that his or her duty of
care is at risk. If the patient is competent then the doctor cannot be held responsible
for any harm that comes to the patient, the legal aspect of autonomy being that
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patients have the right to refuse medical intervention - a negative declaration of will.
The converse being that the doctor may need to prove a patient chose a particular
course of action by means of an advance directive. This situation confronts doctors
everyday, and is expressed clearly by this GP,
It affects me several times a day in my clinic, because nearly every patient
has a mind and an opinion that is not congruent with mypoint ofview. Many
patients I see are coughing and have asthma and still go on smoking, nearly
everyone consults me is obese etc. Already there is an enormous difference
between what I think, from a medical point of view, should be the best action
and what people like to do and how they like to live, but my calculation of
risks is extremely different from what people themselves decide and want
(DD05).
The conflict was also expressed by this doctor,
If the patient refuses your care then you don't have a duty, and therefore
there is no conflict. If a patient said, "I don't want to be treated", or "I do
want to be treated, but only this and excluding that" then that is okay. Of
course, if it was against my principles, then I would have a duty to explain to
the patient about the possible outcomes, but if he says "Well, listen doctor,
thank-you for all these explanations, andyour time, but it's still my decision,
my belief my feeling, and I don't want to do it, " then that's it (DD07).
The above doctors' opinions are straightforward, but when the patient is in a more
serious condition, the outlook may be less clear. A physician who visited a patient at
home with a suspected heart attack told this story.
The patient says "Well, thank-you doctor for coming so quickly, and thank-
you for diagnosing a heart attack, and what can you do to relieve the pain?
Now please let me stay in the house, because I like that" and you try to
explain, that this is impossible because if he stays there this might happen or
that might happen. I am afraid that sometimes these patients simply get more
and more sick until the moment when one says, "We don't know what to do,
and we cannot let this person lie here and die". Then the ambulance is
called, and the patient is too sick to say no (DD06).
In these situations, it eventually comes to the point where the patient cannot make the
decision for himself, so the doctor has to decide anyway. By respecting the patient's
autonomy to make his own decisions, the doctor's perception of his or her duty of
care may be affected, because the patient is becoming more ill perhaps because of his
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or her autonomy. When this was put to the above doctor, the response was as
follows:
No, the problem sometimes is that ill people are just as wise or unwise as
people who are not sick, so a person who wants to stay at home sometimes
does not see the whole picture of that decision. It is one thing to tell the
doctor "I want to stay at home. " but it is another to realise what happens. It
is not up to me to make this judgement, but in real life, people sometimes do
stupid things or do things that affect other people, or force other people into
conflicts ofconscience. So, as a doctor, sometimes people ask me things and I
say "Well, ifyou ask me to do that or not to do that, you make my situation
quite complicated" Making the decision is one thing but implementing the
decision is sometimes even more complicated. (DD10)
One doctor was forthright about the circumstances where the doctor and patient
opinions clashed and the outcome was,
I would explain the situation, I would give my arguments why I think they
should do it, and I would give them the medical arguments. I cannot discuss
with them the emotional arguments, they are by themselves ... [So my duty of
care could] sometimes become overruled by what the patient wants. But, ifI
think that they are not capable of making that decision, then it is not a
problem. In the case where my duty of care can be compromised, and I feel
that I am not doing my job properly, and when that feeling is too strong, that
can sometimes mean that I have to advise them that they would be best with
another doctor (DD07).
Most other doctors interviewed were able to consolidate their duty of care and
respect for patients' autonomy. The following view represents the middle ground.
What doctors have to keep doing is try to take care as much as they can
within the framework that is acceptable to the patient, so it should not be that
ifyou refuse to have a coronary bypass graft, for instance, then the doctor
says, "Well okay, then I won't give you any medication either. " Just because
that patient doesn't want to be operated on, doesn't mean that he doesn't
want to be treated. So, in one way, there is still a duty of care, but I don't
think Dutch doctors would interpret it as a conflict because, a conflict would
drive them to overruling the patient (DD05).
Conscientious Objections
Sometimes the only way that the doctor can retain his or her, professional autonomy
is to pass the patient on to another physician. Many doctors have objections to
advance directives on moral or ethical grounds, or because of religious beliefs;
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whatever the reason, there may be a duty for the doctor to pass the patient to a
colleague for treatment. The consensus among the doctors interviewed, was that as
long as the doctor was prepared to come to an acceptable solution with the patient, a
conscientious objection was reasonable.
As a professional, you have your own standards, your own ethics, your own
culture and beliefs. But you have to tell the patient or the family ofthe patient
and help him look for another doctor if you have professional or moral
difficulties (DD03).
One doctor expressed a different view, believing that physicians should not let their
own beliefs influence their treatment of patients, and more importantly, put his
autonomy before that of the patient.
I think the doctor has a right to have religious and ethical ideas, and I think
the patient has the same rights about his own life, so it is notfor the doctor to
do something different from what the patient wants. If the doctor has a
problem with that, in the ultimate case maybe he should decide to become a
lawyer or to sell vegetables. I mean that is his problem, it is absolutely not
the problem of the patient, so in my opinion it is unthinkable that the doctor,
through his religious background, decides to treat a patient who does not
want to be treated. It is crazy (DD06).
The WGBO is not clear on the legislative position of conscientious objection.
However, there may be a way out for doctors to pass over the patient for
conscientious objections by way of the WGBO.
If it is agreed that actions as referred to in article 1653 are to be carried out by
a certain person, the procedures necessary for the implementation of the
treatment contract must be performed by that same person, (Art 1653h).
In other words, if a doctor is to carry out a certain procedure, then he or she should
do so unless 'where it follows from the contract that he may instruct others to
perform them ...' (ibid). This may allow a doctor to avoid treating certain patients




Within the Netherlands, informed consent from the competent patient is always
required; this may be implied, by proxy or through an advance directive. Medical
practitioners have a statutory duty to inform patients of the treatment choices
available to them but under certain conditions doctors may withhold this information.
However, the patient's right to refuse treatment can never be overruled although
there is not duty for doctors to inform their patients that they have that right to refuse.
Where the patient can no longer consent to or refuse medical treatment, both
substituted judgement and best interests models of decision-making are used by
doctors in the Netherlands. Family relationships, poor communication with
healthcare providers and withholding information from patients all contribute to
challenges in this difficult are of decision-making.
Statute (the WGBO) provides statutory authority for advance directives, but doctors
interviewed in the Netherlands do not necessarily feel compelled to follow them in
making treatment decisions for incompetent patients. Doctors found advance
directives useful in making decisions for incompetent patient and they may even be
useful in reinforcing a patient's autonomy into incapacity. However, doctors did say
that they would override directives if their duty of care is compromised. Ultimately,
advance directives, according to the doctors interviewed are useful in decision¬
making but doctors can get round them if necessary. Directives do not present
problems to medical practitioners in relation to their professional autonomy in
medical decision-making.
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Chapter Five Analysis of Scottish Data
Introduction and Background
This chapter follows a similar format to Chapter Four and is also divided into two
main parts: Scottish lawyers and Scottish doctors. As with data collection in the
Netherlands, a total of ten lawyers and ten doctors were interviewed in Scotland.
Interviews again were qualitative and semi-structured, each was 30-50 minutes in
length and analysis was conducted using NVIVO qualitative data analysis software,
which was used to examine several major themes. These themes indicate how
advance directives and treatment decision-making integrates with the current Scottish
legal arrangements.
In this chapter the data illustrates that lawyers interviewed in Scotland, like lawyers
in the Netherlands, agreed that communication with patients, their relatives, and the
exchange of information between doctor and patient are essential in medical
decision-making. While advance directives, regardless of their legal standing, can be
useful as a method of communication, problems surrounding them, such as the age of
the directive, the state of the author's mind at the time ofwriting, and the pressures
that may be put on the person to complete the directive, may be reflected in how
seriously the advance directive is taken and consequently how much individual
autonomy is retained by the person in the face of their incapacity.
In Scotland, treatment decisions for patients with capacity are generally made after
discussion with the patient and sometimes the family. It is recognised by all
interviewed parties, however, that while competent, the patient always has a right to
refuse treatment regardless of the consequences. However, this right is not always
explained to patients on their admission to hospital for treatment. For patients
without capacity, the healthcare team will normally make decisions on their behalf
by means of discussion with relatives and among themselves and also by referring to
the patient's earlier wishes made known by oral or written advance directives. A
combination of decision-making models is used: substituted judgment or best
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interests. Conflicts usually are resolved through discussion with all interested parties;
however, the doctors interviewed gave the impression that they (erroneously)
believed that relatives had rights to give or refuse consent in treatment decision¬
making.
Neither the doctors nor the lawyers interviewed believe that advance directives have
legal status at present in Scotland, but the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act
2000, which promotes patients' wishes in its general principles, might provide some
protection for patients' autonomy. The lawyers, who were interviewed, more than
doctors, believe that the courts might rule in favour of advance directives becoming
binding on doctors in the future.
Specialists in care of the elderly and neurology, who were interviewed, criticised
advance directives, whether expressed orally or set out in a document, on the grounds
that people may change their mind without updating or informing the correct
persons. They also expressed concerns about uncertainties surrounding validity of the
directive and ensuring that no undue influenced was involved in its compilation.
According to the Scottish interviewees, the capax patient has ultimate decision¬
making power over medical treatments. However, the incapax patient only has
protection over his or her autonomy if a welfare attorney speaks on his or her behalf
or if he or she makes an advance directive. While the welfare attorney has statutory
backing through the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, advance directives
rely on regulation only through Codes of Practice monitored by the professional
medical organisations. Patient autonomy is less well protected than professional
autonomy and the resultant balance of rights is more heavily weighted on the side of
the healthcare professional than the patient.
Lawyers
Ten Scottish lawyers were interviewed, all working in the areas of private client law:
reparation and negligence, wills and probate, trusts, estate and asset protection
planning. Eight lawyers were solicitors who worked with private clients in or around
the Edinburgh, one was currently on secondment to the Scottish Executive, working
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on updating mental health legislation, from his usual position as a solicitor for a
national voluntary organisation, and one was an advocate specialising in civil
litigation, with a particular emphasis on medical negligence, and associated advice.
All lawyers gave permission for the interviews to be tape recorded, except one,
where instead, brief notes were taken. Another lawyer was unable to keep an
appointment for interview, and so replied instead by email. This was satisfactory as
further questions were answered by telephone. The interviews pursued two main
themes: Scots legislation on treatment decision-making, and lawyers' opinions
concerning advance directives under the current legal arrangements.
Legislation
Background
Over the years it had become increasingly evident to both the healthcare and legal
professions that legislation was inadequate to the meet the needs of persons who had
lost mental capacity and that there was a need to modernise and harmonise legislative
provision in this area. The Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 contains provisions for
a guardianship order. Section 37 allowed a local authority or the nearest relative of a
patient with a mental disorder to apply for guardianship for a period of six months,
renewable for a further 6 months and thereafter annually. Guardians have 3 specific
powers: they can require the patient to live in a specific place, to receive medical
treatment, education or training, and gain access to see the patient in his or her own
home.
Social workers and care managers had been increasingly presented with the practical,
ethical and moral dilemmas involved in taking decisions in respect of the welfare,
finances and property of individuals who are unable to look after their own interests
due to the effects of incapacity. The guardianship order was one way of making
decisions on behalf of persons with mental incapacity, but it was inadequate for
persons who had lost capacity to take control of their own affairs for reasons other
than mental disorder.
153
Overall there was no comprehensive legislative framework with which to secure the
financial, property and welfare interests of an adult who was incapable of acting or
communicating their own informed wishes, nor was there a legislative framework to
create welfare directives in advance of incapacity. Informal, quasi-legal
arrangements often sat uneasily with social workers, care managers and local
authorities who were faced with statutory responsibilities for assessment and care
planning for those who were unable to safeguard their own interests. This led to an
uncomfortable situation where the inflexibility and narrow focus of the law led to
many professionals, relatives and carers operating informal arrangements outwith
statutory law, acting in what they perceived to be the best interests of the adult with
incapacity. Issues relating to the management of the property, finances and personal
welfare of adults lacking the capacity to manage their own affairs were dealt with
under a variety of common law appointments, such as curators bonis, tutors dative,
tutors at law, powers of attorney and continuing powers of attorney.
In the early 1990s the Scottish Law Commission was charged with drafting two
consultation documents, resulting in the Report on Incapable Adults (Scottish Law
Commission, 1995). This formed the basis for the Scottish Executive's own
discussion paper and Bill in 1999, and the subsequent passage of the Adults with
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. The Act is a complex piece of legislation which
addresses the protection and management of the finances, property and welfare of
adults who lack capacity to do so for themselves. It also sets out the legal
mechanisms by which people can make their own arrangements for management of
their affairs in the event that they lose the capacity to do so themselves. It introduced
a new form of guardianship and was intended to make it easier for adults to arrange
their affairs in preparation for the possibility of incapacity and for carers, family and
public authorities to intervene in an adult's life following the onset of incapacity. It
does not cover incapacity to consent to treatment due to a mental disorder, which is
still dealt with under the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984, although the 2000 Act
does cover health issues for those same patients.
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Type ofLaw
In Scotland, the law relating to advance directives and treatment decision-making is a
devolved issue and therefore any statutory changes to legislation have to be passed
by the Scottish Parliament to become law. Without any statutory developments, the
common law and BMA Codes of Practice regulate treatment decision-making for
incapacitated persons. The common law states that a person must consent to medical
treatment, including any touching, and medical examinations (Law Hospital v. Lord
Advocate 1996 SLT 848 per Lord President Hope at 852F). A healthcare professional
who administers any care without the patient's consent could be liable for criminal or
civil assault. These civil or criminal wrongs could be asserted in the courts. The only
exception to this is the doctrine of necessity which allows medical practitioners to
give emergency, life-saving treatment to patients who cannot consent.
Codes of Practice exist and provide advisory guidelines to healthcare professionals
on several issues relevant to treatment decision-making (BMA, 1999). These include
withdrawing and withholding medical treatment; use of advance statements; and
seeking consent for medical treatments. These codes and guidelines are not law and
only give advice on best practice in certain situations. The ultimate problem is still
unresolved: if a patient is unable to give or refuse consent to a medical procedure
there is no easy way to determine who would be able to so do on the person's behalf.
Relatives, including the next of kin, have no right to authorise consent to treatment
for their relatives, even though they often assume they do have such a right. Lawyers,
in their dealings with patients' relatives, observed that families believe they do have
the right to make these decisions.
I think a lot of them are probably led to believe that by the medical
profession. I've seen it in the hospital myselfwith my late father, when they
were seeking our consent to do procedures when he was dying, which ... I
mean I knew that we didn't have the consent but then it was really ... it's
funny, when it's your father, you have a slightly different view about it
(SL04).
Though it rarely happened, the courts could become involved in appointing proxy
decision-makers, but it is understandable that doctors may allow or encourage
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families to make the decisions. Advance directives currently have no statutory
authority and no case law had been reported in Scotland28 in this matter, therefore,
this route would not ease the way to treatment decision-making for incapax patients.
After Devolution, the first major piece of legislation passed by the Scottish
Parliament attempted to resolve this problematic situation through the Adults with
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. The Act sets out various ways in which intervention
in the property, financial affairs or welfare of an adult can be made:
• It allows for the appointment of proxy decision makers, who are continuing
29
attorneys and welfare attorneys, withdrawers (persons authorised to have
access to the adults funds), managers of care establishments who are
authorised to manage residents' finances, financial or welfare guardians and
interveners (persons authorised to act under intervention orders);
• It provides general authority for medical practitioners to give medical
treatment to adults who are not capable of giving their own informed consent;
• It creates, in limited and defined circumstances, provision to authorise
medical, nursing, dental or psychological research involving adults with
incapacity; and
• It sets out the functions and duties of statutory organisations under the Act,
including the new Office of the Public Guardian, the Mental Welfare
Commission for Scotland and local authorities.
The 2000 Act is based on a set of principles (section 1) which must be satisfied
before an intervention is made.
Principle 1 - Benefit
Principle 2 - Minimum intervention
Principle 3 - Take account of the adult's wishes
Principle 4 - Consultation with relevant others
Principle 5 - Encourage the adult to exercise his/her skills
Principle 3 (section 1(4) (a)) requires that account must be taken of the present and
past wishes and feelings of the adult so far as they can be determined by any means
of communication. This may be by human or mechanical aid appropriate to the adult,
28
Although there is no Scottish case law, English decisions are likely to be strongly influential.
29 Section 15 (1) and (2) define a "continuing power of attorney" as a power to manage specified
aspects of the person's property or financial affairs that continues to have effect when the person loses
the capacity to deal with the matters concerned. The person to whom such powers are given is defined
as a "continuing attorney". This creates a distinction between powers of attorney that have effect only
when the granter still has capacity, but cannot or does not want to act for some other reason, and those
that are intended to continue on incapacity. The AWI Act is only concerned with the latter.
156
and causes oral or written advance directives to spring to mind as a method of
communicating those wishes. These general principles must be followed by the
courts, by statutory bodies such as local authorities and by individuals. In particular,
subsection (4)(a) emphasises the importance of considering the adult's views, both
those known to have been expressed in the past and their current views, regardless of
their capacity. The adult should be helped to communicate his or her views.
The Act allows a person to discuss and influence how these powers may be
exercised on his/her behalf. While the law does not specifically allow for the
granter to make any legally binding advance directive, were [someone] to
record [his or] her wishes, they would constitute a very clear statement which
would help those proposing to intervene to act upon a core principle of the
Act: taking account of the adult's past and present wishes. This would not
necessarily mean, however, that these wishes would have to be respected
(Scottish Executive, 2002: 11).
Part 2 of the 2000 Act allows a capax adult to appoint a person to speak for him or
her in financial and property matters - Continuing Attorneys. Welfare Attorneys
have powers over personal welfare, and may include authority to consent to or refuse
medical treatment on the granter's behalf, but this authority will only commence on
the granter's incapacity. Granters have wide scope to grant whatever powers they
choose, but these powers are strictly interpreted, and this means that there is no
possibility of deducing implied powers and, unless expressly included, they cannot
be inferred.
Section 16 defines a "welfare power of attorney", and describes how a valid welfare
power of attorney is created. Previously the legal status of attorneys with powers
over welfare matters was unclear and there may possibly have been no legal facility
to make treatment decisions on another's behalf in Scotland. This section establishes
the right to grant such a power, and establishes various safeguards. A welfare power
of attorney has authority to make decisions about the personal welfare of the granter.
Part 5 of the 2000 Act refers to medical treatment and research. In this part, medical
practitioners are given a general authority to treat adults where there is a certificate
of incapacity in force, subject to certain safeguards and exceptions. At common law
the doctrine of necessity already allows doctors to give life-saving treatment to
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patients who cannot consent or refuse such treatments, this doctrine remains in place
and there would be no need to carry out the processes of Part 5 of the 2000 Act in an
emergency. Part 5 would be required for non-emergency treatment where the adult is
unable to express his or her treatment wishes. Section 1(6) broadly defines
"incapable" as including incapable of acting on, communicating, understanding or
retaining decisions because of a mental disorder or physical disability. The basic
principle of Part 5 is that, in the absence of consent by an adult patient with
incapacity, or any proxy authorised under the Act to consent of his or her behalf, the
doctor's certificate of incapacity in relation to the treatment in question takes the
place of the patient's consent. The general principles {supra) of the Act must be
applied by the doctor in deciding whether to issue such a certificate.
In determining the wishes and feelings of an adult the medical practitioner must have
regard for what can be determined of the person's history. In this respect it can be
seen that the principles interact with each other. What may be considered of benefit
to the adult must be determined with regard to what the adult considers or once
considered to be of benefit.
While you must take the adult's views and wishes into account, this does not
mean that they necessarily must be followed. This consideration must be
subject to analysis of risk to ensure that the pursuit of the wishes of the adult
(or others) does not place the adult at unacceptable risk. Unacceptable risk
could never be considered to be ofbenefit to the adult (supra cit., 2002: para
4.4.2).
Under the AWI Act advance directives do not have any statutory backing and
therefore doctors are under no obligation to do more than take them into
consideration. Ten Scottish lawyers tentatively thought giving advance
statements/directives statutory basis would be useful,
Yes, I suppose that would certainly be a help if they were entrenched in
statute. I don't know if that would be too rigid though, some doctors would
be against it (SL01).
Another lawyer felt that legislation would deal with the problem of vagueness that
surrounds the legal nature of advance directives,
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Yeah, because that would solve the grey area problem ... it would have to be
statutory or some sort of regulation introduced under the Adults with
Capacity Act (SL10).
Other lawyers interviewed did not believe that it was necessary to go as far as
enshrining advance directives in statute and this lawyer believes that professional
regulation is sufficient.
1 do not favour a legislative framework and would suggest that a code of
practice jointly promulgated by the BMA and the Law Societies of the
respective constituent jurisdictions within the United Kingdom is preferable
(SL06).
Case Law and the Courts
Prior to the 2000 Act there was very little legislation but there was also very little
case law in Scotland. This might be said to be indicative of a kind of paternalistic
assumption that, for people who were deemed incapax, the treatment would just be
given and no questions would be asked about its legal basis. One lawyer recalled
such an instance,
I remember a case where a disabledpatient had had their teeth removed by
doctors and dental staff [with consent of] the carer [who] wasn't actually a
blood relative. Ifelt very much that that shouldn 't have happened and other
strategies should have been employed but by that time it's really too late to
kind ofdo anything about it (SL07).
The unusual, and possibly only, Scottish case that has been reported in this area was
an application to withdraw life-sustaining treatment where the patient was in a stable
and persistent vegetative state - the circumstances that gave rise to Law Hospital
NHS Trust v. LordAdvocate 1996 SLT 848 (see Chapter 1). This case was the first to
lay down some sort of guidelines for treatment decision-making in Scotland. These
were:
• A patient with capacity had the right to refuse or consent to medical
treatment;
• The patient's consent legitimises a doctor's actions;
• Doctors who act on their patients' instruction require no further authority
from the courts; and
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• It is not up to the court to decide what may be in the patient's best interests
(at 825F).
This ruling was welcomed by lawyers for providing some indication of how the
courts would deal with such a situation. However, there are a number of well known
drawbacks with the court process,
I certainlyfind the court process, in a number ofcases that I have dealt with,
completely cumbersome. There's no quick way of going about it, and you
have to follow the same procedures, it takes a long time. I had a case where
we were acting on behalf of a mother whose 36-year old incapacitated
daughter required to be sterilised. Although [the Law Hospital case] was
quite widely reported, it took months to go through the whole system ... so
you can't get a quick decision. You can't bypass the normal court rules just
because you've got a case that needs a quick decision, and that's what's
frustrating about doing it through the court. They don't have any kind of
streamlined process that you can go through. You've just got to sit and wait
with everybody else (SL01).
Court involvement in patients' rights in Scotland is not widespread. Prior to the 2000
Act coming into force, it could take up to a year to go through the whole process.
One lawyer expressed her exasperation with the procedure,
You've got to apply for legal aid and the Legal Aid Board is notoriously
difficult. They sometimes don't understand what's going on; they say "why
can't you do this in the SheriffCourt? " Well you can only petition the Court
of Session. You come across these hurdles the whole time. And then your
medical reports have got to be up to date and by the time you have the Legal
Aid argument, the medical report's out of date. Then you've got to get a
consultant to see them again andyou've got to get fresh reports so it's a very
cumbersome process (SL01).
The 2000 Act will enable many more decisions to be made at a level more consistent
with patients' wishes, and possibly without legal involvement. Previously the only
"shortcut" available was for the lawyer to address the court to get an interim order
for consent to treatment.
Yes, you can do that, there was a chap who had epilepsy and he did have a
brain operation. It wasn't urgent but it was going to make his life better
because he wouldn 't have as many fits but the problem with that was he was
on a waiting list ... I've done it on quite a few occasions and the family just
can't believe the kind ofhoops they've got to go through to get this. So that's
why Part 5 ofthe Incapacity Act will make a huge difference (SL07).
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As far as advance directives are concerned, it was difficult for the lawyers
interviewed to comment on how the courts might view them. Responses could only
be speculative, but it was interesting to discuss what might have happened if the
patient in the Law Hospital case had had an advance directive.
I think the courts might have found that persuasive evidence. Yes, I think if it
comes to it that there's an advance directive, if you end up in court, the
existence of one would certainly be persuasive, I think, on the basis that it's
the nearest you 're going to get to instructions from the person concerned.
Yes, it's just unfortunate there's never been a case in Scotland. I think the
courts might find the English cases persuasive ...they wouldn't be bound by
them because that's not the way the court system ofprecedence works. They
can be persuaded by arguments in some but they would certainly have to
make up their own mind according to the law ofScotland. Having said that,
the Human Rights aspect, of course, is cross border so any arguments
advanced on that basis, in the English courts, would be binding on Scottish
courts (SL08).
No cases have been brought before the Scottish Courts in relation to advance
directives. This, alongside the above shortcomings of the court process, appear to be
the main reasons why Scottish case law is little help for those seeking legal
determination on anticipatory decision-making. In future cases, there may be
assistance from the general principles of the 2000 Act, especially the principle stating
that account should be taken of
the present and past wishes and feelings of the adult so far as they can be
ascertained by any means of communication, whether human or by
mechanical aid (whether of an interpretative nature or otherwise) appropriate
to the adult (Section 1(4) (a)).
This part of the Act might be construed by the courts to refer to advance directives as
being a communication of the past wishes and feelings of the adult. If the court holds
that this is so, advance directives would be given legal standing in Scots law. This,




All lawyers interviewed agreed that refusals of treatment from a patient with capacity
should always be followed. For many, the example that springs to mind is the refusal
of blood products by a Jehovah's Witness patient, who is able to appraise the health
team of his or her beliefs.
Incapax Patients
When the patient is not able to express those wishes, problems can arise and lawyers
were generally keen to make the decision-making simpler and less of a legal
minefield for doctors and families.
There is a role for doctors taking the burden ofdecision-making offfamilies.
Unfortunately sometimes the family are likely to feel that it's them that is, as
it were, pulling the plug or stopping treatment or whatever. I think
sometimes doctors take that burden on but I think families do have a role in
bringing things to the table and bringing a perspective to the table, which
ought to be taken into account (SL02).
For this to happen the existence of an advance directive might relieve that burden
and in this case if the document lodged with the lawyer,
We would give a copy to the relative who is the contact with the hospital and
ask them to take it in to give it to the consultant in charge of the case (SL05).
Most lawyers interviewed hardly ever had to deal with decision-making cases for
incapacitated patients, except possibly in the context of interventions under the
Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984,
I find that doctors would predominantly go ahead on the basis of the
treatment they wanted to give ... but if they were still worried about it, they'd
consult the Central Legal Office of the Health Board. In the legal profession
as a whole in Scotland, there's a very limited input prior to Adults with
Incapacity [Act] into all these issues around decision-making (SL06).
Sometimes in the past, lawyers would be asked more for advice that the healthcare
professional was not "breaking the law", especially as there were movements
towards legal change in this area.
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When I was with [anotherfirm ofsolicitors] I would quite often get called on
to provide reassurances that treatments could be given and I think it was
prior to Adults with Incapacity [Act] coming in, there was an increased
awareness of the whole issue around the rights of incapacitated people and
that started to throw up this issue about medical consent more and more.
And so I did get asked quite a lot of questions and sometimes people asked
daft questions about what could or couldn't be done with people, like cutting
their nails and all this kind of thing (SL10).
Lawyers may still become involved when there is a dispute. Quite often that dispute
is between the family members, usually siblings if it's an older person, as to who is
responsible for making decisions on that person's behalf. A lawyer had a case where
the GP was concerned by a daughter acquiring power of attorney for his patient. The
GP did not feel that his patient was actually incapacitated and a dispute arose as to
whether the mother was incapacitated and this required a second medical opinion.
Lawyers may become more involved, at least as advisors, as the use of welfare
powers of attorney executed under section 16 of the 2000 Act increases.
I do not think lawyers become involved in the decision making process per se
relative to the medical treatment of incapax patients unless perhaps in the
situation where a lawyer has been appointed as a continuing welfare
attorney. Normally, it is a relative or close friend of the granter who will be
appointed in this capacity and not a professional adviser (SL03).
There is a minority of cases in which lawyers are consulted, and may be brought
before the courts, due to the complexity of the legal issues arising from them.
Additionally, a different problem for decision-making may arise if the person has
periods of lucidity as well as incapacity.
You've got to kind ofjudge it, every time you see the person depending on
what kind ofstate they are in at that particular time. We 're usually involved
when a conflict arises, if there's a kind ofquestion mark over whether or not
the doctors can act or should act in this certain circumstance (SL05).
Finally, one lawyer felt that the law surrounding medical decision-making was not
quite as bad as some believed.
1 think at the moment it's very much of a grey area or, as some say, a black
hole. I say a 'grey areaI mean emergency care is not an issue. If there's
some kind of emergency being done, then the medical professionals tend to
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just go ahead and do it but there are issues around consent for procedures
for people when they 're not able to give their consent and my experience is
that the doctors tend to be looking to the next-of-kin to be providing consent
or some sort of informed consent on their behalfbut there's no legal basis for
that, ofcourse (SL10).
The relative non-litigious nature of Scottish society and the new provisions of the
Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 have meant there is little need for
lawyers to become involved in treatment decision-making unless conflicts arise.
Lawyers could only contribute anecdotal evidence of conflicts in medical law.
Refusal of Treatment
As can be seen in the section on Scottish doctors, patients are seldom told that they
may refuse treatment for their condition when they are admitted to hospital. Some
patients do refuse to consent to treatment personally, through instructions to their
relatives, or through leaving an advance directive. Where treatment decisions are
disputed, some lawyers thought that the family had, a role on the basis that they
knew the person better than the doctor,
... it's obviously important to untangle what the family feel about something
from what theyfeel the person may have felt about something and what's best
for that person (SL02).
One lawyer had personal experience of being involved in a dispute where the doctors
wanted to perform a treatment that neither the family, nor, to the best of their belief,
the patient wanted.
I've only come across one and that was the case ofmy own father. He was
basically dying of cancer, and they wanted to cauterise bleeding ulcers. We
allowed them to do it once and then they said "we '11 have to go and do it
again ". We said "no, you 're not doing anything else ... ". But their argument
was "well, he's on a gastro-intestinal ward at the moment, we've got to do
this ", which was one I hadn't heard before (SL04).
According to this lawyer, the doctors, looked to the family for consent, but not for
any input into the medical decisions that were being made,
It was a conjoined decision with my siblings and myself and the medical
profession were basically deciding but were taking our consent and ...
although I didn 7 say to my brother and sister, "I don 7 think they 're actually
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right in askingfor our consent because I don't think we 're capable ofgiving
it"... (SL04).
Other lawyers interviewed had advised clients on similar issues, one threw light on
how,
the families tend to come to us because we, perhaps, have been acting for the
parent for a long number ofyears and would be coming to us basically as a
family lawyer, seeking a view and we tend to try and keep it pretty informal.
It really depends rather on what the family want to do. I think the issue that I
find most difficult with families is the question of withholding of consent
rather than the granting of it because most people will say "yeah, actually,
you can't give consent without some form oforder from the court. " You can
say to the doctors that you have no problem about that. If, however, you 're
talking about a situation where somebody is, perhaps, comatose and the
hospital are wanting to put in a shunt or something in to tube feed, then that's
a slightly different matter. The discussion within the family has to be "well,
what's the medical prognosis anyway? " Ifhe or she is going to die anyway,
this is just prolonging the experience. On occasion people may say "Mum
always said she didn't want to linger and she'd rather go quickly" sort of
thing, so withhold consent. But again, you see there are no real grounds for
the next-of-kin to make the decision but again they're led to believe by the
hospitalparticularly that it is their decision (SL05).
What is apparent is that, from the perspective of the lawyers interviewed, many
doctors assume that the family may give consent to treatment, while this is not
legally the case. This misunderstanding of the legal position is a common theme
especially among the medical practitioners interviewed. Various explanations may be
suggested: doctors may be aware that the family has no authority to make treatment
decisions, unless there is a welfare attorney, but permit them to do so because it
allows relatives to be part of the treatment process. Alternatively, doctors may be
ignorant of the legal position and wrongly ask relatives to consent to treatment;
examples of the doctors' views on this point are discussed later in this chapter.
Advance Directives
There is an increasing awareness of, and interest in, advance directives or living
wills. Some lawyers interviewed had experience of drafting living wills and powers
of attorney intended to enable the person (or, in the case of a continuing welfare
power of attorney containing an advance directive, an attorney appointed by the
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individual) to determine what medical treatment he or she will or will not receive if
certain circumstances arise after capacity is lost. Lawyers who draw up living
wills/advance directives would expect them to be witnessed like testamentary wills
and that the doctor in charge of the case should be given a copy when the patient was
admitted to hospital. Most lawyers interviewed had relatively few dealings with
advance directives. One lawyer commented,
I am rarely consulted to draft a living will and frequently have found that
clients giving instructions for continuing welfare powers of attorney do not
wish an advance directive incorporated. It may be that those considering
making living wills are not sufficiently aware of the complexities surrounding
their application and legal status to consider that it is necessary to consult a
lawyer. As living will forms are available from other sources there are,
undoubtedly, more advance directives in existence than my personal
experience would indicate but I do not think they are generally common. I
imagine their application is more widespread amongst individuals who are
suffering from conditions such as HIV/AIDS and who have definite wishes
regarding their future treatment (SL03).
Oral advance statements were thought to carry less weight than the written
equivalent.
Although the person may have said "I don't want to linger" or whatever ...
it's a difficult one to pin down because people's views change as time goes on
and I know that's a view about advance directives. Yes, it's all very well that
that's what you felt 5 years ago but perhaps anybody should check that that's
the way they stillfeel (SL09).
Caution with oral statements and the problems associated with them were prevalent
with the Scottish lawyers interviewed.
Legal status
Of the ten lawyers interviewed, none believed that advance directives were legally
binding on doctors in Scotland; this was regardless of the general principles of the
2000 Act, which requires that healthcare staff have regard to the past and present
wishes of the person. Furthermore, there has been no court ruling on advance
directives in Scotland, and judges would be required only to view English rulings as
persuasive. One lawyer stated 'they are not legally binding on doctors but must be
regarded as persuasive authority of the granter's wishes at the time of granting'
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(SL06). Some of the reasons why they are not binding are outlined below. One
lawyer thought,
Advance directives are not currently binding. In circumstances where the
terms of the advance directive do not cover the actual situation, it is more
questionable as to whether or not the advance directive should be followed
(SL03).
When the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 was passed, it was clear that
the Scottish Executive decided that advance directives would not be contained in the
statute, instead the law continued as a vague status quo. However, one lawyer
commented as far as the common law is concerned that,
English case law, which has not been controverted in Scotland\ states that a
competently made advance statement is potentially as binding as a
contemporaneous statement by a competent person. My suspicion, however,
would be, just looking at how the cases have worked in England and how
judges work up here, that in a hard case, I think the judges would go quite a
long way to finding reasons not to apply an advance directive if it really
meant, for example, that a 17-year old with an eating disorder was allowed to
die and I just don't see it happening. I remember speaking to a sheriff who
just said that if it came before them, they wouldn't uphold a suicide motivated
advance directive (SL08).
An alternative to legislation would be for the courts to decide whether an advance
directive was binding. All the circumstances could be taken into consideration, for
example, how the statement was made, who made it and who might be named as the
proxy; evidence that it was a genuine statement of the person's wishes; and any
possible changes since the statement was made. If this were to be the case one
lawyer's feeling was that,
Ifyou 're going to respect them at all then you should be prepared to consider
oral statements as well. Obviously more weight should be attached to
something, which somebody has set down and signed in front of witnesses
because you can take it that's a considered statement of somebody's views,
but people may often say things, which is what they think at the moment
(SL07).
Regardless of whether the directive is legally binding there was a certain feeling
amongst lawyers interviewed that, ethically, doctors should be made aware of the
document's existence, by the person holding possession.
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I think certainly if a GP had an advance directive in his possession and if
notice of it were in the hospital notes, then I think they'd be duty bound to
take that into account. It may not be the actual final decision but it should
certainly help in making the decision. I have had one that's been looked at by
a hospital who thought it was very clear and helpful (SL09).
Conflicts
What happens when the family disagrees with a patient's living will, does the lawyer
become involved in the dispute? These lawyers interviewed gave explanations,
...it is open to family members to seek legal advice in relation to the advance
directive of a relative. As the issue of consent to or refusal of medical
treatment is one for the patient, it is questionable that relatives would have
locus standi if they wished to raise proceedings to set aside a validly executed
living will (SL06).
Lawyers may be consulted, if they are known by relatives or doctors treating
an incapax patient to hold an advance directive on behalf of that person, to
provide such a document and perhaps to comment on its legal status and
formal validity but clinical decisions would in the majority of cases be taken
by the doctors concerned after giving due consideration to the facts of the
case, the terms of any advance directive or the opinion of any continuing
welfare attorney appointed by the incapax (SL05).
I've had one or two people I know who signed them. I've had one or two
situations where people's learning disability have made them and I know
somebody with a mental illness who made an advance directive, and
sometimes one of the issues about it is where it has it come from really and
often they've been encouraged, I think, to sign it and there is sometimes ...
particularly not so much advance directives in the sense of withdrawal of
treatment issues but often statements about who they would want to be
involved or be consulted, should the person have a psychotic episode, for
example (SL02).
Many lawyers interviewed felt it unsatisfactory that advance directives might be
binding but that nobody knows until either the courts make a ruling or Parliament
legislates on the subject,
...and I think it all comes down to how much you trust doctors I suppose, but
I think it's unfortunate people do have a very settled and clear view ofwhat
treatments they do or don't want but perhaps they can't be given the
reassurance that their wishes will be respected. On the other hand, I think it
would be very difficult to frame legislation, not just because there are ...
people at one end of the argument who are never going to accept advance
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directives and it would be hugely political and controversial. So I think
there's the political reality of whether you'd ever get legislation but I think
there is also a real genuine difficulty in how you would draft legislation,
which actually covers all the angles (SL10).
While there is an dissatisfaction with the vagueness of the law on advance directives
by the lawyers interviewed, there remains an underlying acceptance of the status quo
since legislation would be difficult to draft and likely to cause the same divisions that
were encountered when they were introduced in the consultation to the Adults with
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 (Scottish Executive, 1999). The English Mental
Capacity Bill incorporates advance directives and the points raised by lawyers in
both Scotland and England in relation to the accompanying difficulties will be
discussed in Chapter Seven.
Overriding Advance Directives
Where there is a degree of perceived or actual conflict between doctor and
patient/family, it has been commented that the focus ought to be on trying to remove
that conflict, and having patients and doctors communicate more about future
treatment issues.
I think where it's important is, where people have a diagnosis, for example,
of cancer or dementia or whatever, I think it would be helpful if, as Millan
did for people with mental health problems, we have some framework for
saying we 're going to talk about what might happen and what you would
want to happen and wouldn 't want to happen and we give you the opportunity
to discuss and explore what you would like or not want to happen. Then
record it so that people may feel that it's legally binding, I think the primary
issue is people feeling that they \>e had a chance to put forward a view about
what they value and what they don't value and what their wishes are. And
the doctors have got some way oftaking that into account when they do come
to make treatment decisions (SL07).
There may be many legitimate circumstances in which it would be essential for
doctors to override a living will, but in cases where no such circumstances existed,
lawyers were asked for their opinions on how this should be dealt with.
Ifadvance directives are, however, to have any force, I think recourse ought
to be made to the courts prior to overriding a patient's expressed wishes.
Clearly, medical necessity may not always permit this and any code of
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practice introduced would require guidance as to how a doctor should
proceed in such circumstances (SL05).
This would include some type of measure to discourage healthcare professionals
from overriding treatment instructions in a valid living will without good reason. In
the lawyer's opinion, objection to treating patients with living wills because of their
religious or moral beliefs would be a good reason to pass the patient to another
doctor, but not to disregard the directive altogether.
I do not think disregarding a validly executed advance directive should be a
criminal offence but I think some disciplinary sanction must be taken and
perhaps a civil liability should arise depending on the facts. I also think it has
to be open to a doctor to conscientiously object to adhering to an advance
provided that a substitute practitioner can be appointed to act (SL06).
The Abortion Act 1967 contains a clause dealing with conscientious objections
which permits doctors to refuse to participate in terminations of pregnancy. The
scope of the Act's conscientious objection clause was clarified in a Department of
Health Parliamentary answer in December 1991 (Hansard, 1991: Volume 201, Part
II, Column 355) and in a Health Service circular in 1994 (DoH, 1994). This made
clear that conscientious objection was only intended to be applied to participation in
treatment. In addition, the British Medical Association (BMA, 1997, revised 1999)
produced an overview on the law and ethics of abortion, based on a comprehensive
review of relevant legal documents.
Advice has been given by the BMA where a doctor has a conscientious objection to
an advance directive. The BMA recognises that doctors can object on moral, ethical
or religious grounds to advance directives, and advise that management of the patient
should then be passed on to a colleague (BMA, 1995: para 13.4, 35). There is also an
issue of possible disciplinary action by the GMC or civil liability arising in the
courts. All things considered this lawyer seems to take overriding an advance
directive seriously.
PatientAutonomy and Balance ofRights
Interestingly, although the lawyers interviewed did not think that advance directives
were binding, many did believe that they were useful in promoting personal
170
autonomy. By enabling a patient to make an anticipatory decision regarding
treatment to be refused or received after incapacity has been established, the advance
directive does offer a person greater self-determination. According to one lawyer,
this safeguard is necessary because of struggles between competing autonomies.
A relatively large number of doctors would not act according to the explicit
wishes of the patient. One possible explanation could be the conflict between
the doctor's and the patient's autonomy, and also between the doctor's duty
of beneficence and the patient's autonomy. Communication with patients,
their relatives, and the exchange of information are essential in the
promoting ofethical decisions (SL03).
If this communication does not happen it may be because of the changing nature of
the society we currently live in, where people are becoming much more litigious, and
a number of lawyers commented that ultimately the solution has to come from the
government, through legislative change.
There is a problem but there's obviously also a desire to see justice done. Is
litigation increasing? Absolutely, and complaints to the GMC are increasing
as well. I suppose that's what the worry is for doctors. Advance directives
could help in that sense, I think it may need some thought about the drafting
of[a law] to take into account any human rights argument but yes, I saw that
argument being advanced in the reports (SL01).
The solution may be at Parliament's door and the increasing lack of clarity in the
common law for treatment of incapable adults is one of the reasons behind the 2000
Act. One lawyer felt that legislation may have been an attempt to even up an
imbalance in power between doctor and patient,
Prior to Adults with Incapacity there really was very little legislation, but
there was very little case law and I think that's indicative, I suppose, of the
fact that there was really very paternalistic assumption that, for people who
were deemed incapax, treatment would just be given and no questions were
really asked about the kind of legal basis ofthat (SL07).
The 2000 Act may be considered an advance in personal autonomy, and the
discussion in the consultation to reform of mental health law also proceeded from an
autonomy perspective. Arguments have stated that advance directives should be
respected; however, there may be some distinction between a contemporaneous
competent refusal and a decision made in anticipation of a situation. A lawyer, who
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saw advance directives as being beneficial, also understood the problems of
foreseeing future events with sufficient precision. He pointed out several reasons for
their being at variance with personal autonomy,
The argument is that once a person's incompetent, you've lost the
opportunity to try and get them to change their mind, that kind ofpractical
issue. One of the problems you obviously have is the issue ofhow old is the
advance directive? How do you know what happened in between? How do
you know what the pressures were on them at the time, what the basis of
making the statement was? So I think, evidentially, there is a problem about
how much you rely on an advance directive in terms of what might have
changed in the person between the making of the advance directive and now?
And I think also that there are issues around the wishes of the person while
incompetent, particularly the issue around, as it were, the kind oflife force of
a person who is still wanting to live even though they may have said "I don 7
want to live in a certain situation" (SL10).
Lawyers who were in favour of legislation thought that advance directives with some
legal status may be the way forward. The 2000 Acts shows a desire to increase the
clarity of the common law basis for treatment decision-making for vulnerable people.
A decline in the paternalistic attitude that existed prior to the Adults with Incapacity
(Scotland) Act 2000 was considered a great advance in the protection of the patient's
personal autonomy.
Doctors
Scottish doctors interviewed specialised in one of three areas: care of the elderly,
neurology (mainly stroke (cerebral vascular accidents)), or oncology (radiotherapy or
chemotherapy). Three of the doctors were consultants in care of the elderly; three in
neurology (mainly stroke patients) and four were consultants in oncology
(chemotherapy and radiotherapy). All were consultants in their speciality, and all
were asked the same (or similar) questions in respect of their attitudes towards
advance directives and treatment decision-making. All interviews with doctors were
tape recorded and transcribed before analysis.
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Treatment Decisions
Patients within the above medical categories either had the ability to express their
own wishes, or had had the ability to do so in the past. All had had the capacity at
some time to consent to, or to refuse treatment.
Capax Patients
As in Chapter Four, doctors were asked how medical treatment decisions were made
for competent patients as a baseline in order to compare this with the ways in which
they made decisions for those lacking capacity.
Care of the Elderly
Patients of the doctors interviewed were generally encouraged to make their own
decisions as far as they were able. The ward round was the initial place where a
patient's treatment plan might be discussed, and the consultant in charge would
inform the patient about his/her problem and the medical plan of action. One doctor
gave the following example of one of his patients:
I have a patient in at the moment who's 93 and has full mental capacity. He
has a tumour in his bowel so what we did was discuss [treatment] with him at
all stages, "Well, you have this tumour, would you consider surgery as an
option? " And he said yes, he wanted the surgeons to assess him. So then the
surgeons got scans done and it turned out that he was not eligible for surgery
but we told him of the other options [radiotherapy and chemotherapy], and
he said "what would they involve? it was an informed decision all the way,
we fully involved him in the decision (SD01).
Relatives, family members, and close friends might also be involved in this decision¬
making process. Most doctors interviewed said they would keep them informed in
order to elicit their help if that become necessary. In one case, a doctor had
telephoned an elderly patient's daughter.
Ijust informed her ofwhat had been going on so that ifshe was talking to her
father and he asked her advice, she was party to knowledge, but obviously not
always ... for every form of treatment and every patient, one is not always in
a position to do so because of time. Phoning 45 relatives would be too much
but in specific cases, yes, I would ask staff to keep relatives informed, so that
they may be able to work with me (SD03).
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In these cases it appeared that doctors kept relatives informed out of courtesy and
also in case the patient (or doctor) needed help in coming to a treatment decision.
Neurology
Patients who are being treated for neurological disorders may have some difficulty in
making decisions. In particular patients who have suffered strokes may have
neurological and cognitive dysfunctions, however, in situations where those patients
are considered to have capacity to make decisions; such decisions would be made in
conjunction with the patient.
If the patient can make an informed decision with the information that has
been given to them, then any decision to perform any treatment will only be
made with their consent (SD04).
Oncology
Patients suffering from cancer, in particular those who are not candidates for surgery
may need to make more complex and far-reaching decisions regarding their medical
treatment. The consultants interviewed did not perform surgery and were involved
only with administering chemotherapy and radiotherapy treatments to patients often
in the terminal stages of their illness. Consequently, the physician's position in
decision-making was less straightforward.
The way that we, in oncology, come to a decision about treatment, is that the
clinicians explain the pros and cons of various approaches, because very
often, particularly for palliative therapy, there isn't a clear-cut, curative
benefit. What the patient wants may determine what would be the right thing
to do and there are balances between benefits and side effects and costs and
inconvenience and all of that. The patient's attitude and wishes are a very
important part ofthat equation (SD10).
Another doctor commented on the special relationship often enjoyed by doctor and
patient within this speciality, one which rose above the usual problems in joint
decision-making.
... you have to try and enter the dialogue in all these areas gradually and the
huge advantage ofmost of the patients I see (that are going to die anyway) is
that I've known them for months, sometimes years. The real problem is the
people who come in very quickly and they 're gone, again, in oncology, that's
rare. So my views are mine but I think I'm somewhat protected from the
really controversial areas, I'm lucky (SD10).
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The doctors interviewed try to determine the patients' wishes through information
gathered from relatives and friends. A wide range of information is sought on the
patients' wishes but patient autonomy is respected, relatives do not make the
decisions but doctors considerately keep them informed. Long-standing relationships
develop between doctors and patients in oncology and this helps greatly with
treatment decision-making, something that was found in the interviews with Dutch
GPs.
Incapax Patients
As with doctors in the Netherlands, Scottish doctors were also asked to explain the
procedure they adopted in determining appropriate treatment decisions were made
for patients who had lost the capacity to give or refuse consent. In particular, the type
of conditions that would apply, and how doctors would determine if someone was
not able to make a treatment decision were of interest. Consideration of consent and
decision-making abilities were issues raised with many physicians and also benefits
of having a treatment compared to the detriments of a refusal were also questions to
be resolved. Because of the nature of the different medical specialties involved,
decision-making for patients without capacity differs from person to person and
specialty to specialty.
Elderly
Within care of the elderly, lack of capacity often may be due to dementia-type
illnesses where intellectual and cognitive skills are being progressively destroyed.
One doctor interviewed believed that people with dementia could have an input into
their decision-making although it may be in a very simplistic way, and that even
people who are considered unable to manage their affairs, could have a say in their
own treatment. This means that strict rules are of little help in these situations, the
solution for this doctor was to talk to the patient.
I generally always ask the patients, even ifthey 're quite demented, ifthere's a
simple choice. For example, if it's a choice ofa treatment that might involve
some blood tests or one that wouldn't, they can often give me an opinion that
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they want the best treatment or they don't want nasty needles or anything like
that (SD01).
If the patient does not understand, the next stage taken by another doctor would be to
consult with relatives or main carers and get their opinion. This could be helpful in
coming to a decision in the circumstances,
...occasionally I have come across patients whose relatives have said "ah,
well, she has said in her Will that she does not want intensive care treatment
or resuscitation " or "she wants to donate her body to medical science " and
that's very useful. If the patient has no next-of-kin that we can contact, under
common law, we can treat people as we think best (SD02).
This may give the impression that this doctor believes the next-of-kin have a legal
right to be involved and to give consent to their relative's treatment. This is not
legally correct, but again the doctors interviewed imply that they either believe this is
the case, or they allow relatives this privilege regardless of their legal rights. Seeking
consent form patients' nearest relatives or next of kin is still taking place as was
found in a recent review of the implementation of Part 5 of the Adults with
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. Researchers found that since the introduction of the
2000 Act 'not all practitioners had grasped that next-of-kin consent was no longer
required' (Davidson et al, 2004: 57). Findings also showed that much significance
was made of relatives' wishes - they were both being consulted in accordance with
the principles of the 2000 Act30, but that their consent was also being sought and
obtained {ibid, emphasis added).
Physical disease may have caused patients to lose decision-making capabilities to a
greater or lesser degree. Another doctor approached the problem in a pragmatic way,
arguing that no refusal implied consent:
If it is a form of treatment that's going to do very little harm to a patient, and
it will have great benefit, I would go along to the patient and say "I'm just
going to start you on a new tablet" and explain the reason and unless they
gave a very vocal or obvious facial reaction to no medication or that they
were refusing medication by closing their mouth, I would take that as being a
form ofassent (SD01).
30
Section 1(4) (b) states that account should be taken of the views of the nearest relative and the
primary carer of the adult, in so far as it is reasonable and practicable to do so.
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This would seem to be close to ignoring the need for consent in the first place and is
at best, consent by default. Unless the patient can express his or her refusal in some
way that the doctor accepts then consent to whatever treatment is being offered will
be implied.
The final alternative given by geriatricians interviewed would be to get a second
opinion from another physician or ultimately legal guidance.
There was a woman who wanted to go home but I didn't think she was
capable of making that decision. So I asked one of my colleagues to come
along, independently, and assess the woman's ability. I've done that as well
in the past, about whether we should go ahead with an operation. If there
was going to be a legal question to it, I would consult the Trust lawyers as
well as to whether I was justified in proceeding with a procedure if I felt it
was for the patient's wellbeing (SD01).
Neurology
In situations where patients have lost their ability to make treatment decisions,
neurologists have to make a judgement even if the patient's cognitive ability is only
mildly impaired. The doctors interviewed stated that there would usually be a
discussion between the healthcare team, looking at whether the patient was giving a
consistent response to the same question over a period of time. However, one
neurologist stated that almost certainly the next-of-kin would also want to be
involved, and this doctor felt that ...
... often there seemed to be a general feeling that they want to be involved if
they are concerned and if they appreciate the consequences of either giving
certain treatments or doing certain things, then I'd say, they want to accept a
responsibility ofbeing involved in those decisions (SD04).
The common factor for neurologists interviewed was that each case is dealt with on
its own merits, and there cannot be a general rule to follow in every circumstance.
One neurologist comprehensively discussed all the possibilities that might be
considered, firstly if the decision was to treat the patients,
If the patients are unable to make their own views known, then sometimes I
make the decision on my own, using information gleaned from the patient's
family or the staff. So I am generally fairly happy to make a decision to
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intervene, to feed, to hydrate, to treat an infection and my default is
generally, if in doubt, to do so because most patients do have the possibility
of getting better and the earlier one treats, the more likely you are to be
successful (SD06).
In the event that treatment is not considered the best option, then this doctor would
approach the relatives,
If one is deciding not to treat, then I will certainly gather views from the
family and if they are able to tell me about a patient's previous view about
their willingness or not to live in a disabled state or "as a vegetable " as they
often say. If they have made an advance directive, that's a bit more clear-cut,
then I take that into account in the decision-making. IfI think well, I'm not
very happy about intervening here, and then I hear from the family that
they're not happy, then maybe the view expressed by the patient that they
wouldn't want to be like this, would certainly make me more confident to
make that decision (SD06).
And also the healthcare team,
I also try and get the views of the junior doctors and the nursing staffand the
other members of the multi-disciplinary team, partly to make sure that they
are thinking about these ethical issues. I have to say that usually Ifind them
reticent; they do not like to get involved ... some will occasionally express
strong views. Usually my experience is not to treat, they 're more idealistic
than I would be but I'm not always sure that is well grounded in an
understanding ofthe condition or the likely prognosis (SD06).
The common theme among neurologists interviewed was that relatives would be
considered at some point during treatment decision-making. The neurologists
interviewed did not explicitly state that families had a major say in decision-making.
One neurologist did not consult the relatives or the healthcare team unless the
decision concerned stopping treatment. It appears that this doctor was only interested
in consulting and being supported by others in making hard decisions.
Oncology
If a patient reached a point where they are no longer able to make a decision about
further treatment because of their cancer, then none of the oncologists interviewed
believed that there would be a circumstance where further treatment would be
appropriate. Consequently, there would be no decision to make; the natural choice
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would be to allow the patient to die. One doctor stated that there might be an
exception,
It's very rare that someone's become so disabled by their disease whom it
would still be appropriate to treat. The exception would be some of the
cancers, which are curable. They're rare ... and that could cause that
problem, but you may find them. In theory, if you've got someone who's
extremely sick from ... the cancers that are curable once they've spread, you
could have a patient no longer capable ofmaking decisions because of their
illness but could still be cured but clearly you've got relatives [to discuss this
with] (SDIO).
Another agreed that the patient's relatives, while not in the position of being able to
authorise treatment, should be included in the discussions, up to a point.
The vast majority ofpatients ofmine who get to the point where they 're no
longer capable ofmaking a decision, the cancer has caused that and I can't
cure them. So it's therefore very rare that you would be contemplating
further anti-cancer treatment in a patient like that because it's unlikely to
reverse the situation. What you would do is inform the relatives of where
you've got to and that further treatment was inappropriate. Now if the
relatives are pushing hard, "oh, but doctor, shouldn't we do this or do that? "
If, in our judgement, and I use the plural on purpose because if it's a difficult
case, I'm not going to make the decision on my own. You get into discussion
with people, these things happen when somebody has become unconscious
because they've got brain metastases ... if you can't control the loss of
consciousness with simple things like steroids, the chance ofany active anti¬
cancer treatment, could reverse it, is actually tiny and I'm afraid we would
take a fairly hard line with relatives that there is no point. You 're not going
to make the patient any better. You're going to put her through treatment
that we don't think is appropriate. I can't imagine a circumstance where
there's a real decision to be made, because all the evidence points to no ...
(SD08).
While each of the doctors interviewed in these three specialties follows slightly
different procedures, the general outcome is the same. The patients are consulted,
and their choices followed as far as possible, and the relatives' points of view are
also taken into consideration; occasionally the healthcare team will become involved,
along with second opinions from other consultants. Some doctors are happy to seek
legal advice, others do not, but what is apparent from interviews with Scottish
doctors is, that no matter how many other views are taken into account, in their
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opinion, the ultimate decision rests with the doctor. How these decisions are made is
discussed in the next section.
Power
In the UK, doctors take an oath to do no harm, and likewise respect for patient
autonomy means that they should not override a patient's considered wishes, even if
that means withholding treatment. However, when these two principles diverge, the
doctor may think that his/her duty of care is compromised by doing nothing, even to
the extent of being at fault by omission. In this situation whether to override the
patient's wishes becomes the dilemma. Resolving this dilemma appears to depend on
the implications of refusing the treatment combined with the doctor's judgment of
the patient's state of mind. The procedure followed a standard course for doctors
interviewed who were caring for the elderly,
First of all discussion with the patient ... to ensure s/he is making an
informed decision because if it was a rash decision, it could be being made
through fear. So I would generally sit down and talk with the patient first of
all and explain the benefits versus the risks of the treatment option that I was
taking. If they still said "no", what I would do is check whether they were
cognitively intact in making that decision because obviously if a person was
confused or paranoid or had any psychiatric psychopathology behind it, they
may not be making a rational decision. IfIfelt that it was a treatment vital to
their wellbeing, I might ask one of my psychiatry colleagues to assess the
patient independently to see if they were able to make a rational decision
themselves and if they weren't, I would ask their advice on what would be the
next best option (SD01).
Would the doctor go so far as to say his or her professional autonomy or duty of care
can actually override a patient's personal autonomy?
It depends on the state in which the patient is expressing their views, their
autonomy. If they have a grasp and an understanding of the full situation in
which they are, ifthey have an understanding ofthe prognosis, ofthe possible
interventions and then they say no, they don't want them, then I don't think
I've got any right to impose those. However, that is uncommon because often
patients who refuse interventions are not fully capable of understanding the
implications of them. So sometimes, yes, you can make a decision about
what's in their best longer-term interests, in which you may have had to
override their immediate autonomy (SD06).
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Neurologists interviewed stated that the reasons behind the patient's decision were
paramount in allowing the decision to stand or be overridden. One neurologist gave
the following example.
Ifsomebody said to me "ifI have a very severe stroke and I'm going to need
nursing home care and I'm not going to be able to look after my own needs
and I get a chest infection, I don't want to have antibiotics I think that is
fair enough. If it was somebody who says "oh, ifI have a stroke and I can 7
talk, I've always talked and talking is my life, so I don't want any treatment",
I would say "well, as your doctor, I cannot accept that because I don 7 think
that is the right choice." So, unless there was a written legally binding
advance directive, Iwouldn't go with that, no (SD04).
This doctor implied that the patient's decision might be overridden if the doctor
thinks it is the wrong choice. Another neurologist stated,
The problem seems to be in getting the message across about something in
the future, which is less easily grasped than something in the present the now,
which is when the discomfort is happening. So sometimes, yes, you can make
a decision about what's in their best longer-term interests, which you may
have had to override their immediate autonomy. For example, a patient may
know that he/she does not want a tube inserted, but does not think beyond
that to the implications ofnot beingfed, that is, starving to death (SD06).
While there seems to be a degree of paternalism present, and this doctor would be
prepared to override the patient's short-term autonomy, there seems to be a notion of
respect for patient autonomy as a general principle. Both doctors, however, are
clearly using their greater power to overrule patient wishes.
Oncologists interviewed felt, often due to the severity of the condition and the poor
prognosis, that there may be less discord between doctor and patient. The oncologists
interviewed all stated that they usually had built up a relationship with their patients
and they normally would be aware of the reasons behind a patient's refusal to have
certain treatments. One gave this hypothetical example based on experience.
Take somebody with a bowel cancer, who said "No, I don't want any surgery.
I don't want any treatment for this bowel cancer ", and I knew that they had a
good chance ofmaking a fidl recovery, I would usually have a meeting with
them and their family, after talking with them and if they were still adamant
and they were cognitively intact and were making an informed decision and
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they said "I hate ... " , and there is a logical reason for not going through
with it, then I would respect their decision (SD10).
Likewise with futile treatments, the oncologists interviewed would seldom go along
with giving treatment against their better judgement. Instead, they would explain to
the patient that the treatment would be more likely to make them worse rather than
better and offer them the option of a second opinion. The oncologists interviewed
seem to have a greater respect for patient autonomy than the neurologists and
geriatricians interviewed. This may be due to oncologists having a higher percentage
of relatively younger patients than the other two specialisms and also have
relationships with their patients that have had several months to develop. Of all the
specialisms, neurologists interviewed most used their power over patients to overrule
patients' wishes.
Decision-making Models
As with doctors in the Netherlands, Scottish doctors were asked about two accepted
methods of surrogate decision-making: the best interest test, and substituted
judgement. Decision-making by means of what may be in the patient's best interests
is often criticised for being too paternalistic towards adults, and more practical when
dealing with children and minors (Scottish Executive, 2000: 1) whereas substituted
judgement is more in line with the autonomous wishes of the patient (Beauchamp
and Childress, 1994: 173). These two types of decision-making and any particular
type or combination of methods they used for patients incapax patients were
discussed with the doctors.
Doctors interviewed who were caring for elderly patients were aware of the dangers
of only looking to the relatives for advice on what the patient might have decided.
This led to no one particular method of decision-making being used and to an
arrangement where many factors were taken into account. One doctor stated,
I would say that I would take the relatives' opinion into account and it would
be a ... a combination ofwhat's in the best interest for the patient, what the
patient has previously expressed, what staff on the ward or friends of the
patient would think. It's a combination. I know that there are nursing
homes, where they askedpatients who were competent, "what wouldyou like
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if such-and-such a scenario came up?" They found that the surrogate
decisions made on behalfof the patients, by relatives, often didn 't correlate
with what the patients themselves wanted (SD01).
In neurologists interviewed, the best interests test was the predominant model, even
when that might go against the patient's previously expressed wishes as told to
relatives. However, the doctors interviewed were aware that problems might arise in
more serious circumstances, and felt that other persons should be involved.
They 're saying "look, from what I know ofmy wife/Mum/etc., I don't think
she would want to be suffering like this. Ifyou 're telling me that you can
control her suffering ..." We've, very rarely, gone through the legal issues
because so many of these circumstances are not about cure or non-cure, I've
never had a cure or non-cure choice that would incapacitate a patient, that
would be difficult. I think under those circumstances, we would probably
want to start getting involved with a patient's GP and others because I
wouldn't be prepared to say they [the relatives] had the right to say "don't
bother doing anything", ifI knew that treatment had a reasonable chance of
cure (SD05).
For the oncologists interviewed, the patient's wishes would always be taken into
consideration, and would carry more weight than relatives expressing what they felt
were the patient's wishes. Relatives could be useful, however, if there were questions
about a person's wishes,
... [although] if there was a major discrepancy, they might just help to clarify
what the patient's view was but I don't think they would help in any other
way (SD07).
It would appear, from the oncologists interviewed, that the model of decision-making
used was more heavily weighted on the substituted judgement side, although it was
not the only consideration. The problems of both methods of decision-making were
exemplified by one neurologist,
I think [substituted-judgement] has got major dangers and I suppose in my
designing best interests, I take into account quality of life etc., but I don't
think I can put myself in their position, nor can any able-bodied person put
themselves in that position. I've seen too many patients who have expressed
the view, prior to their problem that they wouldn 7 want to be alive in any
state such as with difficulty with language, immobility. But then when they
are put into that position, they cling to life and continue to cling to life as they
make some partial recovery. That's always the difficulty withfamilies as well.
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They, like I, are generally often able-bodied and wouldn't swap a disabled
life for it. That doesn't mean a disabled life, once you've got it, is worse than
death. And I think they 're right, death is pretty final (SD04).
This small number of interviewees shows the problems in using definitive models of
decision-making. The most dominant method used by Scottish doctors was to look at
what would be in the patient's best interests.
Right to Refuse Treatment
When a patient is admitted to the hospital it is unusual for healthcare workers to
mention their right to refuse treatment. When asked if this would that be brought up
on admission, doctors caring for the elderly interviewed did not specifically ask the
question. One reason was,
It would only be brought up if the patient said, at the very beginning, "I don't
want certain treatments." They 're always asked about resuscitation, for
example, we say it's Trust policy to ask people, "Ifyour heart slopped, would
you like to be resuscitated? " That's documented at the beginning ofthe notes
but not with regard to refusing treatment (SD01).
Interviewees in neurology and oncology differed in their practice. One neurologist
claimed that it was very much highlighted at the beginning of the admission
procedure, and patients were told that it was an option to do nothing. Conversely,
another neurologist felt that it depended on the treatment offered,
Mostly we rely on implied consent, i.e. they do not say "no" and they go
ahead and that covers most things in terms ofgiving normal nursing care and
administering drugs. I think we are patchy in talking to patients about the
purpose of particular interventions and, indeed, I don't think the Health
Service could work ifwe went into the details ofall that. Obviously we are
rather better at discussing the more invasive investigations and treatments.
Anything that I think is potentially uncomfortable, I would discuss with them
and say "this is why we 're doing it, are you happy? " So I would give them
the opportunity to say, no, they 're not. Sometimes we don't investigate
people, we would like to but they prefer not to. We don't treat them because
they don't want to [be treated] (SD06).
The issue of implied consent is very dangerous for doctors as informed consent is
required for medical interventions. If consent is refused then any touching becomes
professional misconduct or even assault. This fact appeared to come as a surprise to
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some of the respondents in review of Part 5 of the 2000 Act (Davidson et al, 2004:
51) and while medical practitioners were not actually unaware of the legal position,
'it appeared to be a relatively insignificant factor in how they regarded the Act or
Part 5 in particular' {ibid.). However, if patients do not know that they are being
treated, by medication being concealed in food, for example, then they are neither
able to consent to, nor refuse treatment. This may have implications for other
healthcare providers who might be expected to administer medication covertly and
without the patient's consent. Ultimately, giving treatment without seeking consent
or without an Incapacity Certificate, by virtue of section 47, 2000 Act, may have an
impact on carrying out the patients' prior wishes.
Similarly, this doctor states that discussion with the patient would only take place if
the doctor thought the procedure to be 'potentially uncomfortable'. People who
encounter or administer medical procedures on a regular basis can quickly become
de-sensitised to the discomfort and pain involved. It is therefore of concern to
determine by whose standards this potential discomfort is being judged. It would
appear that, in this instance, respect for patient autonomy is being ignored for the
sake of convenience and the smooth running of the NHS.
One oncologist stated it was important that patients were explicitly told about their
right to refuse treatment.
I mean patients ... the way that we come to, particularly in Oncology, a
decision about treatment is that the clinicians explain the pros and cons of
various approaches because very often, particularly for palliative therapy,
there isn't a clear-cut curative benefit, and what the patient wants may
determine what would be the right thing to do and there are balances
between benefits and side effects and costs and inconvenience and all of that.
And patients' attitude and their wishes are a very important part of that
equation (SD09).
Another oncologist did not advise them of this option and believed that it was the
duty of the doctor or consultant to advise the patient only on the best treatment
option.
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A small group may not wish to take that advice and that's perfectly
reasonable and no treatment is entirely an option, they may ask "what will
happen ifI don't have this treatment? " That is quite common, but it's a no
treatment option ...as I said, it's not up front but I suppose it does occur in
cases ... I think more widely, in cases of very advanced cancer, where no
treatment may well be offered (SD08).
Oncologists interviewed who believe that patients should only be given the best
treatment option are not giving patients all the available choices and are even
withholding information through use of their specialist knowledge as power.
Conflicts in Decision-making
The power imbalance between doctor and patient may cause disagreements between
the parties. When a patient refuses treatment and the doctor feels that the decision is
wrong, the situation can be resolved in different ways. One method is through
communication with the patient and close family, explaining the benefits and effects
of the treatment.
Often the doctors interviewed stated that if there was a problem with a patient
refusing treatment, a psychiatric assessment may be called for. The tendency to
assume that the patient has a psychiatric condition if his/her choice of treatment or
treatment refusal does not concur with the physician's was noted and advised against
as far back as 1988, when an Age Concern report stated
The physician should not strive to regard an irrational decision as
incompetently based [and] the physician should always be aware of the real
possibility that a patient's values and goals may differ from his and so he
should not necessarily evaluate an unreasonable or potentially damaging
decision by the patient as stemming from an incompetent lack of
understanding. A mere decision that is regarded as unreasonable should not
in itself lead to a finding of incompetence (Age Concern, 1988).
In the case of patients recovering from strokes there may be fewer disagreements
from relatives, but instead there may be more unrealistic expectations, one
neurologist explained,
I think in my situation in the Rehabilitation Centre perhaps their expectations
for improvement are ... they're disappointed. They feel patients should be
better than they are and, from a therapy point of view, that's true ... rather
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than us being able to give something, which is life changing or life saving or
affecting the outcome (SD04).
Relatives often disagree with treatment decisions made by doctors, and one area
where this may happen more than most is in oncology. The need to retain some hope
of recovery for their relative can cause problems between family and doctor, and one
oncologist was asked how this was resolved,
...patiently and in time. You really try very hard to find out why there is a
disagreement and very often the disagreement is about some underlying
agenda that is nothing, necessarily, to do specifically with the decision about
treating them, whether it's about guilt and past relationships or whatever.
You try to find out what it is that makes them disagree, then what is the gel in
this decision and give them the opportunity to understand what are the
reasons that there is this discrepancy (SD09).
No doctor interviewed suggested that they would consider the law or courts as a way
of settling conflicts. Neither did they give any examples of relatives threatening or
taking legal action against doctors or hospitals as a way of influencing treatment
decisions. In the small sample of Scottish doctors interviewed, litigation against their
medical decisions was not a current problem.
Advance Directives
Definitions
Advance directives have unproven authority in statutory or common law in Scotland
although English case law (Re C, 1994, Re AK, 2000) is likely to be very persuasive
in the Scottish courts as Scotland generally follows England at common law on
medical matters (Law Hospital, 1996). Because of the small number of advance
directives being used in Scottish hospitals how they were understood by Scottish
doctors is exploratory.
Elderly
A reasonable, if simplistic, definition was given by a geriatrician who stated that he
believed that the following criteria were all that were necessary to fulfil the term
'advance directive'. It was:
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... where a person, [who] has capacity and competence to make a decision
about their future care, comes up with a plan ofmanagement should certain
circumstances arise in the future (SD01).
This basic definition was built upon by a second doctor for the elderly, who gave the
example of a person with a progressive and incurable illness.
Ifsomebody has Motor Neurone Disease and they decide that, in the future,
"if I go into respiratory failure, I don't want to be put on a ventilator", and
that that decision is made and written down ... [but] it doesn 't always have to
be written. An advance directive can be vocal but usually ... Iwould take it as
being an informed decision where the person is aware of the risks and
benefits of ventilation and of not having ventilation. Where it is a witnessed
decision, ideally witnessed by a medical professional, that's the sort of idea I
have about advance directives (SD03).
The last interviewee makes three points:
• The person must be aware of the risks and benefits of the treatment;
• The directive does not need to be written; and
• If not a written statement, then the oral statement should be witnessed by a
medical professional.
These aspects recognise that the patient, by being aware of the risks and benefits of
the treatment, must have had capacity when the directive was made. The acceptance
of an oral statement as long as it is witnessed by a medical professional may be
comparable with case law in England and the WGBO in the Netherlands and while it
is only one doctor's view of the definition of an advance directive, it shows a
willingness to respect an individual's autonomy as expressed earlier.
Witnessing the document or verbal statement was preferred by some doctors
interviewed, but just as important was the desire for the doctor to discuss it with the
patient. To say simply that the doctor was aware of the directive was not sufficient
to confirm that the doctor knew that the patient was making an informed statement.
Sometimes patients can be misinformed and can say "I don 7 want this to
happen under those circumstances. " When you talk to them, you realise well,
it's because of this, this and this, but if you point out all that is rubbish,
"oh!" So I think it's I important that we know that they've been properly
informed when they make that decision (SD10).
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Neurology
Neurologists interviewed had a similar idea of advance directives, but also added two
other factors. First, they raised the issue of legality, not that the doctor is legally
bound by the directive, but that the patient would hope that it was binding.
My understanding is that someone makes an attempt to write down their
actual wishes in the event of certain things happening and that they would
wish that this could certainly be legally binding and that their wishes are
respected and carried (SD04).
Secondly, that the directive is, in reality, a refusal of treatment, and not a demand for
treatment against the doctor's better judgement.
An advance directive is any sort of document where a patient would write
refusal ofcertain treatment because we know that people can't demandfutile
treatment (SD06).
Thus, neurologists interviewed appear to understand that the patient is making a
serious attempt at retaining individual autonomy and that he or she believes the
document will bind the doctor to these wishes. What the neurologists interviewed do
not say, however, is whether they will accept its binding nature or even that they will
follow the patient's directions. What they do make clear is, that the advance directive
must only be used to refuse treatment and not as a way of asking for treatment, futile
or otherwise.
Oncology
From the points of view of the oncologists interviewed, the advance directive (or
living will) is defined in a similar fashion, with some unusual differences. One doctor
believed that the directive is a written document that has only an advisory function,
to appraise the physician of the patient's, or next of kin's wishes.
Well, I'd imagine it would indicate, in print, what a certain patient and/or her
husband, perhaps, would wish to happen if they were in certain
circumstances (SD07).
It is unusual that the doctor would believe that the patient's spouse would express his
or her wishes in such a document. If the attending physician felt it this was necessary
it would seem to be simpler merely to ask the spouse. The tone of the doctor's
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statement implies that the document would only have an advisory capacity, which the
doctor could disregard if s/he did not agree.
A second oncologist indicated that he thought the directive would only be advisory
and that medical staff and relatives must agree with the specified course of action.
Both these views are legally inaccurate.
I think that whether it's a document or whether it's an expressed view;
patients have got the right to [consult] with their medical attendants ofwhat
would be the kind ofshape of their terminal illness and what they would like
to do (SD09).
According to the oncologists interviewed, most patients with cancer do discuss the
course of their treatment as the nature of their illness usually gives them time in the
process to develop that. One oncologist had had experience of a patient with an
advance directive, and this type of arrangement worked well for both the healthcare
team and the patient.
I understand the idea that a patient has clearly expressed a desire for a
certain set ofcircumstances to lead to a certain set of interventions or lack of
them and that that has been properly documented and made aware to the
medical team, not just the consultants but the doctors and nurses looking
after her, in advance. That is my experience. I've had one patient, a youngish
woman, who clearly realised her days were numbered and she 'd written what
she called a living will and actually had it backed by a lawyer. It was very
clear what she wanted, so that's my understanding of it (SD08).
The differing beliefs of the legality of advance directives among doctors interviewed
in Scotland may be due to several factors. Doctors have a lack of experience in use of
advance directives, there is no Scottish case law or any statutory authority on
advance directives and many doctors disregard BMA guidance on the subject. All
these problems lead to a misunderstanding of the law in this and related areas of
medical decision-making. None of this helps patients in their quest to protect their
right to respect for autonomy before or during their incapacity.
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Use ofAdvance Directives
The extent of doctors' experience of advance directives is set out in the table below.
5.1 Scottish Doctors' experience of dealing with patients with advance
directives
SPECIALTY ESTIMA TED FREQUENCY OF PA TIENTS WITH
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
Care of the Elderly ~ 4% (some oral directives)
Neurology ~ 3% (some oral directives)
Oncology <2%
(Source: Interviews with Scottish doctors)
Few doctors have experience of patients with this type of anticipatory decision¬
making; therefore much of the information received from medical interviewees in
Scotland is largely anecdotal.
Elderly
A specialist in care of the elderly had an interesting story regarding his experience of
patients with advance directives.
This person had been a barrister and he had had a small stroke and then he
was havingfurther strokes and he made an advance directive that said he did
not want to be ventilated or resuscitated or "ifhis mental state was such that
he was not going to recover to making competent decisions, he did not want
antibiotics in the event of a chest infection He was in a nursing home and
the directive had been made and was left with his GP who held a copy. When
he came in to hospital he had a bad pneumonia and so the GP had said "I
have this advance directive ", and gave a copy of it to us, so we were bound
by that because we felt that his quality of life prior to coming in, was so poor;
he was bed bound and had pressure sores, etc. But his daughters came in
they wanted him to be ventilated. Well, that one example that took so much
work and effort on behalfofstaffon the ward, the professor, me, the person's
family, and lawyers (SD01).
This case occurred in England but gave the geriatrician an insight into the difficulties
that could arise with an advance directive that was likely to be drawn up, considering
the patient's background, as accurately as possible. The doctor was made aware of
the problems that could arise when the family objected despite the fact that the
relatives had no legal rights in the matter and the advance directive was valid. In this
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situation, the directive was respected, but not without a lot of time being spent on the
entire circumstances by the healthcare team and the family.
Neurology
Patients often use oral directives; an example arises from a doctor who worked with
stroke patients in a neurological unit.
I had a recent example where one ofmy patients had said to her friends, and
she'd been a nurse, "I would never want to be tube fed" and since her stroke,
had become dysphagic and had refused tube feeding but she was dying of
starvation and she was hungry and we talked to the family about going
against her previously expressed statement? The problem is, of course, the
person who made that decision was the healthy lady, independent, roaming
round Scotland and [enjoying] foreign holidays. The person who needed the
decision-making was a lady with only halfa brain, who was very disabled in
a hospital bed and that person is now different to the person who made the
decision. And she could communicate. And when we actually gave her the
prognosis, that she was going to die soon with or without a PEG
[percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy] tube feeding but with peg tube
feeding ... she wouldn 7 die ofstarvation, she then decided she didn 7 want to
die and accepted a PEG (SD02).
As this doctor explained, this is one of the medical profession's problems with
advance directives. People may die without changing their minds, but also there is
the issue of who made the best decision: the person in her previous state, with a
shortened period of disabled life or the currently disabled person who may be able to
have further contact with her family over the next few months or perhaps years?
I don 7 know, ethically, on quality of life issues, if she's made the right
decision but certainly she made a different decision in her disabled state than
she's made in an independent state (SD02).
Another neurologist interviewed also had experience of advance directives, but
seems to have had fewer problems with them than his colleagues.
In my experience, they 're not common at the moment in practice. Some ofour
patients have told me they have had them and they've told me what's in them
and it's come across when I've talked about CPR [cardio-pulmonary
resuscitation] decisions and some people have said they would never want
intensive care or tubes to keep them alive, artificial ventilation. So, yes, I've
come across them and, as I say, it's been very helpful for CPR decision¬
al
making, which is a universal policy we have to think about for every patient
(SD05).
Oncology
Only one oncologist interviewed had had a patient with a written living will, but
most had patients who had very strong views about what they wanted and did not
want to have in the final part of their life. Some patients had expressed these views in
the format of an oral living will, which might be taken into account but could cause
problems if any conflicts arose. Oral directives have been debated in the medical
literature but their inherent problems are compounded by 'the paucity of legal and
ethical guidance on reported oral advance statements makes debate imperative and
renders the alternative of having designated surrogate decision makers increasingly
attractive' (Sommerville, 1995: 1663).
One doctor believed that ifmore people did have their wishes written down for use at
a later time as it could make his job easier. It would make it clear where the
difficulties are, and how they might be approached.
We 're debating it at the moment with the directives about not resuscitating
and CPR, which, in a Cancer Unit where at least a third ofour patients, are
here because of palliative care and are clearly dying, it adds another
dimension. In the past we would not necessarily discuss it with them
explicitly, but decisions would be based on joint understanding ofwhat is a
reasonable thing to do for that patient in those circumstances. Now that we
have to discuss it with some patients directly, it is actually much easier than
we thought it was going to be. In a way, patients are actually relieved that
they can say, "No, I don't want to have to go to the ITU [Intensive Therapy
Unit] and have tubes stuck in me and be put on a ventilator" (SD09).
While few doctors interviewed had experience of advance directives, either in
writing or as oral statements, the majority of interviewees in Scotland were able to
see the advantages that might come from them being adopted more widely. There
may be resource problems where more time is required to be spent discussing
decisions with patients and relatives, but the doctors interviewed appear to be aware
of this. Advance directives were mostly seen in care of the elderly and neurology, but
were still very rare. Oral directives were often used and discussed with doctors in
oncology. The majority of doctors felt that their greater use, whether in writing or
verbal, would be helpful for doctors in future decision-making.
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HospitalAdmission
According to the doctors interviewed, patients admitted to Scottish hospitals are
generally not asked whether they have an advance directive. Answers given by
doctors in each of the specialties are outlined below.
Elderly
For doctors in care of the elderly, the question was simply not asked and there was an
assumption that if a patient did have an advance directive, then either the patient or a
relative would make someone aware of the fact.
It's not a standard question. I'd say ifpeople have them, they would usually
say it or relatives would say it (SD01).
Neurology
The situation was similar in neurology,
It's not something you'd ask. Iwould have thought ...ifsomebody has such a
document, they're likely to let someone else know ... if this happens, I want
you to ... (SD04).
The closest that any doctor interviewed got to asking patients in neurology was,
I often ask when I'm sitting down with the families, what the patient thought
and that would often bring one out, ifeven they know about it (SD06).
Oncology
For oncologists interviewed, one doctor was clear; patients were not asked because
treatments were discussed with patients. There also was the assumption that the
patient would let the doctor know if s/he had an advance directive.
I don't ask patients. We tend to talk about the immediate treatment options
and I usually give them some idea as to whether or not there are subsequent
treatment options but I've never gone to anyone and said, "Do you have a
living will? " My presumption is that, if they had one, they would bring it to
my attention (SD10).
It is clear from all the medical interviewees in Scotland that the onus is always on the
patient or his/her relatives, to inform the doctor of any advance directive or living
will. Lack of experience in dealing with advance directives by practitioners in both
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law and medicine and without any legislative developments, means it is unlikely that
this current practice will change in the near future.
Legality
Scottish doctors who were interviewed were not well informed about the legal status
of advance directives. They generally did not have any definite answers, and those
they did have were vague with an indication that advance directives would be taken
into consideration but only on an advisory basis.
Elderly
In care of the elderly only one doctor interviewed believed advance directives would
be legally binding on his decisions.
Legally binding? I know that I would weigh up each one individually. Yes, I
would certainly take it seriously, enough so that ifI wanted to go against it, I
would contact my Legal Department in the Trust or my Medical Protection
Society and say that this advance directive has been made. Am 1 bound to
follow it? And if there were three advance directives on three different
patients in a row, and I disagreed with each of them, I would contact the
Legal Department about each one. In other words, yes, I would say I'm
legally bound so I would have to contact my legal side if I wanted change
(SD03).
This was the only Scottish doctor who considered that they were binding on his
decisions, others interviewed in elderly care were less sure of their legal status.
The advice that I last read was that I needed to take any advance directives
into consideration but they were not legally binding under Scottish Law
(SD01).
This doctor could not say where he had read this information.
Neurology
Neurologists interviewed were unlikely to find advance directives legally binding,
but they were prepared to take them into consideration in treatment decision-making.
This also applied to oral statements for future treatments,
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If it was reported by a reliable person, I think I would. It then comes back to
what was their state when they made that [decision] and do they know, for
instance, that many strokes are not severe and they get better. The problem is
that somebody may need to be fed with a tube for three weeks. They then stop
needing that andget back to where they were SD06).
Oncology
As with the other doctors interviewed, oncologists were unsure of the legality of
advance directives, but in one doctor's case this was inconsequential.
I don't know what their legal status is. Given that the circumstances under
which I would expect them to be applied would relate to patients who are
known to have a cancer and know that it is incurable, I wouldplace a lot of
moral weight by that decision (SD10).
As far as this oncologist is concerned if a patient needs an advance directive, and we
need to assume that this would be a negative directive, the patient would probably
not be receiving any further treatment in any case, therefore the advance directive
would be unnecessary. This situation may be satisfactory for oncology, but it is a
narrow view that would not be suitable for other medical circumstances. Those that
come to mind are the incurable, but not terminal illnesses, e.g. motor neurone
disease, Huntington's disease, Alzheimer's disease. All these illnesses require
extensive treatments that the patient may wish to consent to or refuse sometimes
where a refusal could lead to the patient's death. The problem being that without an
advance directive the patient may not be able to refuse any or all treatments
prescribed by the doctor.
Alternatively, by establishing rules surrounding anticipatory decision-making, one
doctor believed that this was not necessarily a move forward.
I think that the more we actually make this legalistic and we get other parties
involved, the more we decrease the quality of care for patients. I think it's
unhelpful (SD09).
This statement begs the question - unhelpful for whom? The answer that comes to
mind is that it removes the ultimate decision-making capacity from the doctor;
therefore it would be unhelpful for the medical practitioner.
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Overriding an advance directive
There may be many reasons behind doctors disagreeing with a patient's wishes for
his or her treatment. For patients who have the capacity to make treatment decisions,
the common law states that doctors may not override these wishes (Re MB, 1997 at
549). In Scotland there are no unqualified legal rules (common law or statutory) that
prohibit healthcare providers from overriding a patient's wishes if he or she has lost
capacity to make those decisions. In the case of advance directives, whether
expressed orally or in documentary form, there also is no law that states a medical
practitioner must follow them. However, there may be an implication in the 2000 Act
that respect for a patient's present and past wishes could include those wishes written
down in an advance directive. Additionally, recent English case law has stated that a
refusal of treatment, in the form of an advance directive and provided certain criteria
were observed, would be effective.
It is, however, also clearly the law that the doctors are not entitled so to act if
it is known that the patient, provided he was of sound mind and full capacity,
has let it be known that he does not consent and that such treatment is against
his wishes. To this extent an advance indication of the wishes of a patient of
full capacity and sound mind are effective (Re AK, 2001).
The doctors interviewed were asked to relate any circumstances where they thought
they would be persuaded to ignore an advance directive and go against a patient's
treatment wishes.
Elderly
In elderly care interviewees the main reason doctors gave for overriding an advance
directive was if it was used to ask for futile treatment. It is widely acknowledged that
doctors cannot be forced to give treatment they believe to be unnecessary, or which
may be worthless in terms of improving the patient's medical condition. Therefore
according to geriatricians interviewed, an advance directive which stated "I want
everything done", when the doctor knows that any further treatment was futile,
would be worthless and the doctor would be within his or her rights to ignore it. One
doctor said,
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I could say, "Well, they say they want everything done but it's futile". I
would get a second opinion because it would be going against [the patient's
wishes]... What I would do is say, well, it's my opinion that giving an
antibiotic is not going to affect the quality of this person's life. It is only
going to prolong their condition temporarily (SD02).
This scenario is typical of a positive advance directive where patients would use the
document to ask for treatment and in contrast with a negative, refusal directive where
it would be used to refuse further treatment. The requirement that an advance
directive must refer to a treatment refusal in order for it to have any real influence on
treatment decisions was true until a recent decision by the Administrative Court in
England. The court found that GMC guidelines to doctors on withdrawing artificial
nutrition and hydration (ANH) breached a patient's human rights (R (on the
application of Oliver Leslie Burke) v. GMC [2004]). This ruling ensured that Mr
Burke, who is suffering from a progressive disease, if he requires ANH, could only
have it withdrawn after referral to the courts. This case is likely to have repercussions
for positive advance directives which specify treatments that doctors may regard as
futile.
Neurology
Reiterating what was said concerning the legality of advance directives, but still
respecting their bearing on a patient's wishes, a neurologist stated
I wouldn 't go against an advance directive unless there were serious reasons
to do so andperhaps even get a second opinion ... I would not accept them as
legally binding but I would treat them very seriously (SD05).
Alternatively, another neurologist was prepared to override the patient's statement if
he strongly disagreed with it
... in general I think advance directives, if written before something's
happened, are going to be non-specific because the person cannot predict
what's going to happen, what the situation will be. If a patient has got a
progressive problem or a problem which will lead on to another more
predictable problem, then I think we could take more notice of that advance
directive than one which is a new situation. So I think what you 're trying to
do is get at what the patient would want in full knowledge of what situation
they 're in now and ofcourse you cannot do that directly (SD06).
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It seems that this neurologist did not wish to ignore the patient's wishes, but was
more concerned that the necessary wideness of advance directives may make them
less authoritative as a method of controlling treatment decisions.
Oncology
One of the oncologists interviewed addressed the issue of overriding an advance
directive from the perspective of being the person caught between patient and family
members. This is an important issue, as there can be unrealistic expectations from the
family that every treatment would be attempted. In these circumstances, the doctor
must decide how he or she will proceed - by following the patient's wishes as
expressed in the directive, or by conceding to the family's wishes to continue with
treatment. A reasonable approach to this dilemma is expressed below by one of the
oncologists interviewed,
I would, primarily, give a lot of credence to the living will. So if it was very
clear to me you had written down "look, under these circumstances, I don't
want treatment x " it would be your views that would be respected. What we
would do is explain to the relatives why we were taking that view. Now if they
said to us 'well, I happen to know that the day she wrote that, she was totally
depressed' or 'completely drunk' or something like that, OK, then we would
probably have to start to reassess it but, as I said, if I was aware one ofmy
patients had written a living will, I would try and discuss the contents with
the patient. So then I'd say to the relatives "look, actually, s/he may have
written it when she was drunk, but I talked to him/her when s/he was sober
and I know that's what s/he told me. " So we would put a lot ofweight by it
(SD07).
Continuing, this particular oncologist was aware that not all situations could be
planned and that these are probably fairly artificial scenarios. Ultimately, there may
be no other solution but,
... to give my best advice, which if it coincided with the patient's previous
expressed advice, I'd explain, if they were unhappy, I'd suggest we get
another doctor (SD07).
Caught in a dilemma, this doctor was happy to consider the advance directive, but
when the patient's wishes were different to the doctor's, he would probably pass the
patient to another doctor. The concession to the family's wishes is unnecessary as is
the need to pass the patient to another doctor if the family disagree. This could be
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seen as abandoning the patient because the family disagree with the doctor. This is
legally unnecessary because if the doctor and the patient agree on a course of action
(by advance directive or otherwise) the family's wishes are immaterial and no other
doctor's opinion is required.
Patient Autonomy
While most of the doctors interviewed did not believe that advance directives were
binding, they did feel that directives might influence their decision-making and some
thought they might have an impact on the protection of patient autonomy.
Elderly
In care of the elderly, all doctors interviewed felt that the patient's previously
expressed view was, by and large, the most important issue. They hoped that their
main concerns would be with the patient and that the patient's clearly expressed
preferences would take priority. Additionally, they sympathised with the patient's
family if they did not agree with the patient's decision, but would remind them that it
was neither his/her nor the family's decision; 'it was their loved one's decision and
they need to accept some things in life that are sad' (SD02).
In the case of a degenerative condition, for example, Motor Neurone Disease or
Alzheimer's disease, finding out, at the very early stages of the disease would usually
mean that the person has insight and capacity to make a decision regarding future
treatment. This doctor believed that this was relevant,
Ifa person decides "I have been diagnosed with Motor Neurone Disease and
I don 7 want to go through the horror of all my muscles wasting away and
now I want a decision made ... I don 7 want antibiotics ifI am unable to move
my arms or legs, I don't want to go on a ventilator. " Yes, I would respect
that (SD01).
As far as being useful in protecting human rights, the apparent feeling among
geriatricians interviewed was explained by one doctor.
As a geriatrician, I think our speciality is much better at saying "enough's
enough, let's bail out of this situation. " Whereas I see some ofmy single
organ specialist colleagues persevere to the bitter end. An advance directive
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might improve some people's terminal care, maybe but perhaps the Human
Rights Act will be sufficient (SD03).
This interviewee has raised a relevant point as the Human Rights Act 1998 is
designed to protect a citizen's rights from being eroded by the state. As
representatives of the state hospitals will be liable if an individual's or a proxy's
rights are ignored or eroded in some way by hospital policy or medical decisions
made on the state's behalf. Since there have been no court decisions on advance
directives in Scotland, individuals may have to rely on actions raised under human
rights legislation.
Neurology
All the neurologists interviewed would be less inclined to treat people with severe
cognitive problems than to treat persons with severe physical problems. This is
because cognitive problems are unlikely to recover and are more likely to be
progressive and therefore physicians are less uneasy about not treating them than a
physical problem.
I think the ability to absorb and cope with physical disability is greater, by
definition, than the ability to cope with a cognitive disability (SD06).
Neurologists interviewed were also positive in their belief that advance directives
would be helpful as one method of retaining a person's autonomy in situations where
patients could not speak for themselves. One doctor had views on how that
protection could be improved upon,
I think yes, they do bear on one's decision-making and therefore they help
you along. I suppose they could be made more useful by being very explicit
but they would need, guidance, not ofa lawyer, but ofa doctor to explain to
them, the sorts ofcommon situations they might end up in and the prognosis
from there on. So, for instance, if somebody, prior to becoming severely
demented, had the implications of dementia, and the fact it is a progressive
thing, explained to them and they signed a document, which says "look, I
understand all of this and ifI get to that state, I don't want to be fed", then I
think I would take more note of that (SD06).
They also believed that advance directives were a suitable method of safeguarding
someone's individual human rights. One doctor qualified this by arguing that the
nature of the advance directive and what it contains,
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I think, in this country ... we live our life, not expecting things to happen so
we think there's no problem. People may develop a certain disease process
and they then make a directive, with regard to that disease process and it may
be very specific to that (SD04).
While neurologists interviewed thought advance directives useful in retaining patient
autonomy and human rights, previous questions established that neurologists
interviewed did not think advance directives were legally binding on doctors.
Advance directives, as methods of protecting individual autonomy and human rights
would still only be effective if the doctor agreed to follow them. If the doctor did not
agree with them, did not believe they were binding on his or her decisions, and
therefore felt justified in overruling them, it would be of no consequence that they
could protect autonomy and human rights, as they will not have the opportunity to do
so.
Oncology
On the other hand, oncologists interviewed were less sure that advance directives
would be useful in retaining patient autonomy. While one doctor did agree that they
were important, especially if the patient is concerned about their autonomy in the
future, advance directives may not be as important as some people think.
I try and make patients feel that they retain autonomy in decision-making. I
suspect ifyou interviewed halfmy patients, probably some of them would say
"no, I don 7 feel I had that much autonomy ", and obviously that's my failing,
but I think the need for a living will comes when the patient feels they don 7
have autonomy but there is something they draw a stand about: "I want to
make that decision." I, and most oncologists I know, do try and allow
patients to be involved in the decision-making and therefore Iwouldn 7 expect
many ofthem wouldfeel the need to have living wills (SD10).
This doctor continued by expressing a hope that his patients had enough confidence
in the health service to feel that they were involved in decision-making, and that they
felt part of what was going on. Consequently, when it comes to making another
decision, then their wishes would be respected, if the patient were still competent to
make a decision. However, there would be no need for an advance directive at this
point and the doctor seems to misunderstand when the directive is required. Whether
or not the patient feels autonomous is irrelevant if he or she still has decision-making
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capacity. The advance directive will only come into play when the patient has lost
capacity to make decisions. As has been mentioned in many of the oncologists'
responses, by the time the patient becomes unable to make a decision, in the majority
circumstances there is no decision to be made because the treatment regime has
already been decided between all parties concerned. In this oncologist's view 'the
number of instances where more living wills would make my life easier would be
veryfew' (SD10).
Conversely, another oncologist felt more strongly that advance directives were a
suitable way of safeguarding patient autonomy. Although she did hope that patients'
rights, including respect for their autonomy, would be safeguarded throughout their
treatment and that a situation where an advance directive might be required would
not be so common however,
It does assist in that process but I think it's a mistake to see it as the main
thing to preserve that right. It should be preserved all through the treatment
and clearly if a patient who is incompetent prior to their illness, like
somebody who is very badly brain damaged, then they may never have had
the opportunity to write a living will. There may be a few who have but what
happens all along, I suspect, in those patients, is that you would involve their
carers, their relatives and most of the time they have their best interests at
heart. So yes, it is a safeguard but I don't think it's the most important one
(SD08).
The difficulty arose for oncologists interviewed when the patient had stated in an
advance directive certain conditions of treatment, but for whatever reason the doctor
was unable provide treatment. In this situation legal advice was felt to be important
and,
a situation where a living will would need to be legally sorted out because if
a patient is saying "well, look, I'm prepared to die to have no pain " andyet I
know that I can cure them, our natural inclination, as doctors, would be not
to take that risk. So we would need the legal standing sorted out. But for the
patients I treat, there isn't an issue (SD07).
Finally, using advance directives to protect certain human rights was anathema to
one oncologist.
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I suspect it might do exactly the opposite. I would really be concerned that if
it becomes a statute, then what will happen is that, unless it's there, people
will then go, in their self-protected way, to explore the lengths to keep
somebody alive and then it may just misfire because patients will fall through
those gaps (SD09).
In other words, this oncologist believed that doctors would play it safe, and unless a
patient had an advance directive, they would keep patients alive for as long as
possible for fear of being sued.
Conscientious Objections
Many doctors have connected conscientious objection to opposition to advance
directives, whether on religious31 or moral grounds. The BMA has issued guidelines
regarding conscientious objections to advance statements for doctors and patients on
this matter (BMA, 1995a) and advises that if the doctor does not wish to treat a
patient who has written an advance directive, he or she must ensure that the patient's
care is passed over to a doctor who has no objections. These statutes, codes of
practice and guidance are relevant to doctors practising in all jurisdictions of the UK
and especially applicable to the analysis of English doctors' interviews in Chapter
Six.
Elderly
In elderly care, the interviewees were generally in favour of doctors being allowed to
withdraw their services. They felt that it would be reasonable for a doctor to object to
advance directives in a similar fashion to their objection to participating in abortions,
especially if the directive was binding in law.
I think doctors should have the right to withdraw and to ask another doctor to
take over care but again, it should be done with ... preserving the doctor's
autonomy as well Yes, it's similar to should a Catholic doctor be made to
perform abortions? It's similar, but not the same ...doctors in other areas
have the ability not to do things if they disagree with them. Ifyou are not
prepared, ethically, to deal with a situation, you need to refer to someone
who is ethically prepared to deal with the problem. I think ifthey were legally
binding, Imay have trouble with advance directives (SD01).
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A neurologist who was interviewed did not believe that it was reasonable for a doctor
to object to advance directives on ethical grounds. He felt it unreasonable for a
doctor to use his or her personal objections to refuse to carry out patients' wishes.
The patient may want the doctor to stop treatment and conveys this wish via the
advance directive; however, the doctor may have moral or ethical grounds for
objecting to withholding treatment e.g. ANH. In this neurologist's opinion it would
be wrong to impose these objections on the patient and continue to treat regardless.
He said,
I don't think so because, even ifyou come down to just the basic medical
theorem, we are not allowed to do anything without the individual's consent.
We can't operate, we can't stick a needle in them, if we do, it's termed
assault. They have to give consent, so if somebody refuses to have a blood
test, there's nothing we can do about it, and you cannot get that blood test. I
think this is perhaps an extension ofsaying "I do not wish you to do that. " I
think the majority of individuals would say "well, that's just, that's their
decision. But some people may feel it has to be done (SD04).
The doctor believed that when the patient refuses consent through a living will or
advance directive and this refusal would eventually harm the patient, the doctor who
objects to this refusal must transfer the patient to another suitable neurologist;
otherwise the doctor is committing an assault by treating the patient against his or his
will.
Oncology
Doctors interviewed who specialised in cancer care held similar views. One stated
that by 'treating patients in the National Health Service one should be prepared to
take patients ofall sorts' (SD07).
Another oncologist interviewed who dealt mainly in palliative care gave a more
detailed view. He did not believe that the patient's view should be disregarded in
favour of a doctor's opinion.
No, I don't agree, a lot ofmy work involves patient decisions. None of our
treatments are 100% effective so every time I discuss a treatment with a
patient, I have to introduce to them the uncertainty as to whether the
treatment will work or not and therefore the patient has to, at least, have the
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opportunity to be involved in making a decision as to whether or not they
want the treatment, so I depend on patient interests. One patient will make a
different decision in the same circumstances to another. Fine, they're
different people. The same applies to whether they've got living wills, so I
cannot see why you could object to them having a living will (SD10).
This oncologist understood that doctors in other areas of medicine may have a
different outlook, for instance those working in Accident and Emergency
Departments who see their jobs as putting people back together and saving their
lives.
I can imagine those kinds ofpeople would have a problem with [advance
directives] because they might say, "well, does a patient really know what
they 're agreeing to? " But I think if a patient is properly informed ... after
all patients usually come to the doctor in the first place, they've made that
choice, so why can't they make other choices (SD10)?
From all the doctors' responses, conscientious objection to advance directives is less
straightforward than it initially appears, and can operate on several levels. Some
doctors felt that being able to circumvent the use of advance directives on religious
or ethical grounds seems to be only fair on the basis of professional autonomy.
Conversely, if the advance directive is to be viewed as an extension of patient
autonomy, as a facility by which to control treatment decision-making, then a
conscientious objection by the doctor will be a type of erosion of the patient's
autonomy: a case of professional versus personal autonomy. A compromise may be
to ensure that a doctor with no such conscientious objections can treat the patient,
and this is probably what the BMA intended by issuing the aforementioned
guidelines. Nevertheless, by only making these guidelines advisory, there is no strict
duty on the doctor (as the most powerful partner in the relationship) to follow them.
Conclusions
In Scotland, statute law (in the form of the AWI Act) and the common law govern
treatment consent. Informed consent from all patients with capacity is required
before treatment can be given; this consent may be implied, as may a refusal, usually
through shunning approaches to give treatment. The doctor may restrict the treatment
options available with no duty to inform the patient of available treatment choices.
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The right to refuse treatment cannot be overruled, but there is no duty to inform
patients of their right to refuse, they are usually only asked about CPR decisions.
Doctors interviewed in Scotland appear to be unsure of the law in relation to issues
of consent and erroneously may ask relatives to consent to treatment. In all cases,
treatment decisions for patients without capacity are made using the best interests
model of decision-making.
Medical authority is held in high esteem according to both doctors and lawyers
interviewed in Scotland. Doctors hold a position of power and both patients and
families respect their decisions. Challenges are evident in the unrealistic expectations
held by families, poor communication with the health team and through doctors
withholding information from patients.
An advance directive is perceived by medical practitioners interviewed as being a
plan of management of the patient's future care and a refusal of treatment only.
Lawyers interviewed do not regard directives as being legally binding on doctors and
only one doctor was prepared to view a directive as binding in decisions. The
majority are only prepared to take both written and oral directives into consideration.
Doctors will override a directive if they feel it necessary and if the directive is
irrational. Some doctors interviewed would only consider advance directives and will
follow them only if not against doctors' decisions.
The general opinion among doctors interviewed is that use of advance directives is a
move away from paternalism and that they could be useful in promoting the patient's
personal autonomy. While safeguard are sometimes necessary because of struggles
between professional and personal autonomy, there is a chance that directives might
restrict the doctor's ultimate decision-making powers and therefore should not be
given statutory authority.
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Chapter Six Analysis of English Data
Introduction and Background
This chapter adopts the same design as Chapters Four and Five, which examine the
same issues from Dutch and Scottish perspectives. Lawyers' and doctors' views on
treatment decision-making and advance directives are explored and how they affect
professional and patient autonomy is discussed.
Ten lawyers and ten doctors were interviewed in England, all interviews were in-
depth, qualitative, and semi-structured, lasting in the region of 30-50 minutes each;
analysis was conducted using NVIVO qualitative data analysis software, and the
discussion highlights how advance directives are affected by the current English
legal arrangements
This chapter shows that treatment decisions for patients with capacity in England are
generally made after discussion with the patient and sometimes with the family. It is
recognised by all parties interviewed, however, that while competent, the patient
always has a right to refuse treatment regardless of the consequences. This right is
not always explained to patients on their admission to hospital for treatment. For
patients without capacity, the healthcare team will normally make decisions on their
behalf through discussion with relatives and colleagues and also by referring to the
person's earlier wishes made known by oral or in written advance directives.
Different doctors use different decision-making models: usually substituted judgment
or best interests models. Conflicts are resolved through discussion with all interested
parties.
Neither doctors nor lawyers believe that advance directives have binding legal status
on doctors at present in England. New legislation may provide some protection for
patients' autonomy as the Mental Capacity Bill introduces advance directives into
English statute law. Lawyers are more likely than doctors to believe that the courts
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may continue to rule in favour of advance directives becoming binding on doctors in
the future.
Generally, while the capax patient has ultimate decision-making power over medical
treatment, the incapax patient only has protection over his or her autonomy through
advance directives. These directives are currently regulated through Codes of
Practice but may be given statutory backing in the future. Likewise, patient
autonomy is less protected than professional autonomy and the resultant balance of
rights is more heavily weighted on the side of the healthcare professional than the
patient.
Lawyers
Ten English lawyers were interviewed, all working in the areas of private law,
reparation and negligence, wills and probate, trusts, estate and asset protection
planning. The lawyers worked with private clients in or around the Newcastle and
Sunderland areas, and all gave permission for the interviews to be tape-recorded.
These pursued two main themes: English legal arrangements in treatment decision¬




The Draft Mental Incapacity Bill (Cm 5859-1) and accompanying Commentary and
Explanatory Notes (Cm.5859-11) were presented to Parliament on 27 June 2003 by
Lord Filkin, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the newly created
Department for Constitutional Affairs. The draft Bill is the result of a lengthy and
detailed process of consultation. In 1989, the then Lord Chancellor, Lord MacKay of
Clashfern, invited the Law Commission of England and Wales to carry out a
comprehensive investigation of all areas of law affecting decisions on the personal,
financial and medical affairs of those who lack capacity. This was in response to
concerns raised by professional bodies and voluntary organisations dealing with
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mental disability. Following five years of consultation, the Law Commission
produced its final report and recommendations for Law Reform in March 1995 (LC,
1995). The Commission recommended that 'there should be a single comprehensive
piece of legislation to make new provision for people who lack mental capacity'
(ibid, Summary paragraph 1.2).
The Bill will govern decision-making on behalf of adults, both where they lose
mental capacity at some point in their lives, through, for example dementia or brain
injury, and where the incapacitating condition has been present since birth. It covers
a wide range of decisions, on personal welfare as well as financial matters and
substitute decision-making by attorneys, a court, or court-appointed "deputies", and
clarifies the position where no such formal process has been followed. If necessary,
the Bill will provide an opportunity for a court to deal with all personal welfare
(including health care) and financial decisions on behalf of adults lacking capacity.
Clauses 23 to 25 of the draft Bill set out the circumstances in which persons with
capacity, having reached the age of 18, may express in advance a decision about
what treatment they would wish not to have if they were subsequently to become
incapable.
Until the Mental Capacity Bill is enacted and comes into force, legal authority
surrounding decision-making for patients with incapacity continues to be based on
common law. Several cases involving medical decisions helped mould the law but
some lawyers interviewed had opinions on how patients were characterised by the
law and by doctors. One lawyer felt,
I think, personally, that the law doesn't take into account very much the
autonomy of the patient and it's an area that I've got a lot offeelings about.
I think they [doctors] still play the paternalistic role to a great extent (EL02).
The legal reality is that the courts, in their judgements, do take patient autonomy
seriously and acknowledge that anticipatory decision-making is authorised by law.
For example, a non-written advance directive made by a young man with "locked-in"
syndrome was held to be effective,
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To this extent an advance indication of the wishes of a patient of full capacity
and sound mind is effective, but care must be taken to ensure that such
anticipatory declarations of wishes still represent the wishes of the patient (Re
AK [2000] per Hughes, J).
The lawyers interviewed agreed that nobody in England could consent on behalf of
the patient,
... no other adult can consentfor another adult. It has to be the doctor [who]
takes on the responsibility if [patients are] not capable ofmaking their own
consent (EL05).
Or more fully,
IfI came across a situation where somebody who was saying a loved one was
in hospital and it was said that medical treatment was required but the
person was unable to consent to that treatment and what were they to do
about it, I'd have to check it really, look into it carefully. My understanding
is that the doctors can take a view about the capacity of the patient and can
override the patient's own right to consent by saying the person is not
capable of giving consent and therefore they will go ahead with it on the
basis that it is a reasonable and necessary procedure (EL01).
Type ofLaw
Compared to the Netherlands, where medical decision-making is given authority by
statutory law, medical decision-making in England relies on common law doctrine
and case law. Several important cases have shaped the law on advance directives and
medical decision-making incapax patients.
At present people's misunderstanding of the law in this area has caused problems for
family members who may approach lawyers because they are unsure of the law
regarding consent and refusal of treatment for their incapacitated relative. One
lawyer gave an example of how people misunderstood the law,
They still think that they can make decisions on behalf of other people and I
think that's something that probably, as time passes, will get better or will
change ... and I think it's just something that people think they have the right
to do, is to make decisions for other people (EL03).
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The advice given by lawyers usually involved recommending further discussion with
healthcare practitioners and it would be rare for the problem to require recourse to
litigation.
I have had discussions with people who have contacted me by telephone,
concerned about it. It's never been followed through in terms of a serious
issue. There was a recent case, I think it was in Newcastle, I think it was
relating to consent to treatment ... When people make an enquiry with me, I
start offon the basis of the importance ofcommunication so that the patient's
relatives should ... try to communicate fully with ... the treating doctors
(EL10).
In dealing more specifically with law in the sphere of advance directives, one lawyer
gave his reasons for appreciating the current status.
The law surrounding medical decision-making on behalf of those who are
incapax is not governed by statute in the United Kingdom. I see this as
advantageous in that the granter ofa deed containing an advance directive is
effectively making an anticipatory decision, at a point when the facts
regarding his future condition and the treatments available to him are
unknown, about medical treatment which will or will not be received by him.
I feel that the rigidity of a statutory framework in this area may make it
difficult to maintain the necessaryflexibility with regard to treatment which is
demanded by such an unpredictable factual nexus. For example, it would, I
think, be counter-productive for a doctor to be legally bound to act in
accordance with a living will despite having strong reason to believe that the
patient would not have wished it to be adhered to in the unforeseen factual
circumstances arising (EL06).
Because of the present lack of clarity, the Mental Capacity Bill is anticipated eagerly,
but regardless of the absence of statutory rules, lawyers encourage families to talk to
each other and to healthcare professionals in an attempt to understand and resolve
any problem areas.
Case Law and the Courts
As mentioned in the previous section, the common law in England and Wales is the
dominant form of legal authority for medical decision-making. The lawyers
interviewed found the common law to be appropriate to medical decision-making,
one expressed her opinion,
212
The common law is what I work in and I find it flexible, [there are] things
that you don't like because it's not specific and it's not clear but there is
flexibility and there is room for manoeuvre and there is all that sort ofstuff
which is very good. Of course the bad side of it is lots of time it depends on
judicial discretion andjudicial interpretation but statute is not the be all and
end all because there are an awful lot ofdifficulties about statute, and statute
is as good as its drafting and a statute very often doesn't fulfil what is
required. You look back andyou think, well actually we needed more in this
statute. We needed different things. So should it be enshrined in statute? No,
I don't think it should. I think there should be a House of Lords decision
about a living will, which is a horrible thing for the people who are going
through to go through but I think that would be the way (EL05).
Some lawyers interviewed believed that doctors might prefer there to be some type
of statute law, central to this area of medical law. It might afford greater clarity
enabling clinicians to base their decisions on a more solid footing.
I don't know about making it easier, it would probably make it clearer
because of the decisions that have to be taken. It may be that a lot more
people would object and not want to be involved in them. ... Yeah, there
might be more people who would say "I don't want to be involved in that"
but certainly ... it would be like a protocol. As long as you followed the
protocol, you would be covered by that, where I think, at the minute, people
say, "oh, well, I don't want to make this decision because I don't know how I
stand" (EL09).
It seems, from this statement at least, that this lawyer sees two issues: first that there
is a lack of clarity surrounding the law, where the confusion lies is not absolutely
clear, it may be among the doctors or the lawyers or the relatives, or even all three.
The second point is that if there were more definite rules then perhaps some parties
might not want to be confined by these rules. Again, it is not clear which party this
lawyer thinks might object most.
Of the three jurisdictions investigated, England and Wales have produced the largest
number of court actions in decision-making and living wills. Major sources of court
action are cases where relatives and the doctors disagree about the treatment regime
for the incapacitated patient.
Difficulties do arise when the relatives disagree with [the doctor] and they
want treatment continued to be given and then they come and see the lawyer
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and at that point you have to explain to them "well, you can't force the
doctor to treat". I think one ofthe problems is that the law is viewed, I think,
as an adversarial system, as a fight. Whereas I don't think in these sorts of
cases that it necessarily needs to be so. I think there is a lot to be said for
doctors being upfront and straightforward andjust saying, "we think this If
you, as the relative, disagree well, it's like a form ofmediation. The effect is
to go into the High Court with both of their arguments and whatever the
outcome, we will abide by it. But I don't think doctors are often that grown
up. They tend to say, "this is what shoidd happen ", and they get very uptight
when the relatives disagree (EL03).
While this lawyer saw court action as a problem-solving arena, he had the impression
that doctors did not agree. It would appear that this lawyer felt that doctors would
react badly to a court action and possibly would feel that their professional authority
was under attack.
One lawyer also mentioned that legal aid might be a problem that could arise when
the courts became involved,
If the patient is eligible for funding, then the relatives may not get funding.
But the patient, if they're incapable of making a decision, would be
represented by the official solicitor whose only instruction is really arguing
for the patient (EL08).
Problems may arise for people without adequate finances to fund an action in court
to decide whether to follow a patient's advance directive. Without clear, possibly
statutory guidance, many people will be unable to contest medical treatment-
decisions and this may also infringe their rights to distributive justice.
Capax Patients
All lawyers interviewed concurred with doctors on the principle that a treatment
decision made by a patient with capacity could not be overridden regardless of the
consequences. One lawyer mentioned that in some conditions capacity may vary
from day to day, for example, in organic brain disease (dementia, Alzheimer's
Disease, etc.) a patient may become lucid for extended periods before returning to a
less aware state, consequently decisions may be taken on that person's behalf from
time to time,
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I mean there's some days I could say I probably haven't got capacity if I'm
feeling tired or ifI'm spaced out and I have a "senior moment" because I'm
at that age and you think, well, yes, because I'm exactly the same. So who's
to say that I've got total capacity all the time? And I'd hate for someone to
say, "well, I've decided on your behalf" when, in the next ten minutes, I
could have capacity back again? So, yeah, I think it's a big area that needs to
be looked at (EL09).
Capacity therefore, may not always be clear cut and can cause problems for
autonomy. The courts are not always happy to make treatment decisions when the
case goes to court.
It is not for the court to substitute its own views as to what may or may not be
in the patient's best interests for the decision of the patient if of full age and
capacity (Law Hospital v. Lord Advocate 1996 SLT 848 per Lord President
Hope at 852F).
Although this is a Scots law case and has no real precedent in England and Wales,
the point made is still relevant. If the patient has capacity, then in theory, the court
would not become involved, as patient autonomy would take precedence. What is not
clear is whether a statute that explicitly stated the patient's rights would give the
public and doctors more confidence about decision-making and planning for future
medical treatments.
Incapax Patients
When asked about treatment decision-making for incapax patients, the lawyers
interviewed raised several issues. Two points dominated, both concerning the issue
of consent: first, the problem of doctors overriding incapacitated patients' consent,
My understanding is that the doctors can take a view about the capacity of the
patient and can override the patient's own right to consent by saying the person
is not capable of giving consent and therefore they will go ahead with [the
treatment] on the basis that it is a reasonable and necessary procedure. I would
think it is certainly goodpractice (EL01J.
Secondly, consultations with lawyers were made by families who were unsure of
their rights to consent on their relative's behalf, sometimes merely for advice and to
assuage their doubts or fears.
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My experience is to be consulted by the relatives direct but we occasionally have
relatives who will come to us to ask "is this right?" particularly when we 're
talking about people who are suffering from fairly advanced dementia, by and
large, so there's a lot ofangst around that (EL05).
Doctors who previously had not been aware of the law on consent regarding the
incapax patient also made consultations. This lawyer, who specialises in medical law
had strong links with the local hospitals and had carried out informal teaching
sessions for healthcare professionals on, issues of consent to treatment. She related
some anecdotal evidence from her own experience.
...relatives still think that they can make the decisions, especially the elderly
relative of the old aunt or the old mother, and up until about a couple of
years ago they [doctors] were still getting relatives to consent and it wasn't
until ... I'd done a couple of talks on consent and said "this is not legal". But
I've actually had doctors ... well, surgeons, ringing me up and saying "this is
right. They can't consent, can they?"... I've even had them ringing to say
they've had a 'pre-med' and they haven't consented. "What do I do now?"
So it is getting through to them but up until about a couple ofyears ago, they
were still allowing relatives to consent (EL02).
These three interviews are examples of a misunderstanding among some doctors and
the public on what the law on consent and incapax patients is. Doctors' lack of
knowledge in this area compounds the public's confusion and in some cases
probably causes discontent among family members.
In the present legal situation, there are no definitive rules by which to determine how
medical decisions can be made in the case of a dispute. There may be several
different methods of conflict resolution set up in hospitals, e.g. ethics committees,
second opinion, mediation, etc., but the final decision would probably have to be
made by the courts if all other attempts at a solution fails,
In cases of doubt as to the effect of a purported refusal of treatment, where
failure to treat threatens the patient's life or to cause irreparable damage to his
health, doctors and health authorities should not hesitate to apply to the
courts for assistance {In re T (Adult: Refusal ofTreatment) [Court of Appeal]
[1993] Fam 95 per Lord Donaldson of Lymington M.R. at 116E).
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Having to apply to the courts precludes a large part of society who will be unable or
unwilling to take their conflict to court through lack of finances or lack of confidence
in challenging the medical profession.
Refusal of Treatment
Lawyers were asked whether they believed that patients should be told, when they
are being given treatment choices, that they could refuse treatment. The main
response was from lawyers interviewed who answered in the affirmative. One lawyer
gave a comprehensive explanation of why she thought that was the case.
Yes, absolutely, I think that's important. You see I know I can refuse and I
could refuse, well, I know it now. Whether I would know it [or] whether I
would be able to hold on to that knowing when I was in a situation where I
was ill and there was an option for treatment, I don't know. Would I then
think, "oh, I can refuse this", I'd hope I would, and be reminded of it by
people around me "you don't have to do this", that's the important thing.
But, yes, I think doctors should say to people "you don't have to go through
with this. It is your choice whether you do it or not", and I don 7 think that
happens and I see a lot ofmedical records and very, very rarely do I see that
anywhere, written down or anyone ever says to me "well, he said I didn 7
need to go through with it and it was my choice ultimately". I think that's
important, that's really important (EL06).
This lawyer's response points out the issues many people can have with refusing
treatment. First of all, many people may are not be aware of their right to refuse
treatment even if their doctors disagree. The second point is that even when people
do know they have the right to refuse, they may not remember this when they are in
an ill situation. Whichever is the case, what matters is this lawyer, and possibly a
great deal of other people, would be grateful of being reminded of this right at the
time when it matters. Patients' autonomy can be reinforced through giving them the
full range of options to choose from even if in conflict with the patients' "best
interests", instead of acting paternalistically and restricting the choices given to




Several lawyers interviewed were unable to decide whether advance directives were
legally binding on doctors under English Law. One said,
I'd take a stab at saying that I don't think they would be legally binding but
that they would be an expression of a wish, an intention and to that extent,
they would have some weight. ... I don't know, but I don 7 think they could be
any guarantee that this is what is going to happen to you. I've no idea. Do
you know? (EL01)
Another would not advise a doctor that they would be binding on his or her
decisions.
Oh, I don 7 think it's totally binding, absolutely not any certainty about it
being binding but ... if the doctor's concerned about the patient you'd say,
"what did this patient want? " Ofcourse you've got the problem ofwhen they
made the living will and if the circumstances now are different. Now, I would
say if a doctor came for advice and said he wouldn't do it, I'd say "you're
not bound by it". I don 7 think, in law, you are bound by it (EL10).
The common law in England states that doctors are not entitled to act if it is known
that the patient, provided he or she was of sound mind and full capacity, has made it
known that he or she does not consent to certain treatments. To this extent an
advance indication of the wishes of a patient of full capacity and sound mind are
effective (.Re AK [2001], per Hughes J. at 191) and these lawyers' uncertainty could
lead to them giving doctors erroneous legal advice.
Due to the lack of experience in drafting and the difficulties in interpretation and
even possible misinterpretation of such documents, many English lawyers who were
interviewed felt that advance directives should only be considered and taken into
account by doctors and other health care workers, but not automatically
implemented.
To spell out in no uncertain terms that doctors are duty bound to follow, to
the letter, an advance refusal of treatment is wrong. The law firmly and
rightly holds that those who have undertaken to provide treatment or
nourishment are not absolved from their duty by the patient's adamant
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refusal, if that refusal is either incompetent or unlawful. However, if the
circumstances agree, they do have legal status at common law and should be
followed (EL07).
The point made above is an important one, regardless of whether the lawyers
interviewed believed that doctors should or should not be bound by advance
directives. A document refusing treatment must be valid and applicable before it can
release a doctor from his or her duty of care towards the patients (see Lord
Donaldson's four criteria in Re T, [1992]), otherwise the advance directive could be
overruled and the doctor or hospital would not be held liable for assault for not
respecting that refusal. However, if the advance directive were valid then the
common law states that it should be followed and to ignore it means that the doctor
and the hospital would be acting without consent. This situation was illustrated in a
recent case of a woman, paralysed and only able to breathe with the assistance of a
ventilator, whose refusal of treatment was denied by her doctors and the hospital
trust, by claiming that she was incompetent (Re B [2002]). When it was verified that
she was competent to make her own treatment decisions, she made a living will and
still her refusal to consent to treatment was ignored. The court held that the hospital
had acted unlawfully by continuing treatment against her expressed (oral or written)
wishes. Dame Butler-Sloss stated in her judgement,
the [hospital] trust had been under a duty to do something effective to resolve
the dilemma and to do so with some degree of urgency ... There is a serious
danger, exemplified in this case, of a benevolent paternalism which does not
embrace recognition of the personal autonomy of the severely disabled
patient ... The failure to do so has led me to the conclusion that I should
mark my finding that the claimant has been treated unlawfully by the NHS
hospital trust by a small award of damages (Re B (adult: refusal ofmedical
treatment) [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam), [2002] 2 All ER 449, [2002] 1 FLR
1090, [2002] 2 FCR 1, 65 BMLR 149 per Butler-Sloss, P at paras 92-99).
It could be argued that a statutory framework would introduce a welcome degree of
certainty to the law in this area. It could provide a doctor with statutory immunity
from civil or criminal liability if he or she withheld treatment either in accordance
with a living will or upon the instructions of an attorney. Legislation could also
contain safeguards regarding the witnessing and storing of advance directives which
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could help to ensure that they are actually signed by the patient and are not granted
as a result of undue influence.
It was not only the vagueness and lack of clarity surrounding living wills that put off
some lawyers. One believed that making advance directives legally binding would
put doctors in an impossible position, for example,
1 do not think that living wills are actually legally binding in England.
Firstly, it is possible for a person to request in a living will a treatment,
which it would legally impossible for the doctor concerned to administer and
the doctor concerned could not be legally bound to carry out such a request
despite the terms of the advance directive. Obiter dicta in Bland suggest that
it may be possible to make an advance directive which is legally binding. As
far as I am aware, however, the status of living wills is that they remain
merely expressions of the granter's wishes although they may be highly
persuasive andmay be upheld by the courts (EL04).
The above situation would only apply, if a person were allowed to make "positive"
advance directives, in other words, to state that he or she wanted a certain treatment,
rather than to only specify the treatments that are not wanted. These "positive
directives" are seldom used as people more often use advance directives to ensure
that they do not receive treatment. Demands for futile treatments could be
discouraged or even prohibited if a statute existed to give clearer guidance on the
purpose of advance directives.
The following lawyer believed that negative advance directives would be binding,
but there still would be the problems of obscurity in their drafting.
They are in the negative sense, in that if it is a refusal of consent then yes,
they are binding. I think it would be an offence to go against a clear
statement, but of course, what is a clear statement? It doesn 't really strike
me that there are going to be many circumstances where you could make
such a clear statement, when you've faculties. But ... cancer patients are the
most obvious, but generally, I would have thought it's difficult to draft
something that is in fact legally binding (EL03).
From a jurisprudential point of view, one lawyer was aware of the differences that
could exist between the law in theory and in practice.
220
I think there's probably a difference between extrapolating from the case law,
what the law ought to be and what the law actually is. I think even ifyou look
at medical practice, ifyou look at some of the guidance that's come out in
England from the GMC about doctors' positions on advance directives ... it
seems to be much harder than what I actually think doctors would do (EL06).
Finally, one lawyer preferred the BMA Code of Practice (1995a) on advance
statements to statutory provision, and argued that the courts, through the common
law, were able to fill in any gaps. In other words, he did not espouse the need for
statutory backing to strengthen the legal status of advance directives.
I think that some of the perceived advantages of a legislative framework
could be achieved more flexibly by a code ofpractice. The courts in the UK
have been able to address the issues of civil and criminal liability arising
from medical treatment of incapax patients effectively in the absence of
governing legislation and I feel that any cases that arise can be adequately
and, arguably, more appropriately disposedofat common law (EL05).
In theory, this solution would be satisfactory, but in practice, because the Code is
written by a professional organisation, is only voluntary; doctors are not compelled
to adhere to it. Some doctors interviewed did not even know that the code existed
and many others regarded it as only a guide to best practice.
Conflicts
Conflicts arising between doctor, patient and relatives can reach the point where
legal advice is required. One lawyer spoke of conflicts between doctors and relatives
over disagreements about treatment, mostly in the area of treatment withdrawal.
Usually the relatives contacted the lawyers interviewed because they disagreed with
the doctor's decision to stop treatment, and a communication from a lawyer often
stopped events progressing. However, according to one lawyer, the main reason
conflicts arise is that information is being withheld from the family and that an
element of concealment naturally exists within the culture of medicine,
Sometimes [we send] a letter saying, "We understand you're going to
withdraw treatment. What's the basis?" and they back off ... sometimes we
can engineer a meeting to resolve this, but even then, there is still a problem
with secrecy in the NHS. Relatives do feel that things are going on which they
don't know about (EL03).
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The secrecy mentioned by the last lawyer may be part of the overall imbalance of
power that can exist between doctors and patients. The corollary of this can be a
feeling of disempowerment by relatives and patients; in particular, a lack of
knowledge or lack of understanding of the situation can be further disempowering.
There is an element of [disempowerment] I think because of the way things
are presented. The expectations of the NHS are very high, that this patient is
going to be made well again and therefore everything must be done to
achieve that end. There's sometimes a complete lack of understanding that,
no, that's not going to happen ... but there 's still this requirement on the part
of relatives, well, all this treatment should be given. Cost is irrelevant
(EL03).
One conclusion that might be drawn from this statement is that patients are
disempowered because the healthcare team and the relatives believe that the patient
must be made well at all costs. A more realistic perspective is that it is impossible to
make everyone who is admitted to hospital well; in fact many people who are
admitted to hospital never recover from their illness. The disempowerment felt by
patients may be through well-intentioned acts, but it can be argued that regardless of
the intentions, medical paternalism erodes individual autonomy and ultimately
disempowers people by ignoring their wishes.
Overriding Advance Directives
Generally speaking, English lawyers, whatever their views on the legality of advance
directives, consider that the decision to override such a directive should not be taken
lightly. One lawyer recommended that he would advise doctors that to consider the
reasons to override carefully and not just to act in a way that reflected their personal
choice.
You would have to show good reasons for not accepting what it says. I think
you would be foolish to ignore it just because you want to ignore it but to
look at it and say, "well, it's not a sensible way of going ahead with this
patient. I accept that this patient thought that it would be at that time but I'm
going to ignore it for the following reasons "... and then I think ... you 're not
acting illegally" (EL01).
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Another lawyer felt that a conscientious objection to advance directives in principle
would not be a good enough reason to override them. The doctor should instead refer
the patient to another consultant, in the same way as for the termination of
pregnancy.
I think, in the same way that doctors have to remove themselves from the
situation if they don't agree with terminations, they ought to remove
themselves from that situation (EL01).
Referral to another consultant was seen to be very important, but one lawyer went so
far as to suggest that the doctor might be in the wrong profession.
... / think they'd have to question what they were doing in terms ofworking in
that field and if it's the field, for example, strokes or spinal injuries or
something like this, if they have a conscientious objection to it ... (EL07).
Doctors might find themselves facing a civil court action if they did not have a very
good reason for treating a patient against the wishes expressed in his or her advance
directive. Some lawyers interviewed were interested in discussing whether doctors
who ignored advance directives could face some sort of legal sanction. The criminal
law was even mentioned as being an effective method of expressing society's
displeasure at doctors who ignore patients' wishes.
Well it is an assault. It is an assault and battery but there are civil methods
ofdealing with assault and battery. It's also a tort. The thing about it being a
criminal matter is that I think it emphasises its importance and the
importance that society gives to it and so I think that would really be one of
those things where you'd have to have some kind ofpublic debate about it, to
work out whether that is something that seemed to be sufficiently important to
us as a society to merit criminal punishment rather than civil. I don't know
the answer really, but certainly it would give it much more importance than if
it was just a civil [remedy]... (EL06).
While none of the lawyers interviewed would go so far as to want doctors who
ignored a valid advance directive charged with a criminal offence, several agreed
with the above statement.
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Patient Autonomy and Balance ofRights
Very few English lawyers, who were interviewed, had experience of drafting or
interpreting of living wills but some did have opinions on how advance directive
might safeguard patient autonomy. One commented,
I think they could be a way ofprotecting autonomy, but, again, it's the nature
of the advance directive, it's very much what's in the content. I think, in this
country, we live our life, not expecting things to happen so we think there's
no problem. People may develop a certain disease process, they then make a
directive, with regard to that disease process, and it may be very specific to
that (EL05).
This would seem to be both a good time and a good reason to make an advance
directive. According to another lawyer, patient autonomy may be enhanced using
advance directives, but only,
... if they're made with knowledge. I think that has to be the key because if
someone just came in through the door and clearly hadn't discussed
something I wouldn't see how that would improve their position, their
autonomy at all. I think I would send them away and say "look, go and see
your GP and then go and see your consultant and/or his registrar and get a
full explanation of what your condition is, what the options are, what the
prognosis might be " and, at that point then, yes, a directive may enhance the
patient's position but [until then] no, I can't see that it does (EL08).
The point being made here refers again to knowledge about what the person
specifically wants to make clear in the advance directive. More importantly, the
lawyer is concerned that there is communication between the person making the
advance directive and the doctors involved; a significant and recurring theme.
Another lawyer who had much stronger views on patient autonomy again addressed
the information issue. He believed that autonomy must hinge on information and that
often patients do not have adequate information on which to protect their personal
autonomy. Information mainly will come from the medical professionals who control
the type and amount of information given to the patient. This may result in a feeling
of disempowerment by the patient to make more informed decisions.
IfI can't avoid it then I have to go in knowing that actually I have very little
autonomy because I am in a very ignorant position when it comes to what is
happening with my body. It all depends on what a doctor chooses to tell me.
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I may not know the questions to ask to find out the information. They may not
choose to give me the information and so even when I consent to something
or agree to something, it's done on the basis of the information that I am
given, which is often just not sufficient. So I'd have very little autonomy when
it comes to my body in a hospital and I accept that is the case. Unfortunately
that's it, so in the same way, if it came to the situation where I was lacking
capacity, my autonomy [would have] gone anyway really, that's it. That
sounds very negative andpessimistic but that's it (EL10).
The point being expressed here is that even powerful, professional people such as
lawyers, become disempowered by the vulnerability of being ill. The upshot is that
individual autonomy is very difficult to hold onto in these situations and advance
directives may or may not be enough to balance the disempowerment felt by patients
on entering hospital.
Living wills, or advance directives may also help to protect patients' human rights, in
particular, the right of protection from cruel and inhuman treatment. The Bland case
was given as an example of cruel and inhumane treatment. A young man, suffering
from a persistent vegetative state (PVS), with no chance of recovery, was tube fed
for several years before his parents approached the courts to allow doctors to stop
artificial nutrition and hydration (.Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1993]). Most lawyers
disagreed that giving a patient all appropriate medical care could be judged to be
cruel and inhumane treatment and considered that it would be unnecessary for an
advance directive to be required as protection against infringement of this human
right. However, one lawyer had more to say on the subject,
... doesn 7 that have to be allied to the outcome? You may be very seriously
ill andyou may need tube feeding but ultimately the prognosis is that you will
recover, fingers crossed, and therefore it's a perfectly reasonable thing to do
and, ifyou knew that, you would say "yes, do it. I want to get better. " So ...
I'm just not sure how an advance directive would work in that sort of
situation because ... a lot of it does come down to these sort ofdisease cases,
the progressive disease cases. I can see, when you think it through, what is
being implied behind that and then yes, can understand that ifsomeone said,
"I do not wish to be tube fed. IfI reach that point I simply wish to be given
pain reliefand that's it", then that would be found appropriate for them to do
(EL08).
Finally one lawyer commented that sometimes a person's autonomy could be
protected, but at a price,
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Treatment decisions that respect and enhance the autonomy of the patient
may at the same time disregard and shatter the autonomy of the patient's
caregivers and the rest ofherfamily (EL07).
This final comment adds an extra dimension - the autonomy of the family - however,
as relatives have no legal rights in treatment consent issues, it follows that their
opinions carry no weight. On the other hand, the doctors' duty to make treatment
decisions in the patients' best interests and the patient's autonomy may clash and this
is where conflicts can develop.
Doctors
All interviews with doctors were carried out face-to-face except three, which were
conducted by telephone. The interviews pursued two major themes: treatment
decision-making and how advance directives are involved in decision-making. The
doctors interviewed specialised in three areas: care of the elderly, neurology, and




Engaging and informing patients is at the heart of good clinical practice. The General
Medical Council's guidance on good medical practice (GMC, 2001) makes clear that
listening to and respecting the views of patients, giving them information in a way
they can understand and respecting their right to be fully involved in decisions about
their care, represent the ethical bedrock of good clinical practice. This good practice
advice is relevant to the whole of the medical profession across the UK.
Elderly
Decision-making for cognitively-aware elderly people who have capacity is a
significant matter for healthcare professionals. One Professor of Geriatric Medicine
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believed that it might be prudent to restrict the number of options for the person to
choose from,
Ipersonally have come to realise that it is very important to get across to our
younger colleagues that you don't necessarily present all the possible options
to an individual because some options are sometimes not realistic. I notice
that people talk about autonomy but they sort ofsay "well, we couldput you
on the ITU [Intensive Therapy Unit] but we don't really think that's an option
for you ". I mean that's the subtext of it. As if to say, "Well, you don't really
want to go through all that, do you? " (ED01).
This is an example of Lukes' (1974) third dimension of power, which states that by
restricting the available choices, the doctor exerts power over the patient by
controlling his or her worldview of the available choices. This particular doctor felt it
better to a more matter-of-fact approach by saying,
"These are the options, this is what we have in mindfor you, these are the
risks, these are the possible benefits. Do you feel that you want us to
proceed? " And [ personally, feel that you actually should give people a
chance to think about it, if there's at all any time, and consult with relatives
(ED01).
The doctor is doing all the right things - giving the patient the opportunity to consent
to or refuse treatment and by giving time to consider the options. Nonetheless, the
doctor who is the most powerful party in the relationship is still controlling the
options available.
Neurology
For all patients in England and Wales (and in the Netherlands and Scotland), medical
treatment requires the informed consent of the patient. The person giving the
treatment, usually, a medical practitioner, must explain the reasons for the treatment,
and what treatment is recommended. In most cases, the treatment does not require
signed consent but it does still require explanation. The cases where doctors prefer
the patients' written consent tend to be more formal and may involve procedures,
which have significant associated risks, e.g. surgery, general anaesthetics.
We would get the form signed either by the patient or quite often by a member
of the family just to witness that we have explained the potential risks and
benefits, for instance if we were giving clot-busting treatment, or
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thrombolysis, for patients with acute stroke, which we don't do very often
(ED05).
A problem may arise with stroke patients because, in many cases, communication
may be impaired even though a general cognitive function is not. This may lead to a
communication problem, where the doctor can communicate the issues to a patient,
and the patient may be able to process them perfectly well but is unable to
communicate his or her consent. In this situation it is difficult to know how the
doctor can tell if the patient has given his or her consent. Having the form signed by
a family member is inconsequential, as the family member cannot consent on the
patient's behalf. Getting the patient to sign may be the only way that the doctor can
verify his or her consent. Refusing to sign would be an obvious option for the patient
and a clear sign to the doctor not to start treatment.
Oncology
Similarly, oncologists felt patients should not and ideally would not be rushed into
making a quick decision unless this is absolutely necessary.
Most of the decisions can be delayed for 24 hours for the person to really
start thinking about and internalising what you've put to them. If there's
urgency, then obviously different things could get into gear. I think it's also
important to say to the patient that if they find it too difficult to make the
decision that you would be prepared to make the decision on their behalf
(ED07).
This particular doctor might be prepared to make the treatment decision for the
patient, but the patient was still able to be consulted, and therefore the decision was
being made on the basis of substituted-judgement, as recommended in the GMC
guidance on good medical practice (supra cit.). Nevertheless, if the patient has
capacity it is unnecessary for the doctor to make the decision and the patient has
capacity, then he or she must consent or refuse on his or her own behalf. This
particular doctor continued to describe why patients might abdicate their autonomy
to their doctors.
You know, taking into consideration what they say, but to add "look I'll
shoidder this burden", and I quite often have patients ... probably 1 in 8
patients, would say to me, in response to that kind ofoffer, "I really find this
very, very difficult and I have confidence in you and I'd like you to make the
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decision In which case I thank them for their confidence and say that I
would exercise that investment of confidence in their best interest in
discussion with the rest of the team and that I wouldn 7 hesitate to consult
with other consultants ifnecessary. So that's how I respond to that (ED07).
Confidence in one's doctor to act according to one's best interests is a happy
situation to be in, but these patients are also abdicating their autonomy to the doctor.
What is interesting in these instances is discovering why patients are happy to
relinquish their autonomy to their medical practitioners. It may be because it is easier
to allow the doctor to make all the decisions, rather than challenge the choices and
decisions put forward by the doctor; it might be a position of individual autonomy
bowing to professional autonomy in case of "doctor knows best".
Incapax Patients
The law on consent to treatment for incapax patients in England and Wales is similar
to the situation in Scotland before the enactment of the Adults with Incapacity
(Scotland) Act 2000. The doctor has the ultimate decision-making authority, and no
one can actually consent or refuse treatment on another adult's behalf {In re F
(Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 132). This should change with the passing
of the Mental Capacity Bill, which was discussed earlier in this chapter. While many
doctors interviewed would consult with families and friends to determine the most
appropriate course of action, all the doctors interviewed were aware that they have at
some stage to say to relatives without causing offence, that in terms of the law they
have no decision-making authority for other adults. As no adult or court can decide
for another adult, the best that can be done is to garner information before making a
decision.
Elderly
The approaches of all the doctors interviewed did not differ greatly. In elderly care,
one doctor practised substituted judgement and explained his approach,
I think generally the physician's approach ought to be that one needs to try to
determine what the person's wishes would have been if they were able to
participate in the decision and that could entail gathering information from
32 The court held that even the court itself does not have any parens patriae or any other jurisdiction
over the person of an incompetent adult.
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relatives, saying have they ever expressed a view about active management
given this circumstance (ED03)?
In care of the elderly, decisions are often related to whether to give or withhold
certain medical treatments, for example, antibiotics in persistent chest infections, or
some major surgical interventions. Most doctors interviewed would approach this by
detailing the prognosis and the probabilities of certain events happening to the
relatives. One doctor related how he would proceed,
1 think one needs to sketch the prognosis to relatives and say "given this ",
and we 're talking about a person who's going to be dependent, with invasion
of their privacy, probably quite a lot of loss ofamenities of life, "has she or
he said in the past that they wouldprefer not to be treated? " I think that it's
terribly important to emphasise to the relatives that one isn 't asking them for
their view but asking what they think the person's view would have been
(ED02).
His continued explanation of how problems might be solved shows experience of
developing a technique that manages to remain within the law while showing
sensitivity to the family at such a difficult time. From his answer, it is unclear
whether this doctor was aware that relatives and family of incapax patients have no
legal right to make treatment decisions on their behalf, but it was still important for
the doctor to include them in the decision-making process. This dealt with two
important, but tangential parts of decision-making: the need to involve the whole
person, which would include family members, and getting as much information on
the patient's views and wishes in order to make a proper and considered judgement
of what the patient would want done in the circumstances.
I've developed different techniques ofactually making sure that the relatives
are distanced from the burden of responsibility because quite often they just
can't decide. They say "I can't make this decision", so you have to say,
"well, I'm not asking you. All I'm asking is for the facts"... and I try to
stimulate memory ...I also ask about their general view about medical
interventions, issues about privacy and dependency and so on. So if you
actually unpack it, you sometimes get strands of recollection that come up, I
don't think you can just fire a blank question. That interview itself usually
takes about 20 minutes to be quite sure that they do or they don't know what
the relative thinks (ED02).
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As the doctor continues, it becomes clear that the doctor is aware that relatives do not
have the right to consent. He employs substituted judgement by using the family's
knowledge of the patient to find out what he or she would have wanted under the
circumstance and therefore deciding on the most appropriate treatment for the patient
at that time.
Neurology
In neurology, doctors interviewed said that decision-making for incapacitated
patients may present problems, particularly in stroke medicine where the patient has
a degree of brain damage because of the stroke. This damage may or may not involve
any intellectual impairment or it may involve only a difficulty in communication
through both physical and intellectual disabilities. For one physician, certain
treatment decision-making may not require high levels of capacity and some choices
can be communicated even if the patient's competency is quite low. He went to
explain,
When you put a nasogastric tube down to feed a patient, s/he often pulls it out
and we have to decide whether they are systematically saying "look, I don't
want treatment" even though they're aphasic or somewhat confused, or
whether they're just picking at their nose and pulling at this thing without
really intending to do anything along those lines. Sometimes with ourpatients
who have a sensory loss for the left side and don't recognise that side, they
find this tube and they don't see it as being relevant to them and they pull it
out. So that's a typical scenario that we have in stroke and we have to try to
decide, well, what is going on here? Are they philosophically saying to us,
"we don't want to be treated? " or is it just by accident that they've pulled out
the tube? (ED06)
This explanation shows a problem that the doctor may be faced with: the patient may
or may not object to the treatment, and may only be reacting to, what he or she thinks
is, an alien object and trying to get rid of it. Nevertheless, the patient may be
definitely objecting to the treatment. It is difficult to see how the doctor could
differentiate between the two positions. Without any prior discussion with the patient
or any indication in written form (advance directive or similar) the doctor has only
two options - to rely on information from the relatives and to make an educated




The oncologists who were interviewed seemed to adopt a holistic attitude towards
their patients, especially in the area of decision-making. Because of the nature of
their disease, and because of the treatments used in the tertiary stages of cancer, there
has often been a prior discussion between doctor and patient concerning future
treatment, and what would happen if the patient becomes unable to consent to or
refuse treatment. Respect for the patient's autonomy seemed to be treated seriously
and in the words of one doctor,
In days gone by, I think doctors tended to take a rather paternalistic attitude, this
idea ofdoctor knows best and certainly, I think since I've been qualified, there's
been quite a rapid move away from that, so much so that there is a great deal of
improved communication. So ideally the patients themselves [decide]. Just
because they can't speak, there are other ways ofcommunicating with them and
that would be the first port of call. If that doesn't work, you 're then reliant on
relatives and friends and getting as much information from as many people that
are close to the patient as is possible to really maximise the amount of
information. You, as the practitioner, then have to try to understand what a
patient's wishes would have been in the circumstances that they find themselves
(ED05).
In the approach to decision-making for incapax patients, the doctors interviewed
appeared to be moving away from using only the best interests of the patients as a
model for making treatment decisions for incapacitated patients. There appeared to
be a move towards trying to discover what the patients' wishes were before the
events that caused their inability to make decisions. This was seen particularly in
interviews with doctors in care of the elderly and oncology where there was effort to
find out what the patient would have wanted. The exact method of decision-making
used may differ within different specialities, but this may be because of the amount
of time spent with patients before their incapacity and the relationships built between
doctors and patients. The move towards substituted judgement and away from the
pure best interests ethos is a step in the right direction towards recognising
individual, patient autonomy as being equally valuable to professional autonomy, at




Power, lack of power and patient empowerment are important aspects of the doctor-
patient relationship. Clinicians were asked how they viewed the balance of power,
between them and their patients: is it a case of "doctor knows best"? One doctor in
care of the elderly agreed with this explanation,
Yes, it's that sort ofpower. It's the power of social position and it's the
structure of society rather than a legal power, that's what we're talking
about, yes, I think that's true. Things might change and I think things have
changed over the years ... still I think with the majority ofconsultants and the
majority ofpatients, the doctor decides and the patient fits in (ED01).
Neurology
One neurologist commented on the practical problems that arise in the doctor-patient
relationship,
The constraints on a patients 'power arise from a situation to agree with their
doctor's advice and besides access to doctors of the patient's choice is
limited. Patients often can 7 choose the doctor they want to see; can 7 get
second or third opinions and will find it difficult to refuse the medical view,
especially when they need a sick note for sickpay (ED06).
From the few comments made by the doctors interviewed, two problems arise for
patients in relation to the power imbalance involved in the doctor-patient
relationship. The first is the respect and reverence people give to the traditional
position of the doctor within society, the second is more along logistical lines. The
NHS does much to perpetuate the state of affairs where doctors have greater power
than their patients. If patients cannot pick their specialists and cannot get a second
medical opinion easily, then the patients often must take what they can get, unless
they can afford private healthcare, where the power may be more evenly balanced.
Decision-making Models
Where people want to be involved in their treatment they may even wish to work in
partnership with their clinicians. Public consultation shows that patients, or potential
patients, would like to draw upon the.
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essential knowledge, skills and experience of healthcare professionals, but
they also want to be able to contribute their own knowledge about their
condition and their own perspective on what matters most to them. They want
the chance to reach shared decisions about their care and treatment
(Department of Health, 2003: 38).
The desire to participate in shared decision-making is dependent on the models
employed by doctors, below are the models used by the doctors interviewed.
Elderly
Doctors in care of the elderly interviewed did not use the substituted judgement
model because of the reported lack of reliable persons with the authority to act for
the patients. An example of the responses among clinicians was,
My understanding of the way to exercise it would be to have a person to act
as an advocate for the patient, who would argue the case. We've, to my
knowledge, never actually had that formally in any of the areas that I
clinically work in (ED02).
This is a means of using substituted judgement, but a more informal way would be to
ask relatives and friends what the patient would have wanted in these circumstances,
which this doctor had mentioned earlier. He said that he would ask the family,
Has there been a neighbour or a friend who's been in this predicament and
did she, at the time, say that she would hate to be in thatposition (ED07)?
This is a perfectly acceptable method of employing substituted judgment and need
not require a more formal basis.
Neurology
In neurology doctors interviewed did not seem to adopt a deliberate or particular
model of decision-making, for instance, the substituted judgement or the best interest
model. However, further probing during one interview revealed that,
I think these are the principles that come up but they 're probably not called
by their posh name. I think in practice, we do make every effort to try to
establish what the patient's wishes really were but it can be difficult and, I'm
worried that we might get it wrong (EDO5).
234
This doctor have touched on an area deserves further consideration. Doctors may use
the best interests model because it is safer than trying make a decision based on what
the patient might have wanted, especially if the doctor is so far removed from that
patient's position (e.g. class status or gender issues) or if there are no friends or
relatives to ask.
Another issue that was presented by an interviewee was the blurring of boundaries
between medical treatment, which requires the patient's consent and other aspects of
care such as artificial feeding and hydration, etc., which have been designated as
medical treatments by the courts and by the BMA. The dilemmas ofwithholding and
withdrawing these treatments were also factors that had to be considered in decision¬
making.
Oral feeding, I think, can 7 be regarded as medical, whereas peg feeding
(PEG) must be ... and then there's another distinction between initiating and
withdrawing treatment, I'm not clear that the law distinguishes in principle
between them. I mean obviously there are practical issues and I think that in
the case of ... well obviously things like the Tony Bland case where it's
simply an issue ofwithdrawal offeeding, which ... in that case, I think, it had
to be regarded as a medical treatment (ED06).
Oncology
Doctors in oncology who were interviewed said that treatment decision-making
would often be arranged before the patients' incapacity; however, sometimes other
peoples' perspectives interfered in the process. This was because the patient's
relatives often believed they had a right to contribute to the decision on their
relative's behalf. This was a problem that emerged in all three jurisdictions and a
theme that will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter Seven.
It is surprising how forceful relatives can be, saying, "we know what they
would have wanted", or often "we know what they would not have wanted".
Families often seem to support each other in this and once a few family
members have spoken together, there's often a very firm view held by them,
which is then presented to the doctor. Sometimes, occasionally they say,
"well, we've no idea what they would have wanted, doctor, tell us what you
think", but more often than not, the family say, "we think we can give you the
view ofwhat they would have wanted" (ED08).
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From these statements, the doctors interviewed in England do try to find out what the
patient might have chosen in the circumstances. They may not call it "substituted
judgement" but it does appear that they are aware of the need to respect the patient's
autonomy. The problems cited by the interviewees: lack of legal authority to
advocate for the patient; uncertainty of the decisions advocated for the patient; and
the family's insistence of knowing what the patient would or would not have wanted
in the circumstances, bear out a need for some sort of relevant documentation of the
patient's wishes. Advance directives may fill this gap and provide the clinical team
with information on which to base their decisions.
Right to Refuse Treatment
As in Scotland and the Netherlands, patients have the right to refuse medical
treatment when admitted to hospital. Additionally, the British Medical Association,
the Resuscitation Council (UK) and the Royal College of Nursing jointly issued
guidelines to outline legal and ethical standards for planning patient care and
decision making in relation to cardiopulmonary resuscitation (BMA et al, 2001). The
focus of the guidelines is situations in which decisions are made in advance and form
part of the patient's care plan. In emergency situations where no advance decision
has been made are also covered. All the medical interviewees were asked if patients
were explicitly informed of these rights.
Elderly
The geriatricians interviewed did not generally inform their patients of the right to
refuse treatment. One also expressed doubt whether it was something that they
should do in elderly care where people come in to hospital with huge fears anyway.
So they \>e come in with a urinary tract infection and the expectation is that
they're going to get better. I don't think it's fair to ask them to sign a form
about "do not resuscitate status" (ED01).
Another doctor felt that, due to the nature of the patients who are admitted to a care
of the elderly facility, it would be upsetting for them to be asked about their wishes
in respect to resuscitation. This doctor also thought that talking to patients about
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refusing treatment before the situation arose, when this conversation might be
necessary, would confuse them,
I don't think it's appropriate to actually ask every patient "do you want to be
resuscitated? " because, it's a very difficult conversation to have even at the
best of times and to put somebody who's a bit confused and distressed and
worried through that is not fair (ED03).
Neurology
One neurologist had an interesting perspective on the issue of whether to discuss
treatment refusal with patients on admission, or early in their treatment regime,
I think it is likely to give a misleading impression that you 're going to do
something ... it sort of gives the impression that we're wanting to give the
treatment for our benefit rather than theirs. I think patients should be given
every opportunity to express their opinions and I think a good example ofthat
is in nasogastric feeding where patients generally ...we don't sort of tie them
down to put the tube down their nose, if they really don't want it, they will
fight it off. If it's just an unpleasant procedure then they may be able to calm
down until it is done (ED06).
This approach places the onus on the patient to reject forcefully a procedure by
"fighting off the healthcare professional. If the patients are unaware of their right to
simply refuse, by saying "no thanks", they may end up suffering in silence and
undergoing procedures or treatments that they do not want. Neurologists also
commented on the resuscitation question.
I think the situation ofCPR [cardio-pulmonary resuscitation] is a particular
case in the sense that there's no time to take decisions and involve the patient
at that time, nor is anybody else at that time. So it has to be decided in
advance. But I think the impression is given and I think the medical
profession is almost entirely responsible for this, that in terms of the wording
of the DNR "do not resuscitate ", it gives a clear impression that we could
save your life if we wanted to. Whereas in fact, in 95% of the cases, it
doesn't matter a damn what we decide to do because we 're not going to save
you even ifwe tried. The futile attempts at resuscitation are just that ... and I
think that most decisions should be purely medical because you know a lot of
situations where cardiac arrest is likely to occur ... which would almost
preclude any successful resuscitation. So I think it's very difficult to give such
emotionally loaded information either to patients or families in a way that
allows them to express their belieffreely. And that's why I think that advance
directives, I hope, could make a big difference (ED05).
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Oncology
Patients receiving treatment for cancer were not told of their right to refuse treatment
by the oncologists interviewed,
Not by me, probably not by my team. I don't know whether part of the
nursing/admission process would address that issue. I suspect, in general
terms, the answer is "no" (ED07).
These doctors raise two conflicting points, first, patients need to be asked about CPR
in advance because there would be no opportunity to ask when it was required;
therefore it is correct that this question is asked on admission. Second, by asking
about CPR, the doctor implied that it would be successful, which is wrong in the
majority of cases. In this respect, this doctor thought that this was a medical
judgement and that the question about CPR was therefore inappropriate. A third
point that results from this discussion is the difference between asking about CPR
and reminding the patient that he or she has the right to refuse treatment at any time.
Unfortunately these two issues seem to get mixed up and this may be a reason behind
doctors omitting to tell patients of this right. However, even if a doctor does not think
it appropriate to ask if a patient wants CPR, the reasons behind this are unlikely to be
the same as reasons to avoid telling them of their right to refuse treatment.
Nevertheless, no reasonable explanation was given for withholding this information
from patients, apart from wanting to prevent further anxiety.
Conflicts in Decision-making
Elderly
A doctor in care of the elderly described an interesting conflict that arose when a
member of the clinical team disagreed with the rest of the group and took on the role
of patient's advocate,
Whereas the rest of the team said "we must withdraw treatmentone of the
consultants actually saw themselves as the advocate but never declared that
and so it went on for months and caused divisions in the team and ultimately
after some other events, this particular consultant said "well I was just being
the devil's advocate", which is an unfortunate turn ofphrase but ... he was
an innocent advocate. You might say that was very destructive. I think there
could be a role and I think this is possibly a model that we should move
towards for the patient advocacy model but I think, on the whole ... almost
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without exception, we try to come to a balanced assessment as a team as to
what we think is in the patient's best interest. There's not really adversarial
kind ofargument, it's a consensus process (ED02).
This unusual situation shows how conflicts may arise when one person disagrees
with the treatment plan.
Neurology
Neurologists interviewed referred to conflicts with relatives and how they might be
resolved. One doctor explained how he would try to satisfy the relatives' needs to be
involved with the most appropriate treatment for the patient,
I will consult relatives and try to involve them in the decision but make it
clear that it's my decision or it's our decision and if it is clear that the
relative has very strong views, then yes, I am very reluctant to go against
them unless Ifeel that it's directly against the interests of the patient. If it's
going to cause long or futile suffering, then I'll do something and be very
blunt about it. And ifwe can't reach agreement, then ... it could conceivably
come to the patient being moved elsewhere or put under the care of another
doctor who feels differently about it. I've never had to do that (EDO5).
Another neurologist described a case where a conflict arose due to poor
communication among professionals and between professionals and relatives:
There was another case recently, where a man who'd been under my care
had had a stroke, two heart attacks and a life threatening haemorrhage all in
the space of about 10 days and it was a very difficidt situation to manage
clinically. After one ofthe heart attacks he was admitted to another ward and
obviously there 'd been some discussions about his resuscitation status, which
Ifelt weren't conducted in the light offull knowledge of the clinical situation.
None ofmy team was involved and the situation where resuscitation is most
likely to be successful with a good long-term outcome is in the first 24 hours
after a heart attack. We discussed it with the family and the message that
came back to me, indirectly, was that the patient himself had expressed a
strong wish not to be resuscitated. The patient was, I think, given morphine
and by the end of the morning the [family] were able to discuss it with me but
I was suspicious about this because there hadn't been any hint of this
previously and in fact I actually wrote in the notes that if these were the
patient's wishes, we must respect them but there was a reasonable possibility
that cardio-pulmonary resuscitation in the early stages might have been
successful. In fact this chap did have a cardiac arrest and died a few hours
later. I think there was a split amongst the family, I don't think his wife
agreed that he 'd not want to be resuscitated but unfortunately the message
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that came back to us from other members of the family was that those were
his wishes. One ofthe biggest problems is simply communication (ED04).
Again, the problem of lack of communication and lack of knowledge or consensus of
what the patient wants can cause ill feeling and conflicts within the family and
between relatives and medical practitioners.
Oncology
The oncologists were asked a similar set of questions about a situation where there is
a disagreement between the clinician's opinion of the best course of treatment, and
what the relatives think, with very little indication of what the patient would have
wanted. They were also asked how this might be resolved.
In general terms, we err now on the side of going along with the patient's
relatives, even ifthere is an area ofdisagreement, you would try to sensitively
explain your own point and probably ... it's a bit difficult to generalise but
probably you would say my feeling would be based on past experience of
patients in similar situations and you 'd probably remind them that they've
never been in that situation before. But all the same, it would be very unusual
to overrule patient's relatives' wishes if they were really robust about
wanting one thing or another (ED07).
These doctors interviewed could be wrong in going along with the relatives if their
wishes conflicted with any known wishes of the patient or if their wishes were in
conflict with the doctor's best judgement,
conflict and saved time if the patients had
their medical treatment wishes.
These cases might have produced less
executed advance directives laying out
Advance Directives
As with the Netherlands and Scotland, doctors in England had little experience of
dealing with patients who had advance directives. To establish their knowledge of




A consultant working with the elderly had previously taken part in discussions with
colleagues on the definition of a living will.
We made a decision about the terminology ... What you can say, strictly
speaking, is an advance refusal of treatment is not an advance demand that
no one does this or that, which they can 7 do; it's really an advanced refusal
(ED01).
Neurology
The neurologists interviewed agreed that an advance directive would be written by a
person who is of sound mental capacity, and would contain 'a freely expressed
decision, which spells out all sorts of treatment or medical interventions that they are
willing or unwilling to subject themselves to in the future' (ED06).
One neurologist discussed the need for certain treatment and procedures to be
detailed in the document. He explained that because one particular treatment or
procedure was rejected, it could not be assumed that all others would also be refused,
I think one of the major issues about DNR [Do Not Resuscitate] orders, as
they're used at the moment, is that they're confused with withdrawal of
treatment. There's a whole world of difference really. If I had a serious
illness and felt that the chances of successful resuscitation were not good,
then I certainly wouldn 7 want people jumping on my chest at the moment of
my death, but I certainly wouldn 7 want that confused with unwillingness to
undergo every other kind of treatment and it is often confused andpeople are
mentally written off. They say, "Oh, he's notfor resuscitation It means that
they don 7 bother to treat his pneumonia or whatever it is and I think that can
be a major human rights issue actually. In a legal document, I don 7 think if
you 're saying that "I do not want to have CPR " or "I don 7 want to have tube
feeding if I'm permanently incapacitated and unable to swallow" that you
would be refusing other kinds of treatment. ... I think any doctor or
professional that took it to mean that and therefore didn 7 give those sorts of
treatment, would be on extremely dodgy ground and so I'm not sure whether
it's necessary in principle or in practice to list the things that you are willing
to subject yourself to. Yes, it's options, which you could tick, on the form if
you like. But I think giving a whole list of things, which you would want to
have, is unnecessary and impractical (ED05).
To detail all aspects of care to be refused would mean that the document would be
overlong and complex. It would have to represent a definitive list of procedures for
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any possible medical condition - an impossible task. Unfortunately none of the
jurisdictions has specified any particular form of words or design of document and it
is left up to persons executing the directives to take legal and medical advice as they
see fit in making their wishes known in advance directives or living wills. Help and
advice can be obtained from lawyers, governments and various organisations along
with examples of documents and pro formas.33
Oncology
In oncology there was a consensus of opinion on the definition of an advance
directive. An example of this is given below,
It's a bit like a written Will, [in that] it was something to be done after your
death, whether it is a video or a tape recording, just something that was
documented to say that "this is what I want to happen It can be updated
any time, the same as a written Will with a solicitor really. It's just something
that you can write down, someone's witnessed it and that's it and you would
expect that your wishes would be fulfilled (ED10).
This is a very simple description of an advance directive but it does not take any of
the problems that may be encountered in drafting such a document into
consideration. To be fair, if doctors have had little experience of treating patients
with advance directives, they will not be aware of the difficulties and advantages that
these documents can have for doctor, patients and relatives
Use ofAdvance Directives
As was the case in the Netherlands and Scotland, few doctors in England and Wales
have experience of patients with advance directives. Estimations of their use among
patients of the doctors interviewed are illustrated in Table 6.1.
33
Examples can be found in Appendix D.
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6.1 English doctors' experience in dealing with patients with advance
directives
SPECIALTY ESTIMATED PATIENTS WITHADVANCE
DIRECTIVES
Care of the Elderly <5%
Neurology <2%
Oncology ~ 7% (mainly oral directives)
(Source: interviews with English doctors)
Elderly
One of the geriatricians interviewed had had little experience of patients with any
type of advance directives. He believed that there may be more in the future,
however, and to be taken seriously, they would require to be made well before their
use.
I think these are so few and far between at the moment, it's usually very
clear-thinking individuals who think about the benefits of an advance
directive like this to them and make it many, many years before the relevant
time comes and I think those are the ones that I would find persuasive
(ED02).
This doctor makes an interesting point, as many more doctors would argue quite the
opposite. The problem many have with advance directives made well in the past is
that they become out of date for many reasons, for example, advances in medical
technology and treatments. The BMA, in guidance to doctors on consent and refusal
of treatment added this caveat, '[individuals should also be aware that circumstances
and medical science may develop in unforeseen ways in the interval before their
advance statement becomes operative' (BMA, 1995b: Chapter 10). A change in the
person's attitude to illness and disability is another example that might make the
living will invalid or at least less relevant to the person's wishes.
Neurology
A neurologist who had seen few living wills commented on an unexpected
explanation ofwhy few people in his specialty made use of advance directives
I think very little, veryfew. I would be surprised if it's even 2% or something.
Maybe other people have a different spectrum but the cases that I see; it's a
very, very infrequent event. I have to say that the northeast is obviously also
economically and socially deprived and so people don't really have that
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awareness of expectation. The other thing to be said about the northeast,
which I think is wonderful, is that there is a very, very well established
tradition on the extended family. I mean the numbers of cases that we have
that have no brothers and sisters or anybody else but a niece comes in and
takes primary responsibility or a cousin comes up from somewhere else.
That's the closest relative and will resume responsibility. So perhaps ... a
topical or sociological question for research is whether, if there's a strong
family network, is there really a place for a living will (EDO5)?
For this doctor, advance directives are needed more where the patient has no close
friends or relatives to advise the doctor of the patient's wishes. The doctor's response
may show an over-simplistic view of family issues and ignores the possibilities of
conflicts or ulterior motives between family members. It also ignores the fact that
relatives have no legal authority over treatment decision-making.
Oncology
Finally an oncologist spoke of her personal experiences with advance directives.
Not at work, but I did on a personal level because my mother collapsed
nearly five years ago with a massive CVA [cardio-vascular accident, more
commonly known as "stroke "] and was taken into hospital. She always said
to me that if it ever happened, she didn't want to be brought back, she didn't
want to be a vegetable, she would have hated it. So when I went into the
hospital to see her, she was on all these machines and I said "I know I can't
tell you what to do because I have got no rights over this but this is what she
told me. She doesn't want to be brought back. She doesn't want to be a
vegetable. If there is nothing there, after the CT [Computed Tomography
Imaging] scan, just take everything off her and she '11 take her chances " and
that's exactly what happened. The doctor agreed and said, "there is nothing
there. She '11 never come out of this. " And I said 'right, that's it. Just don't
do anything to help her and if she goes again, just let her go because she
would hate it. " So, on a personal level, although I had no rights, she had
made it clear to me exactly what she wanted, although she'd never written it
down, and I just said to the doctor "this is what she said to me " and they
would have to take that on board. But as it happened, they did and went
along with it (ED10).
This is a case of an expression of the patient's wishes being taken seriously and
followed by the doctor in charge. It therefore might probably be assumed that this
doctor would also have followed a written advance directive.
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HospitalAdmission
According to the medical interviewees, it is not a routine procedure in England and
Wales to ask patients on their admission to hospital whether they have an advance
directive. Opinions varied, but a doctor in care of the elderly felt that while they were
not currently being asked, "7 think we should be asking that. I frankly don't know
whether it's in the nursing process yet but it should be " (ED01).
In neurology opinion was ambivalent,
Not routinely, no. I think it will come in, as I say, I don't think I've ever come
across it in a situation where it's made a material difference. One or two
patients have mentioned it but... (EDO5)
Whether a patient is asked if he or she has an advance directive on admission to
hospital may be directly linked to the level of use of advance directives in the general
population. Until more people have advance directives, it is unlikely that hospitals
will insist on a policy change.
Legality
In 1993, the British Medical Association (BMA) stated that:
...the possibility of patients inadvertently misdirecting their doctors by an
inadequate appreciation of the circumstances or of the evolution of new
treatments led the Association to recommend strongly that advance directives
should not be legally binding on doctors, but legal cases in 1992 and 1993
indicated that an anticipatory decision which is clearly established and
applicable to the circumstances would be as legally binding as any current
decision made by a competent patient (Cases referred to are Re T [1992]4 All
ER 649; and Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993]1 All ER 859) (BMA, 1993:
162).
The BMA had to change its recommendation to the medical profession in the light of
several judgements in the English courts that gave common law authority to advance
directives (Re C (1994)),
advance directives are always less conclusive evidence than the
contemporaneous statement of a competent, informed, and autonomous
person. The advance directive substitutes for the latter situation only to the
extent that the patient, when competent, was well-informed, acting
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reasonably freely, intending the instruction as now interpreted, and
envisioning a situation reasonably similar to the one now faced. These
concerns can be met fairly commonly, since ordinary persons giving advance
directives are either giving thoughtful but broad instructions or are
envisioning a future event that is known to be likely in that person's situation
{ibid.).
Doctors interviewed in England were aware of and generally followed the BMA
guidance. Choice in medical treatments means extending best clinical practice to
ensure that all people have choices of where and how they are treated. The inclusion
of patient preferences in medical records will help patients to set out their wishes and
give them the opportunity to refer to an advance directive if they have one. The
Government has published the draft Mental Capacity Bill (Bill 120), which is
designed to give greater choice to people who are mentally incapacitated. The draft
Bill would allow people to appoint attorneys to represent their views in healthcare
decisions if they lost capacity in the future and to make advance decisions about
treatment preferences if they wish to do so (Clause 9) 4.
English doctors were also aware of the problems that might arise from an advance
directive. As in Scotland and the Netherlands, a major one is the time factor,
It is likely that living wills will be made many years prior to becoming
incompetent, when details of the conditions specified - including possible
treatments available - cannot be foreseen. There are many scenarios where a
legally binding living will could bring about a distressing situation, which the
person was trying to avoid. In such cases, legally binding living wills will
prohibit doctors from providing the most appropriate palliative care
available (ED08).
Consequently, if the content of an advance directive is not updated regularly
especially in relation to progress in medical treatments, problems may arise when
that directive comes into operation. Whether this would have any impact on the
validity (perceived or actual) of the advance directive in everyday patient treatment
and care within the NEIS is speculative. This may be a factor influencing the ways in
which healthcare professionals view the legal nature of advance directives and
subsequently how binding they believe directives to be. When asked about the
34 The Bill had its third reading in the House of Commons on 14 December 2004 and will have its
second reading in the House of Lords on 10 January 2005.
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legality of advance directives, doctors raised a number of points and some of the
elements that may jeopardise that legitimacy are examined below.
Elderly
In care of the elderly, a group of doctors had previously discussed the validity of
advance directives. Those clinicians agreed that, provided certain fundamental
conditions apply, the document would be treated as valid. Other issues raised were:
First, there is the question ofwhether they should be revised and we actually
discussed that as well and what is a reasonable period for revision and so
on? Secondly, is the condition contemplated in the Will genuine at the
moment? That's a clinical ethical judgement really, to see [that] those
conditions apply. And thirdly, whether any overriding, more recent, statement
has been made; they may have changed their minds (ED03).
Neurology
In contrast, neurologists interviewed felt that they could not make a decision on
whether an advance statement was valid without further professional advice. While
keeping a relatively open mind, one believed that it was,
...a situation to [be] put it in the hands of the lawyers really. If it appeared
to be legally valid and expressed the patient's wishes, and obviously the
patient's wishes are always paramount, [then we would act on it. But] I think
I'd want a second opinion from the lawyer (ED06).
For oral advance directives, the situation is even less clear and doctors found them
difficult to follow.
... well, again, obviously it's much more difficult to validate it and ... we just
have to do everything we reasonably can to tiy and establish that that was
[his or] her wishes. I think the situation that we come across more is with
people with dementia, where they've expressed wishes but they don't appear
to be totally rational based on the situation. It's usually not so much a matter
oflife or death or not as stark as that but it's usually somebody who is totally
disabled and requires 24-hour care and wants to go home. I think we play
those sorts ofsituations by ear (ED05).
Oncology
Finally, the oncologists interviewed had little experience of advance directives. They
did acknowledge that case law probably existed on the subject, but nonetheless, were
247
unconvinced of a directive's legally binding value. Below is a typical example of the
stance taken,
I think probably they 're not legally binding. There may have been some cases
to explore the legal standing of things like living wills. Ifthere is, I'm just not
familiar with it, I've never come across it. It's never affected me as a
consultant, a so-called advance directive. Only once did I see a patient in
here that had a sticky label on the front of their notes saying "living will"
and it was incorporated into their notes but the patient was fine so it didn't
arise. Nevertheless I'm in favour; I think they're a very good idea. I think,
under the circumstances that we've been talking about, where somebody
perhaps is terribly ill or disabled or can't talk or has had a devastating
illness, something like this can be hugely helpful for the doctors andfor the
patient's relatives (ED07).
Although the oncologists interviewed did not believe that advance directives were
binding on treatment decision-making, they were nevertheless still in favour of them
being an indication of a patient's wishes. They also saw them as being an aid to
healthcare staff and families, and from this it might be supposed that the English
doctors interviewed would take advance directives seriously. This uncertainty about
the legality of advance directives and their impact on actual practice is a common
them to each jurisdiction and will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter Seven.
Overriding an advance directive
It appears that doctors interviewed in England were happy to consider advance
directives in decision-making for incapax patients and in some cases would even
accept that they might be legally bound by them. This then raises the question of the
circumstances in which they would feel entitled to override an advance directive.
Elderly
In elderly care doctor interviewed, in agreement with their earlier consensus, said
that overriding a directive would not be carried out without due consideration of the
circumstances.
I don't think you have a right to override it at any stage if it is clear that the
advance directive contemplated the situation that you are currently dealing
with and if there are no grounds to believe that the advance directive is no
longer [valid]. So if it matches those prerequisites then I think you have an
ethical duty as well as a legal duty [to comply with it] (ED01).
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By admitting to an ethical and legal duty to comply with an advance directive, this
doctor implies that advance directives have legal authority and therefore should not
be overridden unless certain circumstances apply.
Neurology
One neurologist was aware of the potential validity of a directive, and like his
colleagues in elderly care, did not think that a decision to override it would be taken
lightly. However, in an emergency, where the patient had a good chance of survival,
ignoring the prior refusal of treatment might be the most obvious course of action,
I think you 'd have to have a very good reason for going against it. You'd
obviously need to be convinced that it's valid; ifyou are then I think you 'd
have to have extremely good reason. I can conceive of situations where it
just might be a clinical happenstance, which hadn't been catered for in the
wording of the document, but in an emergency situation, if somebody had
signed an advance directive saying "No CPR [resuscitation]", if I was an
anaesthetist and I was anaesthetising for an operation and they had a
ventricular fibrillation during the operation, then I would certainly
defibrillate or do something to try to restart the heart regardless of any
advance directive because I think that's a potentially very reversible situation
(EDO5).
This doctor stated that he would comply with an advance directive unless the
situation was one in which a doctor could save the person's life. This is an inherent
problem with advance directives due to the difficulty of specifying the treatments,
which the person wishes to refuse in specified circumstances.
Oncology
The oncologists interviewed also agreed that the circumstances of the incapacity
dictated whether they would override the directive as the physician in charge of the
treatment.
It's quite a hard one because I think ifsomeone is temporarily incapacitated,
by nature of the disease and they may get better or if it can be reversed, then
I think you've got to look at it very closely. Ifwhatever's happened to them is
never likely to get better and they 're going to stay in that state forever and a
day, or they 're going to get worse, then I think you should look at it and say,
right, that's it. With the treatments we've got, we can't do any more and they
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either come out of it or they don't. Give a timescale and ifnothing's changed
then say, right, we '11 go along with their wishes (ED07).
The decision on whether to override an advance directive seems to go hand in hand
with how doctors view their legal status. If the doctors interviewed felt that they
should consider an advance directive as binding then overriding it would be a serious
matter. Additionally, a decision to override the directive may depend on the medical
circumstances, and the potential recovery or success of the treatment and not by the
personal attitude towards advance directives by the individual doctors. In this
situation the view of the doctor on the binding nature of the directive may not even
enter into the debate.
PatientAutonomy
All doctors interviewed assessed the use of advance directives as a valuable method
of supporting and even increasing patient autonomy.
Elderly
One geriatrician discussed in detail the experience of a dying patient who had drawn
up a living will. The will was followed by the doctor, but not blindly; he was able to
comply with patient's instructions, explain to the family what was happening, and
allow the patient to die without pain and with dignity and without compromising his
professional autonomy. He explained,
...one of the strengths of her particular living will was that it was very
explicit. It said, "if these conditions prevail, then I don't want antibiotics,
intravenous feeding or any fluid supportit actually said that. I discussed it
with her adult children, particularly her son who was interested in medical
things, although not a medic himself. They said "this is what it said, why are
you giving intravenous fluids? " And I said, "well we have to come to terms
with what she wants. I know we 're not giving her antibiotics and we don't
plan to give her antibiotics", but after about 24 hours we discussed what
would be the consequences of withdrawing fluids. I said, "if we carry on
giving her fluids, it could be weeks before she gets pneumonia and we 're not
going to treat that. But ifwe stop fluids, she '11 become dehydrated, she '11 go
into acute renal failure, she '11 become delirious and she '11 require possibly
some morphine, and she '11 die within a few days " and that's exactly what
happened. It was extremely helpful to have the living will saying that "under
250
these conditions, I do not want to have any fluids or antibiotics So, to me,
that was unbelievably useful (ED02).
Neurology
Neurologists interviewed agreed that advance directives can help strengthen patient
autonomy, but that there was also an urgent need for patients to be counselled in
what the directive actually involved. Counselling should preferably be undertaken
with the patient's family doctor and it should never be merely an endorsement of
another course of action.
There's no doubt that people's views change when they become ill, but
nevertheless I think that signing an advance directive is a major issue and
something that you need to think carefully about. There need to be safeguards
to ensure that the person's wishes are really being taken into account. The
[doctor] has to make sure the person understands what sort ofsituations the
document is dealing with and that those are their wishes. If it's just a sort of
... doctor's signing passport photographs or something like that, then, it
seems totallypointless and silly (ED04).
The suggestion that this neurologist makes is relevant. Many people may make
advance directives without getting any legal or medical advice. Counselling a patient
when they present an advance directive at the hospital may be the first time a doctor
has had the opportunity to explain the implications of such a document to the patient.
Oncology
Since none of the oncologists interviewed had experience of actual advance
directives or living wills, answers were essentially speculative. Nevertheless, they
agreed that an advance directive could help direct the doctor in his or her decision¬
making, as well as being indicative of the patient's past wishes.
I think the specimen ones I've seen tend to say "if the following terrible
things happen to me and I'm incapable or I'm needing artificial feeding or
I'm needing prolonged ventilation", and they're pretty directive ofwhat the
patient wants the doctors to do, I think that's great. Any information like that
is better than nothing (ED07).
While the doctors interviewed may believe that advance directives would be helpful
to them in their decision-making for incapax patients, they did not necessarily wish
to be legally bound by them. This may have implications on advance directives' use
as protectors of patient autonomy.
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Conscientious Objections
The final group of questions concerned conscientious objections to treating patients
holding advance directives. The BMA (1995a) has issued guidelines instructing
doctors, throughout the UK, who have such ethical objections, to pass their patients
to colleagues who feel able to treat them and be responsive to the treatment directive.
It was interesting to discover what the doctors interviewed thought of this instruction,
and whether doctors should have such an escape from treating those patients.
Elderly
All consultants interviewed in care of the elderly believed that doctors should not
have to treat patients with advance directives because of various ethical reasons. One
doctor thought that the risk to the doctor's professional autonomy was a good enough
reason to refuse to treat patients with living wills.
I think with all things, because [people] need to make choices; the same
should apply to doctors. If they have a genuine objection to it, then it should
be passed to someone who can maybe make decisions without it affecting
their decision-making process. It's just the same as anyone else is allowed to
make that decision, so their autonomy should be respected as well (ED01).
Another geriatrician approached the dilemma from a different perspective. What was
important was that the medical team agreed on the treatment regime, and that the best
interests of the patient would be served through such a consensus. To have a member
of the healthcare team in disagreement would be disruptive to the patient's care.
I think that's terribly important, as that there should be not just consensus,
but unanimity as to what is being done, because if you proceed without
everybody actually agreeing to what you're doing, it is likely to cause
enormous problems. You 're more likely to actually trigger a process oflegal
enquiry or journalists getting involved and so on, which I think in that
situation would not be in the interest ofthe patient (ED03).
Another consultant reiterated this explanation, but with the added point being made
that this course of action should be clearly documented.
I think if the reasons for disagreeing with the team decision are something
like conscientious objection or some other vested concern that does not allow
them to go along with the team, a position should be taken along the lines of
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the person being excused from involvement in that case. But that needs to be
clearly spelt out and recorded so that there's no misunderstanding
afterwards as to the process (ED02).
Neurology
Neurologists interviewed also agreed that doctors should be allowed to express a
conscientious objection to advance directives.
I think ifyou are pressured to give or even not to give a treatment, and you
disagree on conscience grounds, then yes, I think that the only solution is to
hand it over to somebody who will [treat the patient], I mean personally, it
wouldn't arise because, if that's the patient's wishes, I would go along with it
and I don't care whether it's a Jehovah's Witness and if he's in for a blood
transfusion or what it is, if that's their wishes, that's fine (ED06).
Oncology
The situation was the same for oncologists interviewed, as long as the doctor who
objected did not try to change the opinions of the rest of the team. In that situation,
the doctor should automatically refer the patient to another consultant, and to do
otherwise was viewed to be bad practice.
Oh, I think that would be the right thing to do, I think they should pass the
patient on to somebody else. The problem I would have is if a doctor said
"look, I am the man in charge of this patient, despite an advance directive
and despite the fact that the family all agree with that, I want to take a
different position". I feel the right way to handle that would be for that
particular doctor to bail out of the care of the patient and invite a different
specialist to start looking after them, who presumably would be more
sensitive to the patient and their family's wishes (ED07).
Finally, in the light of their unanimous agreement that it would correct to pass the
patient to another consultant, doctors were asked if this right to conscientious
objections should extend further than the doctor, to other healthcare workers, or
nursing staff.
Oh, yes, to some extent I think we have to accept that. I think you have to be
sensitive to the wishes ofnurses, paramedical staff and so on and if they feel
very strongly that something should or should not be done, then they should
have a chance to air their concerns. At the end of the day though it's the
consultant that's in charge of the patient, I think the consultant, in general,
would try and do his best for that patient, bearing in mind any advance
directives that were an issue (ED10).
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Conclusions
In normal circumstances, in England informed consent is required before medical
treatment can be given, although consent or refusal may be implied. There is no
statutory duty for medical practitioners to inform of patients of all treatment choices
and the doctor may restrict treatment options available. As in the Netherlands and in
Scotland, every competent patient has a right to refuse treatment, which cannot be
overruled, but there is no duty to inform patients of that right. Although these
principles are governed by common law with several High Court and Court of
Appeal rulings, doctors interviewed often ask relatives for consent for treatment
where the patient is incompetent.
No clear model of decision-making emerged from the interviews but a mainly
paternalistic attitude prevailed among medical interviewees. Doctors in England hold
positions of power with patients and families respecting them, however, problems
arise where there is disagreement with doctor's decisions and poor communication
with the health team. Additionally, some of the doctors interviewed ignore guidelines
on policy and restrict the information given to patients.
Advance directives are viewed as refusals, and not demands, for treatment. Opinion
amongst interviewees is mixed on the current legal status of advance directives in
England although many of the interviewees are aware of the BMA guidelines on
directives. Likewise, there is mixed opinion on the binding nature of advance
directives and some doctors stated they would overrule directives even if they were
legally binding.
Very few English doctors who were interviewed had experience of patients with
advance directives, with most found with patients in care of the elderly and
neurology.
Some interviewees thought that ethical or religious grounds are not thought to be
good enough reasons to overrule advance directives and overriding them required
serious consideration. Others, however, thought directives to be influential but that
they would overrule them if they felt it necessary.
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Finally, many interviewees thought that advance directives could strengthen the
patient's autonomy in cases of incapacity, unless the patient was fully informed of all
available choices, then advance directives may fail to protect patient's autonomy to
its full extent. While directives might help doctor's decision-making, in certain
circumstances they could also diminish medical autonomy.
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Chapter Seven Comparison of Findings
Introduction
This chapter brings together the findings of Chapters Four, Five and Six and focuses
on the answers to the research questions. Each question is answered by drawing on
the literature reviewed in Chapter Two and the themes emerging from the data
analysis in Chapters Four, Five and Six. The chapter is arranged in sections, each
headed by a research question. The responses to the questions for each of the
countries studied are compared and the findings are summarised in a table at the end
of each section. Finally, the answers to the research questions are discussed and the
general conclusions are drawn at the end of this chapter.
The research undertaken for this thesis is largely exploratory and because of the
small number of interviews that were carried out, the findings cannot be generalised
in any statistical sense. The findings and conclusions relate the experiences of the
sixty interviewees in the three countries and they provide the evidential support to
the conclusions that are reached
This chapter shows that statute or common law make little difference to how medical
decision-making is made or to the authority of advance directives. Advance
directives may increase patient autonomy through providing information about the
patient's prior wishes; medical practitioners did not show too many concerns about
erosion of their professional autonomy by advance directives as professional
autonomy is still very strong throughout the jurisdictions investigated. The overall
predominant factor arising was that the process of making an advance directive is the
most helpful factor within the doctor-patient relationship as it promotes
communication and dialogue.
The common ground in each of the countries studied was that while the patient
retains capacity, consent is always required to carry out medical treatment and all
such patients have the right to refuse treatment regardless of the consequences.
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Advance directives are uncommon in all jurisdictions studied and most are found
with elderly patients. Regardless ofwhether advance directives are legally binding in
statute or common law, most of the doctors interviewed do not believe directives will
legally bind them. In all cases, and subject to certain circumstances, conscientious
objection to advance directives is both allowed and, agreed upon.
Ultimately, attitudes of the doctors interviewed were paramount in having advance
directives followed with communication between doctor and patient being the
essential element. Poor communication between doctor and patients causes conflicts
in all three jurisdictions with a need for greater communication between doctor and
patient and more openness in giving information to patients
The main differences found between the three countries centred on the following
topics. In the Netherlands, decision-making for incapacitated patients predominantly
uses the substituted judgement model, with the best interests model being used most
in Scotland and England.
It is a statutory duty in the Netherlands to inform patients of the treatment choices
available with the right to refuse treatment often being explained to the patient. In the
UK, doctors do not have a duty to be told of all treatment choices available to them
or of their right to refuse treatment. Regardless of whether there is a duty to inform
patients, medical practitioners may withhold treatment choices from patients for a
variety of reasons.
Doctors interviewed in Scotland and England appear to have a misinterpretation of
the law on consent for patients without capacity and they often erroneously ask
relatives to consent on the patient's behalf.
Advance directives in the Netherlands are governed by statute, with Dutch lawyers
considering directives to be binding on doctors' decisions. Patients are often asked
whether they have advance directives on their admission to hospital or nursing home
and they can be influential on treatment decisions. In the UK, advance directives are
regulated by common law and codes of practice guidelines. UK lawyers do consider
them to be binding on medical decisions with patients unlikely to be asked about
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having a directive on admission to hospital. In Scotland doctors will consider the
advance directive in making a decision for an incapacitated patient, while in Eng a
directive will be taken into account and some cases, probably followed.
Research Question One
How is medical decision-making carried out, and how does this relate to statute or
common law provisions in the three jurisdictions?
This section shows that the Netherlands is moving towards using substituted
judgement, as the main decision-making model for incapacitated patients, while
Scotland and England still use the best interests model for the most part, but this may
show signs of changing. In the Netherlands, the WGBO statute is not really an
important factor in decision-making; doctors can help define the rules, while still
being aware of the law. Scottish legislation is making inroads by underpinning
statutes with principles that must be followed, for example, taking a person's past
and present wishes into consideration, and involving patient in treatment planning.
English case law sets the ground rules on medical decision-making at present with
codes of practice providing professional guidelines for medical practitioners
throughout the UK. Nevertheless, Scottish and English doctors are still misinformed
of and misinterpret the law regarding consent with doctors asking relatives for
consent to treatment.
Decision-making - Capax Patients
As explained in Chapter One, every person, who is competent to do so, should have
the opportunity to decide what happens to his or her body.
The interviewees in all countries said that they were happy for consent to be verbal
and accepted that it may even be implied, with hospitals not requiring written
consent for most treatments. Doctors in the Netherlands stated that presenting oneself
for treatment is often taken to imply consent regardless of what the WGBO (Art
450(1)) states.
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It is legitimate for a doctor in the UK to accept implied consent from competent
patients; it is the reality of the consent that is important, not the form and there is no
legal distinction between written, oral or implied consent (Montgomery, 1997: 236).
Neurologists interviewed in Scotland and England rely on implied consent stating
that if patients do not refuse treatment by fighting it off, it goes ahead. One
interviewee thought that the NHS could not work otherwise, especially if doctors had
to go into all the details of treatment involved with every patient every time a
procedure was to be carried out. However, there is no corresponding duty on doctors
in any of the countries to inform competent patients of this right to refuse treatment.
There is a statutory duty on doctors in the Netherlands to inform patients of available
treatment choices (WGBO, Art 448(1)) and Dutch lawyers believed that the majority
of the public were aware of those rights. Although the doctor has a duty to inform
patients of the treatment options, they may withhold information if they believe it
will cause serious harm to the patient (Art 448(3)). There is no duty on doctors in the
UK to inform patients of all treatment choices, it is up to the doctor in terms of his or
her professional duty of care to decide which treatment options the patient may
choose from.
Interviews with doctors in England showed that the doctor in charge could
deliberately restrict treatment choices. Lawyers in the Netherlands felt that patients
were not being given a full explanation of the alternatives available. There are
several points that arise from doctors having sole responsibility for deciding which
options to offer a patient: first, the doctor controls the doctor-patient relationship by
selecting the treatment option and secondly controls the patient's view of his or her
illness as, in the majority of cases, the doctor is the main or only source of
information and knowledge. Third, the doctor also has a role in the rationing of
resources through not offering futile treatments in the options presented to the
patient.
In all three countries doctors stated that they respected patients' autonomy to make
their own treatment decisions as long as patients had the capacity to do so. All the
doctors interviewed stated that they encouraged patients to make their own decisions
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and considered their wishes important. Elderly patients in the Netherlands looked to
their doctors for help with treatment decision-making and often asked General
Practitioners to help them decide on specialist treatment. Good and long-standing
relationships between doctor and patient enable decision-making to become a
collaborative effort, especially where GPs have known patients for long periods of
time. Geriatricians reported that elderly patients in England were happy to abdicate
their autonomy to the doctor, in the belief that "doctor knows best" and that they
were prepared to take the decision for the patient, acting in the patient's best
interests. In Scotland, doctors said that patients' wishes were respected as much as
possible and in oncology special relationships between doctors and patients often
developed because of the nature of the patient's illness.
Decision-making - Incapax Patients
Decision-making for patients who no longer have capacity varies to some extent
between the three countries but, in all three countries, consent is still required. In the
Netherlands, the WGBO (Art 465(3)), and in Scotland, the AWI Act (section 16),
authorise proxies to consent on behalf of the patient. Prior to the AWI Act, in
Scotland the courts could appoint a tutor dative with powers to act on behalf of the
incapacitated adult. The welfare attorney (section 16, AWI Act) fulfils a similar
function and if no one is appointed, the doctor has a "general authority to treat"
(section 47, AWI Act). In England, consent can only be obtained from the person
who is to receive care. While persons who are aware that they are likely to become
incompetent can hope to make their views known at a later stage, by appointing
someone to speak for them, English law currently does not recognise rights of proxy
consent on behalf of an adult. Where an adult is incapable of giving consent and
requires treatment, the House of Lords has held that healthcare professionals are
obliged to treat their patients in accordance with their best interests (F v. W.
Berkshire HA [1989] 2 All ER 545). Providing they do so, there is no need for prior
authorisation from the court.
In the Netherlands, the patient may have appointed a proxy and it would then fall to
the proxy to refuse or consent to treatment on the patient's behalf. If the proxy has
prior knowledge of the person's wishes, he or she cannot go against those wishes and
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proxies have the right to challenge doctors' on the patient's behalf. If all else fails,
the court can appoint a representative to give consent on behalf of the patient.
Doctors in Scotland and England claimed that implied consent respects patients'
autonomy. Consent could be assumed unless a refusal by the patient was
communicated through signs or gestures. Some Scottish doctors employ a type of
hierarchy of capacity to decide whether a patient can give consent, for example, in
less serious decisions (dressing a wound or removal of sutures, etc.) the patient's co¬
operation may be sufficient, while more significant decisions (consent to an
operation) will require more explicit consent.
Evidence of the patient's previous wishes, including an advance directive, are
collected from the family by some Scottish neurologists and some elderly care
doctors in England attempt to determine what the patient's previous wishes were by
consulting with relatives and friends.
In the Netherlands, Scotland and England and Wales, relatives often wrongly believe
that they have the right to make decisions in the event of their next of kin's
incapacity. In Scotland, doctors sometimes ask relatives to consent to treatment and
by so doing, doctors wrongly give relatives the impression that they have the
authority to give or refuse consent for treatment. In England, doctors also wrongly
ask relatives to consent to medical treatment on their next of kin's behalf.
Geriatricians and neurologists in Scotland and in England also assume that the
patient consents to treatment unless he or she has obviously refused. However, it was
pointed out that this practice is decreasing as more doctors become more legally
aware.
Relatives and friends do not have authority to consent or refuse treatment unless they
are appointed as welfare attorneys under the AWI Act in Scotland and this option is
not available in England in England (Ashton: 1995: 187). The BMA has given advice
on the matter,
Wherever possible, the doctor should involve those close to the patient in the
decision-making process. If the patient has previously been autonomous,
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decisions should be based on the patients' known views and preferences.
People close to the patient can reflect those (Sommerville, 1993: 16).
Some Scottish doctors would seek additional legal advice if there was difficulty and,
although this is preferable to acting outside the law, the BMA does warn that
'doctors cannot rely entirely on the law for clarification of their duties, since the
application of legal maxims to specific cases is often subject to complex and variable
interpretation' (Sommerville, 1993: 157). This seems to leave doctors in a difficult
situation and it is understandable why there has been a call for clarification of the law
dealing with incapacity in both Scotland and England.
It is clearly not routine for doctors in Scotland or in England to approach the patient,
before any future incapacity, for advance decision-making and consent to treatment.
While the doctor-patient relationship was mentioned as being important, the only
doctors to discuss future treatments with their patients were oncologists. In England,
some treatment decisions were made prior to incapacity. In England, there are
currently no definitive legal rules explaining how medical decisions can be made for
incapax patients and, unless the case goes to court, doctors can override the patient's
wishes, where they are known. Good relationships between doctors and patients are
important in helping patients come to appropriate treatment decisions, especially
since patients often look to the doctor for advice and help with decision-making.
In Chapter Two, two models on which doctors could base their decision-making for
incapax patients were outlined - the "best interests" model and the "substituted-
judgement" model. In substituted judgement, the doctor tries to place him or herself
in the patient's position and makes decisions on the patient's behalf. The court, in
Saikewicz at 431 stated that
principles of equality and respect for all individuals require a substituted
judgement decision-making standard that guarantees incompetent individuals
have the same rights as competent individuals to refuse and terminate medical
treatment (Saikewicz, 1977 at 431)
In the Netherlands, as is required by the WGBO, the "substituted judgement" model
was used most often, especially in nursing home medicine. However, doctors in the
Netherlands who chose substituted judgement as their preferred method of decision-
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making with incapacitated patients looked to the first three subjective criteria (the
expressed preferences of the patient; the patient's religious beliefs, if any; and the
impact of the patient's family). Some doctors believed that if the patient's autonomy
was to be respected, then an attempt ought to be made to recreate the situation that he
or she would have wanted. Although the family could help in that reconstruction,
respecting patient autonomy did not necessarily mean following the family's
requests.
Substituted judgement is only useful where the decision-maker knows what the
patient would have wanted (Deverette, 1995: 111). Therefore, in situations where it
was impossible to determine the patients' wishes, some doctors used substituted
judgement and others used the best interests model to make decisions. The best
interests model was used most often. A similar example of a decision-making
hierarchy is developed by Deverette {ibid, 113-115). At level one the substituted
judgement standard is used and the patients' wishes are carried out; at level two best
interests are be used to decide what is in the best interests of the patient. Level three
decisions would be made on the basis of what is reasonable treatment in the
circumstances if the patient has left no indication of his or her wishes and has no
interests because of the permanent loss of all awareness.
Some Dutch doctors believe that employing best interests is a surer method of
decision-making since substituted judgement could be little better than chance. This
view confirmed Dubler's findings that only half of the decisions made by proxies,
using substituted judgement, agreed with decisions the patients would have made
themselves (Dubler, 1995: 298-301).
Patient autonomy appeared to be less important in Scotland with the best interests
model used most often. In neurology this happens even if it goes against a patient's
previous wishes. The best interests standard has been defined as 'acting so as to
promote maximally the good of the individual' (Buchanan and Brock, 1989: 88). If
taken literally and without qualification, doctors would have to evaluate all the
options and act in a way that provides the best outcome for the individual in question
(Kopelman, 1997: 278). Clearly doctors find this difficult as no consideration is
taken of the patient's wishes or religious beliefs, or of instructions left by way of an
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advance directive, or of other patients' needs. It is no wonder that doctors admitted
they found use of both substituted judgement and best interests to be problematic.
When incapacitated persons have periods of lucidity when they were able to make
their own decisions, further problems in making treatment decisions were
encountered.
Scottish doctors mentioned their difficulty in understanding the law relating to
incapacity. Scottish lawyers, on the other hand, were less sympathetic and believed
the law surrounding medical decision-making was less difficult to understand than
often was made out. Lawyers in England thought doctors should take the
responsibility for decision-making and that advance directives could help doctors
make decisions.
In England, among the medical interviewees, no clear model of decision-making was
apparent; the only definitive statement being that substituted judgement was not used
in elderly care because of the reported lack of reliable persons authorised to act for
the patient. When doctors found it difficult to establish patients' wishes and were
worried that they might make the wrong decision they used the best interests model.
They thought it was a safer option especially if there were few relatives or friends to
ask what the patient would have wanted. Having a person to act as an advocate for
the patient and to argue his or her case was helpful for healthcare staff as long as
these other perspectives did not interfere with decision-making.
The Law and Decision-making
The role of statute law and common law in medical decision-making in each of the
three countries is set out in table 7.1 below.
7.1 Laws on decision-making
COUNTRY STATUTE LAW COMMON LAW
Netherlands Yes (WGBO) Infrequent
Scotland Yes (AWI Act) Yes
England No Yes
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In the Netherlands, statute law in the form of the Law on Contracts for Medical
Treatment (WGBO) lays down the rules concerning the aspects of medical treatment
decision-making for both capax and incapax patients. Markenstein (1995) called it a
"Special Contract" because it is associated with extraordinary rules within the civil
code. The legislator used this type of contract in an attempt to redress the imbalance
of power between the doctor and the patient by placing more obligations and duties
on the doctor and giving rights to the patient. As a result, doctors' obligations are
wide and patients' are narrow. There is a facility to override representatives' wishes
if they do not satisfy the 'the standard of care required of a competent care provider'
(Article 453).
In Scotland, the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, controls the area of
decision-making for patients who no longer have the capacity to consent or refuse
treatment for physical conditions. The general principles of the Act state that the past
and present wishes of the patient should be taken into consideration when treatment
decisions are made. The Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984, to be superseded by the
Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003, covers treatment decisions
for mental health disorders. It provides a statutory basis for advance statements
concerning advance planning of treatments in mental health only. Patients without
capacity can have treatment decisions made for them through a representative or a
proxy.
The common law is the current authority for medical decision-making. In England
and Wales, there is currently no statutory incapacity law that allows decisions for
incapax patients to be made for physical treatments. The Mental Health Act 1983
covers mental health disorders and the Mental Capacity Bill covering aspects of
decision-making, medical or otherwise, for incapable adults has recently had its third
reading in the House of Commons. This Bill will not only bring the law governing
welfare, financial and medical provisions for incapax patients in England and Wales
into line with Scottish legislation but it will actually provide statutory authorisation
for advance statements. Codes of Practice concerning medical ethics, withholding
and withdrawing treatment, and advance statements written by the BMA and the
GMC are extensive.
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Litigation against doctors in issues of medical decision-making is rare in all of the
three jurisdictions. According to many of the lawyers interviewed, most courts in the
Netherlands have a great respect for clinicians' opinions. Lawyers in Scotland
thought litigation was rare, costly and cumbersome and pointed out that help was
available only for those who qualified for Legal Aid. In England, lawyers suggested
that litigation was also infrequent and that the cost of medical treatment actions was
prohibitive for a large section of the public who did not qualify for Legal Aid.
Lawyers instead advised and encouraged families to talk to each other and their
healthcare professionals before embarking on litigation.
Written advance statements are recognised in statute in the Netherlands (WGBO, Art
450(3)). A major case in 1989 was influential in encouraging campaigners to push
for legislative backing and lawyers said they were happy that medical treatment and
advance statements are now covered in law. Doctors on the other hand, did not
believe that codification of the procedures regulating advance statements had
produced any real changes in how medical decisions were made. They were
concerned that they would be compelled to follow requests for treatment that may be
futile or even illegal.
Consent procedures for incapax patients and issues surrounding medical treatment
are now covered by statute in Scotland (AWI Act). Formerly case law (mostly
English) had been relied upon for guidance by medical and legal professionals. The
Scottish Executive decided against making statutory provision for advance
statements when the AWI Bill was considered by the Scottish Parliament. Religious
objections were exemplified by the fear of 'euthanasia by the backdoor' (interview
with Policy Officer, CARE, 1999) and because of the need for other, more urgent
provisions (Anderson, 2000). The AWI Act (section 1(4) (a)) states, however, that
account must be taken of a patient's present and past wishes, which may, by
implication, give some sort of statutory authorisation to advance directives. Doctors
seemed to be happy with the informal provisions on advance statements provided by
the Code of Practice (BMA, 1995a), as did lawyers, who did not believe it was
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necessary to make statutory provision for advance statements and that professional
regulation was sufficient.
Patients' rights in England and Wales are primarily grounded in the common law.
Until the Mental Capacity Bill becomes law, only case law provides any legislative
authority (Re T 1992; Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland 1993; Re C 1994; Re AK 2001;
Re B 2002). Doctors were concerned that giving advance statements statutory
backing would infringe their professional autonomy to make medical treatment
decisions. They stated that they would not be happy being confined by more
prescriptive rules (BMA, 1995a). Lawyers reported a high degree of
misunderstanding among doctors and the public in the area of treatment decision¬
making and consent and, while they were happy with the common law, felt that rules
that are more definite would provide greater clarity.
The main findings in relation to question one are set out below.
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7.2 Summary of comparisons for research question one
How is medical decision-making carried out, and how does this relate to statute or
common law provisions in the three jurisdictions?
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What are the processes of treatment decision-makingfor incapax patients and how
are they related to doctors' professional autonomy?
All three jurisdictions foster a "doctor knows best" attitude among the population
with a prevailing attitude of paternalism among medical practitioners. Decisions for
incompetent patients reflect medical autonomy with decisions most often being made
in the patient's best interests.
The doctors' positions of power allow them to make the rules, often ignoring policies
or guidelines especially in the UK. Poor communication, withholding information,
secrecy and lack of knowledge can all result in conflict between families and
healthcare members.
Medical Authority and its Challenges
Doctors occupy a powerful social position that is intrinsic to the practice of medicine
- often the doctor decides and the patient fits in with this decision. Patients can
expect to be at a disadvantage because of their lack of knowledge and lack of
training. Sometimes they 'want to believe the doctor is all knowing and all powerful
and therefore will definitely provide the correct diagnosis and provide a complete
cure' (Jones, 1999: 129). That is perhaps why, in the Netherlands, although statute
controls doctors' powers over treatment decision-making, patients, particularly
elderly patients still are said to feel that "doctor knows best". In Scotland there
seemed to a "blanket" trust in doctors' authority and ability. This trust may be built
on the belief that doctors are technically proficient, competent and committed to
protecting the patient's interests (Mechanic, 2004: 1418-9) and patients were usually
willing to go along with the doctor's decision, even if their own autonomy was
overruled. Care of the elderly doctors in Scotland said that they would happily
override the patient's wishes if they felt that they were irrational.
In oncology, the doctor-patient relationship was reported to be less paternalistic than
other specialties. Often because the relationship has had more time to develop,
oncologists stated they were more likely to go along with treatment decisions of their
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patients. English oncologists likewise claimed that they were moving away from the
paternalistic position of "doctor knows best", towards a more evenly balanced
partnership. This provides support for Jones (1999) who claims paternalism is no
longer the primary model of interaction between doctor and patient and that good
relationships are 'built upon truth and integrity and the trust that this creates' (ibid:
104).
While many patients in all three jurisdictions are said to bow to the doctor's
authority, both relatives and colleagues may challenge medical decisions. Conflicts
can arise with the patient's family and in an effort to ease disputes Dutch doctors
might compromise with families, unless futile treatment was requested. Lawyers in
the Netherlands are seldom involved in disputes between doctor and patient, but
stated that, in any disagreement about treatment decisions, the incapax patient's
proxy need to take responsibility and challenge the doctor's decision on the patient's
behalf. In cases that do go to court, doctors' opinions and judgements were taken
seriously by the court and were rarely overruled.
In all areas, challenges to the doctors' authority usually come from relatives of
patients who have lost capacity. English legal respondents thought that statute law,
e.g. the forthcoming mental capacity legislation, might curb litigation, but offered
few conclusions on whether statute law would keep medical power in check. It
would appear that even where statute law does exist, as in the Netherlands, decisions
reflect professional autonomy.
The family sometimes may disagree with treatment decisions made by the doctor.
However, according to some interviewees, this may have nothing to do with the
actual treatment decision and may be caused by separate family issues such as guilt
and unresolved issues in past relationships. Family members may disagree about
what the patient's best interests are and doctors in Scotland felt that conflicts with
relatives are often due to their unrealistic expectations of what treatment could
achieve.
The patient's prior wishes can also fuel conflicts between families and doctors.
Treatment decisions that respect and enhance the autonomy of the patient may at the
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same time disregard the views of the patient's caregivers and the rest of his or her
family (Hardwig, 1995: 24). From the English doctors' perspective, the clinician's
duty of care takes precedence - some doctors will yield to the relatives if there is no
harm to the patient, but, if there is suffering, the doctor makes the final decision.
Medical respondents in England believed that lack of knowledge and lack of
consensus on what the patient wanted could cause conflicts within the family and
between the family and doctors. Neurologists believed that poor communication and
the need for relatives to become involved in the patient's care could cause
unnecessary conflicts. Poor communication was mentioned by medical respondents
in Scotland and England as being the cause of disagreements among professionals
and between professionals and relatives. A study of more than 400 doctors and
nurses who were involved in life-support decisions for about 100 patients found
conflict occurred between family members and healthcare staff in about half of these
cases. Just as frequently there was tension among staff members and in about one
quarter of cases, family members had conflicts with each other. Communication was
again an issue and it was found that,
although conflicts between families and doctors usually involve a
disagreement on whether to withdraw or continue life support, in many cases
problems arise due to poor communication or other issues (Mulvihill, 2001:
284).
As a solution, Dutch doctors reported that more information, better communication
with, and sensitivity to the family's concerns are valuable in avoiding and resolving
conflicts. Support groups draw attention to the stresses families are encountering at
this time,
We must also recognize that families are not simply or even primarily patient
support systems. They must not be thought of or treated that way by doctors,
hospitals, health care planners, or bioethicists. To do so is immoral, as Kant
made plain. It involves treating the rest of the patient's family as mere means
to the preferences of the patient (Elardwig, 1995: 23).
Conflicts might arise when differences of opinion are seen by medical practitioners
as "wrong" treatment decisions because they are decisions that the doctor would not
make (Jones, 1999: 103).
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In Scotland, doctors who cared for the elderly would consider calling for a
psychological/psychiatric assessment if there were disagreements with the doctor's
treatment plans. Age Concern has advised that doctors should not assume that an
irrational decision (to the physician) is inevitably due to mental disorder or
incompetence and these patients should not automatically be presumed to lack
decision-making capacity (Derse, 1999: 55). Resolution, according to several
lawyers interviewed in the Netherlands and England, was more likely to be found
through better communication with doctors, patients and families, explaining the
benefits and effects of the treatments instead of resorting to the courts.
English lawyers are sometimes consulted by relatives who disagreed with the
doctors' decisions to withhold treatment, typically where the doctor decides to stop
treatment altogether. Lack of knowledge and inability to obtain information leads
people to seek legal advice, often only to relieve their doubts and fears. Teff
recommends greater communication by the medical profession and sees demands for
greater participation in decision-making, as symptomatic of anti-paternalism in a
society that feels 'indignation at the secrecy which often accompanies professional
practices' (ibid 445). One English lawyer who was interviewed commented that
problems can arise from secrecy and the concealment of information by medical
practitioners and that this can lead to feelings of disempowerment by laypersons.
Most Dutch lawyers believed that, while the public were aware of their right to
refuse treatment regardless of the consequences, they would prefer doctors to inform
them of this right explicitly and to explain the alternatives more fully. Lawyers in
England believed that patients should be told of their right to refuse treatment, to
enable them to retain their personal autonomy. While they believed that doctors were
acting in the patients' best interests by sometimes withholding this information, they
were also concerned that it restricted the choices available to patients.
Doctors in all three countries said they did not routinely inform patients of their right
to refuse treatment. Dutch doctors did not explicitly tell their patients as there was an
implicit understanding that most people knew what their rights were and that patients
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knew of their right to refuse treatment when they presented themselves for treatment.
Many medical practitioners withheld this information, as some patients did not like
to refuse treatments for fear of being left untreated altogether. In nursing home
medicine, talking about the refusal of treatment to the patient was seen as leading to
conflict and thought to be too distressing for patients. As a result, only CPR was
routinely discussed with patients on admission to hospital or within the first few
days. Some doctors were unsure about whether patients knew of their right to refuse
- they thought the elderly probably did not, while younger patients were more likely
to be aware of it. GPs were more likely to tell their patients about their right to refuse
treatment, especially from a specialist, but this was expressed as a treatment option
rather than an outright refusal. Finally, one doctor expressed the view that presenting
oneself for treatment can be taken to imply consent regardless of what the WGBO
states.
According to Scottish doctors, it is unusual for patients to be told of their right to
refuse treatment. In care of the elderly medicine, they are told only if they
specifically asked. In other cases, doctors only consult patients about their wishes
regarding resuscitation issues. Some patients are told of their right to refuse treatment
in neurology but consent often is implied so the question did not arise. Only if the
procedure might be uncomfortable or invasive does the doctor offer the patient an
opportunity to refuse, and patients are only asked about CPR because it was NHS
policy. Only in oncology are patients regularly told of their right to refuse treatment.
Doctors said it is important for the patient to know that he or she could refuse and to
know everything about the treatment. However, one oncologist thought it was only
up to the doctor to tell the patient of the best treatment option(s) available.
Similarly, in England, for doctors interviewed, it is not customary to tell patients of
their right to refuse treatment and care of the elderly doctors do not inform patients,
as it would increase their fears. In neurology, doctors rely on patients fighting off
treatment if they did not want it; the onus is on the patients to show their refusal.
Unlike their Scottish counterparts, English oncologists do not inform their patients
that they could refuse treatment. Although guidelines have been issued by the NHS
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(BMA et al, 2001) about asking patients resuscitations wishes, many English doctors
interviewed did not even ask about CPR.
The main findings in relation to Question Two are set out below.
7.3 Summary of comparisons for research question two
What are the processes of treatment decision-making for incapax patients and how
are they related to doctors 'professional autonomy?
Question Two NETHERLANDS SCOTLAND ENGLAND
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How do doctors and lawyers view the current legal status ofadvance directives in
each of the jurisdictions?
This section shows that regardless of the actual legal situations in each of the
countries, most of the interviewees do not believe advance directives legally bind
them. Opinion varies from directives being at best helpful, at worst an
inconvenience. There is a need for more information on the legal situation in each of
the countries and a need to be more aware of how others view advance directives, for
example 'patients hope they are binding'.
Definitions of Advance Directives
The Dutch Euthanasia Society (NVVE) usually supplies advance directives, drafted
by a lawyer, in the Netherlands. There are two types35: a negative directive
(specifying the circumstances in which consent to treatment is refused); and a
positive declaration where, the patient asks for something, e.g. resuscitation. Since
2001 a patient can ask for euthanasia in an advance directive, but the doctor is not
compelled to carry out the request. Lawyers in the Netherlands are familiar with
these documents and advise clients to write down their wishes after discussion with
their family and their doctors and to give their GPs a copy to put in their files.
Doctors interviewed in the Netherlands were familiar with and in favour of advance
directives and encouraged patients to use them to express their wishes. They defined
advance directives as being similar to testamentary wills, although witnesses are not
always necessary (witnesses are not required by the WGBO). Oral directives often
have a lower legal status, while some doctors would give them similar weight to
written directives, others did not consider them valid. The majority of Dutch doctors
interviewed expect patients to be asked whether they have an advance directive on
admission to hospital, but they disagreed on when the most appropriate time might
be to ask this question.
33 See Chapter One for discussion of positive and negative treatment and oral directives.
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There is an increasing awareness of advance directives in Scotland, with lawyers
having some experience of drafting them and a few lawyers offered this service as a
package, together with testamentary wills and powers of attorney. Lawyers
interviewed in Scotland had seen few advance directives. Most were supplied by the
Scottish euthanasia society, EXIT and could be downloaded from their website.
Doctors expected that advance directives to be found mainly in care of the elderly
and neurology. The majority of doctors interviewed felt that greater use of advance
directives would be helpful for doctors in future decision-making, as the directive is
a plan of management of the patient's future care. Doctors stated that they did not
need be in writing, but if not they would prefer them to be witnessed by a medical
professional. A neurologist stated that ideally the document would specify the
treatment the patient wanted to refuse and that the patient could not demand futile
treatment. The oncologists felt it would only be considered as an advisory statement
that could be disregarded by the clinician, and that the next of kin and medical staff
should agree with what is written in the document. Oral directives appeared to be
used most often and discussed by patients and doctors most frequently in oncology.
In England and Wales, advance directives are uncommon amongst the interviewees
and often originate from VES. Doctors in care of the elderly defined them as a
refusal, not a demand, for treatment and ignored requests for futile treatment. The
patient's wishes must be freely expressed and the directive should detail treatments
and procedures that the patient does not wish to have. Oncologists would prefer it to
be a written document but accepted that it also could be a video or a tape recording
and noted that it should be witnessed and could be updated as necessary. Oncologists
felt that advance directives would be useful in helping relatives discover and
therefore assert their next of kin's wishes. Very few are used at present, and they are
mostly found with patients in care of the elderly and neurology, but they could see
that there is a potential for them to be used more in the future.
Care of the elderly doctors and neurologists interviewed in Scotland, did not ask
patients if they had an advance directive at any point in their hospital care and none
of doctors interviewed in England asked patients about them. Oncologists in
Scotland said they did not ask specifically about advance directives because the
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treatment regime would be discussed with the patient. Among doctors in the UK,
medical opinion was that the onus was on the patient or relative to inform the doctor
of an advance directive. This is consistent with BMA advice that the onus lies with
the patient to ensure that the advance directive is properly drafted and is available for
those whom it is addressed. The BMA suggests that patients who have made an
advance directive should carry a card indicating this as well as lodging a copy with
their doctor (BMA, 1993: 162). The opposite view was taken by lawyers in Scotland
who thought that there should be an onus on persons with knowledge of the existence
of such a document (next of kin, lawyers, GP, etc.), to inform the doctor dealing with
the patient of the existence of an advance directive.
Legal Status of Advance Directives
Much decision-making concerning treatment for persons who have lost the capacity
to give or refuse consent takes place without any clear understanding of their wishes,
and a statement made by the patient setting out what he or she would consent to may
be a way of preserving the patient's autonomy. Advance directives, as a way of
documenting those wishes, may be a useful tool for the doctor in decision-making for
incapax patients. To determine whether this is the case, doctors' and lawyers' views
on the legal status of advance directives were elicited.
Lawyers interviewed in the Netherlands were happy with the way the WGBO
protects patients' rights. The WGBO (Article 450(3)) only concerns advance
directives (negative directives or refusals of treatment), requests for euthanasia
(positive declarations) are contained in the Termination of Life on Request and
Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 2001. These lawyers agreed that the law
made advance directives legally binding on doctors' treatment decisions and that
medical staff should comply them with unless there was a good reason for overriding
them. The doctor could be held accountable for ignoring or overriding an advance
directive and families could use this to challenge the doctor's treatment decisions.
This puts a pressure on the doctor and the patient (and his or her family) has a device
by which to challenge the medical professional, which may alter the potential power
of parties involved.
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In Scotland things are somewhat different. Lawyers did not believe that advance
directives were legally binding on doctors and said they would advise clients that
they were only persuasive in medical decision-making. One lawyer said that a
discussion with a judge in Scotland verified that it was unlikely that an advance
directive would be regarded as binding in Scotland if the consequences were that the
person would die, a so-called "suicide-motivated directive". Despite these negative
aspects, some of the lawyers who were interviewed thought that a legislative
framework would introduce a welcome degree of certainty into the law in this area,
and that it could provide a doctor with statutory immunity from civil or criminal
liability if he or she withheld treatment either in accordance with a living will or on
the instructions of a welfare attorney. Additionally, lawyers thought that doctors
should be made aware of advance directives and the fact that they are duty bound to
consider them in helping to make a treatment decision. However, lawyers believed
that people making advance directives were not sufficiently aware of the
complexities of the law in this area and noted that there were drafting difficulties,
e.g. it is impossible to list all medical circumstances in which they would apply.
There is no statutory or case law relating to the legal status of advance directives'
legal status in Scotland, although English case law would be highly influential in the
Scottish courts. Presumably the courts will decide on their binding nature on a case-
by-case basis. There was general agreement that oral statements carry less weight but
should be respected nonetheless.
Opinion was mixed on the current legal status of advance directives among English
lawyers. Most would advise that they should be taken into account when making
treatment decisions, but that doctors would not be duty bound to follow them. Due
to difficulties in interpretation and the uncertainty regarding their legality, lawyers
stated that they would advise doctors that they need only consider them when making
treatment decisions but that they would not be duty bound to follow them. They
admitted, however, there may be some legal authority for directives at common law.
BMA Code of Practice provided satisfactory guidance on advance directives for
doctors, and they considered that the courts could fill any gaps.
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Most Dutch doctors interviewed are aware of and well informed about advance
directives, and were familiar with seeing patients who had them. Some doctors did
not think they legally bound them, despite the fact they were clearly authorised by
statute. In fact one GP went so far as to say that, if a patient disagreed with his
treatment recommendations, he or she could get another doctor. Only three of the 10
Dutch doctors interviewed believed advance directives were legally binding and that
they would be followed. Even the doctors who did believe that advance directives
were legally binding thought that the doctors' views would prevail in the end; there
is clearly a gap between the legal framework and the practical realities in this area of
medical law. This may be caused by lack of knowledge of the law but for some
doctors it was obvious that they felt their professional judgement was more
important, regardless of what the law said.
In Scotland, doctors were not very well informed about the legal status of advance
directives and most thought that they were only advisory. Only one doctor (in care of
the elderly) thought he would be legally bound and this was probably because he had
prior experience of a patient with a valid advance directive in England. Some doctors
would be prepared to take oral as well as written directives into consideration but
still did not believe them to be legally binding; others were unsure of their legality
but would place a good deal of moral weight on them in any case. Doctors believed it
would be unhelpful to place legal rules on advance directives and one oncologist felt
it would be wrong to establish rules around decision-making as it could decrease the
patient's quality of care by restricting the treatments available to them.
Like the Scottish doctors, English doctors interviewed were not very well informed
about advance directives although some were aware of the BMA guidelines stating
that advance statements should be followed in certain circumstances. They were
aware of relevant case law on medical decision-making but were unconvinced that
the courts would find that advance directives were legally binding on doctors.
Nevertheless, many doctors were in favour of them and in care of the elderly
medicine, doctors said they would treat advance directives as valid, provided certain
fundamental conditions applied. Others wanted further legal opinion before making
any decision based on what was written in an advance directive. When pressed,
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neurologists did agree that if the advance directive was legally valid and expressed
the patient's wishes, it would be acted upon. However, in the opinion of many
doctors, legally binding advance directives could cause distressing medical situations
for the patient and prevent doctors from providing the most appropriate form of
treatment. In certain circumstances doctors said they would probably overrule an
advance directive, even, if it was legally binding, to ensure that the best interests of
the patient were satisfied. Oral statements created even greater difficulty - doctors
were sure that they would have to be established as the patient's expressed wishes
and that each statement would be examined and dealt with on its own merits.
In the light of other research carried out in the UK on knowledge of advance
directives, it is perhaps unsurprising that doctors in the UK were misinformed of the
legal nature of advance directives. Only half of GPs surveyed in London and
Winchester were aware that some forms of advance directive could carry legal force
(Bowker et al, 1998) and a postal survey investigating doctors' knowledge of
advance directives in Dorset found 17 hospital doctors and 21 GPs had not heard of
the BMA's guidance on advance statements (Zaman and Battock, 1998: 147). There
is an obvious need for clear and unambiguous information to be given to the medical
profession on advance directives.
The main findings in relation to research question 3 are set out below.
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7.4 Summary of comparisons for research question three
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Do doctors consider advance directives when making treatment decisions for
incapax patients?
This data answering this question shows that decision-making for incapax patients
can be helped by advance directives. In the Netherlands advance directives can be
influential but the doctors interviewed stated that they could get round them by
interpretation of the law and the circumstances. In Scotland doctors who were
interviewed said they would consider them and follow them if they did not contradict
the doctor's decision. In England advance directives are influential but doctors
interviewed stated that they would overrule them if necessary.
Advance Directives and Decision-making
How doctors take account of advance directives when making treatment decisions
depends on how much they believe they are bound by them and under what
circumstances they feel they have a right to override them. Interview data from
medical practitioners in all three countries indicates that doctors believe advance
directives to be little more than advisory. Doctors are happy to follow a directive as
long as certain conditions apply, but very few doctors feel they have to be legally
bound by them. Some doctors would have no problem overriding a directive if they
did not agree with it, but the majority would respect the patient's wishes and try to
comply with what had been asked for.
Use of Advance Directives
Doctors in the Netherlands estimated that between 2% - 35% of their patients had
advance directives. They stated that nursing home residents are the group most likely
to make advance directives as they are usually made by elderly people and when they
become more frail and ill.
In Scotland and England, doctors had very little experience of patients with advance
directives so their responses were somewhat speculative and mainly anecdotal.
Doctors interviewed estimated that between 2% - 4% of their patients in Scotland
and between 2% - 7% in England held advance directives. Neurologists and
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oncologists in Scotland and England had come across more oral directives than
written and much of the advance care planning centred on CPR (possibly because
NHS policy dictates that patients should be asked about this on admission). One
doctor working in care of the elderly medicine in England commented that, in his
view, certain types of people ('clear-thinking individuals') made advance directives,
often many years before they are required. A study researching the type of person
who used living wills, gave some support to this. The researchers found that patients
who held living wills were likely to be female, white, and educated to degree level
(Hanson and Rodgman, 1996). Another doctor, in neurology, postulated a link
between the lack of strong family ties and the need to express future treatment
wishes in a legal document. He felt it would be less common to feel the need to do so
if close family ties existed.
Overriding Advance Directives and Conscientious Objections
Netherlands
Dutch law states that certain conditions must apply before a doctor can override a
directive: if the doctor's duty of care and actions were within profession guidelines,
this would constitute sufficient grounds to override the directive. On the other hand,
doctors said that they did not believe an advance directive would completely legally
bind them and it therefore can be assumed that there are circumstances in which
doctors would override an advance directive. Indeed, some doctors stated that if their
professional duty of care were threatened, they would ignore the instructions in the
directive, often passing the patient to another doctor if there was a disagreement
between doctor and patient.
Dutch lawyers interviewed stated that lawyers seldom become involved with
healthcare issues and the courts rarely deal with cases relating to advance directives.
Thus, there have been few challenges to a doctor's decision to override a directive.
Even when a case does reach the Dutch courts, lawyers believed that a doctor's
professional opinion would rarely be questioned. Many lawyers (50% of those
interviewed) thought that advance directives should not be overridden by doctors or
other healthcare providers, but lack of litigation in this area means that the courts
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have had little chance to rule on this. The lawyers also pointed out that, since the
medical disciplinary court of the KNMG would usually deal with conflicts in this
area, lawyers have little experience of these disputes and were not in a position to
comment further.
Dutch doctors were critical of advance directives that had been drafted without
recourse to medical advice. They felt that lack ofmedical knowledge in drawing up a
directive might either restrict the doctor in the palliative treatment he or she could
offer or force the doctor to override the advance directive under article 453 which
states:
The care provider must, in the course of his duties, have regard for the
standard of care required of a competent care provider and must act in
accordance with the responsibilities ensuing from the standard of professional
care required of care providers.
An advance directive is restrictive if the doctor feels that the care he or she is
allowed to provide is not in accordance with the professional standard of care
expected in those circumstances. The doctor could then feel free to override the
directive. One doctor went further when he stated that, as far as he was concerned,
doctors could interpret the law and make it less robust by determining the standard of
care that applied. In other words, since the medical practitioner decides, using
professional protocols written by the medical profession themselves, on the standard
of care in the Act, the profession is then at liberty to control much of what the patient
can ask for in an advance directive. The state may make the law but the medical
profession interprets it. Doctors can also decide what constitute 'cogent reasons' for
ignoring an advance directive.
As mentioned above, the Act states that doctors cannot terminate the treatment
contract unless there are good reasons for doing so (WGBO, Art 460). The Dutch
doctors who were interviewed thought that conscientious objection would be a good
enough reason to terminate the contract and some of them suggested that patients
could find another doctor if the conflict could not be resolved. This is covered by the
WGBO which states that the doctor may 'instruct others to perform [treatments]
without prejudice to the liability of the care provider'. However, some doctors felt
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that while clinicians were entitled to their own beliefs, allowing these beliefs to have
some influences over treatment decisions could place the doctor's autonomy before
that of the patient.
Scotland
The general principles stated in the AWI Act do not compel the doctor, in his or her
decision-making, to follow the past wishes of the incapax. On the other hand case
law does require the doctor to follow an advance directive, there have been no cases
where a doctor has been taken to court for overriding or ignoring a patient's wishes
either in an advance directive or through a representative.
The BMA code of practice allows doctors who have a conscientious objection to
advance directives to pass the patient to another consultant (1995a). This was likened
to Catholic doctors withdrawing from terminations of pregnancy cases and most of
the Scottish doctors thought this were reasonable. A few misunderstood the advice
from the BMA and thought that it required the doctor to treat the patient even if the
doctor objected on moral grounds. These doctors did not approve and believed it
would be wrong to continue to treat someone and ignore an advance directive
because of the doctor's personal objections. One oncologist felt that if doctors
worked in the NHS they should take all patients regardless of the circumstances and
should not object to advance directives even if they specified a different decision to
the one doctor would take. These views differ considerably from those in relation to
circumstances in which doctors would override advance directives. It seems that
doctors in Scotland disapprove of doctors going against patients' wishes because of
their own religious or moral beliefs but thought it reasonable to override patients'
wishes if they were irrational or unreasonable. It would appear that these doctors
were setting their own autonomy (in the shape of religious and moral beliefs) aside in
favour of the patients' best interests.
England
The lawyers interviewed in England believed that overriding advance directives was
a serious decision and should only be taken after careful consideration by the doctor
in charge. Sanctions should be applied to doctors who wrongly ignored a living will
and, in some cases, it might be appropriate for society to register its disapproval
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through the criminal law. Criminal sanctions were seen to be more important than
civil remedies or a disciplinary action. English lawyers felt that, conscientious
objection on ethical or religious grounds was not a good enough reason to overrule
an advance directive and that referring the patient to a colleague was the appropriate
course of action.
Some English doctors would override a patient's wishes if there were good reasons
to do so, and these would usually be dictated by medical circumstances. Clinicians
would consider the circumstances but unless the advance directive was no longer
valid, there would be an ethical duty to follow it and they would only override it if
there were very good reasons for doing so, for example, in an emergency and where
the patient had a good chance of surviving. This attitude seems to ignore the reasons
behind making an advance directive and implies that, if the treatment refused in the
advance directive were to be effective, the doctor would override the directive and
give the treatment and that the advance directive would only be followed if the
treatment would not be successful. This pays lip service to the ideology behind
extending patient capacity into incapacity and is illustrated by a GP writing in a
medical journal who states,
It is absurd to say that there is no truth defined by experts, that patients are
equals, or to allow patients to define conditions and treatment ... Clinical
effectiveness depends on understanding the patient's beliefs and expectations.
Patients are, however, not equals, and their beliefs do not have the ontological
status ofmedical knowledge (McQueen: 2002: 1214).
The BMA and the GMC have issued guidelines on conscientious objection but
doctors are not compelled to follow them36. In the opinion of the majority of English
doctors interviewed, that conscientious objection should be allowed as long as the
doctor does not force his or her opinion on the rest of the team. It would be
appropriate to refer the patient to another consultant and to extend this facility to
other members of the healthcare team.
All the doctors interviewed in each jurisdiction, agreed that advance directives were
useful in helping make treatment decisions for patients who have lost capacity. They
36 These guidelines also apply to doctors in Scotland, but some Scottish doctors did not regard the
guidelines as binding and other had not even heard of them.
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also agreed that directives could not and should not be used to request futile
treatment and, with the exception of the Netherlands, directives should be used only
to specify refusals of treatment. They were used rarely at present, and again with the
exception of the Netherlands, doctors did not ask patients if they held a directive on
admission to hospital, or at any other time in their hospital stay. As advance
directives are covered by statute in the Netherlands, this may be part of the reason
behind the differences between the views of Dutch doctors and those of doctors in
the UK. In Scotland and in England, while doctors do nothing to or deter patients
from using advance directives and little effort is made by doctors to encourage their
use.
A summary of the answers to question four is set out below.
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7.5 Summary of comparisons for research question four
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How do advance directives affect professional and patient autonomy and the
balance ofpower between doctor andpatient?
This section demonstrates how the interviewees thought advance directives related to
medical autonomy. They felt that directives have the potential to restrict medical
decision-making to some degree but doctors would override them if necessary.
Individual autonomy may be strengthened by advance directives through reinforcing
substituted judgement and self-determination but patients need to be informed about
all treatment choices for them to be effective.
The balance of power between doctor and patient is undergoing minor changes.
There is a move from paternalism towards giving greater weight to individual
autonomy expressed by the patient, but this change is happening very slowly and the
interviewees are unsure how much advance directives contribute to this change. It
may be a natural development and move away from "doctor knows best" which is
due to happen regardless of the presence of advance directives. The process of
making advance directives - communication with healthcare providers, carers and
family members, discussion of treatment options, and what the patient does not want
in the way of medical treatment are all factors that also may have some impact on
individual autonomy.
Professional Autonomy
Cruess and Cruess (1997) comment that maintenance of sufficient individual and
professional autonomy37 is necessary to enable the doctor to act in the best interests
of the patient; and that the obligation to put the welfare of the patient and of society
above their own is paramount.
In certain situations, respect for a patient's autonomy may compromise the doctor's
duty of care: if a patient requires an operation to save his or her life, but refuses to
consent to surgery, a doctor may believe that his or her duty of care may be at risk. If
37 See Chapter Three for discussion of professional autonomy.
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the patient is competent then it is unlikely that the doctor will be held responsible for
any harm that comes to the patient, nevertheless the physician may still experience a
shift in the balance of power over treatment decisions. Conversely, the law does not
free the doctor from his or her duty of care because of a patient's adamant refusal if
that refusal is either incompetent or unlawful and there is no valid advance directive
to confirm the refusal. The dilemma for the doctor seems to be one of trying to
respect patient autonomy while continuing to follow his or her duty to care for the
patient's best interests. This may be where the problem lies: trying to resolve the
tension between what the patient wants and what the doctor thinks the patient needs
(Childress, 1982: 3). The solution may be found in looking at the doctor-patient
relationship more as a partnership rather than as a benevolent healer-disadvantaged
person.
Professional autonomy within the medical profession implies a contract between
doctor and patient in order to improve the patient's health (Horner, 2000: 414). In the
Netherlands this hypothetical contract has becomes a reality through the WGBO,
which through the Law on Contracts for Medical Treatment states that:
The contract concerning medical treatment - hereinafter referred to in this
part as the treatment contract - shall be the contract whereby a natural or legal
person, the care provider, undertakes in respect of another, the principal, to
carry out in the pursuance of a medical occupation or enterprise medical
actions directly affecting the person of the principle or of a particular third
party. The person thus directly affected is hereinafter referred to as the patient
(Article 446(1)).
No formal contract between doctors and patients exists in the UK but a hypothetical
contract in Horner's sense would be that of the doctor and the patient working
together towards a common goal. It is not enough that this state of mind exists,
however, as all parties must play their parts. The patient must give consent for the
doctor to carry out any examination and any necessary procedures and, according to
Horner, 'it also includes the right of the physician to refuse treatment which he or she
judges to be futile or not in the patient's best interests' (ibid). It is at this point that
both professional and patient autonomies may conflict.
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The Dutch lawyers who were interviewed felt that patients often do not have
adequate information on which to base their treatment choices. It is the function of
the law to redress the imbalance between doctor and patient 'by providing patients
with the 'right' to be given that information, or perhaps more accurately by imposing
a duty on doctors to provide it' (Jones: 1999: 129). This was exactly what the
legislators planned by inserting Medical Treatment Contracts into the Dutch civil
code and explicitly placing a statutory duty on doctors to give patients the required
information on which to make informed choices. When the physician chooses to
withhold some information or choices, consent will be given only on the basis of the
information given, which may be insufficient to enable the patient to make a fully
informed decision.
Article 448(3) of the WGBO states that,
The care provider may withhold from the patient the information in question
only if its provision would manifestly cause the latter serious harm.
This means that although doctors must explain the treatment choices available to the
patient, they can restrict the amount or content of information given if it is in the
patient's interests to do so. Withholding information may have some impact on how
the patient views the treatment choices offered. However, by omitting to tell the
patient he or she has a right to refuse treatment altogether, it may even avoid a
refusal of consent. It can protect the doctor's professional autonomy by ensuring that
the patient is only given choices of which the doctor approves. This is similar to the
way Cantor (2001) describes Lukes' (1974) third dimension of power, where the
patient's choices are shaped by the medical knowledge and the doctor's assessment
of the available treatments. English lawyers indicated that doctor's autonomy and
power rested on their control of information. According to one lawyer, patients
frequently do not have sufficient information to protect their personal autonomy.
Doctors are typically the main source of information and they have the power to give
or withhold that information in the best interests of the patient.
According to one Dutch lawyer, advance directives can actually promote doctors'
professional autonomy. Where this lawyer's medical clients had followed patients'
wishes to withdraw or withhold treatment, they commented that they had felt
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supported by advance directives, especially where the decision was not to treat the
patient any further. In this situation the advance directive did three things: first, it
fulfilled its role in protecting the patient's autonomy in making his or her wishes
known. Second, the doctor's duty of care towards the patient was protected through a
legal document. Third, it showed that the doctor respected the patient's autonomy by
respecting the wishes as set down in the advance directive. Some of this lawyer's
medical clients felt supported by advance directives as they allowed the doctor to
withhold treatment knowing that he or she was acting with regard to the patient's
wishes.
Advance directives could be made even more protective by being very explicit, and
one Scottish interviewee thought their role in safeguarding patients' rights could be
enhanced if they were disease-specific. Disease specific advance directives are
designed specifically for people who have a particular disease and differ from
generic advance directives in the instruction component of the directive (Singer,
1994: 594). There are several advantages to having an advance directive that deals
with the specific illness of that patient: it can present a narrow range of choices
making the treatment options easier to understand; the choices are more relevant than
those in a generic advance directive; because the patient usually already has
experience of the illness, the choices are less hypothetical, it is often difficult to
make authentic choices in a generic directive as many of the choices offered are
hypothetical. Finally, because the group of patients catered for in a disease-specific
advance directive is limited to those with a particular illness, the prognostic
information is more precise. The main disadvantage to disease-specific advance
directives is that they often do not cater for events that are not associated with the
primary disease but may sometimes occur. For example, an advance directive
specifically dealing with the treatments of motor neurone disease may not consider
implications of a sudden stroke (ibid 595).
GPs in the Netherlands reported that they often become mediators between patients
and specialists, especially since patients have trouble saying "no thanks" if they do
not want a particular treatment. The power doctors enjoy is a mystery to many
patients and there are still people who think they have to do what the doctor says
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because "doctor knows best". Elderly patients, in particular, have great respect for
the doctor's authority and this may mean other agencies have to become involved in
protecting patients' rights.
Dutch doctors had mixed views on protection of their professional and personal
autonomy. There are clearly problems for doctors in trying to reconcile respecting a
patient's autonomy with fulfilling their own duty of care. Some Dutch doctors were
protective of their own autonomy, and as one put it, if a doctor's duty of care was
compromised by a patient's treatment choice, then he or she might be asked to get
another doctor.
In England, the doctors attributed their power to their social position of being a
doctor rather than any actual legal powers they might have and that this was the most
significant factor in protecting professional autonomy. According to some, it is often
a case that the doctor decides and the patient fits in. Patients experience constraints
on their power through having limited access in the NHS to doctors of their choice
and finding it difficult to obtain second opinions. Patients who could not afford
private healthcare would have difficulty if their NHS doctor did not agree to follow
their advance directive. In this situation an advance directive would be valuable in
supporting patient autonomy only if it did not compromise the doctor's professional
autonomy.
Some medical practitioners in England considered that if patients were going to
benefit from advance directives and if there was to be an increase in their use, there
would be a need for patient counselling. The patient, the GP and the family should all
be made aware of what the directive actually involves. A few of the doctors were
even more cautious and believed that directives could help the doctor in decision¬
making but only as an indication of the patient's wishes, since any information of that
nature might prove to be helpful in the circumstances. There was a caveat, however,
and autonomy would only be protected where the person was fully informed of the
choices being made: discussion, explanation and openness between doctor and
patient were all deemed essential.
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From a different perspective, one lawyer expressed the opinion that treatment
decisions that respect patient autonomy may, at the same time, disregard the doctor's
professional autonomy causing a conflict of autonomies and possible disputes
between the doctor and the patient or the doctor and relatives. That said, others
agreed, and said that if patients were cognitively intact, doctors should respect their
autonomy. Advance directives could help with this but they were not the only way of
preserving patients' rights, since discussion of advance care plans should be ongoing
throughout the treatment regime.
Individual Autonomy
Lawyers interviewed in all three jurisdictions considered that advance directives, as
an additional protection of patients' rights, were becoming more popular among the
public. Often, because of a patient's medical condition, an advance directive was the
only way to determine the patient's wishes, and at times might be the only way to
protect the patient's autonomy.
According to many interviewees, people in the Netherlands are well informed about
healthcare because they are interested in their own wellbeing and personal autonomy.
This was emphasised by Dutch lawyers who thought that a patient's autonomy was
as important as a doctor's professional autonomy. One commented that an ill person
is as wise or unwise as a well person is and should similarly be allowed to make
irrational decisions. Just because a patient does not want the treatment recommended
by the doctor it does not follow that he or she does not want to be treated. In conflicts
with doctors, when a patient becomes incapacitated, advance directives can
strengthen the patient's substituted judgement and support decisions made by a
patient's representative.
Lawyers in the Netherlands said that the "doctor knows best" ethos still prevails,
particularly among the elderly, but thought that the WGBO was helpful in
reinforcing patient autonomy by giving legal authority to advance directives. In an
attempt to normalise patients' attitude to doctors in the Netherlands - many still
believe that doctors have power over life and death - legislators introduced the
Medical Treatment Act, which attempted to balance the power of the doctor and the
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patient. Advance directives were thought to be a way of helping doctors base their
decisions on what patients want particularly where the patient's proxy is not
available, and that, in some cases, they may be the sole indicator of the patient's
wishes. According to some lawyers interviewed, the WGBO has not made a
significant difference to the balance of power between the doctor and the patient.
Dutch doctors interviewed did not feel that it had been necessary to pass such a law
to protect patients' rights, however, lawyers were convinced that the WGBO and
advance directives were helpful in protecting patients' rights and autonomy. They
admitted that advance directives were not yet perfect but they were becoming more
successful, giving the patient the right to initiate discussion with the healthcare team
on decisions that could arise in the future. Because of this high value that society
places on individual autonomy, advance directives that otherwise would have been
ignored through lack of authority, were now being followed.
In Scotland, lawyers believed that traditionally there was a very paternalistic attitude
by doctors towards incapax patients - they would be given treatment and no
questions would be asked. A decline in the paternalism that existed before the AW1
Act was considered a great advance in the protection of the patient's personal
autonomy, and the Millan Consultations and subsequent 2003 Act38 embodied a
protection of autonomy perspective. The 2003 Act went further than the AW1 Act
did by granting legislative authority to advance directives concerning treatment for
mental health disorders. A number of lawyers believed that a solution could be found
through legislation. According to them, advance directives with some legal status
were the way forward and the AWI Act and the forthcoming legislation on mental
health issues show a desire to clarify the common law basis for treatment decision¬
making for vulnerable people. Despite legislative change and a move away from
paternalism, doctors still could override advance directives if they considered them
less than in the patient's best interests. The 2003 Act only requires that the doctor
record his or her decision to go against the advance statement in the patient's medical
records and to inform the Mental Welfare Commission.
38 Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003
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By enabling a patient to make an anticipatory decision regarding treatment, the
advance directive can offer a person greater self-determination Scottish lawyers felt
that this was necessary because they believed that many doctors would not act on the
explicit wishes of the patients and this was leading to an increase in litigation and
complaints to the GMC. Conflict between the doctor's duty of beneficence and the
patient's right to self-determination could cause discord between the doctor and the
patient or between the doctor and the family if the patient was incapacitated. One
solution was improved communication with patients and relatives and it was
suggested that a further exchange of information between doctors, patients and the
families was essential in promoting ethical decision-making. By enabling the patient
to make an anticipatory decision regarding treatment, an advance directive could
enhance his or her self-determination. Greater rights for patients admitted to NHS
hospitals, including access to health records, participation in treatment decisions and
full disclosure of treatment options as part of informed consent were recommended
on grounds that address a major cause of dissatisfaction among hospital patients
regarding communication about their condition and treatment (Morgan, 1997: 75).
Trying to protect personal autonomy may be a lost cause according to one English
lawyer, who noted that other powerful professionals (such as lawyers) might lose
personal autonomy when they become ill. Nonetheless, he believed that this provided
greater backing for advance directives as protectors of autonomy. Other lawyers
interviewed in England did not believe professional autonomy was under threat
because of advance directives. Indeed a recent survey found that advance decisions
do not meaningfully alter the care given to patients (Goodman et al, 1998: 701), this
will not only be a relief to those doctors who do not wish to be bound by them, but
will also cast doubt on whether they assert patients' choices at all.
Lawyers in England were more likely to be involved in disputes about medical
decision-making and English case law has frequently referred to advance directives,
albeit in obiter dicta. This may be part of the reason that the doctors interviewed
seemed to be aware that advance directives were more of a protection of patients'
personal autonomy than a threat to doctors' professional autonomy. English lawyers
believed that discussion between the patient and the GP, and the consultant, and a
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full explanation of the condition, the options available and the prognosis, were all
necessary to promote patient autonomy. Although, advance directives could be a way
of protecting patients' autonomy, their drafting and contents were crucial if they
were to be successful. The doctor's duty of care might also be protected if the patient
refused all or certain treatments and a valid, written advance directive was available
to help substantiate the patient's wishes. Problems occurred when patients changed
their minds at a point when it was too late to resume treatment but if the advance
directive clearly expressed the patient's wishes it should be followed even if it
caused problems with family members and the healthcare team.
Scottish geriatricians thought that if the patient had an understanding of the medical
situation and knew what the consequences of certain decisions were, then the doctor
did not have a right to impose his or her professional autonomy on the patient.
Oncologists agreed that if the patient was cognitively intact, the doctor should
respect his or her autonomy. Medical practitioners agreed that the patients'
previously expressed wishes were important and that, in the case ofmany diseases, it
was important to know when to stop treatment. They felt that the patients' decision
about when to stop treatment, rather than that of the family or even the doctor, was
often the right decision and the one that should be followed.
English neurologists and oncologists agreed that advance directives could protect
patients' autonomy and rights. Doctors in elderly care medicine thought that they
were helpful for terminally ill patients in allowing them to die with dignity and
without compromising their personal autonomy. Although patient autonomy could be
strengthened by advance directives, they needed to be taken very seriously by the
family, the doctor and the patient. In particular, the doctor must be sure the patient
understands what the directive requests. For this reason, they should be drafted with
medical advice. The age of the directive, the state of the patient's mind at the time of
writing, and any possible coercive pressures on the patient to complete a directive all
caused problems for the autonomy the advance directive could afford its author.
Doctors recognised that many conflicts arose in determining the patient's capacity
when advance directive was made. This was especially so in circumstances where the
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patient had had previous mental health problems or intellectual disabilities. However,
the act of writing an advance directive encouraged patients to open a dialogue with
their doctors and promoted discussion of future treatment preferences. Doctors were
happy to spend time with patients talking about treatment choices and advising
patients and their families on outcomes that would help retain their autonomy in the
case of future incapacity. What was important was that doctors treated the dialogue
with patients and families as an exchange of ideas and avoided the comfortable
mantle of paternalism that is easier than facing difficult decisions. The case of Miss
B (who won her fight against her doctors' recommendations) to have her life support
switched off is a good example of safe paternalism versus scary autonomy. The final
word must go to Dame Butler-Sloss whose retort to Mr Francis (counsel for the
hospital) says it all. Mr Francis was concerned that Miss B's doctors, who disagreed
with her decision to withdraw life support, were understandably concerned to
establish that she was competent because of the gravity of the decision. Dame
Elizabeth replied:
You seem to be saying that if you want something and the doctors don't think
it is a good idea because they want to do something else, the more you
disagree the more you will be regarded as unable to make a decision. That is
a dangerous concept. There is a very paternalistic element. It's a very "doctor
knows best" concept. I really bridle at that as a member of the public as well
as a judge (Re B (adult: refusal ofmedical treatment) [2002]).
A summary of the answers to question five is set out below.
298
7.6 Summary of comparisons for research question five
How do advance directives affect professional andpatient autonomy and the balance
ofpower between doctor andpatient?
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In the Netherlands, statute law governs part of medical decision-making, in Scotland
and England, common law doctrine governs medical law for competent patients and
similar rules of informed consent as in the Netherlands apply. In Scotland statute law
authorises treatment for incapacitated patients and the common law currently does
the same in England. Dutch doctors interviewed stated they are more likely to use
substituted judgment of the incompetent patient's wishes to make decisions on his or
her behalf, while doctors in Scotland and England interviewed appear to follow the
more paternalistic best interests approach.
One legal aspect of individual autonomy is that competent patients have the right to
refuse medical advice or intervention - a negative declaration of will. This right may
be restricted if doctors do not inform patients of their right to refuse treatment, a
practice that is prevalent among the doctors interviewed in the Netherlands as well as
in Scotland and England. There are assumptions made by doctors interviewed that
patients do not need or even want to have certain information and a paternalistic
attitude prevails which highlights a "doctor knows best attitude". There may be
concerns whether the doctor whose input has been refused may be in breach of his or
her duty of care. In these situations, a point may arrive in the course of the illness,
when the patient can no longer make a decision and the doctor has to decide, with or
without the help of an advance statement, what to do.
Although relatives are consulted in order to determine what the patient would have
wanted, Scottish and English doctors asked relatives to consent to treatments on
behalf of the patient. These actions reflect either a lack of knowledge of the law on
medical decision-making or a disregard for it. The data does not make it clear
whether statute law has any more authority than the common law in medical
decision-making, but for doctors in all three jurisdictions the law is not the foremost
consideration when they make treatment decisions.
In each of the three countries doctor enjoyed a position of power, respect and trust
among most patients. This was felt to be most prevalent among the elderly who
appeared to be happy to abdicate their own autonomy to that of their doctors and
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found it hard to challenge or disagree with decisions or recommendations made on
their behalf. The "doctor knows best" attitude did not help when it came to problems
and challenges for doctors. Problems with the families of incapax patients were
mentioned quite frequently by doctors and lawyers. The common factor in all these
problems was lack of communication between the doctor and the patient, between
the doctor and the patients' families, and sometimes within the families.
Advance directives are still uncommon in all three countries, even in the
Netherlands, and few patients have an advance directive at present. In the
Netherlands they were most frequently encountered by doctors, among nursing home
residents, in the UK among patients in neurology and elderly care medicine. In the
Netherlands it was considered routine, by the doctors interviewed, to ask patients if
they had an advance directive when they were admitted to hospital or a nursing
home. In Scotland and patients were apparently never asked and several doctors
stated that the onus was on the patient or on the relative to inform the doctor of the
existence of an advance directive.
Advance directives are legally binding on doctors for incapacitated patients in the
Netherlands by statute and in Scotland and England through case law. Lawyers
interviewed in the Netherlands were aware that they were legally binding, lawyers
interviewed in Scotland and England did not. In Scotland and in England most of the
lawyers did not think they were legally binding although they were aware of case law
and court rulings. Some doctors in the Netherlands did not believe they would be
bound by an advance directive; others did not know what the legal status of advance
directives was and most thought that, if there was any doubt, the doctor's view would
prevail. In Scotland only one doctor believed them to be legally binding, the
remainder were only prepared to consider them. Most doctors in England and only
some in Scotland were aware of the BMA guidelines and some in England and
Scotland knew about the case law. Opinion was mixed concerning their binding
nature and some doctors in England would overrule them if they disagreed with
them, even where they were valid and binding.
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If the legal status of advance directives is used as an unsophisticated method of
measuring how well they might protect patient autonomy, statute law might be
assumed to provide the best protection, as it clearly requires doctors to take account
of them. The opinions of doctors and lawyers interviewed in the Netherlands,
Scotland and England show, however, that there is little difference between statute
and common law in the use of advance directives and protection of patients'
autonomy, data from the interviews indicate that there are many more factors
involved. These include: the doctor's beliefs in the directive's binding nature, the
lawyer's advice to his/her medical client, the content of the directive, the capacity of
the individual when he or she completed the advance directive, the views of the
family, the efficacy of the treatment, the prognosis, etc. In reality, many other
considerations in addition to what the law says are significant, and legislation for
advance directives is only one aspect of this complex area.
Doctors in all three countries frequently overrule advance directives. In the
Netherlands, doctors will overrule the directive if the care they are asked to refrain
from is not up to professional standards. Conscientious objection to following an
advance directive is allowed as long as the doctor comes to a reasonable arrangement
with the patient. In Scotland, lawyers saw it as the role of the courts to decide
whether an advance directive should be overruled and although the BMA and GMC
have issued guidelines, there is no strict duty to follow them. An advance directive
can be overruled if it is regarded as irrational and doctors can object to them on
conscience grounds, for ethical or religious reasons. In England, lawyers considered
that ethics or religion were not good enough reasons for conscientious objection but
doctors thought that conscientious objection should be allowed. It seems that the
main reason for overriding advance directives was not because they diminished
professional autonomy in any way but more that the care consented to was not in the
patients' best interests. This is also a paternalistic justification that does not take into
consideration the true reason for having an advance directive in the first place, which
is to retain patient autonomy into incapacity. It would be preferable if the doctor
were to use a substituted judgement approach if there are doubts about the advance
directive. While this approach is not perfect, it represents a move away from
paternalism and toward respect for autonomy.
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Following an advance directive that sets out a person's wishes for the future can have
an effect on the doctor's decision-making. It many cases the medical practitioner will
agree with what has been set out in a document by the patient and this may help in
assuring the doctor that he or she is making the right decision, both clinically and in
terms of the patient's wishes. Nevertheless, some doctors felt that advance directives
can erode their decision-making power and this may create conflict between the
physician's professional autonomy and the patient's personal autonomy. In the
Netherlands, doctors interviewed felt they could get round them if necessary. In
Scotland doctors consider them and follow them only if they do not go against the
doctor's own decisions. In England they are influential but can be overruled if
necessary.
Patients' views are held to be important by the interviewees in all three jurisdictions.
Compared to doctors, lawyers in each of the three countries were aware of the
conflicts that can arise between professional and personal autonomy and could see
how patients' wishes can often take second place to those of medical practitioners.
Professional autonomy in the Netherlands was strong and sometimes clashed with
individual autonomy. In Scotland they could in theory restrict medical decision¬
making but doctors would (in practice) override them if they felt the patients' wishes
were irrational. They could be useful in promoting patient autonomy and help in the
move away from paternalism and towards protection of patient's rights. Safeguards
might be necessary because of the struggles that could develop between professional
and personal autonomy. In England, advance directives may help doctors make better
decisions for incompetent patients but in doing so they may infringe the doctor's
professional autonomy. However, unless the patient is fully informed of all the
available choices, the advance directive may fail to protect patient autonomy fully.
303
Implications for Policy and Practice
This study has highlighted the attitudes of the main players towards advance
directives. Attitudes can be altered by better communication and more open
relationships between professionals and the public and between doctors and patients
in particular. One conclusion, open to consideration, is that having an advance
directive may not reinforce autonomy when capacity is lost, but making one may. If
undertaken correctly, with discussion and advice from legal and medical
professionals, an advance directive can open up a dialogue between doctors and
patients, reassuring patients that their doctors are aware of what they want when the
time comes and will help doctors understand what patients really want in
circumstances that have been anticipated.
One factor that has been identified as extremely important for patients and families,
and least often achieved, is successful communication with the medical practitioners.
When communication does not take place or is inadequate, doctors may be left to
determine what their patient's wishes would have been regarding end-of-life
decisions. This leaves potential for conflict between the doctor and the family, as
terminal patients are often incapable of participating in discussions regarding end-of-
life treatment. Advance care planning on the part of the patient in terms of making
their wishes known and education of healthcare professionals are essential in
promoting effective communication and thereby avoiding conflict in difficult end-of-
life decisions (Friedman, 2001).
In order for advance directives to become better understood by all parties, awareness-
raising and education re both is necessary. The "Let Me Decide" advance directive
program in the USA (Molloy el al, 2000), involved educating staff in local hospitals
and nursing homes, residents, and families about advance directives and offering
competent residents or the next-of-kin of mentally incompetent residents an advance
directive that provided a range of health care choices for life-threatening illness,
cardiac arrest, and artificial nutrition. A similar study conducted in the UK might
produce information on advance directives that could be valuable in promoting them
among the public and healthcare providers.
304
In more general terms, this study has shown a need for instruction in relevant aspects
of law for medical practitioners and other healthcare professionals. Davidson et al
(2004) highlighted the need for general medical practitioner training when significant
pieces of legislation come into force (ibid, 62). Even the small sample of
practitioners in that study shows that there are misconceptions and misinformation
surrounding the law on consent and capacity and further guidance in these areas can
only improve understanding of the legal situation. Guidance is also required in
relation to the legal rules surrounding the creation and use of advance directives. It is
acknowledged that making additional training a statutory requirement for medical
practitioners was unheard of in the UK prior to the implementation of the Mental
Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 200339 but knowledge of the law in
certain areas may need to be made compulsory for those discharging functions under
any Act that contains advance directives and associated factors.
Greater communication between doctors and patients and less withholding of
information should become normal practice within the medical profession. A move
away from paternalism, greater acceptance of individual autonomy and joint
decision-making between doctor and patient should accompany the adoption of
models of decision-making for incapable adults that follow substituted judgement
models rather than best interests. These attitudes are best addressed at the earliest
opportunity and should therefore be part of medical students' curriculum prior to any
patient contact.
At the beginning and end of it all is communication and dialogue. Kafka's story of
the country doctor symbolises the experience of being a healer at any time or place.
The sick are needy, vulnerable, and sometimes demanding; the physician is only
human, can only accomplish so much, and is often mistaken. There may be an
inevitable tension between professional goals and private life. In Kafka's words,
'writing prescriptions is easy, but communicating with folk otherwise is hard'
(1916).
39
Training is required by statute for psychiatrists under the 2003 Act in order for them to achieve
Approved Medical Practitioner status; otherwise, they would be unable to undertake certain functions
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Appendix A Interview Letters




Telephone 0131 650 3920
Dear Professor XXXXX
PhD Research: Advance Directives
I am a PhD student in the Department of Social Policy currently undertaking research on advance
directives and how they work in practice in Scotland, The Netherlands and England. For this
comparative study I propose to interview ten doctors, and ten lawyers in each of these areas, to
establish how treatment decisions are made when patients no longer have the capacity to consent or
refuse, and what effects (if any) advance directives may have on this process.
My background encompasses both medical and legal spheres. I was employed as a psychiatric nurse at
Stratheden Hospital, Cupar for seventeen years, ten years at Senior Charge Nurse level. On leaving the
NHS, 1 undertook a law degree and last year successfully completed an MSc by Research in Social
Policy. My dissertation examined the reasons behind the Scottish Parliament withdrawing advance
directives from the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, in which 1 interviewed pressure
groups, religious organisations, civil servants, and members of the Scottish Law Commission. My
PhD research builds on those findings.
Due to the restrictions of time, 1 have decided to confine my investigation to three areas ofmedicine:
geriatric medicine, oncology, and neurology. My method of research would be to conduct qualitative
interviews with three or four consultants in the Department ofGeriatric Medicine, and likewise in the
Departments ofOncology and Clinical Neurosciences. My reason for writing to you at this stage is to
elicit your expertise and your permission to approach doctors within your department.
I realise that medical personnel are very busy and in order to reduce the contact time to a minimum, I
wondered if you would be willing to suggest names of consultants who may be willing to help in my
research, I would then approach them personally by letter. Face-to-face interviews would be
conducted at their convenience, with my assurance of confidentiality and anonymity. I have already
made enquiries of the Medicine/Oncology Ethics Sub-Committee, and, as no individual patient
information is required, no formal application for ethical clearance is required, as this type of research
is classified as "audit" only.
1 would be willing to meet with you to discuss my research in greater depth, and to answer any
questions you may have, meantime please be assured ofmy appreciation of your time and attention. 1
can be contacted by email or by telephone, and of course, by mail at the above address, I look forward




Sample Interview Request Letter (2) - Scottish Doctors
Date





Please forgive this unsolicited letter but 1 was given your name by Dr XXXXX, as he believes you
may be able to help with my research.
1 am currently doing fieldwork research on advance directives funded by the Economic Social and
Research Council (ESRC). 1 am conducting a comparative study of the legal and medical issues
surrounding decision-making for patients who have lost capacity to consent or refuse treatment in the
Netherlands, Scotland and England. 1 am also interested in how advance directives/living wills may or
may not help retain a patient's autonomy in these decision choices. I have already interviewed 10
doctors and 10 lawyers in the Netherlands to discover how treatment directives work from legal and
medical points of view, whether they cause or solve legal problems, and how the two professions view
them. I am now doing the same in Scotland. I understand that advance directives or living wills are
relatively seldom used in Scotland as a method of treatment decision-making for persons with
incapacity, but I am interested in doctors' opinions on advance directives and their impact on
decision-making.
My background is in nursing and law. I was a senior nurse for 15 years before the profession to
undertake a law degree, I then undertook an MSc by Research in which I investigated the reasons
behind the decision of the Scottish Parliament not to include advance directives in the recent Adults
with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000.1 am now doing a PhD with the Department of Social Policy at
the University of Edinburgh.
I realise that you are probably very busy, but I would appreciate any time you feel able to give and ask
that you consider this request favourably. The interview should last approximately 30 - 40 minutes
and, with your permission, would be tape-recorded. The interview is in two parts. Firstly, I am
interested in your views on medical decision-making for incapacitated patients and how this works in
practice. The second part is mainly about advance directives: how doctors view them, their status in
hospitals and nursing homes and how they can protect patients' human rights.
1 look forward to your reply, and I am grateful for any help you may be able to give me. I will
telephone your office next week to find out your thoughts on my request or 1 can be contacted by




Sample Interview Request Letter - Scottish Lawyers
Date





Please forgive this unsolicited letter but 1 hope you may be able to help with my research.
1 am currently doing fieldwork research on advance directives funded by the Economic Social and
Research Council (ESRC). I am conducting a comparative study of the legal and medical issues
surrounding decision-making for patients who have lost capacity to consent or refuse treatment in the
Netherlands, Scotland and England. I am also interested in how advance directives/living wills may or
may not help retain a patient's autonomy in these decision choices. I have already interviewed 10
doctors and 10 lawyers in the Netherlands to discover how treatment directives work from legal and
medical points of view, whether they cause or solve legal problems, and how the two professions view
them. 1 am now doing the same in Scotland. I understand that advance directives or living wills are
relatively seldom used in Scotland as a method of treatment decision-making for persons with
incapacity, but I am interested in lawyers' opinions on the legal status of advance directives and their
potentially binding nature on doctors in the decision-making process.
My background is in nursing and law. 1 was a senior nurse for 15 years before the profession to
undertake a law degree, I then undertook an MSc by Research in which I investigated the reasons
behind the decision of the Scottish Parliament not to include advance directives in the recent Adults
with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000.1 am now doing a PhD with the Department of Social Policy at
the University of Edinburgh.
I realise that you are probably very busy, but I would appreciate any time you feel able to give and ask
that you consider this request favourably. The interview should last approximately 30 minutes and,
with your permission, would be tape-recorded. The interview is in two parts. Firstly, I am interested in
your views on medical decision-making for incapacitated patients and how the law in Scotland works
in practice. The second part is mainly about advance directives: how lawyers view them, their legal
status and how they can protect patients' human rights.
1 look forward to your reply, and I am grateful for any help you may be able to give me. I will
telephone your office next week to find out your thoughts on my request or 1 can be contacted by
email: s.i.anderson-3@sms.ed.ae.uk or by telephone and fax at the numbers below. In addition I can





Sample Interview Request Letter - English Doctors
Date




Doctoral Research: Advance Directives
I am a researcher in the Department of Social Policy currently undertaking a study on advance
directives and how they work in practice in England, Scotland, and The Netherlands. For this
comparative study I am interviewing ten doctors, and ten lawyers in each of these countries, (the
Scottish and Dutch components are completed) to establish how treatment decisions are made when
patients no longer have the capacity to consent or refuse, and what effects (if any) advance directives
may have on this process.
Due to restrictions of time, 1 am confining my investigation to three areas of medicine: neurology,
care of the elderly, and oncology. My method of research is to conduct qualitative interviews with
three or four consultants in each of these departments. 1 have spoken to Dr XXXXX at the XXXXX
Hospital in Edinburgh, and he has suggested that you might be willing to be interviewed in connection
with my research. I realise that you are very busy and therefore the interview would be kept to 30-45
minutes at most and would be conducted at your convenience, with my assurance of confidentiality
and anonymity. This research methodology has been submitted to the Medicine/Oncology Ethics Sub-
Committee, at the University of Edinburgh, and, as no individual patient information is required, no
formal application for ethical clearance is required, as this type of research is classified as "audit"
only.
I am willing to discuss my research in greater depth, and to answer any questions you may have,
meantime please be assured ofmy appreciation of your time and attention. 1 can be contacted by email
or by telephone, and of course, by mail at the above address, but to keep contact time to a minimum I
will contact your secretary later in the week for your decision. If you have any other suggestions for











Please forgive this unsolicited letter but 1 believe you may be able to help with my research.
I am currently doing fieldwork research for my doctorate on advance directives in which I am
conducting a comparative study of the use of treatment directives for patients who no longer have
capacity to consent or refuse medical treatment in the Netherlands, Scotland and England. In order to
find out more about this issue I have already interviewed 10 doctors and 10 lawyers in the Netherlands
and in Scotland to discover how treatment directives work from legal and medical points of view,
whether they cause or solve legal problems, and how the two professions view them. I am now doing
the same in England. 1 understand that advance directives or living wills are rarely used in England as
a method of treatment decision-making for persons with incapacity, but I am interested in lawyers'
opinions on the legal status of advance directives and their potentially binding nature on doctors in
decision-making.
My background is in nursing and law. I was a senior nurse for 15 years before the profession to
undertake a law degree, I then undertook an MSc by Research in which I investigated the reasons
behind the decision of the Scottish Parliament not to include advance directives in the recent Adults
with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000.1 am now doing a PhD with the Department of Social Policy at
the University of Edinburgh.
I realise that you are probably very busy, but I would appreciate any time you give me and ask that
you consider this request favourably. The interview would last approximately 30-40 minutes and, with
your permission, would be tape-recorded. The interview is in two parts. Firstly, I am interested in your
views on medical decision-making for incapacitated patients and how the law in England works in
practice. The second part is mainly about advance directives: how lawyers view them, their legal
status and how they can protect patients' human rights.
I look forward to your reply, and I am grateful for any help you may be able to give me. I can be











Thank you very much for granting me an interview recently. I have now completed
the transcription and find your comments very helpful and informative. I have now
nearly completed the Dutch/Scottish/English part of my fieldwork and ready to
proceed with interviews in Scotland/England where I hope that I will have as much
success with my respondents as I have encountered both here and in the Netherlands.
Please be assured that your comments will be treated with the utmost confidentiality
and that you will not be referred to by name or specific locality.




Appendix B Interview Schedules
Interview with Dutch Doctors
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed and for helping me with this research. This
part of my research project looks at treatment decision-making and advance
directives as part of a comparative study between The Netherlands, Scotland and
England for my PhD. 1 can assure you that your answers to the following questions
will be kept confidential and that you will not be referred to by name, although you
may be quoted directly. I would be grateful if you would allow me to tape record this
interview as it aids greatly with transcription.
In this interview I am interested in finding out how treatment decisions are made for
patients who can no longer give or withhold their consent. I am primarily looking at
patients within care of the elderly, neurology (mainly 'stroke' patients) and
oncology. The interview is divided into two parts: firstly, I would like to find out
how these treatment decisions are made; secondly, I want to investigate what effect
(if any) advance directives may have on making these decisions.
Part One-Making Decisions
1. Can you tell me a little about your job?
2. How are treatment decisions for patients with capacity made?
3. If a patient is not capable ofmaking treatment decisions, who would make
these decisions?
4. How are disagreements about treatment decisions between patients and
clinicians resolved?
5. How would you determine whether a patient was capable of making decisions
about his/her own treatment?
6. Who would be consulted? Relatives, friends, other clinicians, healthcare
team, ethics committee?
7. How would these decisions be made? 'Substituted-judgement' (autonomy
model) or 'best interests' (beneficence model)?
8. Which is the more effective method of surrogate decision-making? How is
patient autonomy preserved?
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9. How does the doctor's professional duty of care affect patient autonomy?
10. How would you resolve any disagreements in these consultations? Who has
the last say?
11. What do healthcare workers tell patients about their right to refuse treatment?
Part Two - Advance Directives
1. What do you understand by the terms 'advance directive' or 'living will'?
2. Do you believe they are legally binding on doctors?
3. Are patients or their families asked whether they have an advance directive?
4. How widely are advance directives used? Have you had experience of
treating a patient with such a treatment directive?
5. How influential are advance directives on the decision-making process?
6. Do you think that healthcare workers should be allowed to refuse to treat a
patient with an advance directive because they have conscientious objections?
7. If an advance directive was appropriate and applicable in the circumstances,
but the family of the person objected to it being complied with, which party
would carry more weight in your ultimate decision?
8. Do you think that advance directives may have an impact on resource issues?
For example, freeing up beds because patients do not want to be kept alive;
refusal ofmedication, etc.
9. Do you think advance directives should be used more widely? Would it make
your job easier?
10. Do you believe advance directives are a useful method of safeguarding a
person's human rights? For example, the right to family life, right to
protection from cruel and degrading treatment?
11. Do you think that advance directives should be given some sort of legislative
status? Are you happy with their current status?
12. Do you agree that patients should be allowed to ask for euthanasia at a later
date through an advance directive?
Thank you for your time and you assistance. Please let me assure you again that
confidentiality and anonymity will be respected.
329
Interview with Dutch Lawyers
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed and for helping me with this research. This
part of my research project looks at the law surrounding treatment decisions-making
and advance directives in the Netherlands as part of a comparative study between
The Netherlands, Scotland and England for my PhD. 1 can assure you that your
answers to the following questions will be kept confidential and that you will not be
referred to by name, although you may be quoted directly. I would be grateful if you
would allow me to tape record this interview as it aids greatly with transcription.
The interview is divided into two parts: firstly, I am interested in find out what the
law in relation to medical decision-making and incapacity is, and how it works, in
the Netherlands; the second part is concerned with how advance directives (living
wills) are fit into the legislative framework and how they work in practice.
Part One - The Law
1. What type of law do you practice here in the Netherlands, and how long have you
been practising?
2. The Law on Contracts for Medical Treatment (WGBO) is the Act that concerns
treatment decision-making for patients able and unable to give consent. The
intention of this Act was to strengthen the legal position of the patient, why do
you think this was felt to be necessary?
3. Is there any case law you can tell me about in connection with this area of law?
4. Why do you think the Government chose contract law rather than self-regulation
or some other civil code?
5. In your opinion, has the public become more aware of their rights to refuse
treatment because of this Act, or has there been some other reason?
6. Does the Act provide the same protection for incapable adults as capable ones in
treatment decision-making? If so, in what way?
7. Do you think the Act strikes the right balance between doctor and patient?
8. Are patients' rights more easily enforceable? How does this normally happen?
9. There was a last minute amendment to include written statements as part of the
legislation, how valuable is this part of the Act?
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10. In your experience do people look for legal advice and is there much litigation in
the area of health law?
11. How do the courts view the medical profession?
Part Two - Advance Directives/Living Wills
1. Do lawyers draft living wills?
2. To the best of your knowledge how widespread is their use?
3. To what extent do you think they are legally binding on doctors?
4. In what circumstances do you think they should not be binding?
5. Do you think doctors should be able to overrule a living will? If so, in what
circumstances?
6. Do you believe doctors have the right to object to treating patients with living
wills because of their religious or moral beliefs? What are the alternatives for
both doctor and patient?
7. What happens when the family disagrees with a patient's living will, should and
do lawyers become involved in the dispute? Does this happen on a regular basis?
8. Do you think that doctors should be punished by the criminal law for overriding
instructions in a living will? What are the alternative sanctions that you think
might be useful?
9. How useful are advance directives in promoting patient autonomy?
10. Do you think patients should be allowed to ask for euthanasia in the future using
a living will?
11. Are you happy with the law on advance directives at the present time?
Thank you for your time and you assistance. Please let me assure you again that
confidentiality and anonymity will be respected.
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Interview with Scottish Doctors
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed and for helping me with this research. This
part of my research project looks at treatment decision-making and advance
directives as part of a comparative study between Scotland, The Netherlands and
England for my PhD. I can assure you that your answers to the following questions
will be kept confidential and that you will not be referred to by name, although you
may be quoted directly. I would be grateful if you would allow me to tape record this
interview as it aids greatly with transcription.
This project is concerned with finding out how treatment decisions are made for
patients who can no longer give or withhold their consent. I am primarily looking at
patients within care of the elderly, neurology (mainly 'stroke' patients) and
oncology. The interview is divided into two parts: firstly, I would like to find out
how these treatment decisions are made; secondly, I want to investigate what effect
(if any) advance directives may have on making these decisions.
Part One -Making Decisions
1. Can you tell me a little about your job?
2. How are treatment decisions for patients with capacity made?
3. What do healthcare workers tell patients about their right to refuse treatment?
4. How are disagreements about treatment decisions between patients and
clinicians resolved?
5. How would you determine whether a patient was capable of making decisions
about his/her own treatment?
6. What sort of conditions would apply in making the decision that a person was
incapax?
7. If a patient is not capable ofmaking treatment decisions, who would make
these decisions?
8. Who would be consulted? Relatives, friends, other clinicians, healthcare
team?
9. How would these decisions be made? 'Substituted-judgement' or the 'best
interests' test?
10. Which is the more effective method of surrogate decision-making? How is
patient autonomy preserved?
1 1. How does the doctor's professional duty of care affect patient autonomy?
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12. How would you resolve any disagreements in these consultations? Who has
the final say?
Part Two - Advance Directives
1. What do you understand by the terms 'advance directive' or 'living will'?
2. Do you believe they are legally binding on doctors?
3. Have you had a patient in your care with an advance directive? Do you know
of any other doctors who may have had dealings with them?
4. Are patients or their families asked whether they have an advance directive?
5. If a patient had an advance directive that stated certain conditions where he or
she would not consent to treatment or specified a reduction in treatment, what
role would that advance directive have in the decision-making process?
6. Would the fact that a patient had an advance directive influence how
decision-making was carried out?
7. It has been said that advance directives are merely a short step from voluntary
euthanasia. Do you think that healthcare workers should be allowed to refuse
to treat a patient with an advance directive because they have conscientious
objections?
8. If an advance directive was appropriate and applicable in the circumstances,
but the family of the person objected to it being complied with, which party
would carry more weight in your ultimate decision?
9. Do you think that advance directives may have an impact on resource issues?
For example, freeing up beds because patients do not want to be kept alive;
refusal ofmedication, etc.
10. Do you think advance directives should be used more widely? Would it make
your job easier?
11. Do you believe advance directives are a useful method of safeguarding a
person's human rights? For example, the right to family life, right to
protection from cruel and degrading treatment?
12. Do you think that advance directives should be given some sort of legislative
status?
Thank you for your time and you assistance. Please let me assure you again that
confidentiality and anonymity will be respected.
333
Interview with Scottish Lawyers
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed and for helping me with this research. This
part of my research looks at the law surrounding treatment decision-making and
advance directives as part of a comparative study between Scotland, the Netherlands
and England for my PhD. I can assure you that your answers to the following
questions will be kept confidential and that you will not be referred to by name,
although you may be quoted directly. I would be grateful if you would allow me to
tape record this interview as it aids greatly with transcription.
The interview is divided into two parts: firstly, I am interested in find out how
lawyers view the law on decision-making for the incapacitated patient and how it
works within Scotland; the second part is concerned with how advance directives
(living wills) are situated within the legislative framework and how they work in
practice.
Part One - The Law
1. What type of law do you practice here in Scotland, and how long have you been
practising?
2. What is your view of the law surrounding medical decision-making on behalf of
persons who have lost the capacity to consent or refuse medical treatment?
3. When a patient is no longer capable of making his or her own decisions, do
lawyers become involved in the decision-making process?
4. In your experience, do doctors seek legal advice in circumstances of decision¬
making for patients who have lost capacity?
5. What about relatives and friends or the patient, do they consult lawyers for help
in the decision-making process?
Part Two - Advance Directives/Living Wills
1. Do lawyers draft living wills?
2. To the best of your knowledge how widespread is their use?
3. Do you believe that they are legally binding, under common law, in Scotland, in
a similar fashion to their common law status in England?
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4. To what extent do you think they are legally binding on doctors?
5. Do you believe that oral advance statements have the same legal status as a
written statement?
6. In what circumstances do you think they should not be binding?
7. As a practitioner, are you happy with the present legal status of advance
directives/living wills? Do you think they should be enshrined in statute, or is
their common law status adequate?
8. Do you think doctors should be able to overrule a living will?
9. Do you believe doctors have the right to object to treating patients with living
wills because of their religious or moral beliefs?
10. What happens when the family disagrees with a patient's living will, does the
lawyer become involved in the dispute?
11. Do you think that doctors should be punished by the criminal law for overriding
instructions in a living will?
12. How useful do you believe advance directives can be in promoting patient
autonomy?
13. Do you think living wills can help to protect a patient's human rights (especially
Article 3, ECHR, protection from cruel and inhuman treatment)?
14. Do you think patients should be allowed to ask for euthanasia in the future using
a living will?
Thank you for your time and you assistance. Please let me assure you again that
confidentiality and anonymity will be respected.
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Interview with English Doctors
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed and for helping me with this research. This
part of my research looks at the law surrounding treatment decision-making and
advance directives as part of a comparative study between England, Scotland and the
Netherlands for my PhD. I can assure you that your answers to the following
questions will be kept confidential and that you will not be referred to by name,
although you may be quoted directly. I would be grateful if you would allow me to
tape record this interview as it aids greatly with transcription.
This project is concerned with finding out how treatment decisions are made for
patients who can no longer give or withhold their consent. I am primarily looking at
patients within care of the elderly, neurology (mainly 'stroke' patients) and
oncology. The interview is divided into two parts: firstly, I would like to find out
how these treatment decisions are made; secondly, I want to investigate what effect
(if any) advance directives may have on making these decisions.
Part One - Making Decisions
1. Can you tell me a little about your job?
2. How are treatment decisions for patients with capacity made?
3. What do healthcare workers tell patients about their right to refuse treatment?
4. How are disagreements about treatment decisions between patients and
clinicians resolved?
5. How would you determine whether a patient was capable of making decisions
about his/her own treatment?
6. What sort of conditions would apply in making the decision that a person was
incapaxl
7. If a patient is not capable of making treatment decisions, who would make
these decisions?
8. Who would be consulted? Relatives, friends, other clinicians, healthcare
team?
9. How would these decisions be made? 'Substituted-judgement' or the 'best
interests' test?
10. Which is the more effective method of surrogate decision-making? How is
patient autonomy preserved?
11. How does the doctor's professional duty of care affect patient autonomy?
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12. How would you resolve any disagreements in these consultations? Who has
the final say?
Part Two - Advance Directives
1. What do you understand by the terms 'advance directive' or 'living will'?
2. Do you believe they are legally binding on doctors?
3. Have you had a patient in your care with an advance directive? Do you know
of any other doctors who may have had dealings with them?
4. Are patients or their families asked whether they have an advance directive?
5. If a patient had an advance directive that stated certain conditions where he or
she would not consent to treatment or specified a reduction in treatment, what
role would that advance directive have in the decision-making process?
6. Would the fact that a patient had an advance directive change how decision¬
making was carried out?
7. It has been said that advance directives are merely a short step from voluntary
euthanasia. Do you think that healthcare workers should be allowed to refuse
to treat a patient with an advance directive because they have conscientious
objections?
8. If an advance directive was appropriate and applicable in the circumstances,
but the family of the person objected to it being complied with, which party
would carry more weight in your ultimate decision?
9. Do you think that advance directives may have an impact on resource issues?
For example, freeing up beds because patients do not want to be kept alive;
refusal ofmedication, etc.
10. Do you think advance directives should be used more widely? Would it make
your job easier?
11. Do you believe advance directives are a useful method of safeguarding a
person's human rights? For example, the right to family life, right to
protection from cruel and degrading treatment?
12. Do you think that advance directives should be given some sort of legislative
status?
Thank you for your time and you assistance. Please let me assure you again that
confidentiality and anonymity will be respected.
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Interview with English Lawyers
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed and for helping me with this research. This
part of my research looks at the law surrounding treatment decision-making and
advance directives as part of a comparative study between England, Scotland and the
Netherlands for my PhD. I can assure you that your answers to the following
questions will be kept confidential and that you will not be referred to by name,
although you may be quoted directly. I would be grateful if you would allow me to
tape record this interview as it aids greatly with transcription.
The interview is divided into two parts: firstly, I am interested in find out how
lawyers view the law on decision-making for the incapacitated patient and how it
works within England; the second part is concerned with how advance directives
(living wills) are situated within the legislative framework and how they work in
practice.
Part One - The Law
1. What type of law do you practice here in England, and how long have you been
practising?
2. What is your view of the law surrounding medical decision-making on behalf of
persons who have lost the capacity to consent or refuse medical treatment?
3. When a patient is no longer capable ofmaking his or her own decisions, do
lawyers become involved in the decision-making process?
4. In your experience, do doctors seek legal advice in circumstances of decision¬
making for patients who have lost capacity?
5. What about relatives and friends or the patient, do they consult lawyers for help
in the decision-making process?
Part Two - Advance Directives/Living Wills
15. Do lawyers draft living wills?
16. To the best of your knowledge how widespread is their use?
17. Do you believe that they are legally binding, under common law, in Scotland, in
a similar fashion to their common law status in England?
18. To what extent do you think they are legally binding on doctors?
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19. Do you believe that oral advance statements have the same legal status as a
written statement?
20. In what circumstances do you think they should not be binding?
21. As a practitioner, are you happy with the present legal status of advance
directives/living wills? Do you think they should be enshrined in statute, or is
their common law status adequate?
22. Do you think doctors should be able to overrule a living will?
23. Do you believe doctors have the right to object to treating patients with living
wills because of their religious or moral beliefs?
24. What happens when the family disagrees with a patient's living will, does the
lawyer become involved in the dispute?
25. Do you think that doctors should be punished by the criminal law for overriding
instructions in a living will?
26. How useful do you believe advance directives can be in promoting patient
autonomy?
27. Do you think living wills can help to protect a patient's human rights (especially
Article 3, ECHR, protection from cruel and inhuman treatment)?
28. Do you think patients should be allowed to ask for euthanasia in the future using
a living will?
Thank you for your time and you assistance. Please let me assure you again that
confidentiality and anonymity will be respected.
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Appendix C Data Analysis
Node Listing: Doctors
Number ofNodes: 15
C1 Doctors' Nodes Listing
tree node descriptor
1 (1) /Treatment Decisions
2 (1 1) /Treatment Decisions/Capax patients
3 (1 2) /Treatment Decisions/Incapax patients
4 (1 3) /Treatment Decisions/power
5 (1 4) /Treatment Decisions/Decision-making models
6 (1 5) /Treatment Decisions/Right to Refuse Treatment
7 (1 6) /Treatment Decisions/Conflicts in decision-making
8 (2) /Advance Directives
9 (2 1) /Advance Directives/definitions
10 (2 2) /Advance Directives/use of advance directives
11 (2 3) /Advance Directives/hospital admission
12 (2 4) /Advance Directives/legality
13 (2 5) /Advance Directives/overriding advance directive
14 (2 6) /Advance Directives/patient autonomy




1. type ofmedicine practiced
2. definition of advance directives
3. conscientious objection by healthcare staff
4. effect on resources
5. should advance directives be used to ask for euthanasia
Tree Nodes
Treatment decisions
1. how treatment decisions are made for patients with capacity
2. how are treatment decisions made for patients without capacity
a) who is consulted
b) type of decision-making model used by doctor
i. efficacy of this model
c) how is patient autonomy protected
i. impact on doctor's duty of care
ii. advance directives and patient autonomy
iii. do advance directives safeguard patients' human rights
3. are patients told of their right to refuse treatment on admission
Conflicts in treatment decisions
4. how are disagreements about treatment decisions resolved
a) do advance directives affect the ultimate decision
b) relatives and advance directives: influence on this decision
Legality of advance directives
5. are patients/relatives asked they have an advance directive on admission
6. are advance directives legally binding
a) change in legal status
7. use of advance directives




C2 Lawyers' Nodes Listing
tree node descriptor
1 (1) /Legislation
2 (1 1) /Legislation/background
3 (1 2) /Legislation/type of law
4 (1 3) /Legislation/case law
5 (14) /Legislation/court involvement
6 (1 5) /Legislation/capax patients
7 (1 6) /Legislation/incapax patients
8 (1 7) /Legislation/refusal of treatment
9 (2) /Advance Directives
1
0
(2 1) /Advance Directives/legal status
1
1
(2 2) /Advance Directives/conflicts
1
2
(2 3) /Advance Directives/overriding advance directives
1
2




1. type of law practiced
2. amount of litigation
3. experience ofdrafting
4. how do courts view medical profession
5. conscientious objection by healthcare staff
6. should advance directives be used to ask for euthanasia
Tree Nodes
Medical Treatment Act
1. Strengthen legal rights of patients
a) Case law?
b) Why contract law
c) Same protection for capable/incapable
d) Last minute amendment
2. Balance between doctors and patients
a) rights more easily enforceable
b) patient more aware of right to refuse treatment
Advance Directives
3. Legally binding on doctors
a) when should not be binding
b) should doctors overrule
c) criminally liable for overriding
d) happy with present legal status
4. Patient autonomy useful in promoting
a) legal involvement in disputes
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Appendix D Sample Advance Directives
Advance Directives from the Netherlands
The NVVE has three living wills or advance directives, each with a different legal
status and highly valued in both the medical and juridical scene. The value for the
owner of these documents is therefore a lot higher than his/her own words scribbled
on paper. The NVVE circulates about 16,000 documents each year. Every member
who orders a document gets 4 copies: one to keep for him/herself, one to give to his
General Practitioner, two to give to people who, by proxy, can handle his/her affairs
in case s/he loses capacity to do so. More copies may be ordered if necessary.
Do Not Resuscitate Document
This document comes in a small format, like a credit card. It states that under all
circumstances the owner forbids every form of resuscitation. The photograph,
signature, name and date of birth of the owner are printed in an irremovable,
unchangeable way so that no doubts about the identity of the card can arise by
ambulance personnel or healthcare workers. The owner is advised to carry this
document in an "easy to find" place, such as a wallet or diary. In addition to this
card, s/he can wear a special necklace stating, "do not resuscitate". As this necklace
can not carry a signature, it is not a legally valid document, but its value is given in
the fact that it always will be found and signposts the authorities to the official
document.
Although this document finds its origin in the WGBO, there is some resistance
especially from ambulance personnel as they claim that they are there to rescue
people. As this document was only in released October 1997, there has not been a
prosecution yet against any ambulance personnel or doctors who neglected these
documents.
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Refusal of Treatment Document
In 1995 informed consent finally was recognised in Dutch law: the WGBO (the Law
on Contracts for Medical Treatment). In this law, the juridical foundation of the
relationship between doctors (and other people who are allowed to act medically)
and patients is outlined. It is written that an informed consent is necessary for all
radical treatments. The Act also states that a written refusal of treatment is equally
valid as an oral refusal. Therefore, the NVVE's refusals of treatment documents have
a firm juridical basis.
In this document, the owner forbids any treatment other than that based solely upon
pain relief if s/he happens to become so ill that no return to a dignified life can be
expected, the owner's ideas of "dignified life" will then follow. The doctor is warned
that if the document is ignored, juridical action might be taken by, by the owner of
the document or other authorised people. The owner again signs to show s/he is
aware of the risks this document involves; if s/he changes his mind and neglects to
revoke the statements back, he may risk not being treated in certain circumstances.
This document has a supplementary section (signed separately to become valid),
which states, regardless of the medical expectations, the owner refuses all further
treatment other than that solely based upon pain relief. The owner states that s/he
regards his/her life as complete and that he forbids medical interventions to prolong
life and would like to die a natural way.
Euthanasia declaration
In this document, the owner asks his doctor for a gentle, quick death if the time
comes in which there is no expectation of a return to a dignified state of living. The
owner of the document then describes his/her idea of a dignified state of living.
There are many alternative statements for this that may be ticked and signed for, and
in addition to this there is room for personal statements.
The document warns the owner, that by signing the paper s/he accepts the risk that if
s/he changes his mind about euthanasia and neglects to revoke all the documents,
euthanasia might be performed against his/her then current wishes. In fact, this is a
theoretical danger; doctors will only perform euthanasia if the person can confirm his
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wishes, either orally or writing, at the time it will be performed. Both legal and
medical experts have worked on this document to ensure there is no danger of
misinterpretation.
Copies of living wills are now only available to NVVE members, samples are no
longer available from the NVVE website.
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Advance Directives from Scotland
EXIT Living Will
Advance directives or living wills can be obtained from the voluntary euthanasia
society in Scotland, EXIT, or a copy of their advance directive can be downloaded
from their website. This is a comprehensive document which comes with extensive
guidance notes on their use and storage.
A sample copy of the EXIT living will is attached and guidance notes are inserted.
FATE Living Will
FATE (Friends at the End) is a society established to promote knowledge about end-
of-life choices and dignified death; to support those suffering from distress,
especially that associated with the end of life; to advance medical education relevant
to the processes of death and terminal illnesses; to fund research into the causes,
cures and prevention of distress in the dying and those caring for them and to
publicly disseminate the outcome of such research.
Copies of two sample living wills are inserted.
Private Solicitor's Welfare Attorney Certificate andAdvance Statement
Several firms of solicitors are currently offering clients a combination of services:
appointment of a Welfare Attorney (to make decisions and arrangements on their
physical welfare and well being); an advance statement; and a testamentary will.





This document should be lodged with the declarant's medical records.
A doctor having conscientious objection should immediately refer the declarant to another
doctor. Living wills are accepted in the British Medical Association's ethical recommendations
and by common law. The form does not ask the doctor to do anything illegal.
Duplicate copies may optionally be lodged with a solicitor and a closefriend, and a further copy
keptfor reference.
0 Section A. ADVANCEMEDICALDIRECTIVE. Note: This section may be legally binding.
Section A comprises specific instructions to the health-care team in the event that I can no longer
^ express my own wishes; it covers very serious conditions.
g To the Declarant: When filling out this part of the form, you should cross out anything that does
& not express your true wishes, then initial any changes clearly.
13
O
1 Section B. LIFE VALUES STATEMENT.
£
_ .This gives indications of the personal value I attach to my life under various circumstances. I ask
g my health care team to bear these in mind when making difficult decisions about my treatment or
non-treatment, especially in situations not covered by Section A. Where I have indicated that life
^ under such circumstances would be "Much Worse Than Death" this means that I would find the
£ situation totally unbearable and unacceptable, and that I would prefer all life-sustaining treatment
to be stopped or withdrawn rather than exist for the rest ofmy life in such a state.
Note: A doctor should not be liable to civil or criminal proceedings ifhe acts in goodfaith and
with reasonable care in respecting the directives and values in this document.
DO NOT FILLOUT THIS FORMWITHOUT DEEPAND CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.
Complete Section A or Section B or both.
For further infonnation and advice on living wills, you may wish to consult your doctor or one
of the organisations or individuals listed below:
Age Concern England, Astral House, 1268 London Rd, London SW16 4ER;
Phyllis Goodheir, 16 Woodlands Drive, Coatbridge, ML5 1LE;
The Natural Death Centre, 20 Heber Rd, London NW2;
The Terrence Higgins Trust, 52-54 Gray's Inn Rd, London WC1X 8JU;
The Voluntary Euthanasia Society, 13 Prince of Wales Terrace, London W8 5PG;
The Voluntary Euthanasia Society of Scotland, 17 Hart St, Edinburgh EH1 3RN.
Solicitors in England may wish to contact The Law Society, Law Society House, 50/52 Chancery Lane,
London WC2A.
Physicians may wish to contact The British Medical Association, Ethics Department, BMA House, Tavistock
Square, London WC1H 9JP, and consult their code of practice, "Advance Statements about Medical Treatment".
This living will form was developed by CG Docker and is© 1994, revised 1996. Requests for reprinting are welcomed however, together with
suggestions for further development which should be addressed to CG Docker, BM 718, LondonWC1N 3XX U.K. Much of the text is drawn from
existing documents, and many individuals and organisations have contributed ideas and made helpful suggestions, including the National Agency for
Welfare and Health Helsinki and the Ethics Committee of theSeattle Veterans Affairs Medical Center.
Personal copies may be made by the Declarant for his or her own use.
SECTION A. ADVANCEMEDICAL DIRECTIVE
TO MY PHYSICIAN AND HEALTH CARE TEAM, MY FAMILY, MY SOLICITOR
AND ALL OTHER PERSONS CONCERNED:
this declaration is made at a time when I am of sound mind and after
careful consideration.
I UNDERSTAND THAT MY LIFE MAY BE SHORTENED BYTHE SPECIFIC
REFUSALS OF TREATMENT MADE IN THIS DOCUMENT.
I DECLARE that if at any time the following circumstances exist, namely:
(2) I
tU.IsSaftmsK» Ms re; and
(3) two independent physicians (one a consultant) are of the expert, considered opinion, after
full examination ofmy case, that I am unlikely to make a substantial recovery from illness or
impairment involving severe distress or incapacity for rational existence,
THEN AND IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES my directions are as follows:
1. that I am not to be subjected to any medical intervention or treatment (aimed at prolonging
my life) such as life support systems, artificial ventilation, antibiotics (i.e. to control infection),
artificial feeding - whether enteral or parenteral (tube feeding into the stomach or into a vein),
invasive surgery, dialysis (e.g. using a kidney machine), or blood transfusion;
2. that any distressing symptoms (including any caused by lack of food or fluid) are to be
fully and aggressively controlled by appropriate palliative care, ordinary nursing care,
analgesic or other treatments, even though some of these treatments may have the secondary
effect of shortening my life.
HOWEVER, modes of treatment mentioned in (1) above may be applied for elimination of
serious symptoms. Giving intensive care to me is to be allowed only on the condition that
reliable reasons exist for the possibility that such treatment will have a better result than merely
short prolongation of life. In the event that a treatment with prospect of recovery has been
started but proves to be futile, it has to be discontinued immediately.
I consent to anything proposed to be done or omitted in compliance with the directions
expressed above and absolve my medical attendants from any civil liability arising out of such
acts or omissions.
I offer the health-care team my heartfelt thanks for respecting my sincerely held wishes, as
expressed in this directive.
I accept the risk that I may be unable to express a change of mind at a time in the future when I
am incapacitated, that improving medical technology may offer increased hope, but I
personally consider the risk of unwanted treatment to be a greater risk. I wish it to be
understood that I fear degradation and indignity far more than death. I ask my medical
attendants to bear this statement in mind when considering what my intentions would be in any
uncertain situation.
I RESERVE THE RIGHT TO REVOKE THIS DIRECTIVE at any time, orally or in writing,
but unless I do so it should be taken to represent my continuing directions. I hereby deliberately
accept the risk that I may no longer be able to revoke my declaration if I am in a condition
listed in the Schedule, in order to exclude a risk which is greater to me, namely that I should
continue living in circumstances that are not acceptable to me.
if
if*-
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Section A continued
SCHEDULE
A Advanced disseminated malignant disease (e.g. cancer that has spread considerably)
B Severe immune deficiency (e.g. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome)
C Advanced degenerative disease of the nervous system (e.g advanced Parkinson's Disease)
D Severe and lasting brain damage due to injury, stroke, disease or other cause
E Advanced dementia, whether Alzheimer's, multi-infarct or other, resulting in very limited
awareness of the immediate environment and inability to initiate simple tasks
F Any other condition of comparable gravity
Additional instructions (if any, such as pregnancy waiver)
Ifyou would like a particular person's wishes to be taken into consideration during decisions
about your medical care, please give their details here:
Name of my proxy Telephone number ....
Address
To my proxy: Please try to ensure that decisions are taken
(mark one box only) LJ how you believe I would have taken them
D using your own best judgement
The wishes of your proxymay be taken into consideration, but have no overriding force in British law -
neither do the wishes of relatives. It is advisable to discuss this document with your proxy.
I have discussed this document with my doctor D Mark here if Yes
Doctor's Tel. No Name of Doctor
Address
It is not obligatory to discuss your living will in advance with your doctor, but it may be
very helpful to do so.
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SECTION B. VALUES HISTORY STATEMENT Please use this section as a
guide to my values when considering the likely result of treatment.
. iL , Much Somewhat Neither SomewhatCircle the number on the scale worse Than Worse Than Better Nor Better Than
Death: i Death: I Worse Than Death: i
Would Would Death: I'm Would
Definitely Probably Not Sure Probably
Not Want NotWant Whether I Want Life-
Life Life Want Life- Sustaining
Sustaining Sustaining Sustaining Treatment
Treatment Treatment Treatment
of one to five, that most closely
indicates your feelings about









(a) Permanently paralysed. You are
unable to walk but can move around in a ^
wheelchair. You can talk and interact with
other people.
(b) Permanently unable to speak
meaningfully. You are unable to speak to
others. You can walk on your own, feed 1
yourself and take care of daily needs
such as bathing and dressing yourself.
(c) Permanently unable to care for
yourself. You are bedridden, unable to .
wash, feed, or dress yourself. You are
totally cared for by others.
(d) Permanently in pain. You are in severe ^
bodily pain that cannot be totally controlled
or completely eliminated by medications.
(e) Permanently mildly demented. You
often cannot remember things, such as
where you are, nor reason clearly. You 1
are capable of speaking, but not capable
of remembering the conversations; you
are capable of washing, feeding and
dressing yourself and are in no pain.
(f) Being in a short term coma. You have
suffered brain damage and are not
conscious and are not aware of your
environment in any way. You cannot feel 1
pain. You are cared for by others. These
mental impairments may be reversed in
about one week leaving mild forgetfulness
and loss of memory as a consequence.
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
SIGNATURE OF DECLARANT to Sections A & B:
Name (print clearly) Day/Month/Year
Address
Date of Birth*
*lf you are under 18 years of age, you may still complete this document, though itmaynothave the same legal force.
WITNESS'S SIGNATURE: 1 declare that the abovenamed has signed this document in my presence. He/she has declared it to be
his/her firm will, is in fiill capacity and fully understands the meaning of it. I believe it to be a firm and competent statement of
his/her wishes. As far as I am aware, no pressure has been brought to bear on him/her to sign such a document and I believe it to
be his/her own free and considered wish. So far as I am aware, I do not stand to gain from his/her death.
Signed (Witness): Name
Address
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SOME GUIDANCE NOTES ON
COMPLETING YOUR LIVINGWILL
(These notes do notform part ofthe living will document)
NOTE: Ifyou are admitted to hospital with a serious illness you are strongly advised to askfor
your living will so that you can review it, update it, or affirm that it still represents your current
wishes.
Examples ofAdditional Instructions
It is not necessary generally to insert any additional instructions on your living will, but the
following are exceptions that certain people may wish to consider. If you are adding any
wording in the "additional instructions" section, it is advisable to discuss it thoroughly with a
doctor first.
Example 1: Dementia declaration.
Your living will already recognizes the extreme forms of senile dementia - situations where you do
not recognize your nearest relations, no longer know the time in which you live, and are no longer
capable ofperforming the activities ofdaily life such as eating, drinking, washing, going to the
toilet. If you also want to emphasise that you refuse treatment in the initial phase of senile
dementia, which is characterised by periods ofextreme confusion, interspersed with periods of
extreme lucidity, you can add: "In the event that I findmyself in the situation of the beginning of
senile dementia and also have a life-threatening physical condition, I refuse all further life-
sustaining treatment."
Example 2: Declaration of non-resuscitation.
One of the natural ways by which a lasting suffering can be ended is a cardiac arrest. A person to
whom this happens is unconscious immediately. Ifno immediate action is taken, the patient will
die within a short time, dying a fairly mild death. When a cardiac arrest occurs however, health
care teams would generally make attempts to resuscitate the patient as soon as possible. These can
take the form of heart massage, mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, or more sophisticated measures.
Resuscitation however is undesirable ifyou consider cardiac arrest as a relief or if in view of your
age or medical condition consider the chances of complete recovery after resuscitation to be very
small. Your doctor should be able to give you information about the eventual consequences of
resuscitation in your situation.
If you do not want resuscitation, you will have to talk this over in good time writh your doctor, your
family, social workers or those close to you. You will have to consider very carefully if your wish
for non-resuscitation applies to all circumstances. The following text, which also includes accident
and drowning, could be added to your living will for non-resuscitation, but should only be included
after discussion with your doctor: "I refuse all life-sustaining treatment in case I find myself in a
situation of unconsciousness caused by cardiac arrest, accident or drowning. I also refuse any
draining ofmy stomach."
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Example 3: Pregnancy waiver/non-waiver.
If you are a woman of child-bearing age, you may wish to consider whether your wishes about non
treatment should apply if you were carrying a viable foetus. You could then add one of the
following texts:
a) "This living will is to be temporarily overruled if I am pregnant and, to a reasonable degree
ofmedical certainty, the foetus may develop to the point of live birth."
OR
b) "My advance refusal of treatment, as stated in this document, is to be carried out even if I
am pregnant and carrying a viable foetus, and even if this means that the foetus will not develop to
the point of a live birth."
Example 4: Refusal of specific treatments.
If you have a condition such as aids or multiple sclerosis, where the prognosis involving incapacity
is known with some certainty, as are the available treatment options: you may wish to make
advance refusals ofspecific treatments, such as chemotherapy, where there is likely to be a choice
between benefits and burdens. If this is the case, suitable wording should be devised with your
doctor and added to your living will.
WHAT TO SAY TO YOUR DOCTOR
When you approach your doctor or medical consultant in order to lodge your living will in your
medical records, you may be unsure as to his or her reaction. If your doctor has not come across a
living will before, he or she may need some reassurance from you as to what it is. Bear the
following points in mind, or take a photocopy of the following paragraph with you:
(You could say...) "The purpose ofthe living will document is to mimimize the indignity or suffering
that might ensue in the event ofcertain irreversible conditions, and to spare doctors and relatives
the problem oftrying to make difficult decisions on my behalf. "
It does not ask the doctor or nurse to do anything contrary to existing law - in fact the law fully
upholds the right of any patient to decline treatment, including life-sustaining treatment, and to
receive analgesic drugs in quantities to relieve intolerable distress.
If the doctor has personal objections to accepting the document or making its existence known at
.such times as may be appropriate, then an alternative doctor should be recommended who may not
have the same reservations.
If at all possible, it is extremely desirable to discuss the living will with your doctor. Ask for the medical terms and
the implications of refusing treatment to be explained so that you fully understand what you are signing. This will
also mean that your doctor will be more fully aware of your wishes if he or she has to make difficult decisions at a
time when you are no longer able to speak for yourself.
If you still have further queries about your living will, you can send a large stamped
addressed envelope and small donation to VESS, 17 Hart St, Edinburgh EH1 3RN (UK)
requesting a LIVINGWILL INFORMATION PACK which provides further answers to
common questions, as well as guidance on some of the difficult areas of law and medical
ethics concerning such documents. Members of VESS can also obtain Living Will stickers for
medical files, a document carrying case, a medical alert card to carry in a wallet, and update
stickers to indicate that the document has been renewed every few years. Subscription to
VESS costs £15 per year (Overseas residents: £30) and includes a regular and comprehensive
newsletter, which keeps you informed of any changes in the law or practice of living wills.
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LIVING WILL Living Will - Friends Style (11 June 2004)
Important Notes To the maker of this Living Will To treating doctors
This is an important document. It is an
Advance Directive about how you wish to
be treated should you suffer a loss of
mental capacity to make decisions about
your future medical treatment. Please
complete it clearly. You should discuss
your Living Will with your doctor and with
those who are closest to you so they are
aware of your wishes.
This Living Will is the below named person's
Advance Directive which sets out his/her decision(s)
to accept/refuse certain forms of medical treatment
should he/she lose the capacity to consent, or lose the
ability effectively to communicate his/her consent to,
or refusal of, medical treatment.
This Living Will should be brought to the attention of
all treating clinicians and nurses.
This Living Will was signed at a time when the person
named below had the necessary capacity to consent to
or refuse the treatments here described.
Knowingly to treat the person named below contrary
to a clearly expressed advance refusal set out in this
Living Will is likely to be a criminal assault.
If you are in any doubt as to the binding nature of the
decisions set out in this Living Will you should seek
independent legal advice.
Living Wills are recognised as being legally
enforceable by:
the General Medical Council
the British Medical Association
the Royal College ofNursing
the Nursing and Midwifery Council
the Law Society ofEngland and Wales




am of sound mind and not suffering from any physical or mental condition which impairs my capacity to make the medical treatment
decision(s) set out in this document.
I have carefully considered how I would wish to be treated if through accident, illness, or injury I lose the capacity to consent to
medical treatment or the ability effectively to communicate my consent or refusal.
Imminently life threatening physical illness
from which there is little or no prospect of
recovery
I, name
(please tick the boxyou wish to apply)
□ (i) I wish to be kept alive for as long asreasonably possible and consent to all
appropriate medical treatment.
□ (ii) I refuse medical treatment aimed at
prolonging or artificially sustaining my
life. I consent only to medical treatment
whose aim is to keep me
comfortable and, so far as possible, free
from pain. I refuse all other medical
treatment.
declare that my medical treatment wishes are as
follows:
If I suffer from physical injury or illness which
in the opinion of two or more independent
doctors (one a consultant), is imminently life
threatening and from which there is less than a
ten per cent likelihood of recovery.
Examples of an imminently life threatening condition
are the last stages of MND, AIDS, extensive stroke,
severe head injury, or widespread cancer where the
incapacity is due to physical reasons. Please note this
list is not exhaustive and is for illustrative purposes
only.
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Very serious mental impairment with no
prospect of recovery together with a physical
need for life sustaining treatment
I, name




(i) I wish to be kept alive for as long as
reasonably possible and consent to all
appropriate medical treatment
(") I refuse medical treatment aimed at
prolonging or artificially sustaining my
life. I consent only to medical treatment
whose aim is to keep me comfortable, and
so far as possible, free from pain. I refuse
all other medical treatment.
declare that my medical treatment wishes are as
follows:
If my mental functions are very seriously
impaired, and (i) the impairment is so severe
that I do not understand what is happening to
me, and (ii) in the opinion of two independent
doctors (one a consultant), there is less than a
ten per cent likelihood of significant
improvement, and (iii) my physical condition is
such that medical treatment is required to keep
me alive:
Examples of a very serious mental impairment are
persistent vegetative state, very severe damage to the
nervous system, or Alzheimer's disease. Please note this
list is not exhaustive and isfor illustrative purposes only.
In respect of specific
treatment
I have been told that I have been diagnosed as
suffering from
I refuse the following specific treatments for my
condition
I have the following wishes about specific
medical treatment or investigations
(If necessary, a covering letter can be written by you to
expand on this section)
Refusal of treatment I, name I do not wish to suffer the loss of dignity which will be
caused if medical treatment is given to me to which I do
not consent.
have made a decision to refuse medical
treatment in the circumstances set out in this
Living Will.
I wish it to be understood by those treating me
(and others) that my refusal of medical
treatment in these circumstances is a considered
and careful decision made while I have the
capacity to consent to or refuse such treatment.
I am fully aware that one of the consequences
of my refusal to accept medical treatment in
these circumstances may be my death.
1 ask my medical attendants and any person consulted by
them to bear this statement in mind when considering
what my intentions would be in any uncertain situations.
I ask that any distressing symptoms caused by my refusal
of treatment shall be fully controlled by appropriate
palliative care, ordinary nursing care, analgesic and other
treatments, even if some of these treatments may have
the effect of shortening my life.
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Welfare Attorney
(In Scotland, all Welfare
Powers of Attorney must
be drawn up by a lawyer,
signed and witnessed as a
full legal document. You
may appoint an adult as
your Welfare Attorney to
act for you legally in all
decisions concerning
your health and welfare if
you become unable to
make decisions for
yourself)
The following person has been appointed my
Welfare Attorney to take part in discussions
about my medical care on my behalf if I am
unable to make my wishes known for myself. I
have discussed my views about my future
medical treatment with him/her and given
him/her a copy of this document. This person
is to be consulted about and involved in those
decisions by the health care team when
considering what my intentions would have
been in any uncertain situation. I require
anyone who is caring for me to respect the








In the event of my not having a Welfare
Attorney who is able to give instructions, or in
the event of that person not being available, I
have asked the following person to take part in
discussions about my medical care on my
behalf if 1 am unable to make my wishes known
for myself. I have discussed my views about
my future medical treatment with him/her and
given him/her a copy of this document. I
would like this person to be consulted about
and involved in those decisions by the health
care team when considering what my intentions
would have been in any uncertain situation. I
want anyone who is caring for me to respect the






Presence of relative or If my life is in imminent danger I wish the Name
friend following person to be contacted to give
him/her the chance to be with me. I accept that Address
it may not be possible to contact the person
named and for him/her to arrive in time
Daytime telephone number
Evening telephone number
GP details (optional) My General Practitioner is GP's declaration
I have discussed the matters contained in this Living Will
with
GP's address
I am satisfied that he/she has the capacity to make the
decisions contained in this document and satisfied that






In Scotland the Living
Will should be witnessed
by a witness who should
not be a relative, your
Welfare Attorney, your
Health Care Proxy or
anyone who stands to
gain from your death.
They should sign at the
same time as yourselfand
should then print their
name and address in the
spaces provided.
If this deed is granted in
or to be used in England
and Wales a second
witness is required. They
should sign at the same
time as yourself, and
write 'witness' after their
signature, and should
then print their name and











Full name of witness
Address ofwitness
Where to deposit your
completed Living Will
I have given copies of this Living Will to:
A










Name e.g. your local hospital
Address
Telephone number Telephone number
Review dates This Living Will was reviewed and confirmed












This document remains effective unless I have made it
clear above that my wishes have changed and that a new
version has superseded it.
Friends at the EndA
11 Westboume Gardens Glasgow G12 9XD
website: www.friends-at-the-end.org.uk
e-mail: info@friends-at-the-end.org.uk
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APPENDIX 3 EXAMPLES OF LIVING WILLS
LIVING WILL ALLOWING FOR REFUSAL OF UNWANTED TREATMENT
TO MY FAMILY, MY PHYSICIAN
AND MY SOLICITOR
This declaration is made by me, residing at
at a time when I am of sound mind and after careful consideration.
I, the said
in the event of my being unable to take part in decisions concerning my medical care due to my
physical or mental incapacity, and in the event that I develop one or more of the medical conditions
listed in clause (3) below and in the event that two independent physicians conclude that there is no
reasonable prospect ofmy making a substantial recovery, do hereby DECLARE that my wishes are
as follows, viz:-
(1) I request that my life should not be sustained by artificial means such as life support
systems, intravenous fluids and/or drugs or tube feeding.
(2) I request that distressing symptoms caused either by illness or by lack of food or fluid
should be controlled by appropriate sedative treatment, even though such treatment may
have the incidental and secondary effect of shortening my life.
(3) The said medical conditions are:-
1. Severe and lasting brain damage sustained as a result of an accident or injury.
2. Advanced disseminated malignant disease.
3. Advanced degenerative disease of the nervous and/or muscular systems with severe
limitations of independent mobility, and no satisfactory response to treatment.
4. Stroke with extensive persisting paralysis.
5. Pre-senile, senile or Alzheimer type dementia.
6. Other conditions of comparable gravity.
(4) I request that, in the event of my becoming incapable of giving or withholding consent to







such other person as may be deemed by the Court to be a fit person. It is my specific
request that in exercising his or her powers to consent or withhold consent on my behalf to
any medical treatment or procedures, my guardian shall take into account, in any
determination ofwhat is in my best interests, the requests which I solemnly make in clauses
(1) and (2) of this document.
And I declare that I hereby absolve my medical attendants of all legal liability arising from action
taken in response to and in terms of this declaration.
I reserve the right to revoke this declaration at any time, before a witness, in writing or orally.








(In Scotland only one witness is required)
I, of HEREBY APPOINT of as my Welfare Attorney in the event of
my being incapable by reason of mental disorder or inability to communicate because
of physical disability as defined in Section 1(6) of the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland)
Act 2000 to make decisions and arrangements about my physical welfare and well
being which I could have done myself and in particular but without prejudice to the
said generality decisions and arrangements regarding
• My accommodation
• Medical, dental and optical treatment
• Alternative and complementary medical treatments
• Home care and residential and nursing home care
• Respite care
• Attendance at day care centres, lunch clubs or similar
IN WITNESS WHEREOF these presents are executed as follows:
THEY ARE SUBSCRIBED by me the said at on the day of Two





This certificate is incorporated in the document subscribed by (the "granter") on
that confers a Welfare Power of Attorney on
I certify that:
I interviewed the granter on immediately before he subscribed this Welfare Power
of Attorney
AND
I am satisfied that, at the time this Welfare Power of Attorney was granted, the granter
understood its nature and extent.
I have satisfied myself of this:
(a) because of my own knowledge of the granter;
(b) because I have consulted the following persons, who have knowledge of the
granter on the matter:
2
(b) because I have consulted the following persons, who have knowledge of the
granter on the matter:
AND
I have no reason to believe that the granter was acting under undue influence or that
any other factor vitiates the granting of this Welfare Power of Attorney
Signature Date
Name
This is the Schedule containing Advance Statement referred to in the foregoing Power
of Attorney by in favour of
In the event that I develop one or more of the medical conditions listed in Clause 3
below and that two independent Medical Practitioners conclude that there is no
reasonable prospect of my recovering to be able to lead an independent existence
my wishes are as follows:-
1. I do not wish my life to be artificially prolonged or sustained by the use of life
support systems, intravenous fluids, intravenous drugs or tube feeding or
other treatment. I accept that the consequence of withholding treatment
could be premature death.
2. I understand that I cannot refuse treatment or care where this would be a risk
to the physical or mental well-being of others. Where treatment or care is
necessary I request I be given the minimum treatment or care to control my
symptoms. I fully accept that such treatment or care may have the effect of
shortening my life or causing premature death.
Without prejudice to the foregoing generality, I do not wish my life to be
continued or prolonged artificially by the application of medical or other
procedures, treatment with drugs or other remedies if I have one or more of
the conditions listed in Clause 3 below and two independent Medical
Practitioners conclude there is no reasonable prospect of my recovering to
lead an independent existence.
3. The conditions referred to above are:-
(i) Severe and lasting brain damage sustained as a result of accident,
injury or disease.
(ii) Advanced disseminated malignant disease.
(iii) Advanced degenerative disease of the nervous or muscular systems
which severely limits independent mobility and does not respond to
treatment.
3
(iv) Extensive persisting paralysis caused by a stroke, injurious accident or
otherwise
(v) Pre-senile, senile Alzheimer or other type of dementia.
(vi) Advanced HIV or other immuno deficiency
(vii) Other conditions of an equal or more severe gravity than the foregoing
conditions which prevent my being able to lead an independent existence.
4. My Welfare Attorney must be present at all discussions of my treatment and
welfare where decisions are made relating to my care and treatment. In
exercising his or her powers to consent or withhold consent on my behalf to
any medical treatment or procedures my Welfare Attorney shall strictly
construe my best interests in accordance with my wishes contained in this
advance statement. For the avoidance of doubt my best interests will be
served by respecting my autonomy and not artificially prolonging my life in
the situations herein anticipated.
5. Provided my wishes herein expressed, and the wishes expressed by my
Welfare Attorney, are followed I absolve my Medical Attendants of all legal
liability arising from professional treatment or care given or withheld in
accordance with this statement.
6. This statement may be revoked by me at any time, before witnesses, in
writing or orally:
Advance Directives from England
VES Living Will
The Voluntary Euthanasia Society (VES) supplies living wills throughout the UK.
They offer a pro-choice living will which is endorsed by Mo Mowlam MP. It costs
£15.00 for four forms, guidance notes and a medical emergency card. It is pro-choice
because it lets the person either refuse treatment or ask for life sustaining treatment.
The pro-choice Living Will informs medical staff how the person wishes to be
treated if he or she is no longer able to communicate his or her wishes to the medical
team. The VES states that,
with the pro-choice Living Will you decide what happens if you are seriously
ill with little chance of recovery. It makes sure it is not left to your next of kin
to make life and death decisions on your behalf (VES, 2004).
A copy of the information on pro-choice living wills is inserted.
An older version of the VES living will was available for downloading from their
website, a sample copy of this living will and instructions on how to complete it are
inserted.
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